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A B S T R A C T 
This t h e s i s i s an overall attempt to examine man and 
his environment i n Bahrain a f t e r the F i r s t World War and to 
define 9 i f possible, his strengths and weaknesses, h i s 
f a i l u r e s and successes i n meeting the demands of modern 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . 
Bahrain, although not possessing large o i l reserves, 
owes i t s existence as a modern state to the revenues of o i l 
which i t has enjoyed for a longer time than many of her 
neighbours. 
Therefore as a case study i t i s possible to examine the 
impacts of wealth, modernisation and education on th i s island 
community and the impulse given by these factors to the s o c i a l 
changes and p o l i t i c a l awareness between the F i r s t World War and 
the present day. 
In attempting to study the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l changes 
i n Bahrain we cannot ignore the two decades immediately prior 
to the o i l era, as during these years events occured which made 
future changes easier. Items such as the establishment of a 
modern administration and education and the fact that they were 
a r e l a t i v e l y stable community gave them the opportunity to 
observe and adopt further Western innovations, and as o i l 
revenues became available, enabled them to build on t h i s base 
and extend i t s s o c i a l services. 
The material benefits had their impact on the s o c i a l 
existence and p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the people and naturally enough 
th i s produced c e r t a i n stresses. 
These stresses were either of a personal or group nature 
or between the community and the i r changing environments. 
This work attempts to examine the development of 
t h i s community, the problems which arose and the impact they 
had upon a t r a d i t i o n a l society. 
As the B r i t i s h had, and probably s t i l l have, a voice 
i n the a f f a i r s of the Gulf, the work also t r i e s to examine 
the role they played i n Bahrain, and their triumphs and 
f a i l u r e s i n shaping the events with the islands. 
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P R E F A C E 
Between the years immediately following the F i r s t World 
War and the present day, Bahrain Society has witnessed many 
changes. This study has been undertaken to assess, measure 
and c r i t i c a l l y examine these changes, esp e c i a l l y i n the s o c i a l , 
economic and p o l i t i c a l spheres, which represent the central 
theme of t h i s work. 
As to the methods used to compile t h i s work, i t was 
decided to divide i t into four major sections dealing with the 
general background of Bahrain and i t s people, economic a c t i v i t i e s 
and s o c i a l problems, both old and new, the development of modern 
education and i t s impact on the society and the p o l i t i c a l trends 
and s t r i f e which occurred. 
Because the work involved Arabic sources, problems 
arose i n both translation and t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n of Arabic names 
and terms. I n the former I have attempted to translate as 
accurately as possible, in the l a t t e r I have attempted, as far 
as possible, to use the Durham University Oriental Section's 
Transcription System of Arabic, with the exception of the use of 
s e r i f s . Other departures from t h i s system have been made where 
common usage of ce r t a i n words, names and places has established 
a widely accepted form of spelling, i . e . Bahrain and "Bahrayn". 
At times there are only small differences i n the Arabic 
terms for certain singular or plural subjects, i . e . Sunni and 
Sunna, which have been used as appropriate. 
Within the bibliography however the names of authors, 
t i t l e s of books and a r t i c l e s which are i n Arabic have been 
modelled on the Oriental Section system. 
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The c i t i n g of references, especially the documents 
obtained from the India Office Records, B l a c k f r i a r s Road, 
London, and those of the Foreign Office, from the Public 
Records Office, Chancery Lane, London have been l i s t e d i n 
d e t a i l i n the bibliography. A c e r t a i n method of reference 
was used i n the footnotes due to the differences i n the 
f i l e s . 
Those of the India Office were retained i n f i l e s 
bearing a t i t l e of the general subject matter of the f i l e . 
Some of the t i t l e s however were misleading as they often contained 
incomplete or irrelevant information. 
The Foreign Office f i l e s on the other hand bore no 
t i t l e s and items concerning Bahrain were widely scattered 
throughout the f i l e s and were referred to by document numbers only. 
Because of this and also the fact that a single despatch, 
memorandum or l e t t e r i s sometimes repeated i n different f i l e s , 
I chose to refer to the actual document which I was quoting 
from or ref e r r i n g to whilst studying the India Office f i l e s . 
When referring to Foreign Office f i l e s I quoted the 
reference number and the t i t l e of the document, i f any, prefixed 
by the l e t t e r s F.O. 
During the preparation of t h i s thesis I have consulted 
with, interviewed and contacted many people who have provided 
invaluable assistance i n my work, i n England, Beirut, Kuwait and 
Bahrain. To these people I extend my deep thanks and gratitude. 
I would also take t h i s opportunity to express my sincere 
gratitude to my supervisors, S i r John Richmond and Dr. William Hale, 
who throughout the work gave guidance and advice, and devoted a 
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great deal of their time to reading and commenting upon t h i s 
work and making many valuable suggestions. 
To those who helped by offering their time i n answering my 
questions, often persistent, or those who took the trouble to 
write, es p e c i a l l y the la t e Mr. Al-Baker, Sir Bernard Burrows, 
Mr. C.A. Gault, Mr„ A. Al-Shamlan, Mr. S. Al-Dawsari, Shaikh 
A. Al-Khalifah, Mr. M. Al-Ansari, and others who at their own 
request wish to remain anonymous, my sincere gratitude. 
Tx> the staff and l i b r a r i a n s of the India Office Records, 
Public Records Office, the Middle East Centre of Cambridge, 
the Middle East Centre of Oxford, who allowed me access to the 
private papers of S i r Rupert Hay and Major H.R.P. D i c k s o r i s x h e 
School of Oriental Studies and the Science Library s t a f f of Durham 
University, my thanks. 
My thanks go also to Dr. Lawless of the Middle East Centre 
of Durham University, who read the text, and to Dr. J . Bharier, 
of the Economics Dept. of Durham University, who read 
and commented on the economic part of t h i s work. 
Without the generous grant from Kuwait University, t h i s 
work would probably never have seen the light of day and therefore 
to those who made i t possible I express my gratitude. 
I thank also my wife, Ghanimah, who by her tolerance, devotion 
and understanding, made my work more pleasant and my stay i n t h i s 
country more productive. 
I f e e l that I should mention that the ideas and comments 
expressed throughout the work are mine and I am solely responsible 
for them and i f anyone f e e l s that any facts or events have been 
misrepresented, I would be grateful i f they would contact me and 
correct any wrong impressions I may have gained. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Bahrain i s an Arabian Gulf State* situated approximately 
half-way along the western coastline of the Gulf 9 approximately 
18 miles from Qatar and 20 miles from Saudi Arabia. I t i s a 
group of islands, eleven i n number, which has a t o t a l land area 
of 256 square miles. The three main islands are "Bahrain" 
i t s e l f j the largest island, which gives i t s name to the group, 
Muharraq, which l i e s to the north east of the main island and i s 
linked to i t by a causeway, and S i t r a which l i e s off the east 
coast. The main island i s approximately 30 miles long and from 
2 
8 to 10 miles wide. The c a p i t a l , Manama, i s situated on the 
north east t i p of the island of "Bahrain", opposite to i t s twin 
c i t y of "Muharraq" across the causeway. 
The t o t a l population i n 1971 was established as being 
3 
216,303, making i t the largest p r i n c i p a l i t y i n the lower Gulf 
area. They are spread amongst s i x t y - f i v e centres of population, 
most of which are linked by well-surfaced asphalt roads. 
About ten percent of the land area i s cultivated, almost 
exclusively in the northern parts of the main island. Crops are i n 
the main dates, a l f a l f a and some vegetables. R a i n f a l l i s scanty, 
the yearly average being only 75 mm. 
Studying the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l changes i n Bahrain would 
not be complete without studying the economical a c t i v i t i e s of the 
population and how these have developed and helped to transform 
the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l trends i n the islands. 
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In undertaking t h i s study the writer f e e l s that a general 
comparison could be drawn between Bahrain and other Gulf 
p r i n c i p a l i t i e s as they have a number of factors which are common 
to a l l these areas. These are the h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l 
backgrounds, the governmental methods, namely a hereditary 
system of^feuda? aspect, and above a l l sharing a change i n their 
economic structures, having moved very rapidly i n the course of a 
few years from a society based on agriculture, f i s h i n g and pearl-
diving to one based on the modern technologies of o i l production.^ 
Another common aspect was the treaty relationships which a l l of these 
states had with B r i t a i n , who made hers e l f responsible for the 
s t a b i l i t y of the area for most of the 19th century and almost 
three-quarters of the 20th century 
Therefore, the writer fee l s that i n selecting Bahrain as a 
case study, although i t has i t s p e c u l i a r i t i e s and differences, i t 
may i n general be treated as an example of the development of 
simi l a r t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s i n the area, especially i n the 
so c i a l and p o l i t i c a l aspects. Economically the impact has 
varied owing to the different outputs and reserves of o i l of the 
various states. 
This case study of Bahrain deals with the most important 
period i n the modern history of the Amirates, from the period 
following the F i r s t World War up to 1971, the year of B r i t i s h 
withdrawal from the area and the declaration of independence of 
the i s l a n d s . 
In t h i s period of f i f t y years or so the area as a whole, 
and Bahrain i n p a r t i c u l a r , has witnessed great s o c i a l and economic 
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changes which have brought i n th e i r wake a cer t a i n measure of 
p o l i t i c a l change. 
At times the writer has referred to events which occurred 
outside t h i s self-imposed period. This has been done either to 
c l a r i f y c e r t a i n points referred to or to complete the ov e r a l l 
picture of modern events. 
One j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the selection of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
period for study i s that i t was immediately af t e r the F i r s t World 
War that a form of modern administration was f i r s t introduced 
and a modern system of education established. 
There i s , however, a further j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n that despite 
the importance and the impact of s o c i a l and economic development 
with t h e i r consequences of increased p o l i t i c a l awareness, no-one 
has yet examined and analysed c r i t i c a l l y and thoroughly t h i s 
important period. 
So many aspects of Bahrain history, especially a f t e r the 
Great War, have not yet been revealed, and discussed, and the very 
b r i e f allusions to Bahrain made by various writers have often been 
inaccurate and th e i r mistakes have been perpetuated by subsequent 
w r i t e r s M a n y books and a r t i c l e s have been written on most parts 
of the Arab world, dealing i n depth with the i r problems and 
development, but one curious omission seems to be on the area of 
the lower Gulf states of which we have selected Bahrain to be a 
microstudy of the developments i n t h i s corner of the Arab world. 
During our studies we w i l l repeatedly refer to the four 
main r u l e r s of Bahrain during t h i s period and to est a b l i s h them 
firmly i n the readers' mind and to prevent any confusion we w i l l 
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take the opportunity at t h i s point to name them and to give their 
periods of r u l e . They were Shaikh I s a bin A l i , who ruled from 
1869 to 1923 s Shaikh Hamed bin I s a 9 r u l e r from 1923 to 1942s, 
Shaikh Salman bin Hamed, r u l e r from 1942 to 1961, and the present 
r u l e r of Bahrain, Shaikh I s a bin Salman, who has ruled from 19S1 
to the present day. 
The study consists of four main parts. 
In Part I we w i l l e s t a b l i s h b r i e f l y the background to the 
modern history of Bahrain and also discuss the demographic 
structure, the various s o c i a l groups and some problems a r i s i n g 
from thei r differences which have influenced the course of 
events. 
Part I I examines i n d e t a i l both t r a d i t i o n a l and modern 
industries and t h e i r economic and so c i a l impacts on the society. 
Due to the importance of modern education i n i n i t i a t i n g 
s o c i a l change the writer has devoted Part I I I of h i s work to 
dealing with i t s development, structure, aims and impact. 
Part IV deals i n some d e t a i l with the p o l i t i c a l changes 
and c o n f l i c t s which occurred during the period under review 
and attempts to analyse and establish the causes and effects 
of these events and to chart the progress of the growth and trends 
of p o l i t i c a l consciousness within the island group. 
The study has i t s limitations of course. The writ e r , whilst 
r e f e r r i n g to the development of the administration structure 
b r i e f l y , has not dealt with the d e t a i l s of any departmental 
structures and has i n some cases, such as Health or Housing, has 
consciously omitted references to them, i n spite of the fact 
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that they do play an important role i n the social spheres of the 
islands. This was done because i t was f e l t that provision of 
these services was subsidiary to the mainstream of changes i n 
the social patterns, and did not d i r e c t l y influence or i n i t i a t e 
the social, economic or p o l i t i c a l scene. 
During the preparation of t h i s study the w r i t e r v i s i t e d 
Bahrain twice to col l e c t material and interview persons connected 
with the events referred t o . This was i n addition to the writer's 
previous close knowledge of the island and i t s people. The 
major sources of information, however, were the Foreign Office 
and India Office records i n London which contained a large amount 
of information w r i t t e n by B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s about Bahrain and the 
surrounding areas. Some of the records made available were as 
recent as 1950. These l e t t e r s , despatches and memoranda, although 
they contain valuable f i r s t hand information, should not be 
treated as i n f a l l i b l e sources, as minor errors are often found 
i n the minutiae. 
The Government of Bahrain o f f i c i a l publications, especially 
the Annual Reports and the S t a t i s t i c a l Information, were major 
references, and i n addition a number of previously unpublished 
reports of the Government and the Bahrain Petroleum Company have been 
referred t o . 
Other valuable sources of information were private papers 
and l e t t e r s which were made available to the w r i t e r . Those of 
former B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s were consulted as far as possible, depending 
upon t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y , also the private l e t t e r s of some Bahrainis 
who were involved i n the various a f f a i r s of the island were made 
available to the w r i t e r . 
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In addition the wr i t e r also corresponded with or 
interviewed persons who took part i n the events of the p o l i t i c a l 
unrest i n the islands which are referred to during the period 
under review. Some of H.M.G. o f f i c i a l s i n Bahrain during the 1950's 
also consented to be interviewed. 
A number of b u l l e t i n s and unpublished studies have been 
referred to when appropriate. 
As the wr i t e r has attempted to present a case study, no 
attempt was made to f i t the facts to any preconceived p o l i t i c a l or 
social theories which could have been applied. The theoretical 
approach $a the study was derived i n the main from the facts 
as found and corresponded with the events as they occurred. I t 
i s hoped that the study w i l l i l l u s t r a t e and pinpoint the events 
and trends which have occurred and to enable us to attempt to 
forecast the course of future p o l i t i c a l and social developments 
i n t h i s part of the world. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Most of the European writers refer to t h i s part of the world as 
the "Persian Gulf". The term "Arabian Gulf", however i s increasing 
i n i t s usage and the w r i t e r w i l l use the l a t t e r term unless quoting 
from documentso For j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s usage see Al Baharan 
"The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States" - Manchester University 
Pressj 1968 - Introduction. 
2. Belgrave, J.H. - "Welcome to Bahrain" - 7th Edition - Bahrain, 
19709 p.7. (See also the map pg. 8) 
3. F i f t h Population Census of Bahrain, Govt, of Bahrain, Sept. 1971 
p.5. I t should be noted that the figures used from the 1971 Census 
are provisional figures from which the w r i t e r has derived a l l other 
figures for 1971. These may be subject to change on completion of 
the f i n a l Census report. 
4. The production of o i l started i n Bahrain i n 1934, i n Kuwait 1946, 
Qatar 1949, and Abu Dabi, 1962.9 O i l has been found recently i n other 
Gulf p r i n c i p a l i t i e s but not on the same scale as i n the above 
countries, nor has there yet been s u f f i c i e n t time for revenues to 
make an impact upon the l i f e of these states. 
5. For the background to B r i t i s h relationships and tr e a t i e s i n the 
Gulf, see the major works of Aitchison, .•'C.U. - "A Collection of 
Treaties, Engagements and Sanads r e l a t i n g to India and Neighbouring 
Countries", Vol. Govt, of India Delhi 1933. Lorimer, J.G. ~ 
"Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia" - Calcutta, 
Supt. of Govt. P r i n t i n g , India, Geographical part, 1908, H i s t o r i c a l 
part 1915, reprinted and published i n 1970 by Gregg International 
Publishers Ltd. Kelly, J.B., " B r i t a i n and the Persian Gulf, 1795° 
1880" - Oxford Univ. Press 1968s, Wilson, Sir Arnold - "The Persian 
Gulf", 3rd impression London, 1959, and Busch, Briton, C, " B r i t a i n 
and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914" - Univ. of California Press 1967. 
6. An example of the perpetuation of mistakes i s the misconception 
that education started i n 1919 and also that i n that year there was 
a p o l i t i c a l upheaval. The w r i t e r has i n fact been unable to 
substantiate either of these widely held claims. This i s but one 
example of t h i s type of error. 
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HISTORICAL BCKGRQllD 
The modern history of Bahrain may be said to have started 
with coming of the Utub to the island i n 1782.* One of the utub 
tri b e s which crossed the sea from t h e i r mainland headquarters i n 
Zubara was the Al-Khalifah who have ruled Bahrain since that time. 
The common feature of the p o l i t i c a l scene up to t h i s time 
2 
i n the Gulf had been the balance of power between " c i t y - s t a t e s " 
which rose and f e l l regularly as one or other t r i b e gained 
ascendancy and i n t h i s case i t appeared the Zubara was such a 
c i t y - s t a t e i n i t s infancy. 
A change took place however which struck at the basis of 
t h i s type of state and which forced the Rulers of Bahrain and 
elsewhere to ha l t t h e i r expansionist plans and turn to the 
defensive to maintain t h e i r independence. This was done sometimes 
by actual c o n f l i c t and sometimes by playing p o l i t i c s , tasks which 
often proved hard and unpleasant. 
The reason for t h i s s h i f t of power on the p o l i t i c a l scene i n 
the Gulf was the growing strength of a new p o l i t i c o - r e l i g i o u s 
power i n the centre of Arabia, namely the Muwahhidm commonly called 
the Wahhabi. 
We have every reason to believe that i t was the growth of 
t h i s new power which drove the Al Khalifah and t h e i r a l l i e s to 
invade Bahrain which, besides i t s appealing wealth, gave the 
Al Khalifah the chance to defect to an area free from the Wahhabi, 
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who were at that time - the l a s t quarter of the 18th century -
pressing on the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula. As 
3 
early as 1762 Abd al-Aziz, the Hahhabi Amir, raided Al Hasa 
which was uhder the Bani Khalid t r i b e s , with whom Al-Khalifah 
were a l l i e d . 
The Wahhabi and Al-Khalifah i n Zubara were not by any 
means on good terms, according to an A l Khalifah h i s t o r i a n w r i t i n g 
4 
i n the f i r s t quarter of t h i s century. Their fear of the Wahhabi 
proved to be well-founded, f o r the Wahhabi eventually clashed 
with the Utub state i n Kuwait i n 1793 and followed t h i s with an 
attack on Zubara i n 1795. On t h i s occasion the Wahhabi cut o f f 
the town on the landward side and forced the Al-Khalifah and the 
inhabitants of Zubara to abdicate i t and f l e e to Bahrain, where 
they had by now a strong foothold."* 
I n fact the Wahhabi power which dominated the eastern part 
of Arabia prevented the Al-Khalifah from building up t h e i r state 
i n Zubara to become strong enough to assume the role of a c i t y -
state i n the Gulf. A l l the evidence suggests that they would have 
done so had i t not been for the power of the Wahhabi. For instance, 
w i t h i n a few years of t h e i r settlement i n Zubara, the Al-Khalifah 
6 
had succeeded i n making t h e i r c i t y a centre of trade i n the Gulf, 
Of 
and the taking/Bahrain, t r a d i t i o n a l l y the f i r s t v i c t i m of any 
ambitious c i t y - s t a t e , provided further proof of t h e i r expansionist 
aims. However, the pressing power of the Wahhabi obliged the 
Al-Khalifah to entrench themselves i n Bahrain with the object of 
r e s i s t i n g a l l future takeover attempts on t h i s t h e i r new 
stronghold which because of i t s wealth and position was so often 
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threatened. The threats to Bahrain's independence during i t s 
modern history e r3 which were to play an important part i n 
Bahrain's development were three i n number. They were the 
continuation of the t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n the 
Al-Khalifah family and t h e i r a l l i e s , the continuous foreign 
attempts at annexation of the island, mainly by the Persians 
and Turks, and the growth of B r i t i s h power and influence i n 
the Gulf during the 19th century. 
a) The Tr i b a l Conflicts 
The a r r i v a l of Al-Khalifah and t h e i r Arab a l l i e s i n 
Bahrain 8 which was a comparatively settled community, created 
i t s own problems. I t d i f f e r e d very much from the conditions 
they were accustomed to i n the desert, and having been forced 
to evacuate t h e i r headquarters i n Zubara i t brought an end 
to t h e i r ambitions of expansion. They had to adopt a new way 
of l i f e very d i f f e r e n t from the freedoms of the mainland. 
Their t r i b a l origins prevented them from working on the land as 
farmers, something which was completely unacceptable to the 
desert Arab, so they were forced to go into commerce. As Manesty 
and Jones stated i n 1790^ "The acquisition of Bahrain has 
l a t t e r l y , however, encouraged the Arabs of the t r i b e of Beneattaba, 
who inhabit that Island, to purchase vessels proper to perform 
voyages from thence to India and to employ them i n such voyages, 
they have been thereby enabled to convey Pearl i n a di r e c t 
manner to Surat." 
They coped well with t h e i r changing pattern of l i f e but one 
thing they did not manage to change was the constant bickering and 
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disputes between the various factions w i t h i n the r u l i n g family, 
who a l l i e d themselves with one or another of t h e i r a l l i e d 
t r i b e s , or foreign powers. After the conquest of Bahrain, 
the Al-Khalifah adopted a system of dual rulership; the father 
being assisted during his l i f e t i m e by two of his sons and on 
his death the two sons continued with t h e i r duties and shared a l l 
authority. Sometimes the grandsons were also called upon to 
perform various functions of the r u l e r . This system was used 
frequently i n Bahrain u n t i l the accession of Shaikh Isa i n 1869, 
g 
s t a r t i n g from the death of Shaikh Ahmed bin Mohammed a l Khalifah, 
9 
who was known as Al-Fatih, i n Manama i n 1796. He was succeeded 
by his two sons Salman (1769-1825) and Abdulla (1769-1843) who 
ruled Bahrain j o i n t l y . 
As soon as Salman died however, Abdulla t r i e d to enforce 
his desire of being absolute r u l e r of Bahrain. This provoked a 
bloody c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the r u l i n g family i t s e l f . The consequences 
of Abdulla's a t t i t u d e did not only influence the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n 
i n Bahrain, but i t also placed a great s t r a i n on the people and the 
economy. Lorimer, quoting Captain Macleod, the B r i t i s h Resident 
i n Bushire, reporting on his v i s i t to Bahrain i n 1823 said, 
"The authority of the Shaikhs of Bahrain i n t h e i r own 
dominions did not appear to be so absolute as might 
have been expected", 
and that i t was 
"borne with much reluctance by the inhabitants of 
the I s l a n d s . " 1 0 
Referring t o f s t a t e of the economy at t h i s time (1836=38) Lorimer 
remarks, 
"The l o t of the Shaikh's (Abdulla) subjects i n Bahrain 
was growing, from day to day, less endurable, and the 
Islands were being rapidly depopulated by emigration. 
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The towns were i n a state of r u i n and decay, 
and house rents had f a l l e n to one-eighth of 
what they had been only a few years before. 
Six sons of the Shaikh pretended to 
exercise separate and independent power, 
and t h e i r attention was c h i e f l y devoted to 
extracting money from merchants and other 
men of means." 
The deportation of Abdulla i n 1843, by his great nephew, 
Mohammed bin Khalifah bin Salman, did not conclude the a f f a i r . 
Abdulla, and l a t e r his sons and grandsons, continued to be a 
disruptive element i n the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of Bahrain. The 
other Arab tribes were changing allegiances, between the sons 
of Salman and the sons of Abdulla. This was clearl y i l l u s t r a t e d 
by the conduct of theAl Bin A l i and Al-Bu Aynain tribes who at 
f i r s t aided Mohammed i n the task of ridding Bahrain of his 
great-uncle, Abdulla, i n 1843. However, no sooner had t h i s bw**" 
achieved than they a l l i e d themselves to Abdulla, and l a t e r t h i s 
12 
sons, against t h e i r old a l l i e s . 
As the struggle between the r i v a l factions of the 
Al-Khalifah family became more bitter,, the more rapidly did 
Bahrain lose i t s p o l i t i c a l independence, and the more the 
people of Bahrain suffered. 
The c o n f l i c t came to i t s climax i n 1869, when the two 
branches f e l l to war again, everyone with his a l l i e s . A b a t t l e 
took place i n Muharraq between the two. The B r i t i s h Authority by 
t h i s time judged the s i t u a t i o n intolerable and decided that t h i s 
was an opportune moment to intervene; they deported the two r i v a l s 
Mohammed bin Abdulla and Mohammed bin Khalifah, and put i n o f f i c e 
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Sheikh Isa bin A l i , a great nephew of Mohammed bin Khalifah, 
13 
who was only 21 years of age. Shaikh Isa went on to ru l e 
Bahrain for a t o t a l of 54 years u n t i l he was forced to 
abdicate i n 1923 when power passed to his son 9 Hamed.*"^  
With the coming to power of Isa and the deportation of his 
r i v a l s there was a general improvement i n the i n t e r n a l 
relationships w i t h i n the family but the t r i b a l c o n f l i c t s continued 
to arise from time to time, due usually to the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
sons and grandsons of the exiled Shaikh Mohammed bi h Abdulla 
and t h e i r adherents, i n ah attempt to unsettle the r u l e i n 
Bahrain. 
b) Foreign Attempts at Annexation 
The second factor which affected the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n 
throughout the 19th century and up to World War I was the continued 
attempts at annexation by other powers, both Arab and foreign. The 
Arab powers were the Wahhabi and Omanis and the foreign power 
was Persia. The Arab attempts were generally short term i n effect 
and did not influence the shaping of Bahrain's p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s 
to any great extent, but the continued claims of the Persians to 
sovereignty over Bahrain, w h i l s t i t did not d i r e c t l y a f f e c t the 
int e r n a l p o l i t i c s of the islands, often proved to be an 
embarrasment to the conduct of Bahrain's foreign a f f a i r s 
The Omanis attempted to take the island on three occasions, 
1800, 1816 and 1828 1 5 but only succeeded i n one of these attempts. 
When the Omanis conquered Bahrain i n 1800 the Al-Khalifah a l l i e d 
themselves with the Wahhabi and succeeded i n expelling the 
invaders i n 1802, The Wahhabi, however, took advantage of the 
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si t u a t i o n to extend t h e i r dominion and establish a foothold 
i n Bahrain, a s i t u a t i o n which lasted u n t i l 1811 when the 
Al-Khalifah saw the opportunity to r i d themselves of the 
Wahhabi. The f i r s t Egyptian expedition into Arabia, under 
16 
Tusun Bey, was attacking the Wahhabi on the mainland thus 
weakening t h e i r hold on the island. The Al-Khalifah took t h e i r 
opportunity, a l l i e d themselves with t h e i r old enemies, the 
Omanis, and expelled the Wahhabi garrison from the island and 
imprisoned the governor.*^ This move was t y p i c a l of 
Al-Khalifah policy, maintaining t h e i r own rule by playing o f f one 
force against another when confronted by threats of takeover 
i n Bahrain. 
In 1816, when the Al-Khalifah were again faced by another 
18 
Omani invasion, they and t h e i r a l l i e s assembled a formidable 
lo c a l force i n the islands which was remarked upon by Capt. 
William Bruce on his f i r s t v i s i t to the island " as he 
(the Shaikh of Bahrain) was f u l l y prepared to receive His Highness 
(the r u l e r of Oman) with any force he could bring; that he had 
19 
7,000 men at present under arms." 
These attempted takeovers by the Omanis came to an end 
i n 1829, when a peace treaty was signed between the two parties 
a f t e r long talks and mediation by the Shaikh of Bushire. 
The role of the Wahhabi, a f t e r t h e i r expulsion from Bahrain 
i n 1811, was generally confined to backing the claims of Abdulla"s 
sons and grandsons, or i n s t i g a t i n g unrest i n Bahrain by causing 
the t r ibes to make trouble and thus disrupt the administration 
of the islands. This may have been a desire to revenge themselves 
on the Al-Khalifah or more l i k e l y i n order to obtain the Zakat, 
or t r i b u t e , which they claimed should be paid to them by the 
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Shaikh of Bahrain. This s i t u a t i o n reoccurred on occasions 
20 
u n t i l the Turkish occupation of the Hasa i n 1871. 
The threat from Persia however, was the most consistent 
and long-lasting and, as i t was argued i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , the 
most serious, even though the claim was never backed by 
m i l i t a r y force. Although the Persian claim had a great effect 
on the foreign policy of Bahrain i t had very l i t t l e d i r e c t 
effect on in t e r n a l p o l i t i c s and despite the long standing of 
th e i r cliam there was no serious f r i c t i o n between the inhabitants 
of Bahrain (Sunna and Shia) and the siaeable number of Persian 
residents on the island. 
The Persians claimed that Bahrain had been part of her 
• 21 
t e r r i t o r y since 1602, and that Bahrain was ceded to the 
Al-Khalifah only on condition that they paid a t r i b u t e to the 
22 
Shah of Persia. 
Events occured i n the 19th century which made t h e i r claim 
more and more persistent. The f i r s t was the negotiations by 
Capt. Bruce leading to the so-called "Treaty of Shiraz", and the 
second was the w r i t i n g of l e t t e r s by Mohammed bin Khalifa to the 
Shah of Persia and the Governor of Fars which the Persians 
claimed, admitted t h e i r r i g h t to sovereignty over Bahrain. 
Whilst the terms of the treaty i n r e l a t i o n to Bahrain were 
23 
quite specific, the treaty was never r a t i f i e d by either B r i t a i n 
or Persia and thus i t was argued that i t had no legal standing. 
The most probable reason for the B r i t i s h condemnation of the Treaty 
was the fact that Bruce had agreed to supply ships to the 
Governor of Fars, should he ask for them. For his part i n the 
a f f a i r Bruce was dismissed from his post and ordered to return 
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to India. 
Despite the r e j e c t i o n of the Treaty by the two authorities 
at the time of signing, the Persians l a t e r often quoted t h i s 
agreement as proof of B r i t i s h recognition of Persia's claim to 
Bahrain. 
The a f f a i r of the l e t t e r s took place i n 1860, when on the 
9th and 11th A p r i l , Mohammed bin Khalifa wrote two l e t t e r s to the 
Governor of Fars and the Shah of Persia respectively, i n which 
Mohammed acknowledged that Bahrain and i t s inhabitants were 
"always under the protection of Persia", and agreed to pay t r i b u t e 
to the Persians. 
This move by Mohammed was interpreted by Persian historians 
as indisputable evidence i n support of the i r claim and so i t 
appears to be on the surface, u n t i l one considers Mohammed's 
motives and the circumstances surrounding the events which took 
place. 
At the time the l e t t e r s were w r i t t e n the Wahhabis were 
once again threatening the security of the Al-Khalifah i n Bahrain 
by promoting the interests of the exiled claimants to Bahrain, the 
rela t i v e s of Abdulla, and Mohammed was following the usual 
Al-Khalifah policy of playing o f f one power against another i n 
order to gain security f o r himself. As i s proved, Mohammed did 
not hesitate to pay t r i b u t e to anyone i f he believed t h i s would 
give him the upper hand against his enemies. At various times 
Al-Khalifah paid t r i b u t e to the Wahhabi, Egyptians and Muscat. 
I n fact Mohhamed had w r i t t e n not only to the Persians but to the 
Turks also of f e r i n g them the same terms, t r i b u t e i n return for 
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protection. The Persians had been the f i r s t to reply to his 
l e t t e r and Mohammed made his alleged submission to thems but 
t h i s however was very short-lived for no sooner had he a l l i e d 
himself to the Persians than the Turks r e p l i e d , o f f e r i n g him 
more favourable terms, so he immediately declared himself 
a subject of Turkey and agreed to pay t r i b u t e to the Pasha 
25 
of Baghdad. 
Thus i t i s clear that Mohammed was not at that time admitting 
to an h i s t o r i c a l submission by Bahrain to Persia, but merely 
searching for the power who would give him the most favourable 
terms for p r o t e c t i o n . ^ 
However the Persian claims to Bahrain continued to arise 
from time to time but usually only on those occasions when an 
opportunity presented i t s e l f , such as, whenever Bahrain concluded 
any t r e a t i e s with other powers or at other times i n order to 
di s t r a c t a ttention from in t e r n a l pressures which were occurring 
i n Persia i t s e l f , or occasionally when there was an upheaval i n 
27 
the internal p o l i t i c s of Bahrain, 
The Persians never at any time backed t h e i r claims by 
m i l i t a r y action and apart from minor protests by Persia on a few 
occasions, the only major protest during the years from the 1860's 
u n t i l 1927 was one which was made on 19th November 1868 when a 
m i l i t a r y operation was carried out by the B r i t i s h against 
Bahrain by the B r i t i s h Resident i n the Gulf, L t . Col, Lewis Pelly. 
The protest i n 1927 took the form of a note which was 
handed to the B r i t i s h Government on 22nd November 1927, protesting 
about a r t i c l e 6 of the Jiddah Treaty which had been signed i n 
May 1927 by B r i t a i n and Saudi Arabia, i n which the l a t t e r undertook 
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28 to maintain peaceful relations with Kuwait and Bahrain, A copy 
of t h i s protest was sent to the Secretary General of the League 
of Nations, but no action was ever taken upon i t . 
I n answer to t h i s protest the Bahrain Government 
introduced a regulation demanding a visa from a l l Persian subjects 
30 
v i s i t i n g Bahrain, a requirement which was never before necessary. 
Another protest from Persia was received by the B r i t i s h 
Government on 23rd June 1930 a f t e r the granting of o i l concessions 
i n Bahrain. This was followed by another to the American Department 
31 
of State. Both protests were rejected by the authorities concerned, 
but t h i s did not diminish the claim of the Persians. Support for 
Bahrain however was forthcoming from other countries, and on 
11th December 1954, the Arab League, meeting i n Cairo, passed a 
32 
resolution declaring that Bahrain was an Arab country, not Persian. 
This was reaffirmed by the League on 13th November, 1957 af t e r they 
heard rumours of Persia's next move i n the a f f a i r . 
These rumours proved to be true when, i n 1958, the Anglo-
over Bahrain 
Iranian controversy/reached i t s climax with a declaration by the 
Iranian Government that Bahrain was considered to be the fourteenth 
province of Iran and that as such Bahrain would be e n t i t l e d to two 
33 
seats i n the Iranian Parliament. I n addition to t h i s , Iran 
refused to recognise passports issued by the Bahrain a u t h o r i t i e s , 
and instead, insisted on providing Bahraini v i s i t o r s to Iran with 
Iranian t r a v e l permits, but only a f t e r they had signed a declaration 
34 
to the effe c t that they were of Iranian n a t i o n a l i t y . 
However the p o s s i b i l i t y of a settlement of the a f f a i r 
occurred when the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n the Gulf was changed by 
the B r i t i s h announcement on 17th January 1968 of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to 
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withdraw t h e i r troops from the area by the end of 1971. After 
b i t t e r negotiations, which were contributed to not only by the 
local powers concerned, but also by international powers including 
the U.S.A. and Great B r i t a i n , Iran f i n a l l y agreed i n 1970 to accept 
the setting up of an independent one-man commission, to be 
appointed by the United Nations, and to abide by the commission's 
findings. With the consent of a l l the parties concerned the 
Secretary-General appointed Mr. Winspeare Guiccardi as his special 
representative with the terms of reference that he should ascertain 
the wishes of the people of Bahrain with respect to the future status 
of the island. I n A p r i l 1970 he v i s i t e d the island and consulted 
with a large number of public personalities, who represented a l l 
points of view. I n his report, which was submitted to the U.N. 
i n l a t e A p r i l and formally endorsed by the Security Council on 
11th May 1970, he stated ..... "The majority of the Bahrain people 
favoured recognition by these states as independent and free to 
35 
maintain her own relationships with other states". 
Between 19th and 24th December, Shaikh Isa, the Ruler of 
Bahrain, paid the f i r s t o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Teheran, ca p i t a l of I r a n , 
thus s t a r t i n g a new era of relationships between the two states. 
Although the Iranian Press welcomed the v i s i t , no o f f i c i a l 
communique was issued, perhaps implying that Iran i s reserving 
her position for future moves. 
What must be emphasized however, i s t h a t , contrary to the 
36 
claims of Iranian w r i t e r s , the claim of sovereignty over Bahrain 
never at any time had any s i g n i f i c a n t effect on the i n t e r n a l 
p o l i t i c s of the island but that the people of Bahrain shaped 
37 
events i n the island by t h e i r own e f f o r t s . 
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A comment by a B r i t i s h w r i t e r with regard to t h i s i s 
worth quoting, he said ...... "Howevers the recent p o l i t i c a l 
upheaval i n Bahrain was not due by any means to Ira n , the 
very mention of whose name the Arabs hate to hear i n connection 
38 
with t h e i r Gulf." The foreign powers who did exercise some 
influence over the course of events i n the Gulf were the B r i t i s h 
and the Turks. Of the two 9 the B r i t i s h undoubtedly had the 
greater effect so i t naturally follows that we must consider the 
role that they played. 
c) The Growth of B r i t i s h Influence 
I t has been suggested that the dire c t p o l i t i c a l involvement 
of the B r i t i s h i n the Arabian Gulf did not take place u n t i l :the 
l a t e years of the 18th century although they had been long-
established as a commercial power i n the area. The reason f o r 
t h e i r involvement was the Anglo-French r i v a l r y for supremacy i n 
39 
the eastern waters, and to keep the waterways of the Gulf open 
as t h e i r shortest route to B r i t i s h India especially a f t e r the 
40 
occupation of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte i n the summer of 1798. 
In that year the B r i t i s h induced the Imam of Muscat to enter into 
an agreement a l l y i n g himself with them, denying any foothold or 
41 
commercial advantage to either the French or Dutch. 
This engagement marked the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l relationship by 
B r i t a i n with one of the Arab Gulf States. However by the end 
of the f i r s t decade of the 19th century the French were no longer 
a real threat to the B r i t i s h , t h e i r power having been destroyed 
i n Europe, but the commercial interests were threatened i n the 
area by the piracy of the Jawasim, operating from t h e i r base oa 
42 
Oman a l - S i r , now known as the United Arab Amirates , backed by 
the Wahhabi. 
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Their excesses led to the mobilisation of B r i t i s h Naval 
forces i n the area to put down the pirates and safeguard the 
trade routes of the Gulf- These punitive expeditions against 
the Jawasim took place during the winters of 1805-6, 1809-10 
43 
and 1819-20o The f i r s t two expeditions met with only l i m i t e d 
44 
success but the t h i r d resulted m the General Treaty of 1820. 
This Treaty resulted i n the f i r s t B r i t i s h acceptance of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Gulf a f f a i r s and involved keeping the peace 
i n the Gulf s preventing piracy and campaigning against the 
slave trade. 
As time passed the B r i t i s h became more deeply involved 
due to the growth of t h e i r commercial interests i n the area and 
the constant reoccurance of t r i b a l c o n f l i c t s and piracy. 
Eventually,, having settled the a f f a i r s of the region, a s t a b i l i t y 
of commerce was established; but t h i s s t a b i l i t y attracted the 
attention of other powers to the region with a view to essapndihg 
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t h e i r own commerce. The B r i t i s h however, having put i n a l l the 
work i n the Gulf, did not look kindly on any other power reaping 
the benefits of t h e i r e f f o r t s ; such as was attempted by the French, 
Germans and to some extent, the Russians around the end of the 
19th century. This policy was made clear by Lord Curzon, Viceroy 
of India, who v i s i t e d the Gulf and on 2nd Nov. 1903 delivered a 
speech to t r i b a l chiefs assembled at Sharjah i n which he outlined 
B r i t i s h policy i n the Gulf as follows ..... "Sometimes I think that 
the record of the past i s i n danger of being forgotten, and there 
are persons who ask why Great B r i t a i n continues to exercise these 
powers. The history of your states and of your families, and the 
present condition of the Gulf are the answer. We were here before 
any other power i n modern times had shown i t s face i n these waters 
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..... I t was our commerce as well as your security that was 
threatened and called for protection ».... The peace of these 
waters must s t i l l be maintained ...... and the influence of the 
B r i t i s h Government must remain supreme."^ 
The interests and influence to which Lord Curzoh 
referred grew gradually stronger as the communications improved 
and as B r i t a i n used the Gulf for the furtherance of i t s 
m i l i t a r y aims during the F i r s t World Wars when Bahrain was used 
as a base for the Mesopotamian expedition. To t h i s should be 
added the prospects of the discovery of o i l i n the Gulf State 
after the discovery of o i l i n Iran i n 1908. 
In 1930, Capt. P. Parry, w r i t i n g about the Gulf, summarised 
the aims of B r i t i s h policy i n four points:-
a) Enforcement generally of the Trucial t r e a t i e s , which 
includes suppression of the arms t r a f f i c and the slave 
trade. 
b) Protection of the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , and those of 
B r i t i s h subjects i n the Gulf. 
c) Protection of our o i l supply from Persia. 
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d) Questions dealing with the a i r route to India. ' 
Although, as can be seen, the B r i t i s h had well-defined aims 
i n the Gulf as a whole, the a t t i t u d e to individual states tended 
to vary. I n i t i a l l y t h e i r a t t i t u d e to Bahrain i t s e l f was not always 
clearl y defined probably because Bahrain, during the early 19th 
century was not d i r e c t l y involved i n the piracy of the Trucial 
States and the climate was not considered as suitable for prolonged 
residence by Europeans. 
The f i r s t recorded contact between a B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l and a 
r u l e r of Bahrain was i n 1816 when Capt. W. Bruce, B r i t i s h 
Resident i n Bushire paid a v i s i t to the island when i t was 
rumoured that the B r i t i s h were about to aid the Imam of Muscat 
to invade Bahrain. Bruce allayed these fears and drew up an 
agreement, the teext of which was not recorded, with the Shaikh. 
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I t was most probably a treaty of friendship. Bruce spoke 
well of t h i s v i s i t and he remarked "That from the account of 
Bahrain the Government would be able to appreciate the necessity 
of keeping on terms of friendship with i t s inhabitants when such 
an extensive mart for commerce and speculation was held out and 
when the balance of trade was so much i n our favour. 
Despite the Treaty drawn up by Bruce with the Shaikhs of 
Bahrain, the question of the status of the island was apparently 
not agreed upon by the authorities of B r i t i s h India. During the 
preparations f o r the t h i r d B r i t i s h expedition against the Jawasim, 
l a t e i n 1819, the question was raised as to whether to count the 
Al-Khalifah as a l l i e d with the Jawasim pirates and whether to 
subject the two, aft e r the expedition, to the Imam of Muscat,^ 
or to allow Al-Khalifah i n Bahrain to remain independent so 
long as they abstained from piracy.3''" 
This question was s t i l l not resolved when the expedition's 
commander, Major-General Sir William Grant Kier, sailed from 
India towards the Gulf i n October 1819. 
When the expedition was completed, a representative of 
the Shaikhs of Bahrain signed the General Treaty which Kier had 
concluded with the t r i b a l chiefs of the Jawasim, on 5th Feb. 
1820 at Sharjah. This was l a t e r formally endorsed by the Shaikhs 
of Bahrain on the 23rd Feb. 1820. 
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Although Kier allowed a representative of the Shaikhs 
to sign the General Treaty, t h i s was apparently on his 
personal i n i t i a t i v e . The confusion can be seen from the 
fact that when the Imam of Muscat expressed a desire to invade 
Bahrain, Kier was unable to give a clear answer and t o l d the 
Imam that he was an independent r u l e r and could do as he 
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pleased. In the meantime Kier encouraged the representative 
of Bahrain to come to terms with the Imam. Terms were arranged 
whereby the Imam of Muscat agreed not to countenance an 
invasion of the island subject to the payment of an annual 
t r i b u t e of M,T. $30,000 by Bahrain. 5 3 
Further evidence of the uncertainty of B r i t i s h policy 
towards Bahrain can be seen from the a t t i t u d e of John Elphinstone, 
Governor of Bombay, with regard to Bruce*s conduct i n concluding 
the so-called "Treaty of Shiraz", mention of which has been made 
e a r l i e r . Elphinstone observed that the Persian claim "of which 
there i s not a shadow of proof ..... prejudiced both the 
independence of the Al-Khalifah and the claims of the Bombay 
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Government's a l l y , the r u l e r of Muscat, to the island." 
Although Elphinstone, along with the B r i t i s h Authorities, 
renounced the treaty, he s t i l l did not appear to appreciate the 
status of Bahrain, on the one hand mentioning the independence of 
the Al-Khalifah and on the other recognising the claim of the 
Imam of Muscat to the island. 
Between the years 1838-40, the second Egyptian expedition 
against the Wahhabi occupied the Hasa. The Wahhabi Governor 
f l e d to Bahrain and the Egyptians demanded not only his return 
but also the payment of t r i b u t e which had previously been made 
by the Shaikhs to the Wahhabi and one of the Shaikh's sons 
to be present at the Egyptian camp, presumably as a hostage. 
When the Shaikh sought the advice and help of the 
B r i t i s h i n Bushire be was given only an i n d e f i n i t e answer, 
although the B r i t i s h were well aware of the Egyptian influence 
over the Arab chiefs of the mainland and the consequences of 
t h e i r taking Bahrain. This absence of an immediate decisive 
policy towards Bahrain l e f t Shaikh Abdulla bin Ahmed with 
apparently no alternative but to y i e l d to the Egyptian demands 
and i n May 1839 he agreed to recognise the Egyptian suzerainty 
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over Bahrain and to pay a t r i b u t e of M.T. $3,000. 
The presence of the Egyptians on the east coast of Arabia, 
and the threat they posed, made the B r i t i s h consider the occupation 
of Bahrain by a B r i t i s h force. This idea was l a t e r abandoned on 
the grounds that the climate of Bahrain was unhealthy for 
Europeans. 
The show of force by the B r i t i s h and the sudden withdrawal 
of the Egyptians from Arabia as a whole i n 1840 brought r e l i e f to 
the s i t u a t i o n although the authorities i n India probably viewed 
the Shaikh's submission to the Egyptians as an unlawful act and 
were passively i n favour of the Imam of Muscat's proposed invasion 
of the i s l a n d . 5 7 When he demanded m i l i t a r y aid i n his venture, 
however, the B r i t i s h made i t clear that they did not wish to be 
d i r e c t l y involved and so, due to lack of support the Omanis 
abandoned the scheme, but afterwards the B r i t i s h seemed to 
adopt a more precise policy with regard to Bahrain. 
Proof of t h i s more positive a t t i t u d e was provided i n 1842 
when the B r i t i s h Government i n India heard a rumour that the 
Persians were preparing to invade Bahrain and consequently 
issued instructions to the Resident i n Bushire ..... 
" i n the event of the Persian Government 
sending out any force of armed vessels, or 
vessels carrying armed men, such vessels 
should be watched and any actual attempt 
to possess themselves of t e r r i t o r y belonging 
to Arab chiefs i n f r i e n d l y alliance with the 
B r i t i s h Government should f i r s t be remonstrated^ 
against and then, i f persevered i n , resisted„" 
The growing c o n f l i c t s between the two factions of the 
Al-Khalifah family and the growing d i s l i k e of the people for 
Abdulla due to his misgovernment enabled Mohammed bin 
Khalifah, the great-nephew of Abdulla, to expel the l a t t e r from 
Bahrain i n 1843 with the connivance of the Bombay Government, 
when Captain Hennel, the B r i t i s h Resident gave permission for 
the a l l i e s of Mohammed bin Khalifah to cross the Gulf from 
Qais Island to the eastern side of the Gulf with a view to 
making war on Ab d u l l a . ^ The B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e i n t h i s a f f a i r 
may have been influenced by Shaikh Abdulla's submission to the 
Egyptians i n 1839, and the hope that Mohammed might prove more 
co-operative. 
At f i r s t i t appeared that t h i s hope may have been j u s t i f i e d 
but s t a b i l i t y s t i l l did not come to Bahrain. The ex-Shaikh, 
Abdulla, was wandering throughout the Gulf seeking help from any 
power which he assumed would be prepared to help him and eventually 
he arrived i n Muscat where he attempted to persuade the Imam to 
take up his cause. 
This turn of events alarmed Mohammed and drove him to 
approach the B r i t i s h Government with an offe r of the Sovereignty 
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of Bahrain. On the 9th February, 1849 he wrote to the 
B r i t i s h Resident i n Bushire Col. S, Hennell, as follows; 
" I beg to inform you I perceived that a l l 
the countries i n t h i s quarter are dependent 
on one or other of the Sultans, as, for 
example, the coast of Fars i s dependent 
upon the Persians, and likewise the people 
of Kuwait and the Wahhabi t e r r i t o r i e s , etc. 
are dependent on Turkey. And I , as I have 
at heart, am dependent upon the Exalted 
B r i t i s h Government, and subject to i t , and 
I am certain that you w i l l not consent 
to i n j u r y accruing to the dependencies 
of the Sirkar. Accordingly, my request of 
you i s , i f you now approve of what I have 
at heart and I am bent upon, that you w i l l 
cause the return to me of those who have 
seceded from my t e r r i t o r i e s to the advantage 
of the country and i t s inhabitants. Otherwise, 
i f you account me dependent upon others, be 
pleased to acquaint me with whatever i s 
conformable to the policy of the B r i t i s h 
Government.'^ 
This offer was turned down by the B r i t i s h presumably on 
the grounds that/would involve them with the mainland Arabs 
on whom Mohammed wished to wage war to remove the threat to his 
own position. 
This threat was removed by the death of Abdulla i n 
Muscat i n 1849, but was soon replaced an even greater 
threat from the Wahhabi, who were backing the claims of Abdulla's 
sons to the rulership of Bahrain. This pressure grew throughout 
the 1850's and culminated i n Mohammed's correspondence 
with the Persians and Turkis i n 1860, which has been previously 
referred t o . ^ ^ 
Mohammed's conduct i n t h i s a f f a i r raised the question of 
the status of Bahrain again. The Bombay Government i n r e f e r r i n g 
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the matter to Her Majesty's Government, recommended that the most 
suitable answer was that Bahrain should be regarded as subject 
to neither the Persians nor the Turks. This view was approved 
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by H.M.G. i n Feb. 1861. 
This approval represented the f i r s t recognitiion of Bahrain 
as an independent state under t h e i r Al-Khalifah rulers and t h i s 
new status was f i r s t made public when Mohammed on 31st May 1861 
signed a Perpetual Treaty of Peace and Friendship with B r i t a i n 
as "independent r u l e r of Bahrain". In t h i s Treaty Mohammed 
undertook to recognise as v a l i d a l l existing treaties between 
Bahrain and the B r i t i s h Government i. e . The General Treaty of 1820 
and the Slave Treaties of 1847 and 1856, and moreover to abstain 
from a l l maritime aggression of every description and i n return he 
was to receive the support of the B r i t i s h Government against any 
aggression directed against his possessions by the chiefs and 
trib e s of the Gulf 
In 1867 a c o n f l i c t arose between Mohammed and the tribes of 
his dependencies i n Qatar which the B r i t i s h viewed as a v i o l a t i o n 
of the Treaty of 1861. The B r i t i s h Resident, Col. Lewis Pelly, 
arrived at Bahrain with a f l e e t on 6th Sept. 1868 and bombarded 
Mohammed's headquarters at the Fort of Arad and forced Mohammed 
to f l e e to the mainland. The Resident declared A l i b i n Khalifah, 
Mohammed's brother, as the new r u l e r of Bahrain. 
This step by the B r i t i s h indicated that they were prepared 
to play an active r o l e i n Bahrain p o l i t i c s . However Mohammed did 
not give up easily and a l l i e d himself with his old enemy, Mohammed 
bin Abdulla s and attacked Bahrain i n 1869, k i l l i n g A l i during the 
action. The B r i t i s h immediately intervened again, deported the two 
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Mohammeds to India and declared Isa, son of A l i and great-nephew 
of Mohammed b i n Khalifah, r u l e r of Bahrain. 
The occupation of Hasa by the Turks i n 1871, presented a 
growing threat to the security of Bahrain by t h e i r obvious 
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expansionist aims, and so, on the 22nd Dec. 1880, the B r i t i s h 
Resident, L t . Col. E.C. Ross, concluded an agreement with Shaikh 
Isa, consisting of one a r t i c l e only, i n which the Shaikh 
undertook 
"as a chief of Bahrain, to bind himself 
and his successors to abstain from entering 
into negotiations or making treaties of any 
sort with any state or Government, other 
than the B r i t i s h without the consent of the 
said B r i t i s h Government, and to refuse 
permission to any other Government than the 
B r i t i s h to establish diplomatic or consular 
agencies or coaling depots i n our t e r r i t o r y , 
unless with the consent of the B r i t i s h 
Government."^ 
Although t h i s treaty did not deprive the Shaikh of Bahrain 
of his r i g h t to "the customary f r i e n d l y correspondence with local 
authorities of neighbouring states on business of minor importance", 
i t presumably deprived him of his "freedom of action" as an 
independant r u l e r . 
In 1892, the B r i t i s h Resident, Col. A.C. Talbot, apparently 
considered that the agreement of 1880 was not conclusive enough, 
so on 13th March 1892 he made a fresh agreement. The f i r s t two 
a r t i c l e s were on much the same lines as the previous agreement, but 
the t h i r d and f i n a l a r t i c l e read as follows:-
"3rd - That I w i l l on no account cede, s e l l , mortgage 
or otherwise give f o r occupation, any part of my 
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t e r r i t o r y save to the B r i t i s h Government." 
By the turn of the century the B r i t i s h interests had grown 
even more i n Bahrain; they t r i e d to put pressure on I s a ^ to adopt 
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what they evidently considered were necessary s reforms to the 
administration of the Customs, or, to accept a B r i t i s h adviser. 
The B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n was to put the administration on a more 
"secure f o o t i n g " b u t Isa resisted these reforms most strongly. 
A aew development i n the B r i t i s h policy came when they 
replaced the Native Agent of the B r i t i s h Government i n India with a 
European O f f i c e r . 7 * J.C. Gaskin arrived i n Bahrain i n 1900 as 
an Assistant P o l i t i c a l Agent and an o f f i c i a l residence was b u i l t 
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i n Manama during 1901-2. 
Four years l a t e r , i n 1904„ Gaskin was succeeded by Capt. 
F.B. Prideaux who was invested with the local rank of P o l i t i c a l 
Agent aad was l a t e r charged w i t h the j u r i s d i c t i o n over a l l 
foreigners, instead of over B r i t i s h subjects only as previously 
had been the case, although t h e i r prime aim was to maintain the 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . 
The r o l e played by the various P o l i t i c a l Agents i n Bahrain 
varied according to the personalities, principles and i n i t i a t i v e of 
the Agents who held o f f i c e , although a description of t h e i r methods 
of work i s mentioned by one of the P o l i t i c a l Residents as follows; 
"The close personal contact maintained 
between the P o l i t i c a l Agents and the Rulers 
i s an outstanding feature of the B r i t i s h 
position i n the Persian Gulf. They meet 
each other frequently and more often 
so c i a l l y than f o r o f f i c i a l t a l k s . Possibly 
the social meetings are more important than 
the o f f i c i a l ones, as a h i n t dropped here 
and there i n the course of casual conversation 
i s often more effective than formal advice."73 
In 1913 the B r i t i s h proclaimed the "Bahrain Order i n Council" 7^ 
the inte n t i o n of which was to apply to Bahrain the 
c i v i l and criminal laws of B r i t i s h India. 
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This was suspended due to the outbreak of the F i r s t World Wa£ 
and when i t was subsequently enforced af t e r the War i t provoked 
a major p o l i t i c a l upheaval i n the Islands.^ 5 
A further development took place i n 1914, t h i s time with 
regard to the p o s s i b i l i t y of the discovery of o i l , which had 
recently been discovered elsewhere i n the Gulf. On t h i s occasion, 
the 14th May 1914, Shaikh Isa undertook to A.P. Trevor, the B r i t i s h 
Resident i n the Gulf, "not to embark on the exploitation of the o i l 
i n his country himself, nor to entertain ovettures from any 
quarter regarding th a t , without consulting the P o l i t i c a l Agent i n 
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Bahrain and without the approval of the High Government." 
In 1913 and 1915 the B r i t i s h concluded treaties with the 
Turks and Ibn Saud respectively. The Turks agreed that "the 
Ottoman Imperial Government renounces a l l i t s claims to the island 
7 7 . 
of Bahrain ..... etc." and ibn Saud i n 1915 undertook i n A r t i c l e 
6 of the Treaty of 26thDecember that "Bin.Saud undertakes, as his 
father did before him, to r e f r a i n from a l l aggressions or 
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interference with the t e r r i t o r i e s of Kuwait, Bahrain etc." 
As can be seen from these notes, B r i t a i n had gradually 
increased her int e r e s t i n the Gulf as a whole, and i n Bahrain i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , u n t i l Bahrain became the focal point of her intentions 
i n the Gulf. Thus with t h i s growing influence and control of 
Bahrain, the B r i t i s h , especially after the F i r s t World War were 
i n a position to play an active i n the in t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the 
island. 
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C H A P T E R TWO 
THE PEQPUE 
a) Demographical Structure. 
Because of i t s strategical s i t u a t i o n , water, agriculture 
and r e l a t i v e wealth, Bahrain has throughout i t s history 
attracted the attention of d i f f e r e n t races. From time to time 
Arabs, Persians, and Zenj, amongst other peoples have inhabited 
the island. 
The pre-Islamic inhabitants of Bahrain were the Arab 
tri b e s of Beni Baker, Beni Tamem and Beni Abd Qais;* the 
2 
"Bahrain" region l a t e r became a centre of re v o l t against the 
Omayyad and Abbasid dynasties respectively. This rev o l t led to 
the a r r i v a l of other disaffected groups to take up residence 
i n the region. Some of these remained and inter-mingled with 
the indigenous population., The growth of Islamic States i n Persia, 
especially a f t e r the f a l l of the Abbasid dynasty, led to a certain 
amount of emigration between neighbouring Islamic states and th i s 
brbgght a certain number of Persians to s e t t l e i n Bahrain. A much 
larger number of Persians settled permanently i n the Island a f t e r 
the occupation of Bahrain at the beginning of the 17th century, by 
the Persians. 
During the second half of the 18th century the wealth of 
Bahrain was one of the reasons that attracted the Arab tribes who 
were at that time migrating i n the mainland i n a search for new 
living-spaces. Some of them, notably the Utub tribes and t h e i r 
a l l i e s , occupied the islands i n 1782, and established themselves as 
the rulers of the island. 
- 39 -
Bahrain had for centuries maintained trading l i n k s with 
India and therefore a small population of Indian merchants had 
been long-established i n the island; but during the l a t e r 19th 
and early 20th centuries s as the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n became more 
stable and contact grew with the outside world, the proportion 
of Indian merchants and workers grew r a p i d l y , especially after 
the discovery of o i l . The small Jewish population increased 
during the 1920's as some of them f l e d Iraq and Iran. 
So by the beginning of the 20th century there were three 
major ethnic groups i n Bahrain, Arabs, Iranians and Indians. 
The Arabs themselves were divided r e l i g i o u s l y between the two 
sects of Islam, Sunna and Shia. 
Due to the fact that the Bahrain Nationality Law was not 
introduced u n t i l 1937, movement to and from Bahrain had never 
been r e s t r i c t e d , except f o r Iranians i n 1927 as was mentioned 
i n the previous chapter. 
The Bahrain Nationality Law contains f i v e a r t i c l e s , the 
f i r s t and second being the most important. 
4 
The Law stated: 
" A r t i c l e One - The following are considered to be Bahraini nationals. 
a) A l l persons born i n Bahrain before or aft e r the 
date of t h i s law, except as provided for i n a r t i c l e 
Two. 
b) Persons^born abroad before or a f t e r the date of t h i s 
law, whose fathers or paternal grandfather were born 
i n Bahrain except persons whose fathers during the 
minority of such persons, registered at the P o l i t i c a l 
Agency i n Bahrain i n accordance with a r t i c l e Two or 
might have so registered i f resident i n Bahrain. 
A r t i c l e Two - Persons born i n Bahrain before or a f t e r the date of 
t h i s law whose fathers at the time of those persons b i r t h 
possessed the n a t i o n a l i t y of other states shall not be considered 
to be Bahrain nationals. 
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a) I f they register at the P o l i t i c a l Agency 
wi t h i n one year of the date on which they 
a t t a i n the age of 18, i f then resident i n 
Bahrain or w i t h i n one year of the date of 
the commencement of t h e i r residence i n 
Bahrain i f not then resident i n Bahrain, or 
b) I f they register at the P o l i t i c a l Agency 
wi t h i n one year of the date of the 
promulgation of t h i s law i f they have 
already attained the age of 18, and are 
resident i n Bahrain, or, 
c) I f they shall have been registered at the 
P o l i t i c a l Agency w i t h i n two years of t h e i r 
b i r t h or i f t h e i r b i r t h s shall have been 
registered w i t h i n two years of th e i r 
occurence." 
At t h i s time the Bahrain Authorities commenced also the 
issue of passports for people wishing to travel abroad and as 
a form of i d e n t i t y card, a system which s t i l l exists to t h i s day. 
The f i r s t population census i n Bahrain, which was also the 
f i r s t to be held i n the whole of the Gulf, took place i n 1941. 
This pioneer census collected only a few facts about the population 
as i t was intended at that time to provide mainly the number of 
people residing i n the islands so that the food rationing could be 
5 
more carefully controlled during the war years. 
This was followed by a further two censuses at nine year 
i n t e r v a l s , i n 1950 and 1959, the fourth and f i f t h place at six 
year i n t e r v a l s , 1965 and 1971. The 1971 census was conducted 
between 4th and 23rd A p r i l , ^ 
TABLE 1. Population 7 
1941 1950 1959 1965 1971 
Bahrainis 74,040 91,179 118,734 143,814 178,393 
Non-Bahrainis 15,930 18,471 24,401 38,389 37,910 
Total 89,970 lo9,650 143,135 182,203 216,303 
Before 1941 we have only estimated figures, which were quoted. 
by various w r i t e r s , such as Nabhani, and Rihani, who v i s i t e d 
Bahrain i n 1921 and 1923 respectively and estimated the population 
as being 300,000 and 200,000, figures which were obviously 
inaccurate when we compare them with the 1941 figure of approximately 
90,000 and when we also consider the fact that there had been no 
natural disasters or mass movement of population between these 
dates. Another source gives a figure of 120,656 i n 1930 and 
again, obviously we cannot accept t h i s figure due to the fact 
that i t seems to be based purely on assumption.^ 
The figures quoted i n Table 1 give us an overall picture 
of the growth of Bahrain's population, bearing i n mind that the 
f i r s t two censuses were conducted on a basis of a count of a l l 
persons resident i n the islands on census night, whereas the 
l a t e r surveys counted only those normally resident i n the island, 
therefore these figures quoted for the e a r l i e r censuses, should 
not be regarded as completely accurate. 
Bearing t h i s i n mind we can see that i n the 30 years 
covered, the population grew from j u s t under 90,000 i n 1941, 
to almost two and a half times that number by 1971, the average 
increase per year amounting to 4,211 persons (3,478 Bahrains 
and 733 Non-Bahrainis). Thus i t can be seen that the native 
Bahraini population i s increasing at an extremely high rate. 
The growth i n the foreign population was due to the 
discovery of o i l which attracted a large number of foreign 
workers seeking employment. This i n f l u x of workers contributed 
to some social problems, which w i l l be discussed l a t e r . 
Another feature of the changes can be observed from Table 1 
and t h i s i s that the rate of growth of the Bahraini population was 
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greater during the period 1965 to 1971 than any previous period 
covered by the census. Where as the rate of growth between 
1950 and 1959 was 3.36% per annum, the rate increased to 4.00% 
per annum for the period 1965 to 1971, which i s a substantial 
increase when we consider that i t covers only a six year period 
as against the nine years period, 1950-59. This growth was 
probably due to the economic development of the country with 
i t s consequent higher family incomes ? This enabled the people 
to raise t h e i r standard of l i v i n g , and the government was able 
to provide more comprehensive welfare services, such as hospitals 
and other medical f a c i l i t i e s which tended to reduce deaths, 
throughout a l l age groups, but especially to reduce the infant 
m o r t a l i t y rate. Between the 1959 and 1965 censuses the average 
age of the population f e l l , and the under t h i r t y age group 
comprised almost three quarters of the population, as can be seen 
from the following table. 
TABLE I I 
(Percentage of t o t a l Bahraini Population)^ 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of Bahraini population by age groups 1959-71 
Age Group 1959 1965 1971 
Under 11 years of age 36.6 38.9 33.0 1 2 
Under 16 years of age 46.7 51.6 48.4 
Under 30 years of age 68.2 74.0 72.1 
30 and under 60 26.7 22.7 22.8 
60 and over 5.1 3.3 5.1 
I t i s abundantly clear from Table I I that demographically the 
Bahraini population i s a "young population" i n the sense that there 
is a higher proportion of young persons i n i t s composition thafi/ i s 
to be found i n most other countries. 
I t can also be seen from Table I I that t h i s youthful 
population w i l l place a greater burden on the welfare f a c i l i t i e s 
of the state; and that as time progresses greater educational and 
employment f a c i l i t i e s must be provided. 
With the decline of the t r a d i t i o n a l economic a c t i v i t i e s , 
and the growth of the o i l industry, the population has become 
mobile and the d r i f t from countryside to town continues, despite 
the e f f o r t s by both the Government and the o i l company (Bahrain 
Petroleum Company). The provision of housing by the Government i n 
r u r a l areas such as Asker and Jaw, to encourage the people to 
remain i n t h e i r present l o c a l i t y , and the provision by Bahrain 
Petroleum Company of cheap transport f o r t h e i r workers to and 
13 
from work has f a i l e d to ha l t t h i s trend. 
TABLE I I I Geographical D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Population 
D i s t r i c t 1941 1950 1959 1 5 1965 1971 
Manama 27,835 39,648 61,726 79,098 88785 
Muharraq 21,439 25,577 27,115 34,430 37732 
" Suburb - - 5,187 6,713 -Hidd - - 4,440 5,230 5269 Jidhafs - - 5,591 7,941 11152 Sitra - - 3,926 5,071 6665 Rifaa - - 6,623 9,403 10731 A w a l i 1 6 (1,532) 3,846 3,123 2,097 984 
Rural & other 
areas 39,164 40,579 25,404 32,220 54,985 
17 
Totals 89,970 109,650 143,135 182,203 216,303 
Comparison of the population by geographical areas over 
the years tends to be complicated by the changes which have taken 
place i n the administrative boundaries due to the spread of the 
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larger centres of population and the absorption of nearby 
villages and the amalgamation of what have become continguous 
b u i l t up areas. 
The censuses of 1941 and 1950 did not give a precise 
breakdown of the percentages of the various n a t i o n a l i t i e s present 
i n Bahrain, but we can observe the changes i n the following table 
TABLE IV 
18 
(Bahrainis and Non-Bahrainis (Per cent, of Total)) 
1941 1950 1959. 1965 1971 
Bahraini 82.3 83.2 83.0 79.0 82.4 
Iranian 8.4 6.3 2.9 4.0 2.9 
Indians 1.6 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.7 
Omani/Muscati N.A. 2.0 5.1 6.9 6.0 
Others 8.0 5.0 6.2 7.2 5.0 
The f i r s t observation to be made from t h i s table i s the 
large reduction during the 1950's, of the Iranian residents, 
possibly due to the growth of n a t i o n a l i s t feeling amongst the 
Arab population and the Anglo-Iranian controversy which took 
place during these years. 
The next factor to be considered i s that although the 
Indians are shown as comprising one of the smallest percentages, 
when linked with the Pakistani groups, both of which are 
considered as one by the Bahrainis, they then comprise the 
largest foreign non-Arab group i n the island, as can be seen 
from the more detailed breakdown of the censuses of 1959, 
1965, and 1971. 
- 45 -
TABLE V. 
Nationality of Non-Bahrainis (% of Total) 
Nationality 1959 1965 1971 
Indians 25.9 24.2 Pakistanis 31.7 
Iranians 17.1 18.8 13.5 
B r i t i s h 10.3 7.3 7.7 
American 0.6 0.4 0.7 
Other Non-Arabs 2.7 1.2 1.6 
Omanis/Muscatis 30.0 32.9 28.4 
Saudi-Arabians 6.6 4.5 3.5 
Yemeni 2.1 4.1 4.1 
Jordanians 0.5 1.1 3.5 
Lebanese 0.6 0.6 0.7 
U.A.R. 0.3 0.6 1.7 
I r a q i 0.7 0.2 0.2 
Other Arabs 2.6 4.1 2.7 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
From the table i t can be seen that the Non-Arab group as a 
whole, and the Indians and Pakistanis, who we shall subsequently 
refer to as the Indian group, i n p a r t i c u l a r , formed the majority 
of the non-Arab population of Bahrain. This created a social 
problem which w i l l be discussed at a l a t e r stage. 
b) Social Problems i n Bahrain. 
1. Social Problems between the Bahrainis 
The social problems w i t h i n Bahrain tend to f a l l into two 
categories; f i r s t , the denominational differences between the 
Bahrainis themselves, being s p l i t between two sects of Islam, 
Sunna and Shia, and secondly the resentment of the Bahrainis 
towards foreigners. 
The denominational differences have been a frequent source 
of c o n f l i c t throughout Bahrain's modern history and have often 
- 46 -
led to open c o n f l i c t between the two. The root cause of the 
problem was the conquest of the Shia by the Sunna tr i b e s 
of the mainland, who regarded Shiaism as a form of heresy, and 
they consequently missed no opportunity to oppress the o r i g i n a l 
Shia inhabitants. 
The Shia, who are l o c a l l y known as the Bahama, are 
generally regarded as the o r i g i n a l inhabitants of the island, 
but due to t h e i r subjugation by other t r i b e s and peoples, they 
20 
were gradually deprived of t h e i r lands and were made to 
depend on unskilled forms of labour for t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d and 
eventually came to be regarded as second class c i t i z e n s . 
Many writers have puzzled as to t h e i r ethnic o r i g i n , 
Harrison w r i t i n g on Bahrain i n 1924 i d e n t i f i e d them as semi-Persians 
others claim that they are the descendants of Arabs taken as 
prisoners by Nebuchadnezzar into Iraq d3 who l a t e r escaped 
22 
and settled i n Bahrain, w h i l s t others go further and claim 
that they are descendants of Pre-Islamic Jewish inhabitants 
23 
of the Gulf. More recently a study of one of the Shia vi l l a g e s 
of Bahrain was carried out by a Danish woman who surprisingly 
f a i l e d to understand that the Bahama were Arabs and she 
misinterpreted t h e i r replies when she stated that 
"they themselves (Bahama) emphasise that they are 
not Arabs, l i k e the r u l e r , his family and the 
townspeople, they c a l l themselves Bahama." 
But she did not ask herself the next question which i s "What 
25 
then i s Bahama?" 
Bahama i s the p l u r a l of the classical Arab word, Bahrani, 
AS K MSiAlt a i 
which usually denotes one who inhabits Bahrain. 
conquest of Bahrain, and also the fact that they were Shia under 
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Sunna r u l e , the term Bahama became synonymous with Shia 
and therefore the fact that they refer to themselves, due to 
long usage, as Bahama, does not a l t e r the fact that they are 
s t i l l Arabs. 
As so l i t t l e i s known of t h e i r ancestry they have been 
26 
referred to by Sir Robert Hay as "Arabs without a pedigree". 
The fact that they do not know the Persian language and 
that there are no Persian words i n t h e i r form of Arabic, seems 
to ru l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r being "semi-Persians"; 
i n fact the Arab dialect spoken by the Bahama i s very similar 
to that which i s spoken by the Arabs of Iraq. 
The Shia of Bahrain are of the Imamite d i v i s i o n of Shia 
who are often known as the Twelvers, which means that they 
belong to the group of Shia who recognise a succession of twelve 
Imams, s t a r t i n g with A l i and ending with the twelth Imam, 
Mohammed a l Mahdi, who they believe w i l l return again as t h e i r 
27 
s p i r i t u a l leader. 
These Shia b e l i e f s , whilst strongly held, are at variance 
with the interpretation of Islamic teaching according to the 
orthodox sect of Islam, the Sunna who, i n Bahrain refer to the 
Shia as Rafzy the Rejectors . These differences of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
both points of view being f a n a t i c a l l y held by the two sides, 
created the tensions which usually led to the various c o n f l i c t s . 
I t i s not known today which sects forms the majority i n 
Bahrain, but from the 1941 cneus, which was the only one so 
conducted, i t was found t h a t , at that time, the Shia were s l i g h t l y 
s 28 more numerous than the Sunna. (46,359 Shia against 41,944 Sunna). 
This was the only census conducted on the basis of Shia, Sunna, as 
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i t was considered p o l i t i c a l l y undesirable to conduct further 
surveys on t h i s basis. 
I t may however be argued that whilst the two sects are 
approximately numerically equal, the Shia constitute the poorer 
section of the community and manifested the defensive 
29 
attitudes of Q i n f e r i o r group. 
They normally reside i n t h e i r own v i l l a g e communities 
segregated from the Sunni communities. The two sects reside 
together only i n the c a p i t a l , Manama, and to a very small 
extent, i n Muharraq, although even i n these towns they reside 
i n neighbourhood groups. Such i s the depth of feeling between 
the two sects, that serious r i o t i n g took place as recently 
as the 1950's following incidents during a religious procession. 
Even today there i s very l i t t l e intercourse between the 
two groups. They follow an unwritten code by l i v i n g apart, 
worshipping separately and never intermarrying."^ 0 Even on the 
matters of food, dress and habits a wide c u l t u r a l gap s t i l l 
e x i s t s , especially between those of t r a d i t i o n a l upbringing. After 
the F i r s t World War, a modern educational system was introduced 
which, to a certain degree, brought together the two sections of 
the community. This created a basis for better understanding 
between them. About t h i s time, with the growth of B r i t i s h 
influence, changes were made i n the administration of the island, 
and the creation of a central Government department led to further 
contacts. During the 1920's the B r i t i s h observed the suppression 
of the Shia community and encouraged them to participate i n 
public a f f a i r s and to obtain a better education. 
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The discovery and exploitation of o i l during the 1930"s 
31 
offered the Bahama a higher standard of l i v i n g which 
encouraged them to abandon t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l 
a c t i v i t i e s o Employment with the o i l company brought them 
into d i r e c t contact w i t h the Sunni, and i n some cases placed 
them i n position of authority over them. This, combined with 
t h e i r new-found prosperity, aroused for the f i r s t time a new 
feeling of self-respect and equality with the Sunni* 
This s i t u a t i o n was welcomed by the moderate sections of 
the two communities, especially the younger educated element, 
and led to attempts to foster a feeling of brotherhood between 
them. This i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the example of the Sunni j o u r n a l i s t , 
32 
Abdulla a l Zayed, who i n 1940, wrote i n Al-Bahrain, under the 
headline of 'An I n v i t a t i o n to Brotherhood and Unity' ..... 
" I am dire c t i n g my words to the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
youth of the two sects (Shia and Sunna). We 
are proud i n t h i s country of being young Arab 
Moslems, our blood i s one, our house i s one, 
and our future i s one. The discrimination 
between Shia and Sunna i s nonsense 
From the previous discussions i t may appear as i f the whole 
of the social problems of the island revolve around the Shia-Sunna 
c o n f l i c t s ; t h i s i n fact i s not the case, as the Sunna themselves 
have t h e i r own social problems, being at variance w i t h i n themselves 
on a basis of social class divisions. This sub-division w i t h i n 
the Sunna society of Bahrain i s between the Arab tribes who give 
allegiance to Al-Khalifah, and form t r a d i t i o n a l l y an upper class, 
33 
and the Huwala Arabs, who were for a period of time, before the 
coming of Al-Khalifah, the rulers of Bahrain. The l a t t e r tend to 
form the middle classes of the island and are generally merchants. 
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The Arab tr i b e s forming the upper class are recognised 
as being those who came to Bahrain as conquerors and a l l i e s of 
Al-Khalifa and other tribes who have arrived since the conquest 
and who claimed kinship with the conquerors. The tribes who form 
34 
t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l upper class are the following, Al-Khalifah 
themselvesj Al-Jalahima, Al-Fadhl, A l - B i n A l i , Al-Mosalam, 
A-Naime, Al-Sadah, Al-Rumahi, Al-Bu Aynain, Al-Manana, Sudan, 
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Al-Slutah, Kibisah, Al-Bukuwarah and Al-Dawasir. These t r i b e s , 
who through t h e i r claims of kinship formed a t i g h t l y - k n i t 
community, t r a d i t i o n a l l y had direc t access to the r u l e r . Intermarriage 
takes place between the various tr i b e s but whilst the Al-Khalifah 
w i l l accept daughters of the tr i b e s i n marriage, they s t i l l debar 
the marriage of males into the Al-Khalifah family i n order that 
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power w i l l not pass from Al-Khalifah hands. 
In the early years of the Al-Khalifah r u l e , these t r i b e s 
were the nucleus of the defence force of the island, although with 
the assumption by the B r i t i s h of the ro l e of defender of the island, 
t h i s practice f e l l into disuse, but even today some t r i b a l chiefs 
s t i l l draw allowances known as ^ harhah3 from the Shaikh f o r 
providing support i n times of trouble. 
Although the structure i s changing, some tribes s t i l l i s olate 
themselves i n t h e i r own v i l l a g e s , as for instance, the population 
of Jaw i s composed e n t i r e l y of the Al-Rumahi, and that of Galali of 
the Al-Manana. Others have tended to concentrate i n towns, such 
as the Al-Naime i n Rifaa, the ruler's residence, and the Al-Fadhl 
i n Manama, where the d i s t r i c t i n which they l i v e i s known by that 
name. 
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The t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s of these t r i b e s , apart from 
providing a defence force, was the organisation of the pearl 
f i s h i n g f l e e t s , and some of them worked as divers i n the t r i b a l 
f l e e t s . The fact that they considered working on the land and 
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engaging i n commerce as beneath t h e i r d i g n i t y meant that with 
the change i n economic conditions which took place, and the 
decline of pearl f i s h i n g , they have f a i l e d to take advantage 
of and participate i n the growth industries, such as the o i l 
industry and commerce. 
Their conservative point of view was also an obstacle 
to t h e i r acceptance of the new methods of education which were 
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introduced, and although the male members of the families 
began to par t i c i p a t e during the 1940's, only recently have they 
considered education for t h e i r females to be necessary. This 
conservatism and lack of education delayed the development of 
any growth of p o l i t i c a l consciousness amongst them, as had taken 
place with the mass of the people. This was i l l u s t r a t e d during the 
r i o t s of 1953 when they hurriedly assembled i n Rifaa to demonstrate 
t h e i r l o y a l t y to Al-Khalifah. But t h e i r demonstration was more for 
preserving a way of l i f e to which they were accustomed rather 
than f o r any p o l i t i c a l ideas. 
However, as some of them began to work f o r the o i l company, 
they were brought in t o contact with new ideas expressed by t h e i r 
fellow-workers and they began to realise that i t would be 
necessary for them to adapt themselves to a changing system. 
Others of the t r i b e s , when the pearl f i s h i n g industry declined, 
looked around for new sources of income and although t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
not commercially-minded, began to take an interest i n certain 
sections of commerce. Their interest i n these a c t i v i t i e s gradually 
developed, although they r e s t r i c t e d themselves to ventures which 
did not d i r e c t l y involve them i n the running of businesses 
and gave an easy return on t h e i r investments, such as the 
purchase, sales and rent of offic e s and buildings. To date 
only one member of the Al-Khalifah family has involved himself 
i n business to the extent of opening and personally managing a 
fur n i t u r e store. 
The Huwala Arabs, as we have previously stated, form the 
middle classes or townsmen. They o r i g i n a l l y came to Bahrain from 
the western coast of Fars, having settled there following the 
Moslem conquest of Persia by the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula. 
They conquered Bahrain i n the early years of the 18th century 
under t h e i r leader, Jabbara of T a h i r i , and ruled the island 
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u n t i l approximately 1753. As t h e i r t r i b a l structure and way of 
l i f e was not so r i g i d as the tribes from the mainland, probably 
due to t h e i r long contact with the Persian culture, they 
integrated more easily with the other elements of the island. 
The Huwala Arabs, l i k e the other Arab tribes did not consider i t 
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f i t t i n g to work on the land, and t h e i r chief occupations were 
commerce and maritime trading, and due to t h e i r predominence i n 
th i s f i e l d , whilst the Arab tribes held the power, they held the 
purse strings of Bahrain. Because they were town-dwellers and 
they were also amongst the f i r s t to take advantage of the modern 
education, a large number of them now hold offi c e s i n the Government 
Administration, the o i l company and the educational f i e l d . I n 
the commercial f i e l d some of t h e i r family companies such as Kanoos, 
Wazan and Moayyed, form the largest trading groups i n the island 
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with interests ranging from insurance to machine t o o l agencies. 
Although as a group, they have no s o l i d a r i t y between 
themselves, such as exists amongst the Shia and to a lesser 
degree the Arab t r i b e s . They are, due to t h e i r better education, 
the most p o l i t i c a l l y conscious group i n the islands. Their 
p o l i t i c a l feelings are not expressed as a group, but on an 
individual basis; t h e i r aspirations range from Arab nationalism, 
Islamic unity and Western-style democracy, to simple patriotism. 
The Huwala were the prime movers i n the p o l i t i c a l 
confrontations of the 1950's, because of t h e i r desire for 
p o l i t i c a l reforms which they considered necessary for the well 
being and improvement of the s i t u a t i o n i n the island. 
2. The Attitude of the Bahrainis towards foreign communities 
The elements such as education, the build-up of contacts 
between the native groups, the prosperity of the island and 
the new p o l i t i c a l feelings created a sense of unity and national 
i d e n t i t y amongst the Bahrainis. This led to a resentment of the 
presence of other national groups i n the island on economic, 
p o l i t i c a l and social grounds. 
The I n d i a n s ^ constitute the largest foreign community i n 
the islands; Bahrain, l i k e other p r i n c i p a l i t i e s i n the Gulf, 
had a long trading association with India. Through t h i s trade, 
small groups of Indians had been long-established i n Bahrain, but 
the discovery of o i l and the building of a modern administration, 
created a need for semi-skilled and c l e r i c a l workers; t h i s need 
was f i l l e d by a large i n f l u x of Indian workers. 
They ©re a prosperous and reasonably well-educated group 
and i n f i l t r a t e a l l levels of working society. The majority of 
them are employed by the o i l company and to a lesser extent 
by the state, whilst a substantial number are employed by 
local companies and banks. They are so employed due to t h e i r 
working knowledge of English s as the o i l company, the banks, 
local companies and certain government departments conduct 
t h e i r a f f a i r s i n t h i s language. 
Others of them constitute a major force i n the island's 
commerce and trade and have well-established and prosperous 
businesses as merchants etc., 
The status of the Indians i n Bahrain i s rather a peculiar 
one, they consider themselves superior to the indigenous population, 
they l i v e i n t h e i r own social m i l i e u , and they have t h e i r own 
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clubs and societies, such as the Bahrain Sports Club which 
is purely Indian i n composition. They organise t h e i r own sports 
meetings and social occasions and at least two of the local 
cinemas show Indian films exclusively. 
They are resented by the Bahrainis population mainly on 
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economic grounds i n that they f e e l that the Indians have 
reduced the opportunities for advancement of the Bahrainis, 
especially i n the f i e l d of o i l company employment and banking, 
due to t h e i r willingness ass© supply ^ cheap, ready-trained 
labour. As early as 1940 the Bahrain newspaper wrote an a r t i c l e 
demanding that the o i l company should, as a matter of urgency, 
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t r a i n local labour to replace the Indians. 
Another source of resentment was that the Indians exercised 
an influence w i t h i n Bahrain out of proportion to t h e i r numbers 
i n the island. They were able to exert t h i s influence due to 
t h e i r strong position i n the island's administration as 
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administrators s police o f f i c e r s and clerks. 
At the flame time they were often granted privileges 
which were denied to the Bahrainis. Whilst the native workers 
of the o i l company were treated on an individual basis with 
regard to payment, the Indians, as B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s , were 
allowed to c a l l upon the services of the P o l i t i c a l Agent to 
ensure minimum standards on t h e i r conditions of service and wage 
increases, en bloc. This i s i l l u s t r a t e d by a l e t t e r from the 
o i l company's chief local representative to the P o l i t i c a l Agent, 
Mr. G.N, Jackson, on 18th February, 1942 which states ..... 
"Referring to your verbal request yesterday f o r 
the basic wage rates paid our B r i t i s h Indian Artisan 
employees. The present h i r i n g rate for Artisans 
i s R S o5per working day with 26 working days 
guaranteed per month and for approximately one year 
now, we have contracted no B r i t i s h Indian Artisans 
at less than t h i s rate."45 
Another p r i v i l e g e which was resented by the Bahraini 
population was the fact that the Indians were allowed access 
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to certain public places, such as the Gymkhana Club, which 
were otherwise reserved for Westerners only; and here and i n 
other l o c a l i t i e s they were allowed to purchase alcohol. As well 
as t h i s , they are issued with a permit by the P o l i t i c a l Agent 
which e n t i t l e s them to a monthly allocation of alcoholic 
beverage. 
The problem of alcohol i s a delicate one. Legally, as 
Moslems, the local people are prohibited from drinking or 
buying alcohol but due to Western influences and for social 
purposes, many of them do drink. Their source of supply i s by 
the i l l e g a l purchase of alcohol from the Indians, who s e l l at a 
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handsome p r o f i t , a point which exacerbates the s i t u a t i o n . 
- 56 -
The fact that the Indians, especially the white-collar 
workers consider themselves superior to the native population 
and to be western-oriented i s not accepted by the Bahrainis. 
The Bahrainis see the Indians merely as fellow-workers i n the 
o i l company and as menial workers i n the service industries, 
such as waiters, t a i l o r s , washermen, domestic servants, etc., 
In the meantime th e i r claim to be Western-oriented i s n u l l i f i e d 
by the fact that the Westerners look upon the Indians merely as 
th e i r sub-ordinates. 
To sum up, i t can be said that although the Indians i n 
Bahrain are resented on economic and social grounds, the 
Bahrainis do not hold any r a c i a l prejudice and have a great 
respect for I n d i a . ^ 
The second largest group of foreigners i n Bahrain are the 
Iranians. The number of Iranians shown i n the census i s not 
s t r i c t l y accurate and the number i s actually greater than that 
shown. This i s because the census records as Iranians, only those 
who do not hold Bahraini citizenship. A large number of Iranians 
have been on the island since the 17th centaury and others have 
settled there over the years. Many of these accepted Bahrain 
citizenship i n 1937 and are o f f i c i a l l y recognized as Bahrainis. 
A great many other Iranians were not recorded due to the high rate 
of i l l e g a l immigration of these people on to the island i n search 
of work. 
The Iranians are resented by the local population on purely 
p o l i t i c a l grounds because of the long-standing claim by the 
Iranian Government to the sovereignty of Bahrain, and they were 
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suspected by the local people, and also by the B r i t i s h , as a f i f t h 
column during the Anglo-Iranian c r i s i s of the 1950's, when the Iranians 
of Bahrain viewed Mossadeq as a l i b e r a t o r and displayed his 
picture prominently i n t h e i r homes and work places."*^ 
Although they are Shia, they do not i d e n t i f y themselves 
with the Bahama, probably because of the difference i n t h e i r 
economic status. They are mainly engaged i n trade and they 
constitute a prosperous merchant group. Some others of them 
work i n the o i l industry or as employees of various businesses. 
The poorer of them work mainly i n the docks or i n the native 
building trade. 
The merchant classes tend to mix reasonably well with the 
Huwala merchants, but between themselves they always speak 
Persian s although they know the Arabic language, a fact which 
tends to create suspicion i n the mind of the average Bahraini. 
They s t i l l educate t h e i r children i n separate schools i n Manama, 
which are supported by money collected by Iranian merchants, 
and here they are taught the Iranian language and culture. 
The fact that the schools were privately run, placed them outside 
the authority of the Bahrain Education services u n t i l recent 
years. 
The resentment of the Iranians by the l o c a l people came 
to a head during the 1950's when during the p o l i t i c a l upheaval, 
rumours were r i f e i n the island that the Government had found a 
cache of arms intone of t h e i r clubs, the Ferduce , or Paradise 
Club. This turned out l a t e r to be false but the resentment was 
strengthened when the Iranians formed a committee i n r i v a l r y to 
the Higher Executive Committee, ®n act which was looked upon by 
the people a s proof that they were a f i f t h column. 
- 58 -
P o l i t i c a l relationships between Bahrain and Iran 
improved i n 1971 with the agreement by the Iranians to 
recognise Bahrain as an independent state. This may help to 
ease the p o l i t i c a l tensions between the natives and Iranians 
i n Bahrain but could i n the future lead to social tension between 
them i f the legal immigration of Iranians increases, and due to 
th e i r well known f l a i r for business, they establish themselves 
as a major economic force i n the island. Already, since the 
signing of the Agreement, the Iranians have opened a branch of 
t h e i r National Bank i n Manama and th e i r national a i r l i n e has 
introduced a regular service to Bahrain. So unless, i n the near 
fut u r e , the government of Bahrain places a l i m i t on t h e i r level 
of investments, the Iranians could once more become resented on 
economic, instead of p o l i t i c a l grounds. 
A minority group i n Bahrain, who posed a problem, were 
the Jews, a problem which has now resolved i t s e l f . 
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There were between 300 and 400 Jews i n Manama, who 
arrived there following the p o l i t i c a l upheaval i n Iraq during 
the 1920's. Although they accepted Bahrain n a t i o n a l i t y they s t i l l 
considered themselves, f i r s t and foremost, as Jews. 
The community were well known for t h e i r high standard of 
l i v i n g , high level of education and t h e i r receptiveness to 
western influences. They were engaged exclusively i n trading, 
money exchanging and dealing i n r e a l estate. As "People of the 
Book" they were a protected community, Dimah . . They did not 
play an active part i n the public l i f e of Bahrain, although one 
of them usually occupied a seat on the Municipal Council. 
There was no real c o n f l i c t between them and the Local Arab 
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Communities u n t i l the Arab-Israeli c o n f l i c t s of 1947. Their 
children enjoyed the educational f a c i l i t i e s provided i n local 
schools as did the lo c a l children and i n the early 1940's 
many of the younger Jewish students developed f r i e n d l y 
relationships with the Arab students and they did well i n the 
f i e l d s of education and sport. 
The Jewish community was respected by the local people and 
many businessmen preferred to deal with them rather than t h e i r 
own people s as they were noted for keeping t h e i r word. Jewish 
women often provided a service f o r the Arab women, who were 
confined to t h e i r homes, by purchasing merchandise i n the markets 
and hawking i t around the Arab homes. This peaceful coexistence 
was disturbed i n l a t e 1947 when the Arab community heard of the 
UoN. decision to p a r t i t i o n Palestine and form the new Jewish 
state of I s r a e l . Demonstrations broke out on 3rd December, 1947 
with the people shouting slogans against the Jews. The houses of 
some Jews were broken into and ransacked, although the police 
soon arrived on the scene. Some of the Arabs were ashamed of 
the actions of t h e i r countrymen and gave shelter to the Jews 
but from that date, relations between them were never the same 
again. 
With the growth of the Arab-Israeli c o n f l i c t s the tension 
between Arabs and Jews i n Bahrain increased to the point of 
delicacy and although violence was never used against them, they 
were subjected to a complete boycott. 
Gradually the Jews began to wind up t h e i r businesses and 
to emigrate to Europe or Is r a e l and nowadays only a few elderly 
Jews remain i n Bahrain conducting t h e i r businesses i n a small way. 
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The majority of the non-Bahraini Arabs are Omanis, who 
emigrated to Bahrain following the discovery of o i l , i n the 
hope of earning money. They are employed mainly as manual 
labour although some have gained employment as clerks. Towards 
them and Arabs from other Gulf states the a t t i t u d e of the 
Bahrainis i s f r i e n d l y , and they are regarded as Awlad Al-Am , 
or cousins, and there are no p o l i t i c a l , social or economic 
problems between them, i n fact they f u l f i l a need for certain 
classes of labour not obtainable elsewhere. Their numbers are 
now tending to decrease s l i g h t l y following the development of 
the Abu Dabi and Oman o i l f i e l d s . 
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Other Arabs are of Lebanese, United Arab Republic, I r a q i 
and Jordanian o r i g i n and most work as teachers i n the schools, 
although the Lebanese are often businessmen. Most of the natives 
appreciate what they have done for Bahrain, especially i n the 
educational f i e l d and nursing, but they do not mix to any great 
extent with the native population. 
The l a s t group to be considered are the Westerners, mainly 
B r i t i s h and American, who form the higher levels of the o i l 
company, banks, and to a lesser extent, the government. They 
are not resented by the natives on social or economic grounds 
as i t i s recognised that they often possess s k i l l s which are 
needed by the administration which are not yet possessed by the 
loca l people, but there i s s l i g h t resentment i n some quarters 
over the amount of p o l i t i c a l influence wielded by them. 
However, i n general they are tolerated as being necessary 
to the island and the fact that the Westerners l i v e apart from 
the native population i n t h e i r own town, Awali, or i n the suburbs 
tends to minimise the problems which might otherwise occur. 
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P A R T TWO 
E C O N O M I C A O S O C I A L C H A N G E 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y , the people of Bahrain have earned th e i r 
l ivelihood from three main sources, pearl f i s h i n g , agriculture 
and trade. The f i r s t two industries provided not only a source 
of income to the majority of the people, but also a way of l i f e 
which, due to i t s system of working, held them i n v i r t u a l 
bondage. Trade, whilst i t did not employ a great number of people 
i n Bahrain, was nevertheless important as i t provided the major 
source of revenue for the State prior to the discovery of o i l . 
There were, of course, many other smaller industries''" such 
as f i s h i n g and boat building, but these were never large 
employers of labour and were therefore never quite so important. 
One feature of a l l these industries was that nowhere was a 
man paid a regular fixed wage, payment being on a speculative 
basis. This, therefore led to complete lack of security for the 
mass of the people. Another feature was that most people 
employed i n the local industries, because they owned the basic 
2 
tool of t h e i r trade, considered themselves free agents, able to 
work where they pleased, but i n actual f a c t , without r e a l i s i n g 
i t they were bound inexorably to the system. 
One of the main problems of labour i n Bahrain was that the 
people were unaware of any method of s e l l i n g t h e i r labour to 
the best advantage, or of organizing themselves to confront t h e i r 
employers., They often shared t h e i r labour with others, on what 
appeared to them to be a co-operative basis, as for instance did 
the pearl divers; and the profitO of t h e i r labours, i f there was 
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one, was divided between them. I t was not u n t i l the growth 
of the o i l industry took place that they saw the advantages 
of s e l l i n g t h e i r labour fo r a fixed sum i n return for 
performing specific tasks. 
These so-called t r a d i t i o n a l industries had been carried 
on i n Bahrain for many hundreds of years and the inhabitants 
of the island, whether native or newcomer, had of necessity to 
r e l y upon these sources for t h e i r income as there were no 
alternatives. 
The two main industries of pearling and agriculture are 
today declining and what was the most important, pearl f i s h i n g , 
i s now v i r t u a l l y dead due to several reasons, such as the 
growth of the cultured pearl industry i n Japan, the uncertainties 
and the harsh way of l i f e which i t imposed, and the a t t r a c t i o n 
of the prosperity brought about by the discovery and exploitation 
of o i l . 
I t may have been expected that agriculture i n the islands 
would have benefited from the increased demands placed upon i t 
by the rapid increase i n population as the o i l industry grew and 
from the anticipated introduction of modern machinery and methods. 
This however was not the case due to a number of factors, such 
as the lack of security of tenure of the farmers and the 
increasing labour demands of new industries. These factors, 
combined with the greater demands which were placed on the 
natural water supplies, which are now so heavily abstracted 
that they are becoming increasingly saline, has made farming 
more and more d i f f i c u l t . 
The only survivor of the three major industries, and one 
which has benefited from the changes which have taken place i n 
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Bahrain,, i s the trade which has, due to the i n i t i a l wealth 
of the participants, adapted i t s e l f to the growth of the 
new industries and met the demands of the growing economy. 
Although i t has expanded greatly the basic nature has not 
changed i n that there are s t i l l no major manufacturing 
industries but only groups of merchants engaging i n import and 
export and acting as middle-men. 
Of the minor industries only f i s h i n g remains v i r t u a l l y 
unchanged with the fishermen catching enough for t h e i r own 
needs and s e l l i n g any surplus to t h e i r neighbours or, i n some 
cases to f i s h dealers from the towns. 
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FOOTNOTES 
lo A number of minor i n d u s t r i e s e x i s t such as p o t t e r y , 
weaving, and p r e p a r a t i o n of lime and gypsum f o r the 
l o c a l b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r i e s . A l l of these were c a r r i e d 
out on an i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s along the l i n e s of cottage 
i n d u s t r i e s . 
2. A l l workers owned t h e i r own t o o l s , the farmer h i s 
s c y t h e s and hoes, the fisherman h i s nets and t r a p s , 
the p u l l e r i n the p e a r l i n g i n d u s t r y h i s ropes and 
the d i v e r h i s o y s t e r net and b a l l a s t stone. 
C H A P T E R O N E 
TRADITIONAL A C T I V I T I E S 
a) The P e a r l F i s h e r i e s 
The p e a r l f i s h e r i e s were the main source of income f o r 
the people of the i s l a n d f o r many y e a r s . The p e a r l beds 
around Bahrain have been famous f o r thousands of y e a r s 
and have been mentioned by w r i t e r s a s f a r back as 2000 B.C.''' 
We know d e f i n i t e l y t h a t the Greeks, Arabs and Portugese, throughout 
2 
t h e i r h i s t o r i e s , mention t h i s f a c t . 
I t appears t h a t s e v e r a l f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d to make 
the seas around Bahrain s u i t a b l e f o r the growing of p e a r l s i n c e 
the days of a n t i q u i t y . The shallow water and the i n t e n s e summer 
heat combine to make the water warm and provide c o n d i t i o n s which 
may be to the p e a r l o y s t e r ' s l i k i n g . 
S i r C h a r l e s Belgrave, w r i t i n g i n 1968 on the P e a r l i n d u s t r y 
i n B a hrain, s t a t e d 
"Masudi, a n i n t h c e n t u r y Arab w r i t e r , d e s c r i b e d 
i n h i s books the methods of d i v i n g and customs 
of the p e a r l i n d u s t r y i n the Gu l f . H i s 
d e s c r i p t i o n f i t t e d almost e x a c t l y the c o n d i t i o n s 
i n the p e a r l i n d u s t r y , and the way.the men d i v e , when 
I f i r s t went to the Gulf i n 1926." 
Since the customs and methods employed by the i n d u s t r y have 
not changed f o r the l a s t 1,000 y e a r s we may d e s c r i b e w i t h 
c e r t a i n t y , the t r a d i t i o n a l methods. 
There a r e c e r t a i n dates which c o n t r o l l e d the d i v i n g seasons 
and the main season was from the beginning of June to the 
beginning of October, the p e r i o d which u s u a l l y s u p p l i e s the b e s t 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r p e a r l i n g , the water being a t i t s warmest, and 
was known l o c a l l y a s A l ghaws a l - K a b i r (the Big D i v i n g ) . 
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The R u l e r normally i s s u e d a proclamation f i x i n g the 
date of the s t a r t of the season. 
There were two other l e s s important seasons, before and 
a f t e r t h i s p e r i o d . The f i r s t was Ghaws a l - b a r i d , the c o l d 
d i v i n g , running from A p r i l to May, and Mujannah , running 
from October to March. During these two p e r i o d s , small boats 
worked c l o s e i n s h o r e and d i d not venture f a r from the i s l a n d . 
I t was from the r e p o r t s of the d i v e r s during Ghaws a l - b a r i d , 
on water temperature and the s t a t e of the p e a r l beds t h a t the 
date f o r the s t a r t of the main season, a l Ghaws a l - K a b i r 
was f i x e d . 
The f i r s t day of the main season was marked by the boats 
l e a v i n g port en masse w i t h f l a g s f l y i n g , and the people s i n g i n g 
and b e a t i n g drums. Leading the p r o c e s s i o n of s h i p s was the 
"Admiral" of the p e a r l f l e e t , who i s u s u a l l y the most experienced 
c a p t a i n , or Nakuda , and he was the man who r e p r e s e n t e d the 
B a h r a i n f l e e t when they met w i t h the f l e e t s from other p o r t s i n 
the G u l f . Having l e f t p o r t , the f l e e t then broke up and 
proceeded to what each i n d i v i d u a l c a p t a i n c o n s i d e r e d to be the 
b e s t p e a r l beds. 
On board each boat t h e r e were a number of d i v e r s , Ghawas , 
normally from 10 to 40 i n number, depending upon the c a p a c i t y of 
the dhow. There was an e q u i v a l e n t number of men known as Sayb • 
or p u l l e r s , whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was to r a i s e the d i v e r from 
the sea bed. Sometimes i n the l a r g e r boats t h e r e were more men 
known as Redeef or a s s i s t a n t p u l l e r s , who rendered a s s i s t a n c e 
when the d i v e r was working i n deep wate r s . The complement of the 
s h i p was completed by one or two boys known as Tabab who 
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provided the C a p t a i n w i t h .meals and.refreshments 9 some would 
l a t e r t r a i n as d i v e r s . 
The c h o i c e of p e a r l beds f o r f i s h i n g , F a s h t , depended to a 
l a r g e extent on the c a p t a i n s ' e x p e r i e n c e , although d i v e r s who had a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e knowledge of the p e a r l beds advi s e d him i n h i s c h o i c e . 
The working day of the d i v e r s t a r t e d a t s u n r i s e and 
continued throughout the day t i l l s u n s e t . Each d i v e r had two 
ropes, the one on which he descended was weighted w i t h a l a r g e 
stone, H a j a r , to take him q u i c k l y to the bottom and he c a r r i e d the 
second rope w i t h him, t i e d around the w a i s t . As soon as he 
reached the bottom the p u l l e r r a i s e d the weighted rope ready 
f o r the next d i v e , and the d i v e r h e l d the second rope, to which 
he was t i e d , and plac e d about h i s neck an open-weave palm basket, 
C i y y i n , i n which to p l a c e the o y s t e r s . On h i s nose he w6©rs a c l i p , 
Fitam, t h i s kept the water out of h i s nose and enabled him to hold 
h i s b r e a t h longer and a t the same time l e f t both hands f r e e f o r 
work. Sometimes the d i v e r would a l s o s t u f f c o t t o n or beeswax i n 
h i s e a r s f o r p r o t e c t i o n . He a l s o wore a s e t of l e a t h e r f i n g e r 
t himbles to p r o t e c t h i s f i n g e r s from c o t a l and other sharp o b j e c t s . 
Apart from these o b j e c t s , and a l o i n c l o t h , the d i v e r was naked. 
The d i v e r , once on the bottom, c o l l e c t e d as many s h e l l s as he 
could and when ready to ascend, s i g n a l l e d ^ on the rope t i e d around 
him. The p u l l e r , standing on the gunwhale, having r e c e i v e d the 
s i g n a l , immediately r a i s e d the d i v e r by means of the rope. Having 
been r a i s e d to the s u r f a c e the d i v e r s c a t c h was taken from him, an 
average 8 to 12 s h e l l s , and he r e s t e d f o r a few moments by hanging onto 
the s i d e of the boat, a f t e r which the process was repeated. The 
4 
time spent below the s u r f a c e which was normally one minute, 
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was known.' as Tabah. A f t e r completing t e n d i v e s the men came 
on board to r e s t . Ten d i v e s would normally occupy about t h r e e 
q u a r t e r s of an hour 9 a f t e r which the d i v e r was dragged out 
of the water and man-handled to some spot on the s h i p to recovers, 
o f t e n l o o k i n g more dead than a l i v e . A f t e r a per i o d of r e s t , and 
refreshment, u s u a l l y c o f f e e , he began a g a i n . 
The d i v e r u s u a l l y performed 40 to 60 d i v e s per day i n 
waters ranging i n depth from 30 to 70 f e e t . For the l a t t e r depths 
the p u l l e r was given a s s i s t a n c e i n r a i s i n g the d i v e r . 
The d i v e r experienced great danger and discomfort not 
only from the a t t a c k s of sharksand s a w f i s h but a l s o from the 
masses of s t i n g i n g j e l l y f i s h which swim a t a l l l e v e l s and bairn 
the body of the d i v e r or i n some c a s e s even put out an eye. 
P h y s i c a l damage was o f t e n s u f f e r e d by the d i v e r r e s u l t i n g from t i e 
d ^ e ^ d r i v i n g h i m s e l f p a s t the l i m i t s of human endurance. The 
"bends" were a common a f f l i c t i o n amongst the d i v e r s and produced 
severe p a i n s i n the j o i n t s , p a r a l y s i s or even death. Suppuration 
of the ear drums and rheumatism were a l s o common amongst the 
d i v e r s . I f the d i v e r stayed down too long he a l s o o f t e n s u f f e r e d 
from se v e r e b l e e d i n g from the e a r s and nose. A few seconds n e g l e c t 
by the p u l l e r s could mean the d i f f e r e n c e between l i f e and death 
t o the d i v e r and t h e r e f o r e g r e a t co-operation and a t t e n t i o n was 
needed. The d i v e r s never a t e w h i l s t working and took only s m a l l 
s i p s of e i t h e r c o f f e e or water a s food would cause nausea. 
Having f i n i s h e d d i v i n g f o r the day i t was customary f o r 
the d i v e r to have a meagre meal of f i s h , dates and r i c e and 
immediately s l e e p f o l l o w i n g h i s e x e r t i o n s i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the 
next day. These small meals were g e n e r a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t to s u s t a i n 
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t h e e n e r g i e s of: the divers;throughout the season. The small 
meals,, combined w i t h the. extremely ppor l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s 
aboard the boats took t h e i r t o l l of the d i v e r s ' s t r e n g t h and 
by the end of the d i v i n g season they were u s u a l l y i n v e r y poor 
p h y s i c a l , c o n d i t i o n . 
The s h e l l s c o l l e c t e d were u s u a l l y l e f t o vernight so 
t h a t they may be more e a s i l y opened, and the opening of 
the s h e l l s was the f i r s t job of the next day. The s h e l l s had 
been put i n t o a p i l e i n the middle of the deck as they were brought 
from the sea bed so t h a t no d i v e r knew e x a c t l y which was h i s 
c a t c h . The opening i s performed w i t h a small k n i f e , the f l e s h 
searched f o r p e a r l s and the empty s h e l l s and f l e s h thrown back 
i n t o the s e a . 
L e s s than one t h i r d of the s h e l l s opened y i e l d p e a r l s , 
mostly small and i r r e g u l a r l y shaped and may w e l l be c a l l e d " p e a r l 
dust". These p e a r l s were known l o c a l l y as l u l u and were of 
comparatively small v a l u e . The next i n s i z e and v a l u e was 
known as dana and w h i l s t i t was more v a l u a b l e , was s t i l l of 
i r r e g u l a r shape. The r a r e s t and most p r i z e d of p e a r l s was 
the hasbah which was l a r g e and p e r f e c t l y formed. 
The c a p t a i n watched the opening procedure c l o s e l y so t h a t 
no p e a r l s were s e c r e t e d . S t o r i e s were o f t e n t o l d of d i v e r s 
swallowing a v a l u a b l e p e a r l , but the experienced c a p t a i n u s u a l l y 
n o t i c e d t h i s and r ecovered i t by h i s own means. 
A f t e r the l a s t s h e l l s were opened the c a p t a i n then 
c o l l e c t e d the p e a r l s and t i e d them i n a red f l a n n e l c l o t h which 
he then put i n h i s s e a - c h e s t or b i s h t a k t a on the poop deck. A f t e r 
t h i s the b u s i n e s s of the day's d i v i n g began once more. 
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Before r e a c h i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets the p e a r l s 
u s u a l l y passed through many hands- The s a l e s u s u a l l y took 
p l a c e through one of two l o c a l c h annels. The f i r s t of t h e s e 
was the Tawash who eCZrz-, as w e l l as buying the p e a r l s s 
sometimes fi n a n c e d the e x p e d i t i o n s . They roamed i n launches 
between the v a r i o u s banks being f i s h e d and i f news of a good 
p e a r l came to t h e i r e a r s , they would make h a s t e to be f i r s t 
to c o n t a c t the a p p r o p r i a t e c a p t a i n i n the hope of buying i t 
cheaply by an immediate o f f e r of ready c a s h . Sometimes however 
the c a p t a i n would r e f u s e the o f f e r of the Tawash and keep h i s 
p e a r l s i n the hope of a b e t t e r o f f e r from the merchants ashore, 
who were the second l o c a l o u t l e t f o r the p e a r l s . 
Although the p r o f i t s taken by the Tawash and l o c a l 
merchants made them much w e a l t h i e r than the c a p t a i n o r d i v e r s , 
they d i d not p r o f i t a s much as o t h e r s , d e s p i t e t h e i r advantage 
of having f i r s t c h o i c e of the p e a r l s . 
They, i n t u r n , s o l d the p e a r l s to Hindu merchants who 
came a t the end o f the season, and who, by grading the p e a r l s 
and having them made up i n t o j e w e l l e r y , made the maximum p r o f i t 
when they introduced them to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. 
I ) The Economic and S o c i a l Impacts of the I n d u s t r y 
The d i r e c t income of the r u l e r s of Bahrain from the p e a r l i n g 
i n d u s t r y was never v e r y great and c o n s i s t e d only of a sma l l t a x 
which was l e v i e d on each boat. But the i n d i r e c t income was much 
g r e a t e r i n th a t the merchants who s o l d the p e a r l s o f t e n spent 
t h e i r money i n buying goods from abroad, and i t was upon th e s e goods 
t h a t a customs duty was f i x e d and i t was t h i s which s u p p l i e d the 
r u l e r s w i t h t h e i r main source of income. 
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V a r i o u s e s t i m a t e s of the v a l u e of the p e a r l trade have 
been quoted over the y e a r s and g e n e r a l l y , w i t h one or two e x c e p t i o n s , 
they show the d e c l i n e of the i n d u s t r y . 
The f i r s t recorded f i g u r e s of the v a l u e of the p e a r l s was 
given i n 1833, when Wilson s t a t e d t h a t the v a l u e of the t r a d e 
was then estimated as being between £200,000 and £240,000 per 
5 
annum. 
Zwemer, v i s i t i n g the i s l a n d s i n 1896 gave h i s estimate 
of t h e i r v a l u e when he quoted the v a l u e as being £303,941.** 
Graves, w r i t i n g on the l i f e of S i r Percy Cox, estimated 
the f i g u r e a t the t u r n of the century as £500,000 7 and i n 1901 
Q 
Busch put the f i g u r e a t £400,000. 
H a r r i s o n , an American doctor, r e s i d i n g i n Bahrain, 
q 
estimated t h a t i n 1913 the p e a r l t r a d e was worth $9,000,000. 
A h i g h l y u n l i k e l y f i g u r e of £2,000,000 was quoted by R^hani, who 
v i s i t e d the i s l a n d i n 1923 9 1^ > which seems a gross overstatement 
when compared w i t h the f i g u r e s given by Cox i n 1925 and 1926 
of £220,000 and £192,000 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 1 These l a t t e r e s t i m a t e s 
however c o n t r a d i c t those given by S i r C h a r l e s Belgrave f o r 1926 and 
the few f o l l o w i n g y e a r s as being i n the order of £1,500,000 per 
12 
annum. 
A f t e r the Second World War the d e c l i n e became more apparent, 
as was i l l u s t r a t e d by f i g u r e s which were produced by Americans 
working w i t h the o i l company i n B a h r a i n . Thornberg i n 1946 put 
13 
the v a l u e a t $250,000 approximately £62,500 and Kruegar i n 1949 
14 
gave a f i g u r e of $200,000 or approximately £59,000. 
The l a s t f i g u r e quoted, which appeared i n the Bahrain 
Government Annual Report, was i n 1954, when i t was estimated as 
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Rs 378,000 or approximately £27,000. 1 5 
These f i g u r e s can be t a b u l a t e d as f o l l o w s 
TABLE V I 
Estimated Value of P e a r l s landed i n Ba h r a i n 
f o r S e l e c t e d Years 
Year Revenue 
1833 £200,000 to £240,000 
1896 £303,941 
C i r c a 1900 £500,000 
1901 , £400,000 
1913 L ' £1,850,000 
1922 £2,000,000 
1925 £220,000 
1926 £192,000 
1926-1931 £1,500,000 
1946 1 6 « £62,000 
1949 £54,300 
1954 A £27,400 
Apart from the f i g u r e s given by R i h a n i i n 1923 and by S i r 
C h a r l e s Belgrave f o r the p e r i o d 1926 to 1931 i t can be seen t h a t 
the i n d u s t r y was d e c l i n i n g and the y e a r s a f t e r the Second World 
War show a d r a s t i c c u t i n the i n d u s t r y . The r a p i d d e c l i n e began 
i n the 1930's w i t h the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary c r i s i s and the 
growth of the c u l t i v a t e d p e a r l i n d u s t r y , and as s t a t e d , the d e c l i n e 
gathered momentum during the 1940's u n t i l i n the 1950 census 
no-one was recorded a s being employed i n the p e a r l i n d u s t r y . * 7 . 
The f i g u r e s quoted a f t e r 1950 a r e those of other G u l f Arabs 
t r a d i n g i n t o the p o r t s of Bahrain from the p e a r l banks. 
U n t i l the change i n the economic c l i m a t e of B a h r a i n , 
brought about by the d i s c o v e r y of o i l , the p e a r l f i s h e r i e s 
provided the major sources of both income and employment to the 
i n h a b i t a n t s of Bahrain. F i g u r e s a r e a v a i l a b l e which i l l u s t r a t e 
the s i z e of the i n d u s t r y from 1835 onwards, some of them, ko^e-ve*.. 
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e s p e c i a l l y the e a r l i e r ones, must be t r e a t e d c o n s e r v a t i v e l y 
due to the f a c t t h a t they were e s t i m a t e s given by t r a v e l l e r s 
v i s i t i n g B a h r a i n . 
The f i r s t f i g u r e , which was quoted i n 1833, s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e 
were 1,500 boats i n the p e a r l f l e e t s ; 1 8 i n 1889, Bent, who was 
v i s i t i n g B a h rain a t t h a t time, gave the number of boats as 400 and 
t h a t each boat was worked by between e i g h t and twenty men.^^ 
Taking the average as 14 men per boat we a r r i v e a t a f i g u r e of 
5,600 men. W h i l s t the f i g u r e f o r the number of boats can be taken 
as c o r r e c t we f e e l t h a t Bent has under-estimated the number of men 
i n v o l v e d as i t i s probable t h a t he was quoting only the number of 
d i v e r s per boat and not the f u l l s h i p s complement and t h a t t h e r e f o r e 
t h i s f i g u r e could a t l e a s t be doubled g i v i n g a mimimum of 11,200 men. 
Zwemer put the number of boats i n 1896 as 900, which was 
probably an exaggeration or he has counted i n h i s t o t a l some boats 
from other p o r t s i n the G u l f ; he d i d not give any number of the men 
2 0 
employed i n the t r a d e . I n the y e a r s 1926 to 1931 more than 20,000 
2i 
men were employed i n 500 b o a t s . 
The i n d u s t r y began to d e c l i n e during the 1930's and 40's 
as f o r i n s t a n c e i n 1935 the f i g u r e s of 360 boats and 11,550 men 
were quoted; i n 1940 the f i g u r e dropped s h a r p l y to 191 boats and 
7,500 men; i n 1945 t h e r e were 121 boats engaging 5,100 men; i n 
1952 the f i g u r e s were down to 20 boats and 563 men and f i n a l l y i n 
22 
1954 t h e r e were only 11 boats employing 500 men. 
The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e shows th e s e numbers i n a comparative form. 
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TABLE V I I 
T able of Boats and Men i n the D i v i n g I n d u s t r y 
Year Boats Men 
1835 
1889 
1896 
1,500 
400 
900 
500 
360 
191 
121 
20 
11 
11,200 (approx.) 
1926-31 20,000 + 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1952 
1954 
11,550 
7,500 
5,100 
563 
500 
The running and f i n a n c i n g of the p e a r l i n d u s t r y throughout 
i t s h i s t o r y proved to be d i s a s t r o u s s o c i a l l y to v a r i o u s s e c t i o n s of 
the community but none more so than to the d i r e c t workers i n the 
i n d u s t r y , d i v e r s , p u l l e r s , e t c . , 
The s o c i a l impact of the p e a r l i n d u s t r y d i d not d i e w i t h the 
p e a r l f l e e t s but continued f o r a long w h i l e to c a s t i t s shadow over 
the l i v e s of the former p e a r l i n d u s t r y employees. 
The e v i l of the system l a y i n the method i n which the 
e x p e d i t i o n s were f i n a n c e d . P e a r l d i v i n g , by n a ture a s p e c u l a t i v e 
i n d u s t r y , a t t r a c t e d people i n the hopes of e a r n i n g money. 
The abuses of the system were most apparent a t the lower 
l e v e l , namely the d i v e r s and p u l l e r s , who comprised the l a r g e s t 
p r o p o r t i o n of the i n d u s t r y . The d i v e r s and p u l l e r s v i r t a a l l y 
mortgaged t h e i r l i v e s and l i v e l i h o o d to the p e a r l i n d u s t r y . T h i s 
was due to the f a c t t h a t they were not p a i d wages as such, but were 
e n t i t l e d to a share i n the p r o f i t s , something which r a r e l y gave them 
any r e t u r n a t a l l f o r t h e i r e f f o r t s . 
A d i v e r , s t a r t i n g the season, was u s u a l l y given a cash payment, 
S a l a f y h , ( c r e d i t ) , which was intended to support h i s f a m i l y w h i l e he 
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was away5 a t the end of the season, a f t e r the s a l e of the p e a r l s , 
the d i v e r s were given another payment c a l l e d Tisgam, or maintenance, 
and i n the w i n t e r , when no d i v i n g took p l a c e he was given K a r j i y a n , 
pocket money, i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f him d i v i n g f o r the same c a p t a i n the 
f o l l o w i n g y e a r . 
A l l of t h e s e c a s h advances were recorded a g a i n s t the d i v e r s 
name i n the c a p t a i n s log-book, but i t was only v e r y r a r e l y t h a t a 
d i v e r would earn enough to c a n c e l h i s debt to the c a p t a i n . When a 
d i v e r d i d not earn s u f f i c i e n t to c a n c e l these debts, the amount 
outstanding was c a r r i e d forward to the f o l l o w i n g year and i n t e r e s t 
charged upon i t . 
Having once taken an advance from the c a p t a i n , a d i v e r was 
compelled to work f o r t h a t c a p t a i n throughout the f o l l o w i n g season, 
and i n e f f e c t the d i v e r s doomed themselves to work u n t i l t h e i r 
death i n an e f f o r t to repay these debts. U n t i l 1923, when the 
General Reforms i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were s t a r t e d i n B a h r a i n , even 
death was not an e x i t f o r the B a h r a i n d i v e r , as h i s debts were 
then i n h e r i t e d by h i s sons or b r o t h e r s , who were f o r c e d to enter the 
p e a r l i n d u s t r y themselves u n l e s s they had money or property w i t h 
which to c l e a r the debt. Some of the more inhuman of the c a p t a i n s 
would i n s i s t <$n marrying the widow of the d i v e r as payment f o r the 
debts, and i n doing so obtained f o r themselves the c h i l d r e n of the 
d i v e r to a c t as s e r v a n t s i n h i s house and l a t e r , to be t r a i n e d as 
d i v e r s themselves. 3 
The d i v e r s , however, were not the only people to be i n debt, 
as the c a p t a i n s themselves were o f t e n forced to o b t a i n f i n a n c e from 
the merchants i n the towns to equip and p r o v i s i o n t h e i r boats and to 
pay the advances to t h e i r d i v e r s . The shore merchants charged 
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i n t e r e s t on t h e i r money and the c a p t a i n s passed t h i s i n t u r n , 
onto t h e i r d i v e r s . 
The charging of i n t e r e s t , or usury, i s c o n t r a r y to I s l a m i c 
law, but the merchants circumvented t h i s by a system known as 
Mukalaba or turn-over. The system worked by the merchant s e l l i n g 
to the c a p t a i n c e r t a i n goods or p r o v i s i o n s , f o r a f i x e d sum, the 
goods were immediately r e s o l d by the c a p t a i n to the merchant f o r a 
c a s h payment which was a p p r e c i a b l y l e s s than t h a t o r i g i n a l l y s p e c i f i e d . 
The d i f f e r e n c e between th e s e two p r i c e s formed the i n t e r e s t payment 
to the merchant. 
When the season came to an end, the c a p t a i n deducted from the 
s a l e of the p e a r l s , the c o s t of the crews' food and p r o v i s i o n s . The 
remainder re p r e s e n t e d the p r o f i t and was shared a c c o r d i n g to c e r t a i n 
r u l e s , depending on whether or not the c a p t a i n was the owner of the 
boat. 
I f the c a p t a i n owned the boat, one h a l f of the p r o f i t s were 
r e t a i n e d by him, and the remainder was d i v i d e d amongst the crew 
a f t e r the deduction of any advances made, wi t h the d i v e r s t a k i n g 
two shares to the p u l l e r s oneo She Tabab, or boys, r e c e i v e d nothing. 
I f the c a p t a i n was not the owner, he was e n t i t l e d to only 
o n e - f i f t h of the p r o f i t s , the remainder of h i s normal 50% being 
p a i d to the owners of f i n a n c i e r s of the boat. The other h a l f was 
paid to the crew on the p r e v i o u s l y mentioned share system. 
The merchant who put up the money for the e x p e d i t i o n was 
e n t i t l e d to buy the p e a r l s a t 20% below the market v a l u e and t h i s 
o b v i o u s l y f u r t h e r reduced the earnings of both c a p t a i n and crew and 
had the e f f e c t of p u t t i n g them f u r t h e r i n t o debt, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 
a bad season. 
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The f a c t t h a t the d i v e r s were i l l i t e r a t e l e d to many 
abuses of the system by the c a p t a i n s . Because the d i v e r s could 
n e i t h e r read nor w r i t e i t was p o s s i b l e f o r the c a p t a i n to f a l s i f y 
the accounts so t h a t the d i v e r s were permanently i n debt to him 
and i t was not unknown f o r the accounts of the b e s t d i v e r s to be 
f a l i s i f e d the most i n order t h a t t h e i r s e r v i c e s were r e t a i n e d f o r 
f u t u r e seasons. 
I f the c a p t a i n h i m s e l f was i n debt, he was o f t e n f o r c e d 
to s e l l h i s ship or h i s house to the merchants i n order t h a t he may 
c a r r y on; q u i t e o f t e n the c a p t a i n s sank so f a r i n t o debt t h a t 
they were fo r c e d to become d i v e r s themselves. 
The p o s i t i o n of the d i v e r was summed up by H a r r i s o n who 
wrote, i n 1924 ......o... 
"The d\ver i s known as a s l a v e f o r the r e s t of h i s 
l i f e 0 At i s probably e a s i e r f o r a negro s l a v e on 
the P i r a t e Coast to escape, than i t i s f o r a 
B a h r a i n i d i v e r to r e g a i n h i s freedom. As long as 
he i s i n debt he cannot change h i s employer, no 
matter how badly he i s t r e a t e d , nor can he l e a v e 
the town, except under bonds to r e t u r n before the 
d i v i n g season begins and he w i l l never be a b l e to 
get out of debt, he cannot read or w r i t e , t h e r e i s 
no w i t n e s s to the t r a n s a c t i o n s t h a t take p l a c e 
between the c a p t a i n and h i m s e l f . I t i s the 
recognised t h i n g f o r the d i v e r s to r e c e i v e a l o a n 
of rice.„. The sum w r i t t e n i n t o the books i s 
r e g u l a r l y about 50% g r e a t e r than the market v a l u e 
of the r i c e . I f n e c e s s a r y e n t i r e l y f a l s e e n t r i e s 
a r e w r i t t e n i n . The upshot of the matter i s t h a t 
t h e i r men never get out of debt, not one i n a 
thousand of them. 
I n seven y e a r s r e s i d e n c e i n Bahrain, I have 
never y e t met a d i v e r who had escaped from the 
account book, as the Arabs put i t . 
The d e c l i n e of the p e a r l i n d u s t r y brought f u r t h e r problems 
f o r the people working i n the i n d u s t r y , the c a p t a i n s went 
bankrupt and the d i v e r s went f u r t h e r i n t o debt. I n s p i t e of s e l l i n g 
a l l t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s the debts were s t i l l not met or l i q u i d a t e d , and 
i t was not unusual to f i n d people working i n the o i l i n d u s t r y and a t 
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other j o b s f o r up to two decades before the debts were c l e a r e d . 
As i f t h i s were not enough, the c o n t r o l of these p r o p e r t i e s 
and l a n d s , passed i n t o the hands of the merchants and f i n a n c i e r s 
who p r o f i t e d g r e a t l y from them and became even r i c h e r during the 
time of economic growth and development f o l l o w i n g the d i s c o v e r y of 
o i l . 
The abuses of the p e a r l trade were not confined only to the 
p e a r l t r a d e i t s e l f but extended even i n t o the A r b i t r a t i o n Court 
which d e a l t w i t h d i s p u t e s i n the p e a r l t r a d e . T h i s a r b i t r a t i o n 
body, which was c a l l e d l o c a l l y Mahkamah al-Ghaws, or d i v i n g court 
was supposed to a d j u d i c a t e i n d i s p u t e s between the d i v e r s and 
c a p t a i n s , and u s u a l l y c o n s i s t e d of two or t h r e e of the more 
i n f l u e n t i a l c a p t a i n s , who were appointed by the R u l e r . At one time, 
i n the y e a r s immediately p r i o r to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e reforms of 
1923, the c o u r t was reduced to o n l y one i n d i v i d u a l . 
Because of the s t r u c t u r e of the c o u r t , i n t h a t the c a p t a i n s 
were the a d j u d i c a t o r s , the c o u r t was o f t e n b i a s e d and the d i v e r s 
r a r e l y found t h e r e the j u s t i c e which they were seeking. Evidence, 
as such, was not taken, but the c a s e was decided p u r e l y upon 
statements made by the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d under oath; but the c a p t a i n s 
o f t e n circumvented t h i s by e i t h e r t r i c k e r y during the t a k i n g of the 
oath or by bought w i t n e s s e s . The d i v e r s , on the other hand, having 
l i t t l e or no money, and u s u a l l y being i l l i t e r a t e could p r e s e n t n e i t h e r 
w r i t t e n evidence nor could they a f f o r d to buy w i t n e s s e s , a s d i d the 
c a p t a i n s , and thus the s c a l e s were h e a v i l y loaded a g a i n s t them. 
2) The Reforms 
Up to 1924 nothing had been done to improve the c o n d i t i o n s 
of the men working i n the i n d u s t r y , although a f t e r the F i r s t World 
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War the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Agents o f t e n made mention i n t h e i r 
r e p o r t s of the ha r s h c o n d i t i o n s s u f f e r e d by the men i n the p e a r l 
t r a d e . However, a f t e r the s i t u a t i o n i n Bahrain had been changed 
by the Reforms of 1923, and a modern a d m i n i s t r a t i o n began to get 
under way, Major C. Dal y , the P o l i t i c a l Agent (1921-26), f e l t a b l e 
to i n t r o d u c e , i n 1924, a major reform i n the i n d u s t r y , backed by 
26 
the two Qadis of the Sunna and Shxa s e c t s , the newly c r e a t e d 
Shaikh Hamed b i n I s a and a l s o w i t h the support of the B r i t i s h 
Government i n I n d i a . ' 
Daly's work a t t h a t time was not f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d , although 
time proved t h a t the reforms which he promulgated were the most 
p r o g r e s s i v e i n the p e a r l t r a d e f o r many y e a r s . The p r i n c i p a l 
f e a t u r e s of the s e new laws were as f o l l o w s J -
1. A l l h e r e d i t a r y debts were a b o l i s h e d . When a d i v e r 
d i e d , h i s debts died w i t h him. 
2. The amount advanced to a d i v e r Salafjyh, and the 
r a t e of i n t e r e s t were to be s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l l e d 
and no other charges were to be debited a g a i n s t 
the d i v e r . 
3. Merchants and c a p t a i n s were compelled to keep 
r e g u l a r accounts which were s c r u t i n i z e d by a 
number of d i v i n g c l e r k s appointed by the Bah r a i n 
Government. 
4. A system of accounts f o r the d i v e r s was i n s t i t u t e d . 
Each d i v e r was provided w i t h a sm a l l book which 
contained h i s account w i t h the Cap t a i n , as w e l l 
as other d e t a i l s , such as advanced of money or goods. 
These books were i n s p e c t e d a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s by 
the s p e c i a l l y appointed d i v i n g c l e r k s . 
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5 o The boat's captain was forbidden by law to s e l l 
pearls p r i v a t e l y , but must do so i n the presence 
of not less than three of his divers-
6. The divers were given the r i g h t to seek other 
jobs on condition that they repaid part of t h e i r 
debt each year, and they could no longer be 
forced to provide unpaid labour for t h e i r captains 
a f t e r the end of the pearling season. 
7. The old diving courts were to be reformed and i n 
addition the diver had the r i g h t to appear before 
an ordinary court i n any dispute with his captain, 
i f he so desired. 
Despite the fact that these reforms were designed primarily 
to help the diving community, and were backed by the more progressive 
members of the Bahrain people, the divers and pullers themselves were 
some of the main opponents of the reforms. Their main objection was 
to the r e s t r i c t i o n of the advances payable, they presumably preferred 
to have the cash to spend and worry about repaying i t l a t e r . During 
the f i r s t few years following the introduction of the reforms, the 
advance was r e s t r i c t e d to RslOO to the diver and Rs 80 to the p u l l e r . 
The divers considered t h i s amount i n s u f f i c i e n t and they 
regularly held demonstrations at the s t a r t of every season demanding 
higher advances. 
I n 1929, Shaikh Hamed raised the l i m i t on the advances to 
Rs. 130 fo r the diver and Rs. 100 fo r the pu l l e r s . I n t h i s same year 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent estimated that the Reforms had enabled as many as 
60% of the divers to get out of debt.28 
Although the reforms had proved to be of great benefit to the 
- 84 -
diving community, demonstrations and disturbances continued to 
break out at the s t a r t of every season u n t i l the climax was 
29 
reached i n the r i o t s of 1932. 
On the 25th Mays 1932, a number of divers were arrested 
following disturbances over the payment of Salafiyh and were 
imprisoned i n Manama- The following day 1500 of t h e i r 
colleagues crossed from Muharraq to Manama with a view to 
releasing them. On t h e i r way they looted several shops belonging 
to unpopular merchants, they then marched on the police station 
and obtained the release of the arrested men by force. 
The police, the B r i t i s h Adviser, the P o l i t i c a l Agent and 
several Shaikhs t r i e d to prevent them from doing so but were 
unsuccessful and the police were forced to open f i r e . Several 
divers were k i l l e d and a numbss. wounded. The r i o t e r s then 
dispersed, but the following day the r i n g leaders were arrested 
and subjected to a public flogging i n the market place, each man 
receiving ten lashes. 
T h i i was the l a s t incident of t h i s type, p a r t l y because of 
the setting up of a centralised Salfah Court, where the amount of 
advances could be fixed and grievances aired, and p a r t l y because 
of the new opportunities for work outside the pearl industry created 
by the nascent o i l industry and the subsequent decline of the pearl 
industry. I t was also possibly due to the divers f i n a l l y r e a l i s i n g 
that the reforms were entir&ly to t h e i r benefit. 
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b) Agriculture 
Before the discovery of o i l 9 agriculture formed the second 
t r a d i t i o n a l source of income for the inhabitants of Bahrain. The 
area cult i v a t e d was comparatively small, amounting only to approx-
imately ten per cent of the area of the islands s which represented 
only about 23 square miles under c u l t i v a t i o n . The cultivated area 
i s confined mainly to the north of the main island where natural 
fresh-water springs occur. 
The two most important products were dates and a l f a l f a and 
30 
these were supplemented by small vegetable gardens. The date 
palm tree played a si g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the l i f e of the Bahrain 
people p r i o r to the o i l era. I t not only provided them wi t h dates, 
which with r i c e and f i s h , formed the staple diet of the main part 
of the populace, but also provided them with almost everything they 
needed except clothes. I t s branches were used i n the construction 
3 l 
of t h e i r homes, the dry leaves were used as fuel and also to 
make mats and baskets, i t s wood was used to make f u r n i t u r e and the 
sticks to make f i s h traps. Moreover, the f i b r e of the tree was used 
to make ropes which were used by the fishermen. Thus the palm tree 
formed the centre of a g r i c u l t u r a l l i f e i n the islands. 
This importance i s i l l u s t r a t e d by a quotation from Mr. T. Bent 
when he ci t e s a conversation between himself and the Wazir of Isa 
bin A l i , during his v i s i t to the island i n 1889. I n pointing out to 
Bent the many advantages of the palm tree, he said, "Mohamed said, 
honour the date tree, f o r she i s your mother", to which Bent replied 
"True enough".^ 
This dependence upon the products of the date palm no longer 
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holds true today. The decline began i n the early 20th century 
and continued rapidly between the World Wars, since when i t has 
become a very minor part of the economic l i f e of Bahrain, to such 
33 an extent that i n 1967 60% of the date crop was simply abandoned. 
A number of social and economic factors contributed to the 
decline of agriculture i n Bahrain and the absence of a proper 
policy to t h i s section of the economy accelerated i t s decline. 
One of the main social factors was the system of tenure and 
renting of the land. This system has i t s roots i n the conquest 
of the island by the Al-Khalifah. I t has been suggested that 
p r i o r to the a r r i v a l of the Al-Khalifah i n Bahrain, that the land 
was owned by the Bahama, the Shia community of Bahrain. After 
the coming of Al-Khalifah and t h e i r a l l i e s the land was regarded 
as the property of the conquerors, to be disposed of as the ru l e r 
35 
wished. From t h i s point i n time, the rulers t r a d i t i o n a l l y regarded 
the land as t h e i r personal property to seize, give, rent or otherwise 
dispose of, as they saw f i t . 
The conquerors were helped to a certain extent by the fact 
that many Shia, fearing oppression and tyranny, and fearing involvement 
i n the wars which often broke out, f l e d to neighbouring countries, some 
to the mainland and some to Persia. Thus i t came about th a t , w i t h so 
much land vacant, a f t e r a while Al-Khalifah and t h e i r a l l i e s took over 
and divided between them most of the cultivated land. Having done t h i s 
they then proceeded to extract from the remaining Bahama^ a l l t h e i r 
wealth i n the form of land rents and taxes which were levied on the 
v i l l a g e s . This practice continued throughout the 19th century and 
the early years of the 20th. The tenure of land was made even more 
complex by the Shaikh Isa bin A l i (1869-1923) who would often give 
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or s e l l a particular piece of land two or three times to d i f f e r e n t 
persons on several occasions. 
rip. 
This a t t i t u d e of the rulers to the ownership of land 
continued well into the 20th century as for instance, when the 
Dawasir Arabs f l e d Bahrain following the p o l i t i c a l upheaval of 
1923, Shaikh Hamed b i n Isa, backed for a p o l i t i c a l reason by the 
B r i t i s h Resident, claimed the land which they abandoned as his 
personal property. 
The peasants who were fortunate enough not to have had th e i r 
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land taken from them by force were penalised by the imposition 
of heavy taxation which reduced them to the l e v e l of the tenant 
farmers who lived at bare subsistence l e v e l . 
I n the words of Major C. Daly ..... "Date garden tax. 
Collected quite a r b i t r a r i l y , according to the whim and appetite 
for oppression of the pa r t i c u l a r shaikhling, w i t h i n frhbse area the 
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garden exists. P r a c t i c a l l y collected from Shias only." 
One would expect that a f t e r the 1923 reforms some action would 
have been taken with regard to the s i t u a t i o n which existed i n the 
matter of land tenure, especially a f t e r the repeated a g i t a t i o n by the 
Shia; or at least to the questions of taxation and land rents, bearing 
39 
i n mind that e f f o r t s had been made to reform the pearling industry. 
I n fact the P o l i t i c a l Agent, the P o l i t i c a l Resident and the 
Government of India were concerned with t h i s problem, but decided 
to take no action upon i t at that time, as a matter of p o l i t i c a l 
expediency. This i s made clear i n correspondence between Trevor, the 
P o l i t i c a l Resident, and the Government of India. I n ta l k i n g of the 
Reform as a whole, he mentions the problems of land survey, 
r e g i s t r a t i o n and revenues and went on to say that the problem of the 
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land revenues was serious, because i t affected the Al-Khalifah 
as a whole and therefore should be deferred. I n the l e t t e r he 
states ... "We should not involve ourselves i n t h i s matter ....... 
because most of the land belongs to the Al-Khalhish family and 
the other to the Bahama. I f we collected the revenues, from the 
Bahama only, we would provoke t h e i r anger against u s . " ^ Thus, 
i t can be seen tha t , as the B r i t i s h did not wish either the 
ruler s or the peasants to be provoked by further drastic reforms, 
they presumably decided that for the time being they would merely 
r e t a i n the status quo. 
One of the greatest abuses was the system of land rents. 
These were not usually on a fixed monetary basis, although a small 
proportion were, but were fixed on the anticipated output of a 
parti c u l a r date garden. As rent, the tenant was expected to deliver 
a fix e d number of date "skins" to the o w n e r ^ irrespective of the 
harvest f o r that year or the circumstances prevailing i n the island. 
I f the tenant was unable to achieve his target he was often forced 
to purchase additional "skins" i n the open market, with a subsequent 
loss of income, and many tenants f e l l i n t o debt, or borrowed money 
at high rates of interest to r e t a i n t h e i r date gardens. 
To quote Harrison ........ 
"The terms under which the date c u l t i v a t o r s work 
are hard and oppressive. Contracts with the owner 
of the garden run f o r one year only and at the end 
of the time a new agreement must be made, the 
gardener must deliver not a certain percentage of 
the crop but a fixed number of t i n s or boxes of 
dates to the landlord. I n addition he must deliver 
a certain amount of a l f a l f a , i f he raised the crop, 
and of various other vegetables and f r u i t s , depending 
of course on what the gardener raises." 
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There were no other means of earning a l i v e l i h o o d s 
especially for the Bahama, before the era of o i l , except as 
either a peasant or diver. Because i n the l a t t e r occupation 
there was r i v a l r y f o r employment with the Sunna section of the 
community, the majority of the Bahama had no a l t e r n a t i v e except 
to work on the land and accept the conditions offered. 
The peasant families were l i v i n g under extremely insecure 
circumstances, either by the fear of being deprived of t h e i r 
tenancy, or going into debt, and i n addition t h e i r insecurity 
was often increased by the vague terms of the contract Daman 
which were often subject to a l t e r a t i o n by the owner. This l a t t e r 
condition was one of the grievances which were presented to 
Shaikh Isa Bin A l i i n 1922 along with other demands for reform. 
The demand stated ........ "4. Documents concerning gardens leased 
to subjects by the r u l i n g family to be i n duplicate, a copy i n 
possession of each party and to be witnessed by independent witnesses. 
No conditions other than those w r i t t e n i n the document to be enforced.. 
Although t h i s , along with other demands, were granted, the 
terms offered to the tenants did not become less harsh. 
A Land Department was created i n 1927 with the p r i n c i p a l 
object of r e g i s t e r i n g the ownership of the land and l e g a l i s i n g the 
position of the owners. A proclamation was issued on 20th December, 
1927 that a l l persons claiming to hold land must produce documentary 
evidence. This proclamation was presumably designed to c l a r i f y the 
position of many owners who held t h e i r lands either as g i f t s or by 
sale from ex- Shaikh Isa bin A l i . 
The second major land law was promulgated on 8th May, 1937, 
when the Government of Bahrain issued a proclamation supplementary 
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to the 1927 Land Registration. I t was on much the same lines 
as the 1927 proclamation but was designed to r e s t r i c t ownership 
of land i n Bahrain to Bahraini nationals and to deprive the 
foreign elements i n the island of any land they possessed. However, 
t h i s l a t t e r law confirmed that the ownership of a l l unclaimed land 
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passed to the State, and subsequently to the r u l e r . The purpose 
of the law was probably not so much to regulate land ownership as 
to provide a means of depriving the r i c h Iranian landlords of t h e i r 
holdings. This was confirmed i n November 1937^ when the Government 
issued a further notice stating that the new law applied s p e c i f i c a l l y 
to them. 
Neither of these laws dealt with the basic problem of land 
rents or d i s t r i b u t i o n although i t did l i m i t the power of a r b i t r a r y 
seizure of the land by the Shaikhs. 
Because of t h i s problem of the f i x i n g of a f a i r rent f o r the 
land was unsolved, from the 1930"s onwards as alternative employment 
became available i n the o i l industry, the peasants ceased to work the 
land and opted for the more secure employment of the o i l company. 
I n the words of the Government Report of 1954 "The magor 
portion of a g r i c u l t u r a l land i s owned by shaikhs and merchants who, on 
the whole, are not very interested i n agriculture. The rent charged 
i s r e l a t i v e l y high and as the cost of labour has r i s e n very appreciably 
i n the past few years, tenants are f i n d i n g i t increasingly d i f f i c u l t 
to meet the rents, and making a l i v i n g o f f the land." 
As the gardens were gradually abandoned, some of those nearer 
the towns, especially Manama, were destroyed and re-developed as land 
for housing projects, which became necessary as the towns grew. Others 
were bought by some of the more well-to-do townsmen and made into 46 country estates for the entertainment of t h e i r families and fr i e n d s , 
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or were converted into vegetable gardens which were more 
pr o f i t a b l e than the o r i g i n a l date gardens. For instance between 
the years 1952-59 the number of vegetable gardens increased from 
150 to 576.^ Prior to the 1930's the peasant labour force was 
composed e n t i r e l y of Bahrainis, but with the abandonment of the 
land as a way of l i f e and the change i n character of agr i c u l t u r e , 
the number of Bahrainis employed i n the gardens f e l l and foreign 
labour, mainly Omani, was imported for the work i n the gardens. 
Figures are available which show that i n 1959 the number of Bahrainis 
working i n agriculture and f i s h i n g was 3,918 and the number of 
non-Bahrainis was 546; by 1965 the number of Bahrainis had dropped 
48 
to 3,562 and the number of non-Bahrainis had doubled to 1,094. 
The economic factors which influenced the decline of 
agriculture can be separated into two aspects. F i r s t , the growing 
scarcity of the water supply, and second, the marketing of the 
crops. As the r a i n f a l l i n t h i s area i s extremely small, averaging 
only 75 mm. per year, the gardens of Bahrain were formerly i r r i g a t e d 
from either natural springs or surface wells. I t has been suggested 
that the o r i g i n of t h i s fresh water supply i s from two underground 
aquifers located i n Saudi-Arabia. The water either flowed through the 
gardens from the springs or was raised by various manual means from 
the wells to the l e v e l of the land. 
In the f i r s t two decades of t h i s century the usage and wastage 
of water was s u f f i c i e n t to alarm Shaikh Hamed bin Isa, who engaged 
Major Frank Holmes, who was i n the area during the 1920's seeking 
o i l concessions, to d r i l l a number of artesian wells i n Bahrain. Many 
of these were d r i l l e d by Holmes during the 1920T.S and early 1930's 
and f o r a time supplemented Bahrain's natural water supply and 
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changed the outlook on i r r i g a t i o n . Instead of having to raise 
the water by manual means fo r t h e i r gardens, a much more 
convenient piped supply became available, which due to i t s ready 
a v a i l a b i l i t y was used wastefully and thus increased water 
consumption. 
By the l a t e 1930"s t h i s waste of the precious water supply 
moved the P o l i t i c a l Agent, H. Weightman, to attempt to influence 
Shaikh Hamed towards a policy of water conservancy, by placing 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on i t s use i n agriculture and stopping the d r i l l i n g 
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of further wells. I n the meantime he also persuaded the 
geologists of Bahrain Petroleum Company to produce a report on 
the state of the water table supplying Bahrain. This report, confirmed 
Weightman's fears by stating that there had been a drop i n the 
head of water and that i f i t continued to drop, the water would 
become increasingly saline."^ 
The outcome of t h i s report and of Weightman's pressures was 
that a proclamation was issued by the rul e r that no further artesian 
wells were to be d r i l l e d without a w r i t t e n permit from the Government. 
This proclamation was enforced for only a few years u n t i l pressure 
by the i n f l u e n t i a l landowners again created a growth i n the number 
of wells d r i l l e d . The increasing consumption of water during the 1950's 
led to a s i t u a t i o n whereby between 1955-58 the s t a t i c head of the water 
ha^l dropped by more than four inches per year."^ By the 1960's the 
si t u a t i o n had become even more serious, consumption was by now 
\\fhi(,eoo 
=%3&?&S0 gallons per day, a vast amount for a Gulf State of the size 
of Bahrain. 
Despite t h i s increasingly serious s i t u a t i o n the Government 
of Bahrain took no action u n t i l as recently as 13th of January 1971, 
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when a law was published to attempt to r e s t r i c t water consumption 
and to organise the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the water supply. Provision 
was also made to carry out surveys on the water supply and to 
f i n d a lternative sources of supply. 
The other economic problem was, as stated previously, the 
marketing of the date crop. 
As conditions i n Bahrain changed and the standard of l i v i n g 
rose, the dates no longer formed the staple d i e t of the people and 
consequently the demand for these f e l l . Although i n the past the 
local market had been l i m i t e d i n scope and had been controlled by a 
few contractors, supplying the larger consumers, demand had been 
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s u f f i c i e n t to enable the farmer to make a marginal p r o f i t , but 
as demand f e l l and the high i n f l u x of foreigners created a demand 
for new foodstuffs, the farmers were unable to meet the demand due 
to lack of cap i t a l and a lack of a policy of help and guidance from 
the government. As there were no t a r i f f s on the import of vegetables, 
which could have been the basis of an alte r n a t i v e market, i t was 
cheaper for the "few contractors", who controlled the market i n 
Bahrain, to import these vegetables from Lebanon or other countries 
than i t was for them to finance the farmers i n order that they may 
be grown l o c a l l y . 
Although an A g r i c u l t u r a l Department was created i n the early 
years of the 1950's, with a B r i t i s h a g r i c u l t u r a l adviser, the objects 
of the department were r e s t r i c t e d to a g r i c u l t u r a l experiments with a 
view to "meeting the requirements of the l o c a l residents f o r plants." 
Many of these experiements were successful and produced good 
results but the lack of any real drive i n adopting the methods devised 
on a large scale, and the lack of cohesive policy to make use of these 
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results meant that the Department became l i t t l e more than an 
expensive demonstration u n i t . 
The lack of a helpful policy toward the farmers i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the case of poultry farming i n Bahrain. Early 
i n 19569 experimental work showed that European style poultry 
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farming could be successful i n Bahrain and subsequently Black 
Leghorn and Plymouth Rock poultry were successfully introduced 
and the results were so encouraging that i n 1958 many local 
farmers took up poultry farming as a source of income. Ducks 
and geese were also introduced."'"' 
As the demand for poultry created a growth market, the 
contractors and merchants began to import cheaper frozen poultry 
from abroad, thus undercutting the local product and eventually 
led to the collapse of the local industry. 
Another area of interest was animal husbandry but t h i s met 
with l i t t l e success as i t was hardly practicable i n Bahrain due to 
the lack of grazing and the high cost of imported feed for the 
animals. As the report of the Department put i t , i n 1954 "the cost 
of feeding s t u f f i s gradually r i s i n g , the maintenance of stock f o r 
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meat and milk i s losing i t s a t t r a c t i o n f o r the l o c a l population." 
The method of milk supply has therefore either reverted to the 
t r a d i t i o n a l one of a neighbourhood supply from the owner of a few 
cows or, where these are not available, the people have taken to using 
dried milk. 
The mechanisation of farming was yet another area where 
support was lacking. As l a t e as 1956 there was not a single tractor 
available f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l use i n the whole island and by 1963 there 
«ss s t i l l only four tractors and the A g r i c u l t u r a l Department was not 
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i n a position to meet the demands for the use of them by the 
lo c a l farmerso 
Generally speaking, a great deal of reform i s s t i l l 
necessary i n the f i e l d of agriculture i n Bahrain, bearing i n 
mind that t h i s i s one of the few areas of the Gulf with good 
cu l t i v a b l e land. 
Measures which could be taken to improve the l o t of the 
farming community and which would probably r e s u l t i n an immediate 
improvement i n the industry are as follows:-
1. The sale of c u l t i v a b l e State-owned land to the farmers on a 
long term mortgage. 
2. Privately owned lands be l e t at f a i r rents on long term leases. 
3. Protection of the l o c a l products either by subsidies to the 
lo c a l farmers or by the erection of t a r i f f barriers on 
imported foods u n t i l the l o c a l farmers are on a competitive 
footing. 
4. The enlargement of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Department and a broadening 
of i t s terms of reference with a subsequent increase i n i t s 
influence and authority. 
5. Establishing a system of A g r i c u l t u r a l Education and the setting 
up of a relevant I n s t i t u t e of Agriculture. 
These measures, i f carried out could provide the basis of an 
a g r i c u l t u r a l expansion i n Bahrain. They would also help to make the 
island more s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and may even help reverse the flow of labour 
from the land. 
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C H A P T E R TWO 
a) The Growth o f Trade 
1) Imports 
We have already r e f e r r e d e a r l i e r t o the Merchant Traders 
as the only s u r v i v o r s of the t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i e s of the 
Bahrain people. As we have seen, the p e a r l trade and a g r i c u l t u r e 
had declined t o the p o i n t of insignificance„ 
The merchant t r a d i n g however, continued t o f l o u r i s h , and 
the sea-going ships t r a d i n g between Bahrain and the other Gulf 
p o r t s were the main source of income and provided the money 
re q u i r e d f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade and the import of f o r e i g n goods. 
This trade was c a r r i e d out mainly between Bahrain and I n d i a , 
and t o a lesser e x t e n t , w i t h the neighbouring Arab States. By 
the end of the f i r s t quarter of the 20th Century however, the 
sea-going ships of Bahrain were confined t o l o c a l t r a d i n g w i t h 
other Gulf p o r t s such as Kuwait, Al-Aquer on the Hasa Coast, Doha 
i n Qatar and the T r u c i a l States, having been superceded on the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l ' t r a d e routes by the steamers of the B r i t i s h I n d i a 
Steam Navigation Company. Bahrain d i d not s u f f e r because of 
t h i s change as i t was used as a d i s t r i b u t i o n centre by the t r a d e r s 
using the B r i t i s h I n d i a services f o r the Hasa and the States of 
the lower Gulf as i t was the possessor of ddep water harbour 
f a c i l i t i e s f o r the l a r g e r ships being used. 
The use of Bahrain by B r i t i s h I n d i a Steam Navigation Company 
grew t o such an extent t h a t they appointed a permanent l o c a l agent 
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to look a f t e r t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . 
The domination by B r i t i s h I n d i a Steam Navigation Company 
of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l routes and the growing i n f l u e n c e of the 
B r i t i s h i n the r e g i o n brought about changes i n the t r a d e , namely 
t h a t l e s s business was done w i t h I n d i a , but i n i t s place l a r g e 
q u a n t i t i e s of manufactured goods were imported from England f o r 
re-export t o other c o u n t r i e s i n the r e g i o n . 
An impetus was given t o merchant t r a d i n g i n the r e g i o n by 
the establishment i n Bahrain of the British-owned Eastern Bank 
L i m i t e d i n 1920.* At f i r s t i t was used c h i e f l y by a l i e n elements 
such as I n d i a n t r a d e r s and f o r e i g n companies, who were f a m i l i a r 
w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l banking procedure, but l o c a l merchants soon 
made use of the monetary services o f f e r e d once they r e a l i s e d the 
advantages of the banking system. 
An unexpected c o n t r i b u t i o n t o Bahrain's f o r e i g n trade 
2 
occurred when between the years of 1920 and 1942, the Sultan 
of Nejed and i t s dependencies, I b n Saud, due t o a q u a r r e l between 
himself and Kuwait, placed an embargo on imports from t h a t country 
and trade was r e - d i r e c t e d through Bahrain. 
W h i l s t t h i s move increased the volume of trade through 
Bahrain, only a l i t t l e was gained f i n a n c i a l l y , as Ibn Saud p r e v a i l e d 
upon the B r i t i s h Agent i n Bahrain t o use h i s good o f f i c e s t o 
reduce the t a r i f f on re-exports t o h i s country from 5% t o 2£%. 
Following pressure from the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s Shaikh I s a a t 
l a s t r e l u c t a n t l y agreed t o the suggestion of the P o l i t i c a l Agent 
t h a t o n l y a 2 per cent duty should be l e v i e d on goods f o r 
re-export t o the mainland, provided they were t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h i n 
20 days.^ During the e a r l y 1930 ?s however Shaikh Hamed had cause 
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t o complain o f the growing p r a c t i c e of t r a n s f e r r i n g goods a t 
sea o f f the Coast of Bahrain t o avoid a l l duty payments.^ 
The United Kingdom Government t h e r e f o r e , a c t i n g on behalf of 
Bahrain, entered i n t o an agreement w i t h Saudi-Arabia i n November 
1935 i n which the l a t t e r agreed to pay a duty of 1|% on goods 
which were t r a n s f e r r e d a t sea w i t h o u t passing through Bahrain. 
Goods passing through Bahrain were s t i l l subject t o the usual 
2% ad valorem duty. 
The growth of the f o r e i g n trade encouraged more Bahrainis 
to t u r n t o t h i s business as t h e i r source of employment. This 
was a slow but continuous process and reached i t s peak j u s t before 
the discovery of o i l , by which time import d u t i e s and t a r i f f s on 
re-exports accounted f o r the major p a r t of the n a t i o n a l budget. 
For instance, i n 1930 i t was s t a t e d t h a t the income from the 
customs d u t i e s amounted t o 97% of the t o t a l revenues of Bahrain. 
This growth of trade made i t imperative t o e s t a b l i s h a 
proper body f o r the r e g u l a t i o n of t r a d e and the safeguarding of 
the t r a d e r s ' i n t e r e s t s . 
Thus, the t r a d i t i o n a l body, which was known as 
M a j l i s a l - U r o f , which was a committee nominated by the Sheikh to 
s i t as an a r b i t r a r y body to r e s o l v e trade d i s p u t e s , was g r a d u a l l y 
reformed u n t i l , i n 1939» the need was seen f o r a more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
body. And so i n t h a t year a formal Chamber of Commerce was 
established w i t h t r a d e r s * r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s i t t i n g on the committee 
t o l e g i s l a t e and p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the merchants.^ 
I t was o f f i c i a l l y recognised by the Bahrain Government i n 
g 
1951, and i n 1968 i t became known as the Chamber of Commerce and 
I n d u s t r y . 
The development of imports. 
xm s 
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The v a s t b u l k of f o r e i g n trade i n Bahrain was, and s t i l l i s , 
to a large e x t e n t , c a r r i e d on by sea t r a d e , and so here we must 
consider the t r e n d over the years a f t e r the F i r s t World War of 
the growing value of the imports. 
As can be seen from Table V I I I , the estimated value of imports 
rose from £1,350,000 to £22,841,506 between 1918-19 and 1959. 
Records of l o c a l boats p l y i n g i n t o Bahrain are not so complete but 
f o r the years f o r which they are a v a i l a b l e a s i m i l a r s i g n i f i c a n t 
r i s e i s observed. 
TABLE V I I I 
Value of Imports t o Bahrain (1916-70) 
Increase or Year No. of Ships Estimated Value 
Steamers Local of Imports Decrease 
Percentage Increase 
or Decrease 
1916-17 9 — — £1529758 
1917-18 - - £1607049 + £77291 + 5.05 1918- 19-_ 
1919- 2 0 W 
35 - £1350060 - £256989 - 16.00 
- - £1414423 + £64363 + 4.77 1920=21 _ •- £1250993 £136430 - 11.55 
1921-22--
1929-30 U - - £1452689 
+ £201696 + 16.12 
- - £1930692 + £478003 + 32.90 1930-31 - - £1087524 - £843168 - 43.67 1931-32-
1953-54^ 5 3 5 ^ 
•- £ 821824 - £265700 - 24.43 
480 £1812580 + £990756 +120.55 
1956 447 1498 £4864296.92 + £3051716.92 +168.36 
1957 471 1680 £4414009.23 - £450287.69 - 9.26 1958 657 974 £4448084.61 + £34075.38 + 0.77 
1 9 5 9 ^ 784 890 £22841506 + £18393422 +413.51 
1962 672 2027 £27302977 + £4461471 + 19.53 
1965 565 - £33929072 + £6626095 + 24.27 
1966 533 - £36807356 + £2878284 + 8.48 
1967 581 - £39801226 + £2993870 + 8.13 
1968 601 - £45552539 + £5751313 + 14.45 
1969 606 - £50734676-£70163748" 
+ £5182137 + 11.38 
1970 574 - + £19499072 + 38.43 
From the above t a b l e i t can be seen t h a t a f t e r the F i r s t World 
War the import trade g r a d u a l l y increased, w i t h the exception of the 
years 1918-19 and 1920-21, which could have been due t o repercussions 
of the F i r s t World War, u n t i l the 1930's, when the e f f e c t s of the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i sxs made themselves f e l t and imports f e l l by 43.67% i n 
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1930-31o The imports were f u r t h e r depressed d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d due 
to the collapse of the p e a r l i n g industry's, which meant a s i g n i f i c a n t 
l o s s of revenue t o the administration,, and thus a l o s s of the i s l a n d s 
main source of f o r e i g n currency earning power. 
S t a t i s t i c s f o r the l a t e 1930's and the 1940's are not 
a v a i l a b l e ^ but comparing the f i g u r e s of e a r l y 1950's w i t h the 
l a t e 1920's we may assume t h a t wartime r e s t r i c t i o n s o f the 1940's 
were s t i l l t a k i n g t h e i r t o l l , as d u r i n g the war p e r i o d , i n s p i t e 
of the revenues from the o i l , which s t a r t e d i n 1934, both the 
f o r e i g n and l o c a l businessmen were u n w i l l i n g t o place t h e i r money 
at r i s k d u r i n g such an u n c e r t a i n p e r i o d . From what records are 
a v a i l a b l e , however, i t can be seen t h a t a t t h i s stage food and f u e l 
s t i l l c o n s t i t u t e d the major p o r t i o n of the imports. 
The main imports up to the 1940's were mainly food and f u e l 
w i t h items such as r i c e , c o f f e e , t e a , sugar, piecegoods, wheat, 
f l o u r , meat, l i v e s t o c k and kerosene f i g u r i n g prominently on the 
import l i s t s , although w i t h the discovery of o i l , imports of f u e l 
dropped correspondingly. 
The f i r s t change which became apparent i n these l i s t s was 
the import o f c o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s such as cement, wood and s t e e l 
f o l l o w i n g the s t a r t of the o i l i n d u s t r y . The main c o u n t r i e s 
exp o r t i n g t o Bahrain between 1920 and 1940 were B r i t i s h I n d i a , Persia 
and I r a q . Up t o 1930 I n d i a was by f a r the l a r g e r exporter, f o r 
instance i n 1929-30 she exported to Bahrain goods to the value of 
£1,399173 from a t o t a l import value of £1,930692 which represents 
72.47% of the t o t a l imports. 
During the p e r i o d I r a q was the second l a r g e s t exporter t o 
Bahrain although the o v e r a l l percentage compared w i t h I n d i a was small. 
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For instance, i n 1929-30 I r a q exported t o Bahrain goods t o the 
value of only £219,008 or 11.34% of the t o t a l . 
The trade w i t h P e r s i a , despite an o f f i c i a l embargo due 
to the dispute over the ownership of Bahrain, continued t o grow 
throughout the 1920's, but then remained s t a t i c and thus represented 
a much smaller percentage of the t o t a l imports as the years went by. 
I n f a c t the p o s i t i o n o f import/export had been reversed by 1953 
when of a t o t a l o f 480 l o c a l ships c a l l i n g a t Bahrain, 265 
of these were a c t u a l l y e x p o r t i n g from Bahrain t o Persia.*^ 
The p a t t e r n o f imports changed d r a m a t i c a l l y during the 1950's 
and 1960's w i t h the t o t a l value of imports r i s i n g r a p i d l y and the 
geographical o r i g i n changing a l s o . The type of commodities also 
changed from being mainly food imports, t o consumer goods. The 
imports grew du r i n g these two decades w i t h the exception o f 1957, 
which was p o s s i b l y due t o p o l i t i c a l unrest on the i s l a n d and the 
closure of the Suez Canal. 
The apparent great increase i n imports of 1959 should not be 
regarded as a dramatic increase as i t was due t o the i n t r o d u c t i o n 
of a new and more e f f i c i e n t accounting system by the Bahrain Government. 
Trade was encouraged by the d e c i s i o n i n 1953 to constru c t 
a deep-water anchorage a t Manama t o e l i m i n a t e the previous d i f f i c u l t i e s 
encountered by la r g e ocean-going ships which had p r e v i o u s l y to 
anchor w e l l o f f - s h o r e and t r a n s f e r t h e i r cargoes t o l i g h t e r s f o r 
trans-shipment t o the i s l a n d . The new harbour, "Mina Salman" was 
completed i n 1962 and has docking f a c i l i t i e s f o r up t o s i x l a r g e 
18 
ocean-going ships and extensive warehouse f a c i l i t i e s . 
Besides the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the new harbour, the Bahrain 
Government i n 1957 took a d e c i s i o n which made pos s i b l e a Free Trade 
19 
Area a t the harbour, whereby no t a r i f f s or d u t i e s were l e v i e d 
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on goods which were f o r r e - e x p o r t , thus encouraging the use of 
Bahrain i n i t s t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e as the clearing-house of the G u l f , 
and the s e t t i n g up o f more import/export agencies i n the i s l a n d . 
From the s t a t i s t i c s a v a i l a b l e i t can be seen how these 
decisions had the e f f e c t of producing d u r i n g the 1960's a r a p i d 
but steady growth i n the value and q u a n t i t y of goods imported 
t o the i s l a n d w i t h imports i n c r e a s i n g year by year a t a r a t e of 
between 8% and 38%. 
As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, the geographical o r i g i n of import 
to Bahrain changed and centres of supply moved from I n d i a , I r a q 
and I r a n t o Europe and the United States, owing to the o i l 
production industry 0 Although India's exports have s t i l l r i s e n 
they do not represent such a s i g n i f i c a n t share of the t o t a l imports, 
20 
e.g., i n 1962 I n d i a ' s share of the imports was 10.33%, against 
the p r e v i o u s l y mentioned f i g u r e of 1929-30 of 72.47%. 
During the 1950's and 1960's the European and U.S. share 
of the imports continued t o r i s e and by 1965 represented 51.39% 
21 
of the t o t a l imports. During t h i s time the United Kingdom, 
due t o i t s long and close a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Bahrain, achieved a 
s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n of the t o t a l imports. From 1959 t o 1968 
the U.K. increased the value of i t s exports t o Bahrain from £5,887,04o 
22 
t o £11,153,240, an increase of 89.45%. 
The second l a r g e s t exporter to Bahrain was the United States 
w i t h exports f o r the same years of £2,610,333 and £5,507,005 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , an increase of 110.97%. 
A f t e r these two major exporters come West Germany, Holland, 
I t a l y and France. 
During the l a t t e r years of the 1960's, however, the Asian 
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co u n t r i e s began t o achieve a s u b s t a n t i a l share of the market, 
and although exports from Europe and the United States continued 
t o r i s e i n v a l u e , as a percentage o f the t o t a l imports t h e i r share 
has d e c l i n e d ; e.g., 1965 the United Kingdom share of t o t a l 
imports was 25.6%, and by 1967 i t had declined t o 22.52%, and i n 
1969 was 24.63%. 
The same app l i e s t o the United States as, f o r instance, i n 
1966 her share was 13.87% and by 1968 i t had declined t o 12.9%. 
The new forces i n the market of Bahrain are now Japan, 
Hong Kong and the Peoples' Republic of China. 
Japan i n 1959 exported t o Bahrain goods to the value of 
23 
£1,936,077, and by 1969 her exports had jumped to £7,240,805, an 
24 
increase of 274% i n only 10 years, by which time Japan's share o f 
Bahrain's imports was 14.27%. 
Hong Kong during the same period increased her exports 
to Bahrain from £491,243 t o £1,962,346, a r i s e of almost 300%. 
China d i d not s t a r t i t s export d r i v e t o Bahrain u n t i l about 
1963, but by 1969 i t had achieved exports t o the value of £3,326,620, . 
repr e s e n t i n g 6.56% of the t o t a l imports. 
Bahrain's non-Arab neighbours such as Inda, Pakistan and 
I r a n s t i l l export to Bahrain but the value of t h e i r imports remains 
almost s t a t i c and represents only a very small p r o p o r t i o n of the 
t o t a l . 
The record of Bahrain's Arab neighbours i s a s t o n i s h i n g l y poor, 
being a t the bottom of the league t a b l e of imports. The l a r g e s t 
Arab country e x p o r t i n g t o Bahrain, namely I r a q , i n 1965 and 1969 
exported t o Bahrain goods valued a t £850,262 and £805,604, r e s p e c t i v e l y 
being o n l y 2.5% i n 1965 and 1.59% i n 1969. 
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Syria's exports t o Bahrain i n 1966 were valued a t £106,830 
and by 1967 i t was only £78,809, 0.29% and 0.2% r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
As one f u r t h e r example, Sudanese exports i n 1966 were worth 
£43,782 and by 1969 had declined t o £14,010. 
The only exception t o t h i s p a t t e r n of the Arab world i s 
Lebanon, whose exports between 1966 and 1967 rose from £518,388 
to £832,749. 
The poor trade record of the Arab c o u n t r i e s can probably 
be a t t r i b u t e d t o the f a c t s t h a t f i r s t l y , they have very l i t t l e t o 
o f f e r t o meet Bahrain's needs and those c o u n t r i e s who do have 
goods f o r sale have no sea-going c a p a c i t y t o t r a d e w i t h Bahrain 
and confine themselves c h i e f l y t o the land r o u t e s . Secondly, u n t i l 
1971 Bahrain was not a f u l l y c o n t r i b u t i n g member of the Arab League 
and could not t h e r e f o r e take advantage of the e x i s t i n g trade and 
t a r i f f agreements between the members of the Arab League. Things, 
however, may change i n the f u t u r e as Bahrain i s now a p a r t i c i p a n t 
i n the Gulf Amirate J o i n t Chamber of Commerce and I n d u s t r y , which 
25 
held i t s t h i r d meeting i n Bahrain i n May, 1971, a t which ideas 
were put forward f o r j o i n t ventures i n the f i e l d s of commerce and 
i n d u s t r y . 
As the sources of the goods imported have changed over the 
years, so also has the type of goods imported, changing from food 
and f u e l being the major imports t o consumer goods, machinery and 
c o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s being by f a r the l a r g e r . 
I n the f i e l d of consumer goods, household goods account f o r 
the l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n followed by c l o t h i n g , hardware and c u t l e r y , 
26 
s i l k and c o t t o n piecegoods and c i g a r e t t e s . 
I n the machinery and c o n s t r u c t i o n goods category, machinery, 
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p a r t s and o i l w e l l equipment i s the l a r g e s t , f o l l o w e d by cars and 
accessories, cement, timber, and b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s . ^ 
The expansion i n the imports of a l l of these goods was 
necessitated by the c l a s s i c a l p a t t e r n of the needs of an expanding 
area, where men flowed i n from a l l p a r t s of the world r e q u i r i n g 
food, s h e l t e r and c l o t h i n g , and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of towns, roads 
28 
and a l l the basic f a c i l i t i e s . 
The i n f l u x of o i l workers from the Western c o u n t r i e s created 
the i n i t i a l demand f o r western s t y l e consumer goods and as the 
revenues from the o i l began t o f i l t e r through t o the Bahrain 
p o p u l a t i o n the demand was n a t u r a l l y increased, thus c r e a t i n g 
a f u r t h e r demand f o r these goods, by the n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n of a 
newly r i c h populace having money to spare f o r the f i r s t time i n t h e i r 
l i v e s . 
As the i n d u s t r i e s on the i s l a n d , and the p o p u l a t i o n grew, 
so also d i d the demand f o r both c a p i t a l and consumer goods, and 
the per c a p i t a expenditure on imports rose a c c o r d i n g l y as can be 
seen i n the t a b l e below. 
TABLE IX 
Imports, Exports and Per Capita Expenditure on Imports 
f o r Domestic Use 
Year Population Imports Exports Balance Per Capita Imports 
f o r Domestic Use 
1959 143,135 £22,841,506 £9,499,124 £13,342,382 £ 93.20 
1965 182,203 £33,929,072 £9,404,553 £24,524,519 £134.60 
1970 212,000* £70,163,748 £22,028,021 £48,135,727 £227.00 
* Estimated 
2) Exports 
There has always been a close r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
imports and export trade i n Bahrain and because Bahrain was used 
as a r e - e x p o r t i n g centre any depression on one branch of the trade 
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u s u a l l y produced an immediate r e a c t i o n on the othe r . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , p r i o r t o 1959, n e i t h e r the P o l i t i c a l Agent's 
Trade Reports, nor the documents of the Bahrain Government, give a 
complete year by year p i c t u r e o f the exports from Bahrain. However, 
the f i g u r e s which are a v a i l a b l e from these sources p r i o r t o 1959 help 
us t o see the o v e r a l l t r e n d d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . 
The f e a t u r e which characterises the Bahrain exports i s 
t h a t they can be d i v i d e d i n t o two d i s t i n c t p a r t s , namely, the 
export o f o i l , which we w i l l discuss l a t e r , and the re-export o f 
imported goods. 
From 1959 onward more complete and d e t a i l e d f i g u r e s are 
a v a i l a b l e , and these, along w i t h the e a r l i e r s t a t i s t i c s have been 
combined and are shown i n the t a b l e below which d e t a i l s the trends 
i n t h i s sector o f the t r a d e . 
TABLE X 
Values and Percentages o f Increases or Decreases on 
Re-Exports 
29 
Year Value of Re-Exports ° Increase or Decrease % Increase or 
Decrease 
1916-17 £779,943 - . -1917-18 £817,243 + £37,300 + 4.79 
1918-19 £1,317,811 + £500,568 + 61.25 
1929-30 £887,565 — £430,246 - 32.65 
1930-31 £604,034 - £283,531 - 31.94 1931-32 £547,896 - £ 56,138 - 9.29 
1959 £9,499,1243°° + £8,951,228 +1633.75 
1962 £9,597,197 + £98,073 + 1.03 
1965 £9,404,553 - £192,644 - 2.01 
1966 £11,028,896 + £1,624,343 + 17.27 
1967 £12,863,397 + £1,834,500 +. 16.63 
1968 £16,194,395- + £3,330,998 + 25.90 
1969 £17,402,802 + £1,208,106 + 7.47 
1970 £22,028,021 + £4,625,218 + 26.58 
I t i s important a t t h i s stage to consider the p o l i c y of Bahrain 
as a r e - e x p o r t i n g country and t o observe i t s development, and the 
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impact of the various changes. 
As mentioned e a r l i e r , one of the f i r s t changes o f p o l i c y 
a f t e r the F i r s t World War occurred i n 1920 when I b n Saud, Sultan 
of Najed, l a t e r Saudi Arabia, placed an embargo on the import o f 
goods t o h i s country from Kuwait. This i n e f f e c t cut o f f h i s 
main source of supply of f o r e i g n goods and he was forced t o t u r n 
to Bahrain f o r a l t e r n a t i v e s u p p lies. 
At t h i s time the t a r i f f on a l l imports t o Bahrain was f i x e d 
31 
by t r e a t y , a t a standard 5%. On re-e x p o r t s , however, the Sheikh 
had a f r e e hand to levy f u r t h e r taxes and i t was customary f o r a 
handling charge of a f u r t h e r 5% t o be l e v i e d on a l l goods f o r 
re-ex p o r t . 
Ibn Saud, however, baulked a t paying a t o t a l t a x of 10% on 
a l l of h i s imports from Bahrain and so he persuaded the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent i n Bahrain to present a case t o Sheikh I s a f o r the r e d u c t i o n 
of a l l t a r i f f s t o only 2.5% f o r exports t o Najed. E v e n t u a l l y , 
a f t e r a great deal of bargaining the P o l i t i c a l Agent p r e v a i l e d 
upon I s a u n t i l he f i n a l l y agreed t o reduce the o v e r a l l t a r i f f on 
" J O 
a l l re-exports t o only 2%. 
This lower t a r i f f , which was low when compared w i t h other 
Gulf States, except p o s s i b l y Kuwait, and a r e l a t i v e l y good harbour 
at t h a t time made i t possible f o r Bahrain's export trade to 
f l o u r i s h . This was e s p e c i a l l y so when various f o r e i g n goods became 
a v a i l a b l e and Bahrain's p o l i c y of low t a r i f f s subsequently made 
i t p ossible f o r them t o re-export a t much lower p r i c e s than the 
other higher t a r i f f Gulf P o r t s . r 
The lowering of t a r i f f s a l s o encouraged Najed me^feeaats t o 
set up permanent o f f i c e s i n Bahrain from 1920 onwards w i t h a view 
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to r e - e x p o r t i n g t o the mainland, a j o b f o r which they were 
admirably s u i t e d , since they knew w e l l the needs of t h e i r 
countrymen. 
The f i g u r e s a v a i l a b l e t o us show t h a t as the q u a r r e l 
between Kuwait and the Najed b u i l t up, Ibn Saud was already 
t u r n i n g t o Bahrain f o r more o f h i s su p p l i e s , p r i o r t o the embargo 
on Kuwait's imports, as i s shown i n the 61.25% increase o f 1918-19. 
This build-up of trade continued u n t i l overtaken by the 
l a t e e a r l y 
world monetary c r i s e s o f the/1920's and/1930's, which had t h e i r 
e f f e c t on the trade f i g u r e s i n general, as f o r instance, the 
f i g u r e s by 1929-30 had f a l l e n by 32.65% on the 1918-19 f i g u r e s . 3 3 
Imports and exports remained a t a s t a n d s t i l l throughout the 
Second World War. We may make t h i s assumption even though 
o f f i c i a l trade f i g u r e s f o r t h i s period are not a v a i l a b l e , since 
the wartime r e s t r i c t i o n s of r a t i o n i n g e s s e n t i a l f o o d s t u f f s such 
as r i c e , f l o u r , sugar and tea were imposed, and p r i c e c o n t r o l s 
were introduced. These measures had the s i d e - e f f e c t o f s t a r t i n g 
an u n o f f i c i a l export business i n the form o f smuggling t o the 
34 
mainland coasts. I n 1941 an embargo was placed on the export of 
any f o o d s t u f f s from Bahrain, vJiich l a s t e d f o r the p e r i o d o f the war. 
This embargo has been re-introduced o c c a s i o n a l l y f o r short periods 
d u r i n g the 1950's and 1960's. 
The next stage of the p o l i c y developed i n 1950, when a Customs 
35 
Ordinance was issued by the Government of Bahrain. The ordinance 
consisted o f more than 37 a r t i c l e s , b u t , b a s i c a l l y , i t r e g u l a r i s e d 
the charge of 5% ad valorem on a l l f o o d s t u f f s and other goods 
imported t o Bahrain. On c e r t a i n consumer goods, however, such as a i r 
c o n d i t i o n i n g equipment, radios and t e l e v i s i o n s , j e w e l l e r y and domestic 
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e l e c t r i c a l goods, the t a r i f f was r a i s e d t o 10%. Newspapers, 
magazines and p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g m a t e r i a l s were exempted 
from a l l duty. 
On exports from Bahrain charges were also f i x e d by t h i s 
ordinance, but no f i x e d percentage was a p p l i e d , r a t h e r , each 
item was considered i n d i v i d u a l l y and the charges f i x e d a c c o r d i n g l y , 
37 
but these normally averaged out a t the usual 2%. 
This continued u n t i l , as mentioned i n the s e c t i o n of 
imports, the Bahrain Government i n 1957 took a d e c i s i o n t o encourage 
the use of Bahrain as a c l e a r i n g house f o r the other Gulf Ports 
by c r e a t i n g a f r e e trade area i n the p o r t of Mina Salman a t Mariama> 
The p o r t opened i n 1962 and a f t e r a two year b r e a k i n g - i n 
period the Bahrain Port Ordinance of 1964 was issued, and under 
t h i s the t a r i f f s on goods f o r re-export were abolished and were 
38 
replaced by a handling charge o n l y . 
This handling charge was so low i n comparison w i t h the 
other Gulf P o r t s , which r e t a i n e d not o n l y handling charges, but 
also the o l d s t y l e t a r i f f s , t h a t the re-export business of Bahrain 
f l o u r i s h e d . 
As we have seen i n Table X, the re-export business a f t e r 
1962 grew s t e a d i l y , w i t h the exception o f 1965 when there was 
p o l i t i c a l unrest i n the i s l a n d , i n c r e a s i n g by as much as 25.9% i n 
1968 and 26.58% i n 1970. 
The nature of the goods f o r re-export were not determined 
by Bahrain, but were obviously geared t o meet the needs o f the 
cou n t r i e s t o which they were t o be exported, and although the 
needs were o f t e n f o r the same type of goods as those imported t o 
Bahrain, the percentages r e q u i r e d d i f f e r e d . The main requirements 
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being f o r f o o d s t u f f s s household goods and machinery. 
The main importer from Bahrain was, and s t i l l i s , Saudi 
Arabia, as f o r instance, i n 1918-19 the exports from Bahrain 
to Saudi Arabia were £551,720 from a t o t a l o f £1,317,811, or 41.87%. 
39 
This rose t o 84.27% by 1931-32. I t i s s t i l l today Bahrain's 
l a r g e s t customer from a monetary p o i n t of view although the 
percentage i s now much smaller. The d e c l i n e i n percentage 
began d u r i n g the l a t e 1950's. Although the value of exports t o Saudi 
Arabia continued t o r i s e , the f i g u r e s f o r 1959, 1967, 1969 and 1970 
revealed the gradual d e c l i n e i n percentage of t o t a l t r a d e . 
TABLE XI 
Value of Exports t o Saudi Arabia 
Year Value o f Exports t o % of T o t a l Exports 
Saudi Arabia 
1959 £5,362,521 56.45 
1967 £6,683,012 51.95 
1969 £8,690,016 50.03 
1970 £10,984,325 49.86 
A l l other Gulf States are customers of Bahrain's re-export 
trade t o a lesser extent. 
The d e c l i n e i n the percentage of exports t o Saudi Arabia can 
probably be a t t r i b u t e d t o many f a c t o r s such as the devaluation of 
the Saudi Arabian R i a l i n 1957, which reduced the purchasing power 
of the currency, the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the deep-water p o r t a t Dammam, 
and the subsequent i m p o s i t i o n o f d u t i e s on imports from Bahrain i n 
an attempt t o dissuade the Saudi Arabian merchants from d e a l i n g 
through Bahrain and t o use instead d i r e c t imports t o Dammam.^ 
Bahrain, however, should s t i l l continue t o play a major 
r o l e as an importer t o Saudi Ara b i a , because of the e x c e l l e n t 
monetary and banking f a c i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e on the i s l a n d , which are 
40, 
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superior to those available i n the Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia, and also because of the longer experience i n t h i s type 
of trade of the Bahrain merchants. 
In 1966 the countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Dubai, Abu Dabi and Muscat took between them a t o t a l of 80.82% 
of Bahrain's exports. This percentage was accounted for by 
the growing demand from the new oil-producing countries, e.g., 
i n 1959 Abu Dabi received only 0.73% of Bahrain's exports, but 
by 1967 t h i s had risen to 7.32%.43 
Despite these recent r i s e s , the export trade of Bahrain 
is i n some jeopardy due to the fact that the newly-rich o i l -
producing states are i n the process of constructing t h e i r own 
deep-water harbour f a c i l i t i e s . The upsurge i n Bahrain-s exports 
i n recent years i s therefore due not so much to the a b i l i t y of 
the Government and merchants of Bahrain as the overall growth 
of demand i n the area as the new o i l f i e l d s were opened up. 
As these new deep-water f a c i l i t i e s are developed Bahrain 
may lose a substantial proportion of i t s t r a d i t i o n a l traHe with 
the Amirates and Muscat. 
The boom i n the export trade may continue for a decade 
or so u n t i l these alternative f a c i l i t i e s are f u l l y u t i l i s e d , but 
i n the f i n a l analysis much of i t s export trade w i l l be l o s t to 
them, and other sources of income must be found. 
One alternative which could o f f s e t the loss of t h i s trade 
would be for the Bahrain Government to encourage a programme of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n for the island. 
b) Industry 
1) General 
The widely-held view amongst most modern economists with 
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regard to the underdeveloped areas of the world i s that 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of a community i s the most readily available 
and ef f e c t i v e method of achieving economic growth. 
This theory holds true for most communities which have a 
narrow Economic Base , such as nations who are a g r i c u l t u r a l l y 
based or who are exporters of single product raw materials, such 
as sugar, cotton, or i n the case of Bahrain, o i l . 
The reasons fo r t h i s view are that these two groups, 
relying upon a one sector product, face a number of obstacles to 
maintaining a steady and secure growth. F i r s t l y , the price i s 
fixed by demand, and i s subject to large and sudden fluctuations 
i n the international markets, over which the producer has l i t t l e 
or no control. Secondly, the terms of trade tend to worsen for 
primary producers creating a balance of payments problem. Lastly, 
that to countries having only one exporting sector, the danger i s 
that the Government of that country does not have s u f f i c i e n t control 
over the development of i t s own National Economy; i . e . , i n the o i l 
industry, i t i s well known that the bulk of the production, r e f i n i n g , 
t£ansporting, and marketing i s under the auspices of eight international 
companies and these companies usually have the f i n a l word on level of 
44 
production and price. 
Besides these economic reasons for i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , human 
communities tend to associate i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n with economic progress 
and increased technological knowledge. On the other hand, they regard 
45 
a g r i c u l t u r a l l y based communities as being rather backward. 
Before the discovery of o i l i n Bahrain, the l o c a l manufacturing 
industries were very small and l i m i t e d to meeting only a l o c a l demand. 
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They were what may be termed "oases" industries. For instance, 
the l o c a l coppersmith's market i n Manama consisted of a number 
of family groups, who passed on t b e i r s k i l l s from father to son, 
making copper n a i l s f o r boats and house-building, coffee pots and 
other cooking utensils. On the same basis, pottery was produced 
from k i l n s situated i n various parts of the island, pots, bowls and 
water j a r s being t h e i r main products. Lime also was produced by 
the local inhabitants, but only to meet the l i m i t e d needs of local 
housings 
Boat-building also has declined to the point of insignifigance. 
This can be traced to the advent of steamers during the 19th century, 
the decline of the pearling industry and the introduction of fast 
motor launches. These a l l combined to reduce the demand for the 
large old-fashioned s a i l i n g boats. Many small boats were b u i l t 
however, a f t e r the f i r s t world war; these were mainly of the Shoa'v 
type, rowing boats for local inshore f i s h i n g , but even the demand 
for these declined a f t e r the second world war. 
There was a very small amount of weaving carried out i n 
some of Bahrain's v i l l a g e s , but t h e i r product could hardly be 
classed as commercial industry as t h e i r product was usually f o r 
t h e i r own consumption and was only very ra r e l y sold. 
None of the above mentioned industries had any influence on 
the national economy or contributed to i t s revenues. 
The new era of Bahrain's economy was founded upon the 
discovery and exploitation of o i l , with the subsequent r e f i n i n g and 
construction industries. 
The production and r e f i n i n g of o i l has dominated the economy 
for three decades and for the moment continues to do so, although i t 
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i s gradually being recognised that there must be more 
di v e r s i f i c a t i o n s of industry into other f i e l d s . 
The f i r s t step was taken i n the opening of a ship repair 
yard i n 1954 to meet the needs of the growing maritime t r a f f i c . ^ 
This was followed i n 1955 by the setting up of a small paper 
manufacturing plant, but the recognition of a need for 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n was not f u l l y realised u n t i l the 1960' S. I n 1961 
the Bureau of Commerce began the r e g i s t r a t i o n of a l l industries i n 
Bahrain and the number of employees i n these industries. 
Various other industries have started since t h i s date, 
one of the more notable being the Bahrain Fishing Company i n 1966, 
which was a j o i n t enterprise between the Ross Group of Grimsby, 
47 
England, and local c a p i t a l . 
Ah impetus to d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n was given i n 1967 by the 
setting up of the Development Bureau to investigate the needs and 
prospects f o r new industries i n the area. The f i r s t , and major 
success of the Bureau occurred i n 1968, when a consortium of 
48 
international companies were persuaded to set up i n Bahrain, an 
aluminium smelting plant which would use natural gas from the o i l 
f i e l d as a fuel source. Work on the smelter was started i n 
January, 1969, and production commenced i n May, 1971. I t w i l l 
49 
eventually supply employment for 1,400 people when f u l l 
production of 96,000 tons per year i s achieved. 
Since r e g i s t r a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l establishments was begun 
i n 1961 there has been a steady growth i n the numbers and types 
of industries as i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the following table. 
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TABLE X I I 
Growth of I n d u s t r i a l Establishments i n Bahrain by Type of Industry 
Since 1961 
50. 
Economic A c t i v i t y Years of Registration Total % of t o t a l 
establishments 
vO vO lO v O V O V O v O v O V O t"~-
ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON 
i - H i - l t H 1-1 —< r - t r H r - l r - l r - l 
Crude O i l 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 o.7 
Farm Poultry 4 - - - - - - - - - 4 2.9 
Dairies 3 ™ - - - - = - - - 3 2.1 
Fishing - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 0.7 
Bakeries 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 4 2.9 
Beverages 5 - - 1 1 - - - - - 7 4.7 
Prefabrications i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i Q.7 
Paper Products 2 1.3 
Pr i n t i n g & Publishing 2 1 - - 1 - 1 - 1 - 6 4.1 
Ice Plants 5 - - - 1 - - - - - 6 4.1 
Oxygen Plants 2 - 1 - - - - - - - 3 2.1 
Plastic Industry - - - - - - 1 1 - - 2 1.3 
O i l Refining i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i 0.7 
Tiles 2 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 9 6.2 
Blocks 6 2 4 1 2 1 1 1 - - 18 12.4 
Workshops 21 4 1 6 1 6 9 7 7 - 62 42.9 
Ship Repairs i _ _ i _ _ _ _ _ _ 2 1.3 
Neon Plastics 3 ~ ~ - . ~ - . _ _ _ _ 3 2.1 
Gas - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 0.7 
Water D i s t i l l a t i o n 2 - 1 - - - - - = - 3 2.1 
Stone Crushing 4 = 1 1 - - 1 - - - 7 4.7 
TOTALS * 65 8 9 12 7 10 14 10 10 1~™ 146 10°^0 
* The table does not include i n d u s t r i a l projects under 
construction. We can see from the above table that there are 146 
plants of d i f f e r e n t types. With the exception of oil, f i s h i n g , 
ship repairing and the p l a s t i c industries which have r e l a t i v e l y large 
sized plants, the remainder of the servicing and manufacturing 
a c t i v i t i e s are small establishments belonging to individual proprietors. 
The overall growth of i n d u s t r i a l establishments i n the ten year period 
was 123%, an annual average growth rate of 13,6%. 
The aluminium company, ALBA, does not figure i n the table, 
since i n 1970 the smelter was s t i l l under construction. 
Since the o i l industry has been the most i n f l u e n t i a l industry 
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i n Bahrain, and up to recent years the largest employer of labour, 
i t i s appropriate at t h i s point to consider i t s history and i t s 
impact upon the economy of the island, 
2) Oils Concessions and Production 
Following the discovery of o i l i n Iran i n 1908 the Gulf 
region became a potential source of supply of t h i s commodity and 
the major o i l companies of that time began seriously to survey 
the area and to attempt to obtain the o i l concessions. 
The B r i t i s h Government wishing to safeguard the interests 
of themselves and the B r i t i s h o i l companies took the i n i t i a t i v e 
through the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Agents to ensure that the potential 
wealth of the area was not exploited by other foreign powers. 
In accordance with t h i s policy the B r i t i s h extracted from 
Sheikh Isa bin A l i , i n the form of a l e t t e r to the P o l i t i c a l Agent 
i n Bahrain i n May, 1911, a promise t h a t . . . . . . . . . . " i f there i s any 
prospect of obtaining kerosene o i l i n my t e r r i t o r y , I w i l l not embark 
on the exploitation of i t myself and w i l l not entertain overtures from 
any quarter regarding i t without consulting the P o l i t i c a l Agent i n 
Bahrain, and without the approval of the High Government.....o""^ 
I n the years immediately following t h i s undertaking, possibly 
due to the disturbance of the war, no further action was taken u n t i l 
1923, when Sheikh Hamed bin Isa took o f f i c e . The Administration at 
t h i s time began to discuss the deteriorating s i t u a t i o n with regard 
to water supplies and i t was decided to explore the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
sinking wells to locate further sources. A New Zealander, Major 
52 
Frank Holmes, who was i n the area at that time as a representative . 
of a small London o i l company, "Syndicate of Eastern and General", 
seeking o i l concessions i n the area, was contacted by two Bahrain 
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merchant brothers, A l i and Mohammed Yateem, with a view to 
d r i l l i n g between 12 and 16 water wells i n the island., 
On behalf of his company, he undertook t h i s work and the 
wells were successfully d r i l l e d . As a reward for his work, 
Sheikh Hamed, on 2nd December, 1925, granted an exclusive option 
53 
to explore f o r o i l over an area of 100,000 acres. The option 
was eventually to run f o r three years, during which a payment of 
10,000 rupees per annum was to be made to Sheikh Hamed, wit h 
increased payments i f o i l were to be found. 
The concession received the approval of the Colonial 
Office i n London. 
Several geologists were hired to survey the island and 
advise Holmes, but i n spite of evidence of o i l seepages, a l l 
except one reported that d r i l l i n g was not worthwhile, and even 
the dissenter gave only l i m i t e d approval to Bahrain as a prospective 
source of o i l . 
Despite these discouraging reports Holmes t r i e d unsuccessfully 
for two years to interest various B r i t i s h o i l companies i n purchasing 
the concession for Bahrain, and having f a i l e d here he turned to the 
American companies. I n November, 1927, the Eastern Gulf O i l 
Company, a subsidiary of the American Gulf O i l Corporation entered 
int o an option with a view to purchasing the o i l r i g h t s of the 
55 
Syndicate. 
The purchase was, however, overtaken by events, namely the 
signing i n 1928 of the "Red Line Agreement" which obliged the 
signing companies not to develop any o i l concessions independently. 
Gulf O i l was one of the signatories of the Agreement, and was 
therefore, except i f the Gulf Company was able to in t e r e s t other 
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partners i n exploiting the f i e l d j o i n t l y , barred from taking 
up the option. 
In the absence of any other companies wishing to form a 
consortium and the refusal of permission by the other companies 
to allow the Gulf Company to exploit i t i n d i v i d u a l l y , the option 
was not taken up i n spite of good reports by the Gulf O i l geologists. 
On 21st December, 1928 the Standard O i l Company of California 
(SOCAL) bought the option from Eastern and General Syndicate for 
56 
a sum of 50,000 d o l l a r s , on condition that the Syndicate was to 
obtain a renewal of the concession which had expired on 2nd December, 
1928, and to transfer i t to Standard O i l Company of California. 
R a t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s agreement, however, involved the B r i t i s h 
Colonial Office who insisted that only a British-owned company would 
be permitted to operate i n Bahrain, This issue was the cause of 
prolonged negotiations which eventually involved the B r i t i s h and 
American Governments, the B r i t i s h continuing to i n s i s t that only a 
B r i t i s h Company be allowed to operate i n Bahrain, whilst the Americans 
58 
pursued the "open door" policy. 
I n 1929 a compromise was eventually reached whereby a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the Standard O i l Company of Ca l i f o r n i a , to be 
known as the Bahrain Petroleum Company Ltd., be formed and should be 
registered i n Canada. 
The other major provisions of the compromise were that the 
Bahrain Petroleum Company, must remain a B r i t i s h company, one of 
the directors of the company must be a B r i t i s h subject, and persona 
grata to the B r i t i s h Government. The Company's chief l o c a l 
representative must be appointed by the B r i t i s h Government, and a l l 
communications with the Sheikh must be through him and the P o l i t i c a l 
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Agent. Also, as many of the employees as was consistent w i t h 
59 
efficiency must be B r i t i s h and Bahraini subjects. 
By August 1930 the o i l concession was assigned by 
the Standard O i l Company of California to Bahrain Petroleum Company, 
and the transfer became f u l l y e f f e c t i v e i n December 1934 when 
Sheikh Hamed bin Isa granted a minor lease to Bahrain Petroleum 
Company carrying the same terms as the o r i g i n a l lease, i . e . 
100,000 acres on the main island. The lease was to run for 55 years 
and the royalties were negotiated at 3 rupees 8 annas per ton with a 
guaranteed minimum of 75,000 rupees per annum. 
I n addition to t h i s the company was granted major customs 
and tax exemptions. 
During the years between 1934 and 1940 negotiations took place 
concerning the unallotted areas of the Shaikh's dominions, with 
Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Iraq Petroleum Company being 
ac t i v e l y i n v o l v e d ^ and i n 1940 the Shaikh extended the area 
a l l o t t e d to Bahrain Petroleum Company to cover the whole of the 
main islands plus the islands surrounding Bahrain.^ 
The Iraq Petroleum Company was excluded from Bahrain by the 
Shaikh on the grounds that two o i l companies operating on such a small 
area was excessive. 
The new agreement which was signed i n July, 1940 conferred 
exclusive r i g h t s to Bahrain Petroleum Company over the "present and 
future dominions" of the Shaikh. On the signing of the agreement the 
Shaikh received the sum of Rs. 400,000 (£30,000), and the minimum 
annual royalty was raised to £95,000 for the f i r s t 15 years, r i s i n g 
to £127,500 i f o i l was discovered i n the newly-leased t e r r i t o r i e s . 
An additional clause i n the agreement reduced the minimum 
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annual royalty to £11,250 and £22,500 respectively a f t e r the 
termination of the 15 year period. 
The royalty per ton remained unchanged f o r the time being 
at 3 rupees 8 annas. 
I n 1952 the agreement was again renegotiated and the lease 
was extended to a d e f i n i t e termination date of 2024 A.D. 
D r i l l i n g started on the f i r s t o i l well i n Bahrain on 16th 
October, 1931, and by the 1st May, 1932 the f i r s t commercially 
productive well was brought i n at a depth of 2008 f t . This 
important discovery, the f i r s t on the Arab side of the Gulf, brought 
a renewal of interest i n the Arabian Peninsula as a potential source 
of o i l supply. The d r i l l i n g x*as continued successfully and more 
wells were brought i n , storage tanks were b u i l t and i n December, 
1934 the f i r s t tanker-load of Bahrain o i l entered the world market. 
Production at f i r s t rose rapidly during the f i r s t years of 
exploitation then settled down to a steady growth which has been 
maintained up to recent years as i s witnessed by the following table. 
TABLE X I I I 
Bahrain O i l Production - 1933-1970 6 2 ° 
Year U.S. Barrels Tons Year U.S. Barrels Tons 
1933 31000 4000 1952 11004278 1510000 
1934 285072 39008 1953 10978351 1506000 
1935 1264807 173072 1954 10994754 1570000 
1936 4644635 635555 1955 9196527 1260000 
1937 7762264 1058511 1956 11013702 1509000 
1938 8297997 1138000 1957 11691462 1602000 
1939 7588544 1041000 1958 14873111 2038000 
1940 7074065 971000 1959 16473378 2257000 
1941 6794110 932000 1960 16500424 2260000 
1942 6241135 856000 1961 16444492 2252000 
1943 6571825 902000 1962 16445932 2253000 
1944 6710810 921000 j 1963 16502868 2261000 
1945 7309125 1003000 1964 17999821 2466000 
1946 8009925 1099000 1965 20787617 2848000 
1947 9410710 1291000 1966 22520831 3085000 
1948 10914905 1496000 1967 25370007 3475000 
1949 10985484 1508000 1968 27597728 3781000 
1950 11015711 1512000 1969 27813454 3810000 
195x 10994344 1508000 1970 27973000 3832000 
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In 1936, due to d i f f i c u l t i e s i n marketing the crude o i l , 
Bahrain Petroleum Company decided to erect i t s own refinery on 
the island. This i n s t a l l a t i o n was i n i t i a l l y designed to handle 
up to 10,000 barrels per day. The commissioning of t h i s plant took 
place i n 1937. 6 3 
I n the meanwhile the Standard O i l Company of California 
had been conducting negotiations with the Texas Corporation for 
use of i t s marketing f a c i l i t i e s , as the l a t t e r had an extensive 
d i s t r i b u t i o n network i n Asia, Africa and Australia, but no 
Middle East o i l production at that time, a l l the company's o i l being 
shipped from America to these markets. 
F i n a l l y , on 28th June, 1936, an agreement was reached 
between the two which resulted i n the formation of the C a l i f o r n i a -
Texas O i l Company (CALTEX) with each company, Bahrain Petroleum 
Company and Texas O i l Company becoming equal partners i n the 
Bahrain o i l production i n exchange for a 50% share of the Texas 
Corporation's eastern marketing f a c i l i t i e s . Thereafter Bahrain 
Petroleuip Company became the producer of o i l and a l l the marketing 
was done by Texas O i l Company. 
In January, 1946 Texas O i l Company completed the purchase 
of a company which had been marketing o i l i n Europe and the 
Mediterranean countries, thus extending even further t h e i r already 
considerable markets into the Western Hemisphere. 
The Truman proclamation of 28th September, 1945, regarding 
the exploitation of minerals w i t h i n the area of the continental 
shelves, created a new precedent i n international law and opened 
up wider opportunities f o r the o i l companies. 
In June, 1949, af t e r having taken advice on the subject, the 
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Sheikh of Bahrain issued Proclamation No. 37, i n which he 
declared 
......."that the sea-bed and the subsoils of 
the high seas of the Persian Gulf bordering 
the t e r r i t o r i a l waters of Bahrain and 
extending seaward as far as l i m i t s that we, 
a f t e r consultation with the neighbouring 
governments shall determinamore accurately 
when the occasion so requires, ^ 
belong to the country of Bahrain 
As previously mentioned, the royalties were o r i g i n a l l y 
fixed at 3 rupees 8 annas per ton. However, following the 
devaluation of the rupee i n 1949 Bahrain Petroleum Company 
increased the royalties to 10 rupees per ton. This came into 
65 
effec t from January, 1950. 
During 1951 and 1952 the Government of Bahrain entered 
into negotiations with Bahrain Petroleum Company again i n an 
attempt to achieve a larger proportion of the p r o f i t s from the 
o i l i n l i n e with local tendencies to claim a 50-50 p r o f i t sharing 
of the net income from the production and sale of the o i l . 
Although negotiations continued well i n t o 1952, agreement along 
these lines was f i n a l l y reached and the agreement was backdated 
to 1st January, 1952. 
Although t h i s agreement substantially increased Bahrain's 
earnings from the o i l , the price of Bahrain o i l , which was used as 
a basis for calculating the taxes paid to the Bahraini government, 
was below the posted prices used to determine such payments to the 
host governments of neighbouring o i l producing countries. Instead 
the price was a r b i t r a r i l y established by the parent company, 
Bahrain Petroleum Company, and the marketing subsiduary, California 
66 
Texas O i l Company. 
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In l i n e with Proclamation No. 37 of 1949s the Sheikh of 
Bahrain conducted direct negotiations with King Saud of Saudi 
Arabia i n 1958. These negotiations concluded on 22nd February, 
1958 and resulted i n the establishment of marine f r o n t i e r s 
between the two countries. 
A r t i c l e 2 of t h i s treaty designated an area to the 
northeast of Bahrain i n which Bahrain was to receive half of the 
net p r o f i t s of any o i l found i n that area. Sovereignty of the 
area was to be retained by Saudi Arabia who would also carry out 
any o i l operations i n the designated area.^^ 
In 1963 the Arabian American O i l Company began to d r i l l 
i n t h i s area and o i l was found i n the off-shore f i e l d of Abu Safa, 
some 27 miles north of Dahran. Commercial production began on 
19th January, 1966, and i n accordance with the Treaty the Bahrain 
Government began to receive i t s negotiated share of the net 
p r o f i t s , thus increasing her o i l revenues. As the o i l revenues 
grew over the years so also did the u t i l i z a t i o n and capacity of 
the r e f i n e r y , which as previously mentioned, was o r i g i n a l l y 
constructed to handle 10,000 barrels per day, had been quickly 
extended during 1937 to handle 25,000 barrels per day by adding 
a second crude s t i l l with a cracking, reforming and t r e a t i n g plant. 
During 1938 the capacity of the crude s t i l l was further increased 
68 
to 30,000 barrels per day. 
By then the r e f i n i n g capacity was i n excess of Bahrain 
Petroleum Company's o i l production and the company decided to 
import crude o i l from Saudi Arabia to u t i l i z e the spare capacity. 
This operation was carried out i n i t i a l l y by the use of tank barges 
which were eventually replaced i n 1945 by the construction of a 
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direct underwater pipeline to the island. 
During the war years the Bahrain o i l production and 
r e f i n i n g capacity was appreciated as a highly valuable contribution 
to the war e f f o r t , and i n 1943 the United States Government 
decided to rapidly develop the Saudi Arabian f i e l d s . I n turn 
the Bahrain re f i n e r y was increased yet again i n size and scope 
i n t h i s year by the addition of a t h i r d crude d i s t i l l a t i o n u n i t , 
a c a t a l y t i c cracking unit to produce high octane s p i r i t , a gas 
recovery and s t a b i l i s e r unit and other units f o r the manufacture 
of special products. 
The throughput of the refinery was raised to 37,500 barrels 
69 
per day i n 1944 and to 65,000 per day i n 1945. I n t h i s year the 
new 12 inch pipeline was l a i d over the 34 miles between Bahrain 
and the mainland f o r the delivery of crude o i l to the refi n e r y . 
At t h i s time the 17 miles of underwater pipe was the longest 
underwater stretch of pipe i n the world. 
Between 1947 and 1952 the capacity of t h i s l i n e was 
doubled to meet the expanding requirements of the refi n e r y . 
During 1944, following the opening of the c a t a l y t i c cracking 
plant, a drum manufacturing and f i l l i n g plant was added to 
f a c i l i t a t e the transportation of the high octane aviation f u e l 
and motor s p i r i t being produced. 
Following the war years the r e f i n i n g capacity of Bahrain 
continued to grow and reached i t s peak during the l a t e 1960's, and i n 
1969 whilst the Bahrain o i l production was only 27,813,454 barrels 
the t o t a l refined was 87,375,625 barrels, an average of 239,385 
barrels per day.^° 
The products currently being manufactured by the Bahrain 
refinery include Nfptha, Gasoline, Kerosene, Aviation Turbine Fuel, 
Diesel O i l , Fuel O i l and Asphalt. 
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TABLE XIV 
Selected Years of Refining Production (U.S. Barrels) 
Year Bahrain Products Refined Saudi Arabian Products Refined 
(1953 10978351 59668382 
71.(1954 10991754 65164333 
(1955 9196527 61116578 
1956; 10941126 58459368 
1957; 11784980 44291485* 
1958; 14828176 48668088 
1959; 16390110 50548677 
1960; 16493442 58462862 
196i; 16493998 63238830 
1962; 16487577 71982462 
1963; 7 9 
1964; / z* 
16597889 66450124 
17911358 56974833 
1965; 20793253 49647777 
1966; 22516482 49397139 
1967; 25311229 62444609 
1968; 27543057 55877186 
1969; 27813454 58159182 
1970; 27940945 63517833 
* I t should be noted that the substantial drop i n 
Saudi Arabian o i l supplies for 1957 was due to the 
closure of the pipeline between November, 1956 and 
March, 1957, because of the effects of the Suez 
Cri s i s . There i s no o f f i c i a l explanation for the 
f a l l i n supply from Saudi Arabia between 1963 and 
1966 study of the Bahrain Petroleum Company's 
reports for these years indicate major shut-downs 
of parts of the ref i n e r y f o r repairs, modernisation 
and automation. 
Although, as can be seen, the o i l from Saudi Arabia represented 
the major portion*of the refinery's throughput, the advantage to 
Bahrain u n t i l 1952 was n i l as no roya l t i e s were collected on the o i l 
so processed. But i n 1952 with the opening of the second pipeline 
from Saudi Arabia a small tax of 5| cents per barrel on a l l o i l 
passing through the pipeline was levied 
Between the years of 1960 and 1964 Bahrain Petroleum Company 
was extremely active i n surveying a l l the t e r r i t o r y w i t h i n the area 
of i t s concession i n an attempt to locate further o i l supplies. 
Having f a i l e d to locate any reserve f i e l d s the company i n 1965 
- 130 -
relinquished a l l t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s except for the current 
production area, and the area relinquished was re-leased to the 
Continental O i l Company. 
Although Bahrain was not an active member of the Organisation 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), she s t i l l managed to 
take advantage of OPEC negotiations and agreements. For instance 
i n 1965 Bahrain Petroleum Company agreed to the principle of 
royalty expensing to the l i m i t of 12£% of the production at the 
poated price, but reserved the r i g h t to deduct 8£% from the 1964 
posted price, l\7> i n 1965 and 6£% i n 1966, reducing gradually 
7 A 
to zero. ^ 
I t i s worth noting that the Bahrain o i l production i s 
extremely small when compared with other countries i n the Gulf 
region, but i t i s s t i l l important i n that i t possesses one of 
the largest r e f i n e r i e s i n the Middle East, 
At the present moment, the existence of an o i l industry i n 
Bahrain appears to be l i m i t e d , as i t i s calculated that the o i l 
reserves i n the island are s u f f i c i e n t to l a s t t i l l only 1990.^ 
I t has, however, had a major influence on the island i n two spheres. 
F i r s t , i t has created a much needed f i e l d of employment and 
second, the revenues from the o i l have made i t possible to introduce 
measures f o r the social and economic development of the community 
at the time i t was most needed. As Longrigg put i t , ......."No 
community or government, indeed, has been more suddenly and timely 
rescued from economic disaster than those of Bahrain i n 1932........"^ 
The payment of the o i l revenues to Bahrain was from the 
beginning divided into three equal parts. One part i s paid d i r e c t l y 
to the Shaikh for the maintenance of his household and family. Another 
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p a r t i s used t o meet c u r r e n t government expenditure and 
development p r o j e c t s . The t h i r d p a r t i s invested abroad as a 
reserve against f u t u r e c o n t i n g e n c i e s . ^ These payments o f the 
revenues are confined t o the production of Bahrain o i l . I t has 
been suggested t h a t revenues from the f o r e i g n o i l f i e l d s , such as 
Abu Safa, are regarded as the Shaikh's personal income. This may 
be t r u e , as the income from the Abu Safa o i l f i e l d s was expected 
to increase the o i l revenues by 1970 to a f i g u r e approximately 
7ft 
40% higher than t h a t of 1964. ° On studying the f i g u r e s a v a i l a b l e 
t h i s p r o j e c t e d increase does not appear t o have taken place. The 
income from o i l has over the years been the mainstay of the Bahrain 
economy, w i t h customs d u t i e s , i n t e r e s t from overseas investments, 
and other smaller items making up the remainder. 
The w r i t e r a r r i v e d a t the f o l l o w i n g f i g u r e s f o r o i l income 
a f t e r deducting the one t h i r d of the revenues which i s paid 
d i r e c t l y to the Shaikh. Thus the t r u e amount a v a i l a b l e f o r 
Government expenditure may be a r r i v e d a t and the percentage 
which the o i l revenues represent of the t o t a l State Budget may 
be e s t a b l i s h e d . 
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TABLE XV 
The C o n t r i b u t i o n of O i l t o the State Budget 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89, 
Year O i l Income T o t a l ( A l l Sources) 
1934-35 Rs. 379000 1153000 
1935-36 Rs. 461000 1416000 
1936-37 Rs. 2110000 3281000 
1937-38 Rs. 2363000 3563000 
1938-39 Rs. 2157000 3500000 
1939=40 Rs. 2368000 3717000 
1940-41 Rs. 1977000 3443000 
1941-42 Rs. 1748000 3108000 
1942-43 Rs. 1807000 3798000 
1943-44 Rs. 1859000 4575000 
1944-45 Rs. 2017000 5391000 
1945-46 Rs. 2073000 5634000 
1946-47 Rs. 2601000 7379000 
1947-48 Rs. 3061000 8799000 
1948-49 Rs. 3281000 10547000 
1949-50 Rs. 6255000 13877000 
1950-51 Rs. 10226000 20042000 
1951-52 Rs. 13401000 23358000 
1952-53 Rs. 27656000 45061000 
1954 Rs. 35002000 49200000 
1955 Rs. 28370000 44790000 
1956 Rs. 24120000 38005000 
1957 Rs. 35040664 54863668 
1958 Rs. 39553756 58613822 
1959 Rs. 33540124 55689455 
1960 Rs. 35243924 59061962 
1961 Rs. 34741158 54852429 
1962 
1963 Rs. 35858666 58355667 
1964 Rs. 39039954 63335954 
1965 Rs. 39333334 71133332 
1966 
1967 
'1968 B.D. 5333000 8814000 
1969 B.D, 5913000 9793000 
1970 
1971 B.D. 6133000 14933000 
% 
32.87 
32.56 
64.31 
66.32 
61.63 
63.71 
57.42 
56.24 
47.58 
40.63 
37.41 
36.80 
35.25 
34.79 
31.11 
45.08 
51.02 
53.06 
61.38 
71.14 
63.84 
63.47 
63.87 
67.48 
60.23 
59.67 
63.34 
61.45 
61.64 
55.30 
60.50 
60.38 
41.07 
S t a r t i n g from 1965 the Bahrain Annual Budget moved i n t o a 
d e f i c i t s i t u a t i o n and the government began t o draw upon the p o r t i o n 
o f the o i l revenues which were normally invested abroad plus the 
i n t e r e s t from e x i s t i n g investments 9 and q u i t e r e c e n t l y 9 due to the 
expansion of the s o c i a l services and the consequent growth of the 
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c i v i l s e r v i c e , some of the a c t u a l investments have been redeemed 
90 
f o r use i n the isl a n d ' s budget. This i s c l e a r l y shown by the 
f i g u r e s f o r 1971 where although o i l earnings are the highest ever 
recorded they represent only 41.07% of the Governments Budget. 
I t can also be seen from the t a b l e t h a t d uring the l a s t 
two decades, w i t h o nly very few exceptions, o i l revenues have 
provided more than 60 percent of the is l a n d s income, a percentage 
high enough to q u a l i f y Bahrain as a " s i n g l e product" s t a t e , and 
i t i s obvious t h a t i f f o r one reason or another t h i s income had 
been c u r t a i l e d then the economy of the i s l a n d would have q u i c k l y 
collapsed. 
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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
THE SOCIAL IMPACT" OF MODERN INDUSTRY 
a) The S t r u c t u r e of the Bahrain Labour Force. 
S t a r t i n g from the t h i r d census of Bahrain i n 1959 i n f o r m a t i o n 
was c o l l e c t e d regarding the economic status of the economically 
a c t i v e members of the p o p u l a t i o n , the i n d u s t r i e s i n which they were 
working and the occupations which they f o l l o w e d . 
The e a r l y census of 1956, which covered employment o n l y , was 
t o a c e r t a i n extent an estimate of the a c t u a l numbers i n c e r t a i n 
f i e l d s , but i t provides us w i t h a basis from which we may b u i l t t o 
o b t a i n the o v e r a l l p i c t u r e and trends. 
I t i s n o t i c e a b l e from t a b l e XVI below t h a t , d u r i n g the p e r i o d 
covered t h e r e has been a tremendous growth i n the number employed 
i n the Government Service, which a t the present time i s the l a r g e s t 
s i n g l e employer of labour, due t o an expansion of the government 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n machinery. Meanwhile, other s e c t i o n s , such as the 
wholesale trade have experienced a p e r i o d of growth f o l l o w e d by a 
r a p i d d e c l i n e . I n the case of the wholesale trade t h i s was probably 
due t o the f a c t t h a t i n e a r l i e r years w i t h a r a p i d l y growing economy 
many small wholesaling businesses were set up but as the economy 
became more s t a b i l i s e d the trade was not so a t t r a c t i v e t o small 
t r a d e r s , amalgamations and r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s took place u n t i l 
f i n a l l y the wholesale trade was l e f t i n the hands of a few l a r g e r 
companies w h i l s t those employed i n the smaller wholesale agencies 
found employment i n the other s e c t o r s , such as the r e t a i l t r a d e . 
An i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of the t a b l e i s the very high 
p r o p o r t i o n of non-Bahrainis i n the labour f o r c e , the percentage of 
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the t o t a l being i n 1956 - 41.2%; 1959 - 34.2%; 1965 - 41.3%; and 
1971 - 37.2%. The reason f o r t h i s i s p o s s i b l y due t o the f a c t 
t h a t the non-Bahraini labour forces are composed of two main 
groups, those possessing t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s and those having no 
s k i l l s but p r o v i d i n g manual labour f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n , t r a n s p o r t 
and r e t a i l t r a d e s , and working ifauthe s ervice i n d u s t r i e s , jobs 
which are not a t t r a c t i v e t o the l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n because of the 
low status and pay, but which are nevertheless e s s e n t i a l t o the 
economy. 
As we have already mentioned the unemployed were included i n 
the f i g u r e s of the previous t a b l e , but t h i s does not show us the 
unemployment r a t e f o r the economically a c t i v e groups, nor yet have 
we considered the p r o p o r t i o n s of the economically a c t i v e w i t h 
respect t o the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n , the crude p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e , two 
feat u r e s which are important i n any i n d u s t r i a l l y based economy. 
Table X V I I below has been c a l c u l a t e d from the a v a i l a b l e 
f i g u r e s i n the censuses of the three years 1959, 1965 and 1971. 
I t i s n o t i c e a b l e from the t a b l e t h a t the crude p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
r a t e f o r the non-Bahraini p o p u l a t i o n i s very much higher than t h a t 
of the Bahrainis. This i s because the non-Bahraini p o p u l a t i o n 
have emigrated to Bahrain f o r the sole purpose of o b t a i n i n g employment 
and i t f o l l o w s t h a t the va s t m a j o r i t y of the immigrants are of the 
working-age groups and i n many cases do not b r i n g t h e i r dependants 
w i t h them. 
I t i s n o t i c e a b l e , a l s o , t h a t the crude p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e of the 
Bahrai n i p o p u l a t i o n has s t e a d i l y f a l l e n and t h i s i s no doubt due to 
the l a r g e increase d u r i n g the peri o d shown i n the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n 
which now includes a very high p r o p o r t i o n of young people who may not 
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be considered a c t i v e . 
The crude p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of 
Bahrain, both Bahraini and non-Bahraini, i s less than the world 
average crude p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e , which was 42,5% according t o 
9 
the censuses taken i n 1950 and 1951. But t h i s i s no doubt due 
to the f a c t t h a t the l o c a l female p o p u l a t i o n ba^ag almost e n t i r e l y 
non-working due t o l o c a l customs and a t t i t u d e s . When one 
compared the p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s of the B a h r a i n i males w i t h those 
of other c o u n t r i e s , such as the North American c o n t i n e n t however; 
then the f i g u r e s are very s i m i l a r a t the l e v e l of 56.8 per c e n t . ^ 
The unemployment f i g u r e s show t h a t the percentage unemployed 
i n the non-Bahraini p o p u l a t i o n i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y lower than t h a t of 
the Bahrainis. This i s probably because the m a j o r i t y of the 
non=Bahrainis are prepared t o change t h e i r f i e l d of employment 
more r e a d i l y and t o accept any employment which may be o f f e r e d . 
This d i f f e r e n c e i s accentuated p a r t l y by the Bahrainis' s o c i a l 
a t t i t u d e to jobs i n v o l v i n g manual labour and domestic s e r v i c e , these 
being looked upon as very i n f e r i o r means of employment. 
The f i g u r e s f o r 1959 and 1965 show a s u b s t a n t i a l degree of 
unemployment i n the i s l a n d , a s i t u a t i o n which now seems to have 
changed, although the f i g u r e s f o r 1971 should be t r e a t e d w i t h some 
reserve as the normal method of s p e c i f y i n g a p a r t i c u l a r number as 
being unemployed was not used. Instead, the number given was 
"unemployed persons seeking work f o r the f i r s t time", a r a t h e r 
inadequate statement. 
From the Government Census of I n d u s t r y i n 1969 i t can be 
established t h a t of the t o t a l number of persons employed on i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o j e c t s i n Bahrain B the Bahrainis numbered 5,381 and the non-Bahrainis 
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1,808, and of the t o t a l numbers of Bahrainis employed, 4,455, or 
82.8% where d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y employed by Bahrain Petroleum 
11 
Company, As i s shown i n Table X f l up t o 1959 the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company was s t i l l the l a r g e s t s i n g l e employer of labour 
i n the i s l a n d , even l a r g e r than the Government, and i t i s t h e r e f o r e 
a p p r o p r i a t e a t t h i s stage to study the employment, wages, and 
t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g given t o the Bahrainis and the developments 
which these brought about, 
b) Bahrain Petroleum Company as an employer. 
1. General 
I n the years immediately f o l l o w i n g the discovery and p r o d u c t i o n 
of o i l i n Bahrain, the i n d u s t r y provided a great o p p o r t u n i t y f o r l o c a l 
manual workers t o o b t a i n steady employment a t r e l a t i v e l y h i gh wages 
f o l l o w i n g the d e c l i n e of t h e i r more t r a d i t i o n a l methods of employment. 
I n those years, however, there was very l i t t l e prospect o f the l o c a l 
labour being employed as anything other than manual workers, since the 
needs of the company were f o r labour w i t h p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l s which 
were not a v a i l a b l e l o c a l l y and which t h e r e f o r e had t o be r e c r u i t e d 
from abroad. As Mr. Max Weston Thornburg pointed out. 
....."the American o i l men ( i n Bahrain) had been t o l d 
by B r i t i s h f r i e n d s w i t h many years experience i n other 
p a r t s of the Middle East t h a t not much could be 
expected of Arab labour, and t h a t f o r a l l but the 
lowest u n s k i l l e d grades i t would be necessary t o 
import Indians or others f o r t r a i n i n g . The l o c a l 
labour, c o n s i s t i n g of peasants, v i l l a g e r s , tribesmen, 
fishermen, p e a r l d i v e r s and town-fringe i n d i g e n t s , 
was indeed u n s k i l l e d . 
I t was also i l l i t e r a t e , impoverished, under-
nourished and diseased, these people f l o c k e d t o the 
company f o r employment but were seemingly i n d i f f e r e n t 
to wages beyond the few rupees which would provide food 
f o r the f a m i l y group t h a t each s u p p o r t e d . " ^ 
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The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s statement i s p o s s i b l y t r u e 
as up t o t h a t time the l o c a l i n h a b i t a n t s had experienced very 
l i t t l e contact w i t h organised i n d u s t r i e s , and the standard of 
general h e a l t h and medical a t t e n t i o n was very low. But t o s t a t e 
t h a t they were i n d i f f e r e n t t o wages beyond t h a t which would 
support t h e i r f a m i l i e s seems t o be somdihing of an exaggeration. 
For the f i r s t t e n years or so the p o l i c y of the company 
was t o subcontract the h i r i n g of labour i n the i s l a n d t o l o c a l 
agents, namely A l i and Mohammed Yatteem, who received from the 
company the wages of the men employed which they then d i s t r i b u t e d 
t o the workers a f t e r having deducted a s u b s t a n t i a l commission f o r 
themselves. The money a c t u a l l y received by the workers a t t h i s 
time was o f t e n as low as 4 t o 6 Annas (1 Rs. = 16 Annas) per day. 
This system n a t u r a l l y l e d t o d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n on the p a r t of 
the l o c a l labour e s p e c i a l l y when they saw the I n d i a n workers and 
ot h e r s , over the years, being granted b e t t e r wages and c o n d i t i o n s 
than those which they themselves enjoyed. Throughout Bahrain 
Petroleum Company's i n d u s t r i a l h i s t o r y i n the i s l a n d , these 
f e e l i n g s continued t o grow and were u s u a l l y connected w i t h wages 
and c o n d i t i o n s as the labour concessions of the workers developed. 
However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o t a l k of labour unrest i n i s o l a t i o n , as 
periods of unrest on the i n d u s t r i a l scene u s u a l l y coincided w i t h 
13 
p o l i t i c a l unrest i n the i s l a n d , as happened i n 1938, 1953 and 1965, 
The only exception t o t h i s record was i n 1943 when a s t r i k e took 
place r e l a t i n g t o wages and c o n d i t i o n s a t a period when, due t o the 
war, there was very l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the i s l a n d . 
The main demands of l o c a l employees were u s u a l l y i n the f i e l d s 
of wages, c o n d i t i o n s and t r a i n i n g , the last-mentioned being very 
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important as the Bahrainis resented the presence of Indians 
and Pakistanis on the intermediate grades of the companys which 
i n fact appeared to the Bahrainis as a threat to the i r promotion 
prospects. 
As early as 1940, the editor of the l o c a l paper, Abdulla 
Al-Zayed sin a meeting with Mr. Thornburg, company Vice-President, 
placed before him some of the complaints and demands of the l o c a l 
employees. These were as follows;-
a) That a f t e r the deduction of his personal expenditure 
connected with h i s employment, the l o c a l labourer was l e f t with only 
10 rupees per month on which to support h i s family. 
b) That the quarters provided by the company were too cold 
i n winter and too hot i n the summer, and that e l e c t r i c l ighting 
should be provided. 
c) That the l o c a l employees should be given t r a i n i n g which 
would enable them to replace the Indian workers at the e a r l i e s t 
- I * opportunity. 
The j u s t i c e of these demands was borne out by a l e t t e r sent 
to the P o l i t i c a l Agent by the chief l o c a l representative of the 
15 
Bahrain Petroleum Company i n 1942 i n which he mentioned that 
although some lo c a l employees were performing the same work as the 
Indians, the l a t t e r enjoyed other p r i v i l e g e s denied the Bahrainis, 
such as hospi t a l i s a t i o n during i l l n e s s , and half pay during the 
h o s p i t a l i s a t i o n , and also the payment of housing allowances and 
war allowances. This created a feeling of fr u s t r a t i o n amongst the 
Bahrainis, as was instanced by an occurrence which took place i n 
1939 during the v i s i t of a Swedish doctor, Dr. L i n d i t , to the island. 
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He wrote, 
" I s h a l l never forget the very hurt face of my 
very well-born Arab interpreter when, accompanying 
me on a tour of the Bahrain o i l f i e l d s * he was 
refused admittance to the hospital". " 
The wages of the Bahraini coolie during the early 1940's 
did not exceed one rupee per day,*^ and the resentment at these 
conditions gradually b u i l t up 9 culminating i n the s t r i k e of 1943, 
when on the 22nd December the l o c a l labour employed i n the 
refinery walked out i n protest against the wages and conditions. 
They were soon joined by the workers i n the company's transport 
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departments tank f i e l d , and sea transport d i v i s i o n s . 
The s t r i k e continued u n t i l the end of the month and almost 
brought the company to a s t a n d s t i l l . 
Great efforts were made by the Adviser to the Government, 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent and the Chief Local Representative of the 
company to persuade the men to return to t h e i r work i n return for 
a promise that their demands would receive f u l l consideration. When 
th e i r efforts f a i l e d Bahrain Petroleum Company introduced a Benefit 
Plan and War Allowances scheme to bring them more into l i n e with the 
Indian workers, but t h i s would apply only to those who returned to 
work before 30th December. 
Pressure was also brought to bear upon the Shaikh to persuade the 
workers to return even though he was i n sympathy with some of their 
demands, such as the granting of Fridays, the main Islam day of 
worship, as a regular paid r e s t day. He was approached by the 
P o l i t i c a l Agent who l a t e r stated i n h i s report, 
. . . . . " I pointed out to His Highness that the cessation 
of work at the refinery would mean a serious f a l l i n g - o f f 
i n the output and would seriously a f f e c t the supply of 
petrol for the Royal A i r Force. I also drew h i s attention 
to the fact that cessation of work at the r e f i n e r y shouj^ 
mean a decrease i n r o y a l t i e s paid to His Highness " 
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After the suspected ringleaders had been arrested by the 
Government and the workers began to f e e l the hardship with no 
money to support the i r families, they began gradually to return 
to work. By the f i r s t week of January, 1944 a l l the workers were 
back at work again with nothing more than the War Allowance which 
amounted to 20% of t h e i r wage. 
The workers who had remained at their posts during the s t r i k e 
were rewarded by the company with the grant of an ex-gratia payment 
equivalent to the War Allowance payable for the s t r i k e period, a 
blatant attempt to buy the loyalty of the workers. 
The demands which were the cause of the s t r i k e were as 
follows s-
1) The Tindal at Bahrain Petroleum Company should receive 
10 rupees per day. 
2) The ordinary gauger or operator should get at l e a s t 
7 rupees per day. 
3) Labourers at any plant should receive 4 rupees per day. 
4) Pay should be given to the labourers for holidays, whether 
weekly holiday or lad holiday. 
5) A l l labourers should be e n t i t l e d to transport to and from 
their places of work, as were the Indians. 
6) Vacations should be increased to 1 month per year. 
7) Labourers should not be treated with cruelty or be abused 
by the "Sahib", nor should they be despised. 
8) I f any labourer happened to be injured during h i s work for 
the company, he should be e n t i t l e d to f u l l pay for the duration of 
h i s i njury. 
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9) I f a labourer was taken i l l and was c e r t i f i e d as such 
by a doctor, then he should receive half pay during his i l l n e s s . 
10) I n recognition of War Problems the labourers should be 
given a r i s e of 15% as a War Allowance, graduated according to 
earnings. 
11) Any new notices with regard to rations and conditions 
which were issued to the Indians should also be issued to the 
Bahrainis» 
12) The practice of fining a labourer for t r i f l i n g mistakes 
should be stopped. 
13) The above d e t a i l s should not be agreed temporarily, but 
should stand perpetually for both present and future employees. 
14) The company should commonly announce to the public as 
well as the labourers a l l the above d e t a i l s and to state whether 
they are acceptable or not. 
15) The reason for t h i s s t r i k e of the labourers i s caused 
mainly by the following items. 
a) The continuing r i s e i n expenses. 
20 
b) Cruelty used i n the treatment of labourers. 
Some of the above detailed demands were u n r e a l i s t i c , whilst 
others were j u s t i f i e d . Some were even in advance of thei r time 
and anticipated future s o c i a l developments. But b a s i c a l l y the 
st r i k e was due to what would be termed nowadays as the " r i s i n g cost 
of l i v i n g " , a fact which did not appear to be f u l l y appreciated 
by the company. 
The demands which may be classed as premature and to a cer t a i n 
extent i l l - c o n s i d e r e d were those for one month leave per year, and for 
a minimum payment of 4 rupees per day for labourers, the l a t t e r 
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representing a r i s e at that time of approximately 300%. 
The demands for paid holiday 9 transport and the cessation 
of cruel practices were e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d , however. 
The demands for payment during periods of injury and 
sickness were i n advance of t h e i r time for the area, but were i n 
fact no more than those which the Indian employees already 
enjoyed. 
The lack of a proper organisation and experienced 
negotiators precipitated the ending of the s t r i k e , although some 
concessions were won. Reading the demands c a r e f u l l y we may 
conclude that even at t h i s early stage some Bahrainis had received 
s u f f i c i e n t training to achieve positions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , as i s 
instanced by the references to Tindals, gaugers and operators, and 
once the war time r e s t r i c t i o n s were removed some of the trained 
operatives made use of t h e i r experience, by accepting employment 
i n Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, i n positions of high r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
better wages. 
During the second half of the 1940's many o i l workers l e f t 
Bahrain for the o i l f i e l d s of the mainland. As one report put i t , 
"Restrictions which had been imposed by the Bahrain 
Government on people leaving the country to work i n 
Saudi Arabia were l i f t e d during the summer (1946), 
and some 1,300 Bahraini subjects crossed to Saudi 
Arabia because were attracted by the prospects 
of higher wages". 
Over the years, once i t passed i t s i n i t i a l peak, the number 
of Bahrainis working for the company began to decrease possibly 
due partly to the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the labour force by the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company, but also due to the a t t r a c t i o n of higher wages 
elsewhere. The overall trends are shown i n the following table. 
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Figures quoted i n the table up to 1955 have been obtained from 
various sources and those from 1958 to 1963 were obtainable from 
the Bahrain Petroleum Company annual reports. From 1964 onwards 
the Bahrain Petroleum Company quoted only percentage of the tota l 
national groups and the other figures were obtained by comparing 
these percentages with the "Rupee P a y r o l l " , which l i s t e d Bahrainis 
and Gulf Arabs as a single group. 
As may be seen, the decline i n the tota l numbers employed 
began during the l a t t e r half of the 1950's and the numbers of a l l 
groups employed has fallen,, including those of the Bahrainis. For 
instance, i n the 12 years between 1958 and 1970 the number of Bahrainis 
employed by Bahrain Petroleum Company decreased from 5,684 to 3,791 
a percentage decrease of 27.83, a substantial figure, bearing i n 
mind the dependence of the Bahrainis on Bahrain Petroleum Comapny 
as a source of employment and revenue. 
Comparing the number of Bahrainis employed by Bahrain 
Petroleum Company i n 1971 with the t o t a l economically active Bahraini 
population for that year, we see that Bahrain Petroleum Company 
employees represent only 10% of the t o t a l and when expressed as a 
percentage of the crude pa r t i c i p a t i o n rate only 2.12%. 
I t i s astonishing, therefore, to consider that t h i s 2.12% of 
the Bahraini population i s d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y responsible for 
producing o i l revenues which i n 1971 represented 41.07% of the to t a l 
National Budget. 
In spite of t h i s f a c t i t i s well-known that the wages paid to 
Bahrain Petroleum Company employees are lower than those paid by 
other o i l companies i n the Gulf. 
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A comparison i s usually drawn between Bahrain Petroleum 
Company and Arabian American O i l Company, as they are both American-
owned and are cl o s e l y linked with each other, both from the 
geographical point of view and from the j o i n t use of the Bahrain 
r e f i n e r i e s o 
One comparison which could re a d i l y be drawn i s that of wages 
as for instance i n 1954 the average, not minimum, da i l y wage <ESr 
Bahrain Petroleum Company employees i n the lowest category, 
"non-contracted d a i l y " , was 4.25 rupees, whilst about the same time 
31 
the Arabian American O i l Company minimum da i l y payment was SR.6, 
(at that time and up to 1957 1 SR = 1.5 rupees) a difference which 
appeared to be excessive. 
One of the arguments by Bahrain Petroleum Company and the 
Bahrain Government was that t h i s difference i n wages was j u s t i f i e d 
on the grounds that the cost of l i v i n g i n the other countries was 
much higher than i n Bahrain where prices had i n the past been controlled. 
This may well have been true during the war years and the years 
immediately following, but closer examination of t h i s argument, 
espec i a l l y following the l i f t i n g of r e s t r i c t i o n s i n 1947, reveals t h i s 
to be untrue, as both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were both buying and 
importing goods to their respective countries at the same price 
33 
on the international market, and i n addition to th i s the Saudi 
p 
Arabian Government were heavily subsidising the imports of food to 
maintain prices at an a r t i f i c i a l l y low l e v e l , whereas Bahrain which 
had to import her food from the same sources did not adopt the same 
measure and therefore prices of food inn Bahrain were, i f anything, 
higher than those of the mainland. 
This d i f f e r e n t i a l between the wages paid i n the two countries 
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has been maintained up to the present day and the maintaining of 
t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l i s a d i r e c t contradiction of the company's 
"BAPCO" stated policy which i s that, 
"Salary ranges and wage rates based on prevailing 
domestic rates i n the home country for Pound 
Sterling and other non-Dinar payroll employees 
or on going Bahrain rates i n Bahrain and the Gulf 
Area for l o c a l and foreign contract payroll 
employees are established and periodically 
reviewed."^ 
These reviews do not appear to have been conducted on an 
absolutely f a i r basis, since the policy c l e a r l y states that the 
lo c a l employees should be paid the going rate of "Bahrain and 
the Gulf Area", and since the Arabian American O i l Company i s 
the nearest o i l producer i n the Gulf area, one would have thought 
that the Bahraini wages would be the same or very near to those 
paid by the Arabian American O i l Company. 
Despite c e r t a i n technical differences i n c l a s s i f i c a t i o n k as 
i n the Arabian American O i l Company, there are General, Intermediate 
and Senior Staff, with sub c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s within these groups. 
Bahrain Petroleum Company c l a s s i f i e d her employees as Grades One to 
Eleven, with groups One to Four forming the lowest daily-paid groups, 
the writer arrived at the following comparisons i n Table XIX. (P.156) 
I t can be seen that although the Arabian American O i l Company 
payments antedated those of the Bahrain Petroleum Company by some 
18 months, they were s t i l l s ubstantially higher than those enjoyed 
by Bahrain Petroleum Company employees, especially i n the lower 
grades of the company i n which the majority of the Bahrainis were 
employed. As can be seen from the table following the equivalent 
paymenfoSsby the Arabian American O i l Company for grades 1 to 7, which 
comprise the general labouring and intermediate grades, vary from 11.11% to 
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TABLE XIX 
Monthly Payments for Bahrain Petroleum Company and the A r a b i a n , 
American O i l Company Employees 
Class 
of _. MINIMUM MID-POINT MAXIMUM 
Labour BAPCO 35Aramco % lead 34BAPCO 35Aramco 34BAPC0 35.Aramco 
C 1 300.50 355,00 18.14 390.70 455.00 480.00 555.00 
C 2 400.30 490,00 22.41 500.90 595.00 570.30 700.00 
C 3 450.10 - 570.30 - 640.70 -
C 4 540.0 600.00 11.11 690.00 720.00 780.00 840.00 
C 5 660.50 755.00 14.31 840.00 907.50 1020.50 1060.00 
C 6 830.00 935.00 12.65 1050.50 1122.50 1280.00 1310.00 
C 7 1000.00 1145.00 14.50 1350.00 1375.00 1690.00 1605.00 
C 8 1270.00 1400.00 10.24 1700.00 1680.00 2120.00 1960.00 
C 9 1570.00 1710.00 8.92 2100.00 2052.00 2620.00 2395.00 
CIO 1950.00 - 2600.00 - 3250.00 -C l l 2440.00 - 3260.00 - 4070.00 -
BAPCO s a l a r i e s e f f e c t i v e from 1.7.68, Aramco from 11.1.67. 
Aramco payments are quoted i n S.R., and BAPCO i n Rupees. 
The exchange rate at th i s period was 1 SR = 1.02 Rs. 
22.41% higher than the Bahrain Petroleum Company payments. With 
ragard to maximum payments, however, Bahrain Petroleum Company 
appears to be more generous i n the treatment of her higher grade 
employees. 
However, the status of the Bahraini labour i n Bahrain Petroleum 
Company i s s t i l l very low, occupying i n the main only the lower and 
middle grades, as can be seen from the payroll of December, 1970, below 
TABLE XX 
Breakdown of BAPCO Labour by Classes 
Class Non-Dinar Local F oC. 
1 - 750 -2 - 400 3 3 - 360 4 4 - 830 8 
5 - 710 13 
6 3 530 14 
7 30 350 32 
8 50 142 15 
9 83 40 7 
10 78 12 -
11 40 6 2 
12 17 1 0 
Totals 301 4131 96 
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From the above table i t can be seen that l o c a l employees 
f i l l almost a l l posts i n the lower and middle grades of the 
company. Up to grade 7 the number of l o c a l employees was 3,930 
from a t o t a l of 4,131, or 95.13%. 
In conclusion, i t has been suggested by an Arab o i l expert 
that since o i l i s an international commodity and the price va r i e s 
only very s l i g h t l y , i t follows that a l l o i l workers employed i n 
the same conditions and grades should receive the same remuneration 
3 
espec i a l l y i f the countries are i n the same geographical positions. 
The argument appears to s u i t the situ a t i o n with regard to Bahrain 
Petroleum Company and Arabian American O i l Company. 
One further point i s worthy of mention, and t h i s i s that of 
4,721 l o c a l employees i n 1965 only 45 of these had any university 
training or q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , l e s s than 1% of the t o t a l Bahrain labour 
38 
force, and t h i s no doubt i s the reason for a lack of lo c a l 
employees i n the top-flight management l e v e l s of the company, a 
situa t i o n which could have been r e c t i f i e d by more company training 
and sponsorship of employees for university education. 
2. Training, ' j 
In the years immediately following the s t a r t of BAPCO's 
operations i n Bahrain, the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the l o c a l inhabitants 
were regarded as minimal. As Thornburg put i t , 
"As would be expected there was wide v a r i a t i o n 
i n the a b i l i t i e s of these workmen (Bahrainis), 
a v a r i a t i o n more b a f f l i n g than i n the West, 
because the workmen seemed to lack observable 
t r a i t s that would indicate their probable 
cap a b i l i t y or aptitudes, for several years the ^ 
company's only guide was t r i a l and error 
The si t u a t i o n appeared to improve a l i t t l e , however, as the same 
writer noted that by 1940, 
- 158 -
" I n Bahrain a casual observer might walk the length 
of the o i l refinery and scarcely see a European. 
They were there, of course, i n the o f f i c e s , control 
rooms, laboratories, and shops. But the Arabs were 
everywhere, not only as "coolie" labour, but i n 
maintenance squads working under their own foreman, and 
also as machine helpers, truck and tractor d r i v e r s , 
hoist operators, pumpers, gaugers, carpenters, pointers 
pipe f i t t e r s and even acetylene welders ....."^ O 
From these two statements by the same author i t may be safely 
assumed that given the opportunity and training the l o c a l labour was 
capable of assuming a greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and occupying more 
advanced positions i n the company. 
This improvement was possibly due to the i n i t i a t i v e of the lo c a l 
labour rather than any defined company training policy which was not 
formally adopted u n t i l after the i n d u s t r i a l unrest of 1948. 
This unrest was caused by the demands of the Bahrainis for 
improvements i n conditions and a formal training programme for the 
workers. In that year, 1948, a Western observer remarked, "part of the 
trouble i s due totthe Bahrain Petroleum Company's f a i l u r e to encourage 
i t s Arab workers to t r a i n themselves for technical and administrative 
jobs i n the r e f i n e r y . " ^ 
This lack of training was obviously due to a shortsightedness 
on the part of Bahrain Petroleum Company i n i t s relationship with the 
l o c a l labour as i t i s normal policy for new industries establishing 
themselves i n a particular area to import the i r top executives but to 
seek the immediate par t i c i p a t i o n of the l o c a l labour i n the intermediate 
grades of the company hierarchy, thus encouraging the l o c a l people to 
identify themselves with the company and to become lo y a l employees. 
Following the unrest of 1948 a policy of training was adopted 
by Bahrain Petroleum Company under the heading of the Bahraini 
Development Programme. This programme was designed to provide 
Employees with a new and improved s k i l l . This training took two forms, 
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"on s i t e " and "off s i t e " training. The former was undertaken by the 
employees' own department within the company whilst the l a t t e r was the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the I n d u s t r i a l Studies Section. 
The company s t i l l , however, appeared to provide mainly on s i t e 
training only, thus r e s t r i c t i n g to a c e r t a i n extent the promotion 
prospects of the Bahrainis within the company, although the company 
stated by 1957 a t o t a l of 2,467 l o c a l employees had progressed through 
these two forms of t r a i n i n g . ^ 
One good feature of these training programmes was the setting up 
of evening classes i n the v i l l a g e s and towns where the o i l workers l i v e d , 
which gave an opportunity not only for the o i l workers but also for 
members of the general public to learn the basic elements of reading and 
writing. This was done i n co-operation with the Government Department of 
Education as part of a general drive against i l l i t e r a c y . In 1953 there were 
138 Bahrain Petroleum Company employees attending these c l a s s e s , but 
by 1957 the number had r i s e n to approximately 600 employees attending 
44 
at 17 centres established i n the towns and vintages of Bahrain. 
Another scheme which was introduced by Bahrain Petroleum Company 
was the opening of a vocational training centre i n 1954, the intention being 
to r e c r u i t school-leavers for a form of apprenticeship training, l a s t i n g 
for four years, with a view to eventual employment, within the company. 
The f i r s t group consisted of 44 primary school-leavers i n 1955 and the i r 
training consisted of c r a f t operating and commerce. The syllabus was 
extended for l a t e r applicants in 1959 to cover catering and stores control. 
In the f i r s t few years of t h i s programme large numbers of 
applicants were attracted by the promises of the company of secure 
employment, promotion and the opportunity for further training abroad. 
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In 1956, 87 applicants were accepted and i n 1958, 88 were 
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accepted from a t o t a l of approximately 200 applicants per year. 
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In 1959, 32 of the f i r s t batch of apprentices completed 
th e i r training and the following year there were 68 graduates but 
as i t became apparent that the company's promises to these 
apprentices were not being f u l f i l l e d , the number of applicants 
f e l l . From 1961 onwards Bahrain Petroleum Company ceased to mention 
i n her annual reports the numbers accepted and undergoing training, 
and also i n t h i s year, the company announced that the training 
period was to be cut to 2\ years o n l y . ^ 
In 1960 the company also announced that 581 apprentices 
had enrolled up to that year, no further figures were given u n t i l 
i n 1964 the annual report stated that there were 718 employees with 
the company who had been enrolled and trained under t h i s scheme. 
The report made no d i s t i n c t i o n between those currently employed by 
the company and those undergoing training, but we may assume from 
these figures that only 137 new pupils were enrolled during these 
four years (1960=64). 
In 1961 i t was decided to extend the scheme to cater for 
secondary school-leavers but by 1965 i t was stated that only 18 
Bahraini graduates from secondary schools joined Bahrain Petroleum 
Company. 
I t appears, therefore, that these schemes have not been 
en t i r e l y successful and t h i s i s probably due to the fact that the 
company did not f u l f i l l i t s promises to the apprentices and that 
the l o c a l school-leavers were obviously unwilling to spend a four 
year period of training on very small wages with no firm prospects 
of employment with the company at the end of the i r training, except 
i n the lower echelons of the company structure. 
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3. Benefits and Social Services 
In order to meet the demands for improved conditions of 
employment, the company i n 1948 introduced a T h r i f t Plan for the 
Rupee Payroll employees. The system adopted was that the 
company contributed to the plan an amount equivalent to the 
employees' contribution. The scheme was to apply to a l l employees 
with more than one year's service, 
A member's equity i n the plan was always equal to h i s own 
contributions plus any i n t e r e s t earned. After f i v e years service 
the equity was increased by an additional amount contributed by the 
company. This amount ranged from 50% "after 5 years up to 100% after 
15 years' service. 
Also i n 1948 the amount of annual vacations was also agreed, 
r i s i n g from 14 days per fear for those with only one year's service 
up to 28 days for those with more than 5 years' service. I n 1966 the 
vacations were reviewed and 28 days granted to a l l employees, 
irrespective of the length of service. These vacations were i n 
addition to public and r e l i g i o u s holidays. 
Prior to 1953 l o c a l employees were normally expected to 
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provide their own accommodation, and no formal housing plan was 
i n e f f e c t . I n that year, however, the company introduced a plant to 
provide limited help for i t s l o c a l employees. The essence of the 
scheme was that employees with more than 5 years' service, and at a 
ce r t a i n l e v e l on the Rupee Pay r o l l , could borrow against their 
T h r i f t Plan money to extend and repair th e i r e x i s t i n g homes. 
A new plan was introduced i n 1964 which enabled those at the 
higher pay l e v e l s to borrow money for house b u i l d i n g . ^ 
By the end of 1969 a t o t a l of 161 home loans had been granted. 
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Other Benefit Plans which were introduced over the years 
included the "Death and D i s a b i l i t y Plan", which gave f i n a n c i a l 
help to the employees and t h e i r dependents i n cases of loss of 
employment, from sickness, i n j u r i e s or death, the "Tuberculosis 
Leave Plan", which provided f i n a n c i a l assistance for employees 
suffering from T.B. for up to 12 months, and i n the f i e l d of 
health, Bahrain Petroleum Company has a modern, well-equipped 
hospital and also from time to time has donated equipment to the 
Government hospitals. 
l j Bahrain Petroleum Company's contribution to the l o c a l market. 
The company's contribution to the l o c a l economy takes a 
var i e t y of forms such as r o y a l t i e s , which provide the means for 
l o c a l government and s o c i a l services, wages and s a l a r i e s which 
obviously find t h e i r way into the l o c a l economy, sub-contracting 
of work, and dir e c t purchasing on the l o c a l markets. 
The amounts of r o y a l t i e s and wages have already been 
discussed, the sub-contracting i s only a limited factor and we 
therefore propose to discuss at t h i s stage the effects and influences 
of l o c a l purchasing by the company. As Bahrain has very few l o c a l 
products, i n order for the island's economy to p r o f i t from l o c a l 
purchasing, t h i s means the use of l o c a l merchants as agents or 
middlemen between the company and the world markets. The company 
spe c i f i e s her needs i n advance and i n some cases she has the deciding 
voice i n specifying the origin of the commodity. 
This policy began in answer to the c r i t i c i s m by l o c a l merchants 
during the early 1950's that the company was ignoring the l o c a l 
suppliers and importing a l l her needs from abroad without the payment 
of taxation or customs duties and thus f a i l i n g to benefit the l o c a l 
- 163 -
economy. 
Therefore 9 i n 1953 the company opened a small o f f i c e i n the 
c a p i t a l , Manamas "to f a c i l i t a t e the purchasing of goods and equipment 
w i t h i n the country to the f u l l e s t extent possible"."^ The o f f i c e 
was extended i n 1956 to form an o f f i c i a l "Local Purchase Department". 
As t h i s o f f i c e was situated i n the capital i t became the 
"shop-window" of Bahrain Petroleum Company and i t was e n t i r e l y 
staffed by Bahrainis, the Office Manager being the f i r s t Bahraini 
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to hold "Head of Department" status i n the company. 
The table below shows us the expansion i n local purchasing 
over the years from 1954 onwards. 
TABLE XXI 
Value of Local Purchase Made by Bahrain Petroleum 
Company Year Value of Purchases 
1954 Rs. 2,400,000 
1955 Rs. 3,223,000 
1956 Rs. 2,863,000 
1957 Rs. 5,000,000 
1958 Rs. 8,303,190 
1959 Rs. 13,152,000 
1960 Rs. 14,655,000 
1961 Rs. 16,888,000 
1962 Rs. 19,421,000 
After 1962 the w r i t e r was unable to establish any r e l i a b l e 
figures for lo c a l purchases as i t became company policy to publish 
a j o i n t amount covering both local purchases and services, t h i s could 
be due either to a l e v e l l i n g - o f f or even a decline i n the amounts 
purchased. This l a t t e r comment i s based on the figures available i n Table XVI 
p.141, - which indicated a f a l l i n recent years i n the numbers employed 
i n the wholesale trade. These traders and wholesalers were, however, 
the main beneficiaries of the company's local purchase plan, and i t 
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was through them that any money reached the local economy. 
Labour Legislation. 
As previously stated the labour movement i n Bahrain has 
always been closely associated with p o l i t i c a l movements i n the 
island and demands for p o l i t i c a l reforms. The forerunner of the 
modern labour l e g i s l a t i o n were the pearl diving reforms of 1925 
although the modern l e g i s l a t i o n did not begin to c r y s t a l l i s e u n t i l 
the 1950's when there was p o l i t i c a l confrontation and labour unrest 
was widespread. This unrest came to a head between the years of 
1953 and 1956 when one of the basic demands was for the r i g h t to 
form trade unions i n Bahrain.^ 
Following the general s t r i k e of December, 1954, the Government 
yielded i n part to t h i s demand by promising to consider the matter. 
When no decision seemed to be forthcoming, the Higher Executive 
Committee,"'"' hearing that Bahrain Petroleum Company intended to 
establish a Joint Consultative Committee, announced on the 8th January 
1955, that they intended to establish a labour union consisting of 
twelve members representing the various trades, and that they would 
s t a r t to draw up t h e i r own labour l e g i s l a t i o n with a view to rai s i n g 
the status of local labour and protecting t h e i r r i g h t s . T h i s 
move spurred the Government int o action and on the 23rd February, she 
announced her int e n t i o n to establish a Labour Law Advisory Committee 
to d r a f t labour l e g i s l a t i o n and meanwhile to establish a labour 
exchange under a Department of Labour. 
In A p r i l of that year, the Government announced that elections 
would be held to choose the three labour representatives to s i t on the 
t r i p a r t i t e committee. 
Meanwhile, the Higher Executive Committee took the i n i t i a t i v e 
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and began a campaign of recruitment u n t i l i n October, 1955 a 
general trade union, Bahrain Labour Federation, (BLF) was founded, 
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and w i t h i n a very short time claimed a membership of 6,000. 
Most of these members were from Bahrain Petroleum Company and the 
Government services. Membership was r e s t r i c t e d to Bahrainis and 
the i n i t i a t i o n fees were fixed at 5 rupees, and the annual dues at 
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12 rupees. 
One of the e a r l i e s t declared intentions of t h i s newly-formed 
union was the setting-up of a building co-operative to provide 
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"hygienic, comfortable housing" f o r i t s members. 
The T r i p a r t i t e Labour Law Advisory Committee had been set 
up i n the meantime and consisted of Government, employers and labour 
representatives. 
The Government representatives comprised two members of the 
Ruling Family and a B r i t i s h Employee of the Bahrain Government, the 
employers were represented by a member of the Bahrain Petroleum 
Company management, an important local merchant and a local 
contractor, whilst the workers were represented by three elected 
representatives from the labour forces of the Government, Bahrain 
Petroleum Company and an independent commerical establishment. 
Although the Bahrain Labour Federation gave i t s support to 
the labour representatives, i t was d i s s a t i s f i e d with the co n s t i t u t i o n 
of the Committee, feeling that the Government and employers were 
combining to f r u s t r a t e t h e i r demands, and also with the general 
progress of the negotiations. 
In February, 1956 a meeting of the Bahrain Labour Federation 
was held to discuss the work of the Labour Law Advisory Committee 
and several resolutions were adopted for submission to the Government 
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and the Labour Law Advisory Committee. These weres 1) The r i g h t 
to establish only one labour organisation as a state-wide federation, 
joined by a l l Bahraini workers; 2) Recognition of the Bahrain 
Labour Federation by the Government; 3) The speedy conclusion of 
the Committees work; 4) Incorporation i n t o the Labour Law of a cost 
of l i v i n g escalation clause for general wage adjustments; 5) The 
apointment of any worker rperesentatives to any Joint Consultative 
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Committees to be a function of the Federation. 
A l l of these proposals were rejected, especially the 
setting-up of a state-wide federation as t h i s was unacceptable to 
the employers because they wished to keep the various trades 
separate and the Government looked upon the establishment of such a 
federation as a p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous p o l i t i c a l weapon. 
Following the outright r e j e c t i o n of t h e i r resolutions, the 
Bahrain Labour Federation backed by the Higher Executive Committee 
went ahead with i t s plans and on the 21st March, 1956, announced 
that they would hold an election for the formation of i t s Administration 
Council and General Assembly, and that nominations would be opened 
i n July. The structure of these two bodies was to be as i n the 
following table. 
TABLE XXII Proposed Organisation of Bahrain Labour Federation 62 
Employee Group Seats i n Admin. 
Council 
Seats i n General 
Assembly 
43 
Total 
Bahrain Petroleum 5 48 
Company 
Other Companies 
Govt. Employees 
"Capable Persons" 
3 
4 
4 
23 
18 
0 
26 
22 
4 
16 84 100 
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The Government reacted strongly to these proposals and 
the setting up of the Committee without i t s permission and these, 
combined with other occurrences on the island, prompted the 
CO 
Government to crush the Committee for National Unity and Bahrain 
Labour Federation. I n November 1956 the leaders of the Committee 
for National Unity and Bahrain Labour Federation were arrested along 
with others and were brought to t r i a l , following t h i s the labour 
movement disintegrated. 
The Labour Law Advisory Committee continued to meet throughout 
these troubles and by October 1956 had held 58 meetings, and following 
the removal of labour and p o l i t i c a l pressure by the e x i l i n g of the 
leading members of the Committee for National Unity, the committee 
pressed on wit h i t s work. I n early 1957 the Government extended the 
committee's terms of reference to include the d r a f t of Compensation 
Ordinances. 
By July, 1957 the Committee had completed i t s d r a f t of the 
"Bahrain Labour Ordinance" a f t e r 70 meetings. 
On 10th October of the same year the Bahrain Employed Persons' 
Compensation Ordinance was signed by the Shaikh and on 12th November 
the "Bahrain Labour Ordinance" was signed by the Shaikh a f t e r certain 
modifications had been made. 
Both of these l e g i s l a t i v e acts came into e f f e c t on 1st January 
1958. 6 4 
The labour exchange, which was mentioned e a r l i e r , was established 
i n July 1955. Or i g i n a l l y i t s intended function was to carry out the 
proposed new labour laws and to compile current cost of l i v i n g indices, 
but as the new laws were not passed u n t i l 1957 i t s a c t i v i t i e s were 
i n i t i a l l y confined to the r e g i s t r a t i o n of unemployed labour, mainly 
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unskilled Bahrainis, and attempting to f i n d work for them. 
I t was not u n t i l 19579 however, that the Labour Department 
was placed on formal footing by the appointment of one of the 
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Ruling Family as i t s f i r s t President and Commissioner of Labour. 
On the signing of the Compensation Ordinance the Department 
immediately became responsible for handling a l l complaints made under 
t h i s act. At the same time the Labour Department also began the 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of a l l unemployed foreign nationals. 
In carrying out her task of placing the registered unemployed 
labour, the Department observed over the years that even up to the 
present day there i s not a single instance of s k i l l e d labour using 
the services of the Department. 
This could be due to either the natural tendency of s k i l l e d 
workers to f i n d employment on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e or a lack of 
confidence i n the Department's a b i l i t i e s . 
The figures available f o r unemployment define the labour as 
either non-skilled or semi-skilled but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
between the two categories as the Government Report of 1957 points 
out, 
"For the Bahrainis there i s no clear-cut d i s t i n c t i o n 
between one category of labour (semi-skilled) and 
another (non-skilled). The same labourer claims to 
be a painter, carpenter or pipe f i t t e r . He might 
have been doing a l l of these jobs with various 
employers and therfore acquired some l i t t l e s k i l l 
i n each occupation". 
However, the following table shows us that the e f f o r t s of t h i s 
Department have been expanded i n the placing of Bahraini labour, i n 
preference to non-Bahraini. 
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TABLE XXIII 
The Placement of Unemployed Persons (Bahrainis & Foreigners) 
Year Bahrainis Non-BMhrainis 
Registered Placed Registered Placed 
1955 2586 586 - — 1956 1748 1189 - -
1957 2843 1034 828 241 
1958 1866 1247 993 421 
1959 1122 977 639 324 
1960 936 428 686 108 
1961 1053 803 1088 100 
1963 947 886 1674 62 
1964 910 787 1489 0 
1968 1075 715 - -1969 1047 929 - -
above 
I t i s clear from the/table that a deliberate policy of 
preference f o r Bahraini labour appears to have been adopted and i t i s 
probably i n accordance with t h i s policy that the Department from 1964 
onward ceased to publish the numbers of unemployed foreign nationals. 
1 • The Legislation. 
The Compensation Ordinance of 1957 covered claims for i n d u s t r i a l 
i n j u r i e s and diseases and specified i n d e t a i l compensation payments 
to be made i n cases of death, temporary or permanent, t o t a l or p a r t i a l 
d i s a b i l i t y or disfigurement due to i n d u s t r i a l causes. The compensation 
payable was related to earnings and was broken down into four classes. 
TABLE XXIV 
Compensation for Death and Permanent D i s a b i l i t y ^ 
Monthly Earnings Compensation Rupees Rupees 
Class 1 Up to 300 12,000 
Class 2 301-600 15,000 
Class 3 601-1000 18,000 
Class 4 1001 or more 27,000 
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In d u s t r i a l claims a r i s i n g between employers and employees 
had, prior to the introduction of t h i s ordinance, usually been 
dealt with under Indian compensation l e g i s l a t i o n , although t h i s 
l e g i s l a t i o n had never been o f f i c i a l l y enforced for the benefit 
of Bahraini workers and compensation had been on an "ex gra t i a " 
basis. 
The Bahrain Labour Ordinance of 1957 was divided into f i v e 
parts and appendices, the o f f i c i a l text being i n Arabic. The 
Ordinance deals s p e c i f i c a l l y with three major areas of i n d u s t r i a l 
relations on which the Government intended to regularise. 
These were the relationship between employer and employee, 
Trade Unions and Trade Disputes. 
Part I I of the Ordinance, which covers rela t i o n s between 
employer and employee, contains a number of items of i n t e r e s t , e.g. 
Para. 6, states that "The employer shall at the request of the employed 
person draw up i n duplicate or t r i p l i c a t e a w r i t t e n contract of service 
between him and the employed person." Para. 23a provides for a 
maximum working day of eight hours and a maximum working week of 
48 hours, with the exception of Ramadan, during which the hours were 
to be six and 36 respectively. 
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The Amendment of 18th March, 1958, Para. 23b, provided for 
a minimum payment for overtime working of an extra 25% of the 
employee's normal hourly rate of pay or time o f f i n l i e u of overtime. 
Para. 31 specified that employees with not less than one year's 
service should receive 14 days annual vacation on f u l l basic pay and 
co s t - o f - l i v i n g allowances ( i f any) and after f i v e years' service t h i s 
was to be increased to 28 days annual vacation. This was to be i n 
addition to nine public holidays to be specified by the employer, 
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but which must include not less than two days for each of the 
following; Id Ul F i t r s Id a l Ha j , Ashoor,^ and one day for the 
Prophet's birthday. 
Para. 32a, e n t i t l e s the employee to two weeks of paid 
sick leave on f u l l basic pay and c o s t - o f - l i v i n g allowances ( i f any) 
after completion of one year's continuous work with his employer. 
Part I I I of the Ordinance which covers Trade Unionism 
lays out certain conditions for the creation of trade unions and 
membership thereof. 
I t s p e c i f i c a l l y excludes from membership of trade unions 
such groups as members of management, head teachers, and o f f i c e 
supeintendents, students, domestic servants, part-time employees 
and other classes of persons who may after consultation be 
precluded from j o i n i n g a trade union. 
This section allowed f o r the setting up of both general 
and c r a f t unions provided that there was a minimum membership of 
20 persons. The Ordinance does not d i r e c t l y f o r b i d the setting 
up of a confederation* of unions. 
The r i g h t of an individual to refuse to j o i n a trade union 
was safeguarded and i t was forbidden to intimidate or coerce a person 
into j o i n i n g . Nor was i t allowed for employment to be refused to such 
a person on the grounds that he was not a union member. 
Part IV, which covered Trade Disputes, made provision for any 
dispute between the two parties to be referred to the Commissioner by 
either party. He was empowered to take such steps as were necessary 
for promoting a settlement of the dispute. These steps included the 
power to set up a committee under the chairmanship of a nominee of 
the Commissioner or a person acceptable to both parties. I f the 
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dispute was not settled w i t h i n 1 4 days then the Commissioner was 
empowered to refer the dispute to an a r b i t r a t i o n board. 
This section also stated that f o r a period of 21 days 
following the reporting of the dispute to the Commissioner, no 
in d u s t r i a l action should be taken by the employees, and neither 
should the employer close his place of employment nor suspend 
or dismiss his workers. Any persons refusing to part i c i p a t e i n a 
trade dispute were not to be subjected to expulsion from the trade 
union nor subjected to any fines or penalties. 
Para. 82 of the Ordinance place r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the 
r i g h t to s t r i k e of certain public employees such as those providing 
gas, water, e l e c t r i c i t y , sanitary services and also those employed 
i n the f i r e and public health services. 
The Ordinance did, however, provide for the r i g h t of the 
trade union to engage i n peaceful picketing i n furtherance of trade 
disputes. 
A number of minor labour le g i s l a t i o n s ordinances were enacted 
during the 1 9 6 0 ' s . One of these was the "Percentage of Bahraini 
Employment Regulations', which came int o effect on 1st January, 1 9 6 2 o ^ ' 
These Regulations stated thats-
1 . The employment of unskilled Bahraini labourers 
i n unskilled jobs should be 1 0 0 % i f available and medically and 
physically f i t . 
2. I n s k i l l e d jobs preference should be given to Bahrainis 
i f available, medically and physically f i t . 
Another item of l e g i s l a t i o n was contained i n Proclamation No. 2 
of 1 9 6 5 , ^ which was issued by the Government of Bahrain, which l a i d 
down a minimum wage lev e l of 8 rupees per day for daily paid unskilled 
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labourers. The Proclamation excluded porters s domestic servants, 
pearl divers, persons serving a probationary period of employment, 
persons employed as apprentices, and students taking part-time 
employment during vacations. I r o n i c a l l y , these exclusions cover 
almost the entire range of lowest paid workers i n the island. 
Although there are at the present time a number of labour 
leg i s l a t i o n s i n force, most exist on paper only. There i s s t i l l 
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not a single trade union existing i n Bahrain, much less a 
state-wide union as was f i r s t envisaged i n the creation of the 
Bahrain Labour Force, and the re-activating of such a body i s 
ac t i v e l y discouraged. 
Of the l e g i s l a t i o n which i s i n force very l i t t l e use appears 
to be made of the powers contained i n these items of l e g i s l a t i o n 
and the workers of Bahrain have never enjoyed the f u l l benefits of 
the provisions of these laws, the climate towards trade unionism 
having been for the most part continuously repressive. 
As the reports of the B r i t i s h Middle East Development 
Division stated i n 1965, "Powers under t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n appear to 
have been used sparingly over the l a s t few years." 
I n the face of intensive suppression during the 1960's 
the labour force of Bahrain continued t h e i r attempts to give voice 
to t h e i r grievances. Apart from the 1965 upheaval, which was 
p o l i t i c a l i n nature rather than a true expression of discontant 
with working conditions, the Bahrain workers during the second half 
of that decade frequently showed t h e i r discontent through s t r i k e 
action. I n A p r i l 1968 the e l e c t r i c i t y workers went on s t r i k e i n 
protest against working conditions. The Government broke the s t r i k e s 
imprisoned the ringleaders and on the return of the men to work 
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demanded that a l l workers should sign an agreement absolving 
the E l e c t r i c i t y Department from a l l blame should any worker be 
k i l l e d i n the course of his employment. This l a t t e r measure only 
served to further inflame the s i t u a t i o n . Resentment against t h i s 
condition b u i l t up u n t i l i n September of that year the men went 
on s t r i k e again and eventually the Government .agreed to waive t h i s 
regulation i n order to effect a return to work. 
During 1970 s t r i k e a c t i v i t y became intensive. Amongst 
those s t r i k i n g were employees of the Gulf Aviation Company, Cable 
and Wireless Company and the Sanitary workers of the Health Department. 
In December of that year the employees of ALBA who were i n the process 
of constructing the new aluminium smelter also struck. Again action 
was taken against the leaders of the s t r i k e and the strikes broken. 
Even news of a l l these strikes was suppressed by the Government and 
they scarcely achieved a mention i n the local newspaper. 
The general demand of the s t r i k e r s , apart from improvements 
i n conditions and wages, was to be allowed to form trade unions. In 
view of the continued suppression of strikes by the Government some 
of the more enlightened workers sought to conduct negotiations with the 
Government and argued that since Labour Laws existed, at least i n 
theory, then that law should be u t i l i s e d to assist the workers i n 
conducting t h e i r negotiations and setting up trade unions. 
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In mid July 1971 a Foundation Committee xras formed and 
the committee planned a provisional c o n s t i t u t i o n along the lines of 
the Bahrain Labour Law and collected almost a thousand signatures 
on a p e t i t i o n f o r reform which was presented to the Ministry of Labour 
and Social A f f a i r s . After prolonged negotiations with the Ministry 
and interrogation by the Special Branch of the Police Department, the 
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committee put t h e i r i n i t i a l demands to the Government. 
These were:-
1. To allow the publication i n the local press of a 
statement of t h e i r intentions to form a trade union. 
2. To allow the committee to debate the issue of trade 
unionism publ i c l y . 
3. To allow the d i s t r i b u t i o n of l e a f l e t s to explain the 
purposes of the proposed trade union and the procedure of forming 
the same. 
The in t e n t i o n of the committee was to eventually create a trade 
union representing labourers, white-collar workers and the self 
employed. 
The Government however continued to prevaricate over the 
issue and prolonged the negotiations. By January 1972 however 
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the number of signatures to the p e t i t i o n had grown to 3,000 
and discontent was again ar i s i n g . 
I n March 1972^"* the matters cam<£^ :o a head and a vi o l e n t 
s t r i k e and demonstrations occurred between the 8th and 22nd of 
that month. 
The Government re-acted s w i f t l y , imprisoned many people, 
including members of the committee and the l a s t hope of any form 
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of labour representation evaporated once more. 
However i t i s probable that i f the provisions of the 
Bahrain Labour Laws had been granted i n f u l l to the workers of 
Bahrain when they were formulated and i f the modest demands of 
the committee had been met, the benefits to the community as a 
whole would have been great and may have gone a long way to resolving 
the recurring periods of i n d u s t r i a l unrest and may have avoided the 
lat e s t confrontation. 
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P A R T T H R E E 
E D U C A T I O N A N D S O C I A L C H A N G E 
i N T R O D U C T I 0 N 
I t i s acknowledged nowadays that education i s widely used as 
one of the instruments for bringing about technological and social 
changes i n modern societies.^" 
Education can also be defined as one of the methods of 
improving communications, not only i n terms of enabling human beings 
to read and w r i t e , but also to communicate through the media of 
l i t e r a t u r e and thus exchange ideas and knowlege or give and receive 
human experiences„ 
I f i t i s deemed necessary for the developed countries to use 
education as a tool f o r the advancement of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and 
human studies i n order to enrich c i v i l i s a t i o n , then i t i s absolutely 
essential for underdeveloped countries to use education as a means 
of catching up with the rest of the world i n order to enjoy the 
benefits of modern c i v i l i s a t i o n , , 
I n the underdeveloped countries, however, "modern education", 
which some term as "western styl e education", i s a comparatively 
recent innovation which few of the populace have so far experienced. 
In the Gulf Area as a whole there was very l i t t l e formal 
education, apart from the r e l i g i o u s education which was received 
by children i n t h e i r local v i l l a g e s , un&il the turn of the century. 
Modern education i n Bahrain, for instance, did not s t a r t u n t i l the 
early years of the 20th century when mission schools were established 
on the island. These were, however, only on a very small scale, 
catering f o r possibly f i f t e e n to twenty children. I t was not u n t i l 
well after the F i r s t World War that the f i r s t modern educational 
i n s t i t u t e s were set up by some richer members of the community fo r 
the education of t h e i r sons and other members of t h e i r family or 
social group. 
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These f i r s t pupils were l a t e r to be regarded as the country's 
" i n t e l l e c t u a l s " , having been exposed to modern teaching methods and 
having acquired the basic s k i l l s of reading and w r i t i n g . We use 
the term " i n t e l l e c t u a l " i n t h i s context i n the widest sense, for as 
Kautsky put i t the i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,..,, "are a l l persons w i t h an 
advanced modern education and the i n t e l l e c t u a l concern and s k i l l s 
2 
o r d i n a r i l y associated with i t ....." 
In a t r a d i t i o n a l society such as existed i n Bahrain at that 
time, the " i n t e l l e c t u a l " and the "educated person" were two faces 
of the same coin. As i n any underdeveloped society, to the 
uneducated father, being able to neither read nor w r i t e , the son 
who obtained a working knowledge of these subjects was regarded as 
educated, and was a source of pride to both the family and the 
community. 
The achievement of these rudiments of education were regarded 
as the maximum education which was necessary u n t i l as l a t e as the 
1940's when education was extended beyond the primary l e v e l . 
I t was during t h i s period that the difference began to 
cryst a l i s e between an educated person and an i n t e l l e c t u a l , and the 
people at l a s t began to recognise the difference. Even those people 
who could not afford to undergo a formal course of secondary education 
began to apply the basic s k i l l s which they had learnt to educate 
themselves. With the establishment of secondary education the 
possessor of a c e r t i f i c a t e , Shahada, denoting the achievement of a 
higher level of education became a person of standing i n the 
community. 
The educated person or i n t e l l e c t u a l i n such an underdeveloped 
country are often the f i r s t to f i n d common ground f o r contact with 
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outside communities. As Halpern stated 
....."They are often the f i r s t i n the history 
of t h e i r family to be l i t e r a t e . They often 
discover t h e i r best friends at school or i n a 
p o l i t i c a l movement ..... They are the f i r s t 
to t r u s t strangers on grounds of competence or 
shared ideology. They are ready to trade new 
dogmas for old. They are also the f i r s t to~ 
p u b l i c l y confess t h e i r uncertainties " 
The above points hold true i n the case of Bahrain as 
education provided the means of breaking the t r a d i t i o n a l closed 
communities and opening up new areas of contact between Sunni and 
Shia by the use of common educational f a c i l i t i e s and secondly by 
breaking down the existing class structure and creating i n i t s 
place a new meritocracy. 
I n the i n i t i a l stages of education i n Bahrain the community 
did not easily accept that a person from a humble background could 
by v i r t u e of his education become the social equal of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
e l i t e . 
Therefore, i n i t i a l l y the use of education as an instrument 
of social mobilisation was very l i m i t e d and i n the f i r s t instance 
the acquiring of a basic education was r e s t r i c t e d almost e n t i r e l y 
to providing the means for those of humble o r i g i n to obtain a more 
secure job as a Kateb, or clerk, due to the long held t r a d i t i o n a l 
view that b i r t h rather than education best f i t t e d a man for positions 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or power. 
The recognition of the schools as educational i n s t i t u t e s 
f i t t i n g man fo r future r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s was grossly underestimated. 
As for instance at one time the Ruling Family i n Bahrain decried the 
need f o r education by saying Majalisna madaresna, l i t e r a l l y translated 
Our salons are our schools. Thus saying that t h e i r heirs could obtain 
a l l the education they needed to rul e the country by attending and 
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l i s t e n i n g to t h e i r councils. 
Over the years t h i s a t t i t u d e gradually changed as the 
Administration expanded and the need f o r educated persons was 
f e l t . More school-leavers began to enter Government Service and 
the old r i g i d attitudes began to relax s l i g h t l y . 
When considering the development of modern education i n 
Bahrain we f i n d that i t can be defined i n two d i s t i n c t sectors, the private 
schools, which were established by foreign nationals to serve 
specific i n t e r e s t s , r e l i g i o u s or national, and public schools which 
were established by the Bahrainis themselves and which were l a t e r 
incorporated into the Government Service. 
Although the private schools were not a s i g n i f i c a n t factor 
i n the development of education i n Bahrain we propose to deal with 
t h i s sector f i r s t as they were the founders of modern education 
on the island. Although two of them were established before the 
F i r s t World War they had l i t t l e impact on the l o c a l community as one 
was Non-Islamic and the other Non-Arab i n t h e i r teachings. 
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C H A P T E R O N E 
EDUCATION 
a) Private Schools 
The f i r s t western styl e school was founded i n Bahrain by 
the American Mission 9 an independent group who began t h e i r 
operations i n Bahrain i n 1892, and who were i n 1894 "adopted" 
by the Reformed Church i n America.* 
The school was opened i n Manama by a Mrs. Samuel M. Zwemer 
and catered f o r a small number of local g i r l s . The classes were 
very small, hardly ever exceeded one dozen during the early years, 
due p a r t l y to the resentment by the local population of g i r l s being 
educated and p a r t l y due to the fact that Christian r e l i g i o u s 
2 
i n s t r u c t i o n was given at the school. I n spite of the poor response 
Mrs. Zwemer persevered and i n 1905 a boys' school was also opened 
i n the Mission building, and i n 1908 i t was said that four children 
of the Ruling Family were attending the school. This i s highly 
questionnable i n view of the known a t t i t u d e of the Ruling Family with 
regard to the need for education of t h e i r sons, and also i n view of 
the statement made i n 1910 by Julius Richter that, "work among women, 
and schools are s t i l l i n t h e i r i n i t i a l stages, both being much hampered 
3 
by the s t u p i d i t y and fanaticism of the Moslems". Between 1910 and 
1914 the number of children en r o l l i n g at and attending the school 
declined and by 1922 a Christian Arab wr i t e r noted that 
" i f the mission had stopped evangelising f o r converts 
to C h r i s t i a n i t y and devoted t h e i r work to medical and 
educational services, they would have been more 
successful, as the Moslems i n general and the Arabs i n 
particular are extremely l o y a l to t h e i r r e l i g i o n and 
w i l l not accept any other."^ 
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By 1934-35 poor attendances and a lack of f i n a n c i a l supports 
caused the closure of the boys' school. The g i r l s ' school continued 
to function as before with the classes being composed mainly of 
pupils of Persian o r i g i n who were said to be "of the poorest 
and most ignorant class." Over the years the numbers attending 
the school continued to grow and i t attracted more and more students 
as the views on g i r l s ' education relaxed and more foreign elements 
entered the island following the discovery of o i l . By 1956-57 the 
number of pupils had r i s e n to 162 and the a c t i v i t i e s of the school 
covered the range of education from pre-primary grades through to a 
seventh grade specialising i n teacher t r a i n i n g for g i r l s wishing to 
become primary school teachers. The s t a f f at that time consisted of 
ten f u l l - t i m e teachers and f i v e part-time. 
I n 1964-65 the number of pupils was 201, and the teaching 
s t a f f was twelve f u l l - t i m e teachers. I t was reported at that time 
that most of the teachers were not q u a l i f i e d , not having undergone 
the required secondary education.^ 
According to Mr. Al-Hamer, the school was co-educational but 
g 
t h i s was probably at pre-primary (kindergarten) l e v e l only. 
However, by the academic year of 1970-71 there were 382 pupils and 
23 s t a f f and the range of education had been standardised and 
covered eight grades, six of them primary, and two elementary. 
The second modern private school to be opened i n Bahrain was 
one catering for the teaching of the Persian language and culture 
for the children of the Persian minority residing i n Bahrain. The 
actual date of the opening of the school i s a matter of conjecture 
as for instance, Al-Hamer mentions that i t was opened around 1910 
and was called " A l - I t i h a d " Union. He does not, however, quote the 
- 187 -
source of his information- On the other hand, Winder states that 
the school was not opened u n t i l 1923 and was called Tarbiyat 
Education, although he concedes that a form of Persian school 
existed between 1914 and 1921. 1 0 This information he obtained from 
a private l e t t e r from Sir Charles Belgrave, Faroughy confirms the 
setting up of the Tarbiyat school as being a f t e r the F i r s t World War. 
12 
However, neither Rihani nor Shaikh Haffez Wahbah, who was 
the f i r s t headmaster of Bahrain's f i r s t public school, have 
mentioned the existence of t h i s school i n t h e i r writings. 
We may conclude that some form of informal school was i n 
existence immediately before the F i r s t World War and that i t was 
reformed on a formal basis i n 1923 as the Tarbiyat, a name which 
was l a t e r changed to A l - I t i h a d . The date of 1923 may be taken as the 
correct date as i t was about t h i s time, during the setting up of the 
public schools i n Bahrain, that the Persians decided to set up t h e i r 
own school following the r e j e c t i o n of t h e i r demand that the Persian 
language should be part of the curriculum of a l l Bahraini schools. 
The A l - I t i h a d school i s s t i l l i n existence and i s run by a 
Board of Trustees composed e n t i r e l y of Persians holding Bahraini 
n a t i o n a l i t y . The finances of the school come from two sources, 
donations from the Persian community, and from the r e l a t i v e l y high 
t u i t i o n fees demanded of the pupils. Most subjects are taught 
i n the Persian language although Arabic i s i n the curriculum and 
i s used for Religious Instruction and Social Studies. I t caters f o r 
the teaching of boys only and r e s t r i c t s i t s teaching only to the 
primary l e v e l , a f t e r which the pupils go on to attend Government 
secondary schools. 
Figures of the number of pupils attending the school were not 
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available p r i o r to the 1960's. 
In 1964-65, however, we see that there were 242 pupils and i n 
1968 t h i s had risen to 295 and by 1971 there were 335 pupils. 
Throughout the 1960's the number of classes was never more 
than s i x , and the number of teachers never exceeded nine, although 
by 1971 there were twelve teachers. 
Two other private schools opened simultaneously i n 1940, The 
Sacred Heart School, run by the Roman Catholic Church, and the 
Indian School, run by the Indian community on the island. 
The former had for several years only two grades which were 
supervised by lay teachers. By 1953, at which time four Sisters 
arrived to take over, the school had 85 pupils. The numbers enrolling 
at the school grew quickly over the years and i n 1958 there were 500 
pupils, and by 1960 the number had jumped to a peak of 850 pupils i n 
ten classes, with twenty-five teachers. I n 1971 the figures were 
835 and 23 respectively. 
The grades covered by the school are the i n f a n t , primary and 
intermediate levels which follow the pattern of 2, 4 and 4 years' 
study at each l e v e l . 
The language of ins t r u c t i o n i s English and i t i s probably t h i s 
fact that accounts f o r the popularity of the school, making i t by far 
the largest private school on the island. I t i s co-educational 
school and the majority of the pupils are foreign nationals. 
The Indian school which was opened i n the same year i s 
supervised by an independent group of Indians l i v i n g i n Bahrain. 
The pupils are exclusively Indian .and the teaching covers infa n t 
and primary levels. The school i s co-educational and the numbers 
attending the school were 170 i n 1968, r i s i n g to 319 i n 1971, i n 
which year there were eighteen teachers. The school i s financed 
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by the lo c a l Indian community. 
One other major private school was opened i n 1956. This was 
the Urdu School s which i s administered by Pakistanis settled i n 
Bahrain;, for the education of Pakistani children only. The 
school i s co-educational and the teaching covers i n f a n t 9 primary 
and secondary levels which the pupils attend f o r 2, 5 and 5 years 
respectively. 
The media of i n s t r u c t i o n i s Urdu but both Arabic and 
English are taught as secondary languages. Text books are imported 
from Pakistan and from 1968 onward the correction and marking of 
examination papers for the secondary le v e l was carried out i n 
Karachi. 
A number of other minor private schools exist i n Bahrain. 
These are the Pakistan, St. Christopher 9 Awali, Bahrain-American, 
Dar Al-Hadana, Dar Al-Hanan and the Muharraq Kindergarten school 
The f i r s t four of these are to serve the needs of children of 
foreign elements residing i n Bahrain and the other three to 
serve the needs of the Bahrainis and other Arab groups for children 
at Kindergarten l e v e l . 
Prior to 1961 a l l private schools i n Bahrain operated 
completely independently and were not subject to any form of Government 
control. This degree of independence was unacceptable to the Bahrain 
public and repeated demands were made to have them brought under the 
supervision of the Department of Education. 
The 1955 Taqrer Report on Education demanded that a l l private 
schools i n Bahrain should be brought under the supervision of the 
Bahrain Department of Education i n order t o , "correct the situations 
i n those schools and to guarantee t h e i r performances and to ensure 
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13 that t h e i r c u r r i c u l a met the national interests". 
The Bahrain Private Education Ordinance of 1961 provided 
the Department of Education with overall powers of supervision.^ 
An Inspector was subsequently appointed and from that date 
the schools became subject to close Government supervision. 
b) Public Schools 
Prior to the introduction of modern public education into 
Bahrain af t e r the F i r s t World War, some t r a d i t i o n a l Arabic schools 
existed. These took the forms of Mutawa or Kuttab, as they were 
l o c a l l y known. 
The two names denote 'shaping' and 'schooling', and the object 
behind these schools was as the names indicate, to shape the chi l d 
with regard to manners and obedience, and to impart to the c h i l d 
the rudiments of education. The teaching consisted of the c h i l d 
learning the Quoran by heart, with the teaching of w r i t i n g and 
arithmetic playing a very minor r o l e . 
The schools were run by the local mullas, who were usually 
i n charge of the lo c a l mosques, to ensure additional source of 
income for themselves, and were usually held either i n the house 
of the mulla or i n the corner of some local shop. Payment was made 
each Thursday i n either cash or kind, the level being agreed 
according to the circumstances of the parents. This payment was 
known as Al-Khamisiya. 
There was no fixed period of time for the c h i l d to attend 
these schools, his or her education was deemed to be complete when 
they had learnt the Quoran by heart. When the c h i l d had attained 
t h i s objective, i t was usual for a celebration to be held to mark 
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the event s at which the c h i l d was dressed i n his best clothes 
and was taken to every house i n the neighbourhood, carols being 
sung at every doorway. This celebration was known as Al-Khatmah 
'The Finishing', and the carols were called Al-Tahmedah, 'Thanks'. 
After the completion of t h i s education i t was usual for 
the g i r l s to be confined to t h e i r houses thereafter and never to 
see t h i s neighbourhood again u n t i l they were married, the boys 
would then seek work, usually i n the same occupation as t h e i r 
fathers. 
An eye witness described these schools i n 1944. He wrote, 
"The native school finds i t s e l f between other 
houses. Some are found i n the bazaar, amidst 
the noise and bustle of Eastern trading. The 
smell of f i s h , locusts and r o t t e n f r u i t , i n 
addition to the dunghill nearby, makes the 
smallest whiff of fresh a i r impossible for the 
children inside, the building i s low without 
windowso The scholars s i t on the ground along 
the w a l l , they stay from sunrise to sunset, six 
days a week, we seldom f i n d more than one 
teacher i n each school, the teachers are 
bigoted mullas or mutawwas, they knowQ the Koran 
per f e c t l y , and teach only the Koran. That i s 
the only text book, although the older boys are 
taught the t r a d i t i o n s p r i v a t e l y . No other Sura 
i s entered upon u n t i l the opening chapter i s 
mastered. The boys are taught to repeat the 
book. The method i s that of endless r e p e t i t i o n . 
A l l the pupils read aloud i n a sing-song tone 
bending t h e i r bodies back and forth."15 
This quote, s t a r t i n g from "the scholars s i t on the ground", 
i f we disregard his comments on "bigoted mullas", gives us a perfect 
picture of these t r a d i t i o n a l schools which continued t h e i r existence 
on a smaller scale u n t i l the 1950's, i n the remoter areas. 
The change from t r a d i t i o n a l to modern style education i n 
Bahrain can be loosely considered i n three d i f f e r e n t phases, although 
there are other subdivisions of the development which we w i l l consider 
concurrently with the theme. These main phases are, on a chronological 
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basis, the foundation period during the 1920's and 1930's, the 
growth period during the 1940's and 1950's and the period of 
modern development from 1960 onward. 
There i s no clear cut di v i d i n g l i n e between these 
periods, although each period can be distinguished by certain 
s i g n i f i c a n t features. 
1) The Foundation Period 
A l l the Government of Bahrain records and those of the 
Education Department state that 1919 saw the s t a r t of modern 
public education i n Bahrain w i t h the opening of Al-Hidayah school 
for boys i n the northern part of Muharaq, by public subscription. 
This date was o f f i c i a l l y recognised by the Bahrain Government to 
the extent that they celebrated the Golden Jubilee of the Education 
Service i n 1969. Study of other sources however state that the 
date of 1919 i s probably incorrect. 
The main reason given by the Government for f i x i n g the date 
as 1919 i s that Shaikh Abdulla b i n Isa, a f t e r his v i s i t to England 
i n that year, decided to i n s t i t u t e a system of modern style education 
along the lines of educational i n s t i t u t e s which he had v i s i t e d 
during his travels. 
Although he may have formulated the ideas for schools during 
1919 the creation of an educational system i n the physical sense did 
not come u n t i l l a t e r , and there are a number of reasons to support 
t h i s argument. 
The f i r s t point i s that Shaikh Abdulla did not return from 
his tour u n t i l l a t e 1919, which did not allow s u f f i c i e n t time to c o l l e c t 
finances and b u i l d a school. 
A further point i s that Dickson, i n his private papers, 
mentions that Shaikh Isa bin A l i , father of Shaikh Abdulla, did not 
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hold a meeting u n t i l early 1920 to discuss with the various 
sections of the community the p o s s i b i l i t y of building a school 9 
and to c o l l e c t public subscriptions. And therefore, as the 
matter of finance was s t i l l being discussed during 1920 i t i s 
probable that building had not even started by then. 
One further point i n support of t h i s argument i s that i n 
1923, during Rihani's v i s i t to Bahrain, he remarked on the 
existence of a "small primary school" which had recently been 
constructed i n Muharaq.^ 
From these points we may conclude that a more probable 
date for the s t a r t of modern education i n Bahrain would be 1921. 
The setting up of t h i s f i r s t school was not without i t s 
i n i t i a l troubles, mainly due to an argument between the Arab 
and Persian communities with regard to the proposed curriculum. 
Dickson remarked that at the meeting of 1920, to which we 
have referred previously, the Arabs promised Rs.120,000 whilst 
the Persians' contribution was only Rs.7,000. The Persians 
promised a further Rs.13,00,000 on condition that teaching at the 
school should include the English and Persian languages. The 
demand was apparently refused and the Persian contribution returned.^ 
I t i s in t e r e s t i n g to note that an Education Committee 
was established under the guidance of Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa which 
18 
was composed of the Sunni notables only to supervise t h i s school, 
19 
and that the Shia were excluded. 
The Hidayah School was the very f i r s t modern public school 
to be opened i n the Gulf Area. The f i r s t headmaster was an Egyptian, 
Shaikh Haffez Wahbah- a n <* n e w a s assisted by a Syrian, Mohammed 
al-Yamani. 
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The committee's work was extended i n 1923 when a second 
Hidayah School was opened i n Manama. 
A problem was created i n 1922 by the deportation of 
Haffez wahbah by t^ i e B r i t i s h on the grounds of being a p o l i t i c a l 
20 
agitator. This led to the committee engaging a number of Syrian 
21 
teachers to take over the running of the two schools. The head 
22 
of the Syrian teaching mission was Uthman al-Hourani 9 who took 
the post of headmaster and supervisor over both schools. 
As may be expected i n these early years the curriculum of 
the schools was mainly r e l i g i o u s apart from some elementary reading, 
w r i t i n g and arithmetics, adapted from the sylabi of other Arab 
countries. The attendance at the schools was poor, being on a 
casual basis, the pupils absenting themselves from the school 
during the diving season or i n the summer time when t h e i r families 
l e f t the towns f o r the sea-shores. Another period of absence was 
the month of Ramadan when families required t h e i r younger members 
to read the Quoran u n t i l very l a t e at night so that they were not 
able to attend the school on the next morning. 
An early report of the school, discussing absenteeism during 
1921 states„ 
"from the above l i s t we see that 25 pupils ceased 
to attend school before Ramadan because th e i r 
homes were too far from school or t h e i r parents 
had l e f t the town for the sea-shore and now 
another 35 pupils were absent between the f i r s t 
and tenth days of Ramadan, and some of the 
l a t t e r alleged that t h e i r fathers compelled them 
to read the Quoran t i l l l a t e at night and they 
would not be able to come on the following day. 
Some of them played truant because of the 
approaching examinations. I t r i e d hard to 
advise t h e i r fathers via the porter of the 
school but I f a i l e d aad now there i s ng more 
than 80 pupils attending the school." 
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An early Government report which described the results 
of the f i r s t years of education i n the public schools stated 
th a t , 
"Boys were unable to read or write a f t e r two 
years of school and those who l e f t a f t e r 
several years were incapable of f i l l i n g the 
simplest posts i n the Government o f f i c e s . 
The reason for t h i s poor showing i n 
education was undoubtedly the fact that 
most members of the Education Committee took 
more interest i n the f i n a n c i a l advancement 
of t h e i r friends and rela t i v e s than i n 
education i t s e l f . 
In 1927, however, the committee was responsible for the 
opening of two more schools i n addition to those i n Muharraq and 
Manama. These were situated i n Hedd and Raffa. 
The growth of these schools, which were r e s t r i c t e d to the 
sons of the Sunni populations created a feeling amonst the Shia 
that t h e i r sons should also have the opportunity of enjoying 
a modern style education, and wit h t h i s thought i n mind a 
25 
committee of Shia notables was formed with the object of raising 
money to finance t h e i r own schools. The Advisor to the Shaikh, Sir 
Charles Belgrave, attended the meetings of t h i s committee i n an 
attempt to give such guidance as may be necessary. He la t e r remarked, 
"The Shia community were poor, but they put up a few thousand rupees 
as a token contribution." As to the committee themselves, he added 
t h a t s "The Shia were even less educated than the Sunnis, neither 
26 
of them knew anything about school management." 
Nevertheless, the Shia committee succeeded, i n 1927, i n 
opening four classrooms i n Manama which they called the J a f f a r i a 
School. 
A year l a t e r another Shia school was opened i n the v i l l a g e 
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of Al-Kamiss and took the name of the Al-Alawia school. 
I n contrast to the Sunni committee, who recruited t h e i r 
teachers mainly from Syria, the Shia recruited t h e i r teachers 
from Iraq. 
I n the same year, 1928, the Sunni committee took two 
important steps forward. The f i r s t was i n the opening of the 
f i r s t g i r l s ' public school i n the Gulf Area, and the second 
was the sending of eight boys to Beirut with a view to t h e i r 
27 
obtaining a higher education. 
The opening of the G i r l s ' school brought a storm of protest 
from the more conservative elements w i t h i n the community. Typical 
arguments against the opening of the school were, " I f the g i r l s 
learn to read and w r i t e , what i s to prevent them from getting 
28 
l e t t e r s from men, without t h e i r parents' knowledge". The local 
mullas were moved to vigorously attack t h i s innovation to the 
extent of pu b l i c l y denouncing the move i n the Friday Kutba. 
The more enlightened sectors of the community including 
the Sheikh gave the new school limited support, p r i v a t e l y , i n 
view of the general resistance to g i r l s education by the 
conservative majority. 
The school was at f i r s t only a li m i t e d experiment and was 
29 
held i n a house rented by the committee. From these small 
beginnings began the f i r s t education service for g i r l s i n Bahrain. 
A l l of the eight boys selected to go to Beirut to study were 
Sunni, and of these, three were sons of;members of the Ruling Family. 
The boys returned from Beirut two years l a t e r , three of them having 
been successful i n t h e i r endeavours and these three immediately 
joined the teaching professioa i n Bahrain. One l a t e r became the 
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island's Director of Education,, and l a t e r Minister of Education. 
Thus, by the end of 1928 there were seven public schools 
i n Bahrain. Five of them, including the g i r l s ' school, were the 
Al-Hidayah schools, which were run by the Sunni committee, the 
other two being those run by the Shia committee. 
The Government began to subsidise the public schools as 
early as 1925 but apparently became increasingly d i s s a t i s f i e d with 
the management of the schools and the running of t h e i r finances. 
Because of t h i s the Government quickly attempted to bring these 
schools under kier supervision but t h i s move was strongly opposed 
by both committees. 
I n view of t h i s opposition the Government threatened to 
withdraw a l l subsidies from the schools and t h i s threat had the 
effect of making the committees agree to the Government supervision 
which was required. 
So i n 1929 the Government appointed Mr. Fayek Adham, a 
graduate of the American University of Beirut, as overall inspector 
of these schools. 
One of his f i r s t actions was to open another g i r l s ' school 
i n Manama of which his wife became the f i r s t headmistress. 
Other actions taken were to review the administration of the 
schools and to introduce new curic u l & o n the Lebanese pattern. 
Advanced subjects ^ uch as physics, music and higher mathematics were 
dropped on the grounds that they were badly presented. The pay 
of the teachers was reviewed, the hours worked reduced and more 
teachers were recruited. 
By the end of 1930 i t was reported that 500 boys and 100 g i r l s 
30 
were attending the eight schools. 
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The new organisation was declared unacceptable by the 
teachers, who, led by the headmasters of the Manama and Muharraq 
schools, and with the backing of t h e i r pupils, declared a s t r i k e 
on the 1st February, 1930 and presented their demands to the 
Government and the two committeeso 
Their demands were th a t , no changes should be made i n the 
salaries paid to the teachers, that t h e i r appointment should be on 
a permanent basis and that the new inspector should take into 
account the views of the two headmasters when considering matters 
31 
af f e c t i n g the curriculum* 
The Government reacted s w i f t l y and arrested Uthman al-Hourani 
and two of his associates and deported them. By the 15th February 
the s i t u a t i o n had calmed down and control was restored, and the 
Government, through i t s new inspector, took a f i r m hand over the 
control of the schools. The committees were reduced to an advisory 
capacity and were l a t e r disbanded. Mr. Fayek Adham became Director 
of Education and was answerable to Sir Charles Belgrave at the 
Adviserate. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the g i r l s ' schools was placed 
32 
i n the hands of Lady Marjorie Belgrave, assisted by Mrs. Wafika 
Tabara Nair, a Lebanese from the B r i t i s h Syrian Training College, who 
was also the sister-in-law of Mr. Adham. Mrs. Nair continued to 
serve i n the g i r l s ' section of the Education Department, and i n 1957, 
on Lady Belgrave leaving Bahrain, she became D i r e c t r i x of the G i r l s ' 
Education Department. 
Mr. Adham's period of o f f i c e extended up to the academic year 
1938-39 by which time education i n Bahrain had undergone some v i t a l 
changes. 
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The most important change was the amalgamation of the 
Shia and Sunni schools, especially i n Manama, when i n 1930 on 
the completion of the new Jaff a r i y a school, which was capable 
of accommodating up to 500 pupils, i t was taken over by the 
Government as a non-sectarian school and a l l boys transferred there. 
The old Manama boys' school of the Sunni sect became an enlarged 
non-sectarian g i r l s ' school. The l a t t e r move gave the opportunity 
for the f i r s t time for Shia g i r l s to obtain an education. 
These amalgamations were at f i r s t resented by the opposing 
r e l i g i o u s factions, but eventually i t proved to be one of the most 
important steps taken towards the integration of the two communities. 
Meanwhile a backward step was taken which l a i d the 
foundations for future divisions w i t h i n the Administration. This 
step was i n allowing boys' and g i r l s ' education to develop along 
e n t i r e l y independent lines» These two separate lines were l a t e r to 
be o f f i c i a l l y adopted i n the 1940's as o f f i c i a l policy and were i n 
themselves the most serious obstacle to the wider development of 
education i n Bahrain during the 1940's and 1950's. 
The pattern of primary education was put on a sounder footing 
during the 1930's on the basis of three years pre-primary and four 
years primary education. The enrolment of pupils was started at 
the age of s i x . 
Some writers doubt the existence of pre-primary schools, 
Taladiriyah, during t h i s period as for instance, Winder, quoting a 
Government report of 1951 @tates that the s t a r t of pre-primary 
education did not take place u n t i l 1949-50. On the other hand 
34 
Al-Hamer, re l y i n g on the Government Report of 1943, chooses that 
year as the s t a r t i n g date. 
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I n fact the two reports of 1943 and 1951 were r e f e r r i n g 
to specific schools and not to pre-primary education as a whole, 
as both these reports are pre-dated by other sources such as the 
"Al-Bahrain" newspaper which i n issue No. 15, dated l5th>June, 
1939 mentions the existence of Tahdiriyah i n an a r t i c l e complaining 
of overcrowding i n the Tahdiriyah classrooms of some schools. 
We therefore have good reason to believe that pre-primary 
education was introduced during the administration of Mr. Adham. 
The stated goals of the pre-primary schools were t o , 
"give the student character, t r a i n i n g , good habits, sharpened 
35 
senses, and heightened powers of observation". The curriculum 
consisted of the principles of reading, w r i t i n g and arithmetic, 
verses from the Quoran, religious i n s t r u c t i o n and songs. Study 
periods f o r the pre-primary schools consisted of morning attendance 
only. 
Once primary level was reached the pupil was expected to 
attend on both morning and afternoon for f i v e days per week. 
Thursday attendance was on the morning only and Friday was the 
weekend holiday. Each class usually lasted for 45 minutes and 
the teachers were expected to undertake 43 classes per week. 
The number of classes was usually exactly equal to the 
number of teachers, including the headmasters and headmistresses, 
who were also expected to teach the same number of classes i n 
36 
addition to t h e i r other duties. 
A further innovation was introduced during the Adham 
administration when i n 1936 two technical classes were formed, 
one being attached to Muharraq Boys' School and the other to Manama 
Boys' School. 
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Two Lebanese teachers were engaged to teach the boys simple 
37 
carpentry and mechanics i n a course las t i n g for two years. 
The following year, however, a separate technical school 
was established i n Manama and these courses were transferred to the 
new school. I n addition to the ex i s t i n g courses two others were 
added, blacksmithing and turning. The res p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
administration of t h i s new school was given to the E l e c t r i c i t y Supply 
Department. 
The school was open to any pupil who had completed the f i r s t 
or second years of his primary education. 
Towards the end of t h i s period, i n 1937-38, there was s t i l l 
only eight schools i n Bahrain. 
In Manama and Muharraq there were four schools, one boys' 
and one g i r l s ' , i n each town, and i n addition there was the Technical 
School, The other schools were situated at Rafaa, Hedd and Suq 
al-Khamis. 
I t was reported that by the end of the academic year 1938-39 there 
38 
were 1,589 students, almost three times the 1930 number. 
Although the number of pupils had almost trebled the number 
of schools existing between 1928 and 1938 had risen only from seven 
to eight, and the r e s u l t i n g overcrowding gave r i s e to concern as to 
the q u a l i t y of teaching which could be carried out i n these 
overcrowded conditions. Public discontent mounted and was given 
a voice i n "Al-Bahrain" on 15th June, 1939, when c r i t i c i s m of both 
the modern and t r a d i t i o n a l schools was expressed and the following 
points raised: that the pre-primary schools were overcrowded with 
between 50 and 60 pupils per class, that the Manama and Muharraq 
schools were located i n remote areas and the pupils had d i f f i c u l t y 
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i n reaching them, and that the Department of Education should 
provide transport to the schools for both pupils and teachers. 
The a r t i c l e also stated that the educational l e v e l of 
the teachers was very low and t h a t , "the teacher who has nothing can 
give nothing"; and that the proper school teacher should be 
"healthy, have a good knowledge of his subjects, organise his time s 
and should not resort to beating the pupils". The w r i t e r also 
mentioned the continued existence of the t r a d i t i o n a l Kutab schools 
throughout the island and expressed the opinion that they were 
f i l t h y , mis-educated the pupils and that the mullas put pressures 
upon the boys and t h e i r parents to prevent the children attending 
39 
proper schools. 
The Government seized the opportunity to review the s i t u a t i o n 
following the forced resignation of Mr. Adham and his w i f e , who 
returned to t h e i r native country, and appointed an English educational 
expert, Mr. A. Falness, who had been working w i t h the Education 
Department i n Iraq. He assessed the s i t u a t i o n and ascertained the 
views of the local people and presented his report, w i t h certain 
recommendations, i n 1938^-39. 
The Government of Bahrain appointed Mr. Falness as Director 
of Education i n order that his recommendations might be carried out. 
His appointment marked the segregation of boys, g i r l s and technical 
education into three r i g i d sectors, himself being Director of 
Education f o r the boys, Lady Belgrave for the g i r l s , and Sir Charles 
Belgrave became responsible for technical education. 
This system was i n force for two decades and each sector teaded 
to develop independently. This we propose to deal with i n the next 
section on the growth of the educational system. 
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2) The Period of Growth:- Boys' Education 
The o f f i c i a l name of the Boys' Department was the "Maarif 
Talim al-Banin" (Boys' Education Department). 
One of the f i r s t acts of Mr. Falness i n carrying out his 
recommendations, was to open another three schools, two for boys, 
i n S i t r a and Budayyia and a g i r l s ' school i n Hedd, i n order to 
relieve the pressure on the existing schools, and to spread the 
f a c i l i t i e s over a wider area. 
Another of his recommendations was to promote secondary 
education i n the island and the f i r s t establishment i n Bahrain to 
off e r f a c i l i t i e s f o r secondary education was opened i n Manama i n 
1940-41. This was known as Al "Kulliyah", or Manama College, and 
was intended to take the cream of the pupils leaving primary schools 
at around 13 to 14 years of age, and i t s object was to provide 
higher education and character t r a i n i n g for those of the Bahrain 
students who would l a t e r l i k e to enter one of the Government Departments 
40 
or serve as teachers i n the Education Department. 
The courses were designed to be of three years' duration and 
ins t r u c t i o n was carried out i n English on the lines of the Indian 
curriculum. The f i r s t batch of pupils, 30 i n number, were personally 
selected by Mr. Falness. A small hostel was also set up to accommodate 
boys attending the school from remote areas of the island. 
A year l a t e r the name was changed to "Thanawiyah", or Secondary 
School, instead of "College". 
Mr. Falness served as Director for two years and was succeeded 
by Mr. F.G. Wakelin, who served f o r four years, and Mr. W i l l i e , who 
served f o r only a few weeks before being replaced by Mr. Ahmed Al-Umran 4 i n l a t e 1945, and who continues to hold the post up to the present day. 
- 204 -
During these early years, however, the B r i t i s h Administration 
introduced certain modifications i n the system, which can be 
summarised as follows. 
The working hours of both masters and boys were reduced, pay 
and conditions for teachers were regularised and permanent rates of 
pay, with annual increments were introduced, and the teachers, with 
the exception of the v i l l a g e s ' mullas were included i n the Government 
Provident Scheme. 
Grades of teachers and standards of education were defined. The 
system whereby the pupils had to pay fo r t h e i r own text books and 
equipment was abolished and i n i t s place a central store was 
established at the Education Department to provide free stationery, 
text books and equipment, thus removing what had been an insuperable 
barrier to education for the poorer sections of the community. 
In an attempt to reliev e the overcrowding the enrol l i n g age 
was raised from 6 or 7 years to nearer 8 years of age. The number 
of over-aged pupils and married men who had formerly monopolised 
the higher levels of education was reduced and further enrolment of 
th i s group of pupils was r e s t r i c t e d . 
The use of the Quoran as a means of teaching pre-primary 
children to read was discontinued and proper reading books were 
introduced. Thus the v i l l a g e schools were transformed into proper 
teaching establishments w i t h the mullas being retained for the 
teaching of r e l i g i o n alone. 
A l l Government schools i n the island were also brought in t o 
a good state of repair. 
During t h i s period, up to the end of the Second World Was, the 
number of boys' schools rose from f i v e to t h i r t e e n , including secondary 
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schools, and the number of students and teachers were 1,750 and 
82 respectively. 
I n 1943, Mr. Wakelin succeeded, with the help of the 
B r i t i s h Councils i n Bahrain and Cairo, i n r e c r u i t i n g a number of 
Egyptian teachers to serve with the Education Department i n Bahrain, 
mainly i n the secondary schools. They took up the i r duties i n 1944 
as the f i r s t Egyptian Education Mission. The s y l l a b i i n the schools 
from that time began to change to the Egyptian curriculum. 
Mr. Ahmed al-Umran gives us some idea of the si t u a t i o n at 
the end of the Second World War when i n his report of 1955, he 
states that, "When I took o f f i c e , t h i s sort of education (secondary) 
was hardly worthy of mention. I t consisted of only two classes 
bearing the name of secondary school." In the year mentioned (1945) 
there were only 36 pupils of secondary l e v e l . This was not the 
highest number of secondary pupils up to that date as i n 1943-44 there 
had been approximately 50 pupils at t h i s level but a number of them had 
l e f t to take up employment and had not been replaced by newcomers. 
In 1947 a new development took place with the introduction 
of a special course of evening classes i n the secondary school, called 
"Al-Qism al-Khass" with a view to t r a i n i n g those pupils attending 
secondary school who were inclined to enter the teaching profession, 
i n the rudiments of teaching, p r i o r to becoming primary school 
teachers. These classes were i n addition to the pupils' normal studies. 
To encourage students to enrol i n these classes a monthly allowance 
of 15 rupees was given. 
Psychology, methods of i n s t r u c t i o n , both general and p a r t i c u l a r , 
theoretical and p r a c t i c a l , were the main subjects, besides attending 
experimental classes. 
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The response by the secondary level students to t h i s 
scheme was good9 probably i n view of the fact that the allowance 
and the prospects of a secure future were a t t r a c t i v e to them. 
Between 1946 and 1948 due to the pressure of the increased 
enrolment at pre-primary l e v e l , the normal three years of 
"kindergarten" were reduced to two. 
The pattern was thus established of 2 years of pre-primary 
from 8 to 10 years o l d , followed by four years primary education 
44 
and four years secondary education. This was the theoretical 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n but i n fact the age of pupils at a l l levels teaded 
to be higher than that l a i d down, as f o r instance i n 1948 the 
average age of secondary school pupils was between 18 and 19 years 
of age, indicating a high l e v e l of older pupils. 
The 1950's saw further developments i n the f i e l d of boys' 
education^ new secondary school building was opened i n Manama 
i n 1951 which was equipped with more up-to-date f a c i l i t i e s i n the 
form of laboratories, large classrooms, a modern l i b r a r y and a large 
playground. 
The studies at secondary school were divided into two year 
periods; the f i r s t two years being i n general subjects, and the 
l a s t two years allowing the pupil to specialise i n either science 
or arts subjects. 
I n 1952 Commercial Studies f o r the l a s t two years were added 
45 
to the curriculum, and i n 1954 a teacher t r a i n i n g branch was 
46 
established, which replaced the former system of evening classes. 
The pupils attending the teacher t r a i n i n g branch were given an 
allowance of Rs. 60 per month throughout t h e i r t r a i n i n g . 
The programme of each section of the secondary school was 
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modelled on the Egyptian syllabus. 
The goals of the secondary school were stated to be to 
provide the adolescent with s u f f i c i e n t general education 9 
"Thaqafah"a so as to become a useful member of society, and to 
impart s c i e n t i f i c knowledge with a view to continuing with 
university studies. 
I n 1951 a new hostel was constructed adjoining the 
secondary school to serve the needs of the pupils who lived too 
far from Manama to make a da i l y journey. This was mainly f o r 
the secondary school, the technical school and certain of the 
higher classes of the primary schools. A number of Gulf Arab 
students were also accommodated i n t h i s hostel and i n 1955 i t was 
reported that there were 100 students l i v i n g i n the hostel, thirteen 
of whom were non-Bahraini Arabs. 
The 1950's generally was a period of great growth i n the 
boys' education service i n Bahrain with a number of new schools 
being opened. The largest primary school i n the Gulf at that 
time,, was opened i n 1957, namely the al-Salymaniya School, capable 
of accommodating 1,000 pupils. 
The aims of primary education during the 1950's were stated 
to be 
"the spread of general culture i n the younger 
generation ..... the bringing up of a 
generation equipped to cope with the demands of 
c i v i l i s e d l i f e such as general knowledge, correct 
things, healthy bodies, s o l i d morals, deep 
s p i r i t u a l f a i t h , good taste and a willingness 
to make sacrifices f o r the nation (Al-Ummah), and 
the country, (Al-Watan)" 
I t was recognised at t h i s stage that at least a primary education 
49 
was something that no c i t i z e n should be without. 
By the end of the period which we have termed the "Growth 
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Period", there were 34 boys' schools with 12,364 pupils and 470 
teachers,"*^ a great increase from the humble s t a r t made af t e r the 
war. 
The Administration of the Department of Education became 
more formalised during the 1950's and a great deal of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
took place under the Director of Boys' Education. The divisions 
or "Idarah" were as follows%-
1) Secretariat - which kept records and s t a t i s t i c s and 
confidential correspondence and assisted with the organisation of 
examination^ • 
2) Inspection - the duties of the d i v i s i o n being to 
supervise the work and management of the schools. 
3) Sports Inspectors' Division - to supervise sporting 
a c t i v i t i e s and other organisations such as the Scouts which were 
attached to the schools. 
4) Employees' Division - Publication of o f f i c i a l notices 
and recruitment of a l l grades of employees. 
5) Stores Division - D i s t r i b u t i o n of books and materials 
and can&and maintenance of school buildings and o f f i c i a l housing. 
6) Transport Division - Transportation of s t a f f and pupils 
from remote areas to and from the schools. 
7) Library Division - Supervision of the Department's 
General Library. 
In 1956 a Council of Education was established as a result 
of p o l i t i c a l pressure. I t was authorised by "Health and Education 
Councils Ordinance" of 31st December, 1956, which also authorised 
the setting up of the Health Council. 
The number serving on each council was fixed at 8 persons, 
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f i v e of them selected by the Municipalities and three by the 
Shaikh with one of the Shaikh's nominees being Chairman of 
the Council a " * * 
The terms of reference of the Education Council were 
t o , 
"Consider a l l proposals concerning education 
services coming from the public or l o c a l councils, 
and to make representations to the head of the 
department concerned, as to action to be taken, 
on the other hand the council would be the channel 
through which the Director pronounced his policies 
and reported progress. The council would have 
close public relations and i n t h i s way the 
members, and i n t u r n , the Municipal councils and 
the wider public, would concurrently be aware of 
results and kept i n touch with prospective 
developments."-^ 
Early i n 1957 t h i s council was appointed under the 
chairmanship of Shaikh Khalifa b i n Salman, the second son of the 
then current Ruler, now the Prime Minister. 
Although the Technical School was under a separate administration 
from that of the primary and secondary education systems for boys 
we propose to deal with i t at t h i s stage as i t was another branch 
of the boys' education and eventually became an integral part of 
i t . 
At the s t a r t of the period of growth of education i n Bahrain 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for technical education was placed i n the hands 
of a B r i t i s h p r i n c i p l e under Sir Charles Belgrave, who acted as 
Head of Technical Education u n t i l his retirement i n 1957. 
In 1946 a new p r i n c i p a l was appointed, Mr. Said Tabara, a 
Lebanese from the American University Hospital i n Beirut, who held 
t h i s appointment u n t i l 1958 when the school was amalgamated int o the 
Boys' Education Department. At t h i s time Mr. Tabara also assumed 
the r o l e of Head of the Technical Division of the Boys' Education 
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Department. 
Enrolments at the school, despite the a t t r a c t i o n of the 
53 
t r a i n i n g allowance which was payable, was very small and 
amounted to only 40 pupils i n 1945-46o 
I n 1946-47 the length of the courses was extended from 
two to three years and i n 1948-49 to four years. 
On taking over the school i n 1946 Mr. Tabara immediately 
set about re-organising the curriculum and extending i t to cover 
a wider range of subjects. He also re-organised the number of 
hours worked by teachers and pupils at the school. 
I n 1950 the school started a special programme for the 
t r a i n i n g of BAPCO employees which as we have mentioned e a r l i e r , 
lasted only for a few years. 
The Education Report of 1952 mentioned a r i s e i n the 
standard of acceptance, i n that pupils now had to complete either 
two or three years primary education before entering the school 
and by 1955 the Education Report stated that pupils were preferred 
to have completed t h e i r primary education, thus indicating a 
welcome r i s e i n standards at the school. 
By the end of the academic year 1949-50 the number of pupils 
at the technical school had risen to 60 and the number of teachers 
to 11. The numbers of boys attending the various courses were 9 
i n Blacksmithing, 10 i n Machining, 10 i n Carpentry, and 31 i n the 
General Group. 
Between 1955 and 1957 the laboratories and workshop f a c i l i t i e s 
were greatly extended. Other innovations included the supply of 
overalls and t o o l - k i t s to the pupils, free of charge. 
Despite these changes enrolment during the 1950's was s t i l l 
- 211 -
very low and by 1959-60 the t o t a l number of pupils was only 89. 
The poor response to technical education was a r e f l e c t i o n 
of the community a t t i t u d e to t h i s type of education which s t i l l 
regarded manual work as a social stigma. 
Successive Government Reports deal with t h i s point. The 
1954 Annual Report stated 9 
"Among the young men and boys of Bahrain there i s 
s t i l l a d e f i n i t e f e e ling that to learn a trade i s 
derogatory, and so long as t h i s f e e l ing exists i t 
w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to get the r i g h t type of boys 
to take up technical t r a i n i n g . The majority of 
these boys who do enter the school are either ^ 
those of Persian o r i g i n , or boys from v i l l a g e s . " 
I n the Annual Report of 1957 i t was said th a t , 
"The Bahrain Government i s rather anxious to 
further encouragement towards such professional 
and technical education i n Bahrain,"^5 
and i n 1959 the Annual Report stated that "The monthly grant for 
(technical) students was increased by an average of 15 Rupees, i t 
56 
i s hoped that enrolment w i l l increase i n the future." 
These statements r e f l e c t the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a t t r a c t i n g 
pupils to participate i n the Technical Education i n Bahrain. 
Some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s experienced by the Technical 
Education School may be at t r i b u t e d to the fact that i t was a 
separate e n t i t y , apart from the mainstream of general education. 
The persons i n charge of the education programme repeatedly demanded 
during the 1950'sthe amalgamation of the Technical School into the 
Boys' Education Department. Mr. Umran wrote i n 1955 that, 
" i t i s natural that the Education Department should 
have complete supervision over the Technical School, 
as i s the case i n a l l other countries ..... i t may 
be that one of the reasons for the lack of growth 
of the technical education, despite the country's 
need for t h i s type of education, i s that i t i s not 
attached to a department specialising i n educational 
matters. The school should perhaps be a part of the 
- 212 -
secondary school system so that the pupils 
would f e e l that they were on the same road 
and seeking the same goals as other graduates, 
only on a d i f f e r e n t branch, and that their 
work also could serve t h e i r country."57 
G i r l s ' Education 
As previously mentioned, i n the two decades under review 
G i r l s ' Education was administered by a separate department, and 
for most of t h i s period, up to her departure i n 1957, Lady 
Marjorie Belgrave was the D i r e c t r i x of G i r l s 1 Education. 
Between 1957 and 1960, i n which year the amalgamation of 
both educational departments took place, Mrs. W. Nair (Waffica 
Tabara), took over the duties of D i r e c t r i x . 
After the amalgamation she became the Head of the G i r l s ' 
Division i n the Directorate of Education. 
During the 1940's and 1950's the l i m i t a t i o n s which impeded 
the progress of g i r l s ' education were the facts that i t was 
segregated from the main developments i n boys' education and also 
that the local a t t i t u d e to g i r l s ' education was s t i l l to a large 
extent one of discouragement. 
The fact that g i r l s ' Education had to develop w i t h i n a 
male-dominated society and w i t h i n the l i m i t s of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
purdah system made progress i n numbers and types of t r a i n i n g 
available very d i f f i c u l t . 
The Bahraini g i r l s , however, were eager to obtain education. 
As early as 1939 an anonymous open l e t t e r to the "Al-Bahrain" 
58 
newspaper, w r i t t e n by one of the schoolgirls, demanded that g i r l s ' 
education should be compulsory, at least between the ages of seven 
and twelve, before they took the purdah. 
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In 1940 there were three g i r l s ' primary schools accommodating 
around 450 g i r l s . By 1945-46 the number of schools had risen to 
f i v e and the number of pupils to 1,139. At t h i s time there was a 
59 
t o t a l of f i f t y - o n e teachers. 
There was no secondary education for g i r l s at a l l during the 
1940's and by the end of the decade there were only six g i r l s ' 
primary schools with only 1,356 pupils and 58 teachers. 
The purpose of g i r l s ' education during the 1940's was 
summarised i n Mr. Umran's lecture i n London i n 1946 when he stated 
t h a t , "The goal of g i r l s ' education i s to prepare the g i r l to be a 
respected w i f e , i n t e l l e c t u a l mother and an educated housewife,"^ 
Thus we see that Mr. Umran, who was regarded as an 
enlightened man, saw no role for women outside t h e i r own homes. 
The curriculum of g i r l s ' schools d i f f e r e d s l i g h t l y from the 
boys', i n that greater emphasis was placed on Arabic and domestic 
sciences at the expense of other subjects, such as English and 
s c i e n t i f i c subjects. 
The years of the 1950's were marked by an expansion i n the 
number of g i r l s ' schools i n both towns and v i l l a g e s . The f i r s t g i r l s ' 
secondary school was opened i n 1950 i n a rented house i n Manama, 
with a f i r s t year class of eleven g i r l s . 
I t was conducted along the same general lines as that of 
the boys' general academic programme with the addition of domestic 
science. Due to the comparatively large number of enrolments i t 
became necessary af t e r the f i r s t two years of general studies to 
sub-divide the courses into three sections, General Academic for 
both Arts and Sciences, Teacher Training and Domestic Sciences. 
The f i r s t group of g i r l s to complete t h e i r secondary education 
graduated i n 1956. Only f i v e g i r l s graduated, but three of these 
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went on to Beirut College for Women to complete t h e i r higher 
A 61 education. 
By the end of the 1950's there were sixteen g i r l s ' 
schools, including the secondary school, with an attendance of 
5,467 pupils and 202 teachers. 
Despite the growth of education for g i r l s , the general 
a t t i t u d e was s t i l l that the main object was to f i t them for a 
l i f e i n the home, although some did f e e l the need for a more modern 
at t i t u d e to be adopted. 
Mr. Umran, i n a report to the Shaikh i n 1955 put forward 
the view t h a t , 
" I f e e l some anxiety when I t a l k of boys' education 
without mentioning the g i r l s , t h i s i s an unnatural 
thing to exist ..... i t i s l i k e our sons l i v i n g i n 
one country and our daughters i n another. Are they 
not the future fathers and mothers of our grand-
children? Do they not l i v e i n the same environment? 
I t i s imperative that we bring together both boys' 
and g i r l s ' education that they may march together 
to the same goals. 
I n general, education i n Bahrain during t h i s period, despite 
the growth which took place, suffered to a certain extent from the 
di v i s i o n of the service into three separate compartments, with each 
one competing against the other for the resources which were 
available. There was wastage and r i v a l r y i n the fact that each 
Department (Boys' and Girls') duplicated each others functions and 
e f f o r t s . 
One peculiar aspect of the system, however, was that during 
t h i s period, with the exception of Mr. Umran, education was 
controlled by two families, Sir Charles and Lady Belgrave being 
responsible f o r Technical Education and G i r l s ' Education respectively 
assisted by Mr. Said Tabara and his sister Waffica Tabara (Mrs. Nair). 
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Whatever the merits of t h i s arrangement may have been, i n 
Bahrain, with i t s r e l a t i v e l y small community, i t was resented on 
the grounds that i t smacked of nepotism and public sympathy was 
very much with Mr. Umran who was one of th e i r own people. Although 
he was not p u b l i c l y outspoken about the s i t u a t i o n one could sense 
from his reports his doubts and di s s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
3) The Period of Modern Developments (1960-71) 
The amalgamation of the Technical School into the Boys* 
Education Department i n 1958 has already been mentioned, but a 
far more important step was taken i n August, 1960 when the Boys' 
and G i r l s ' Departments were amalgamated under the newly-created 
Directorate of Education. Mr. Umran assumed the t i t l e of 
Director-General, assisted by Shaikh Abdul Azia bin Mohammed 
al-Khalifa, who was Assistant Director-General ? now Minister of Education. 
The Directorate was sub-divided into two main divisions, 
the Boys' Directorate and the G i r l s ' Directorate, but with a 
63 
central administration. 
The Directorate was set up on the recommendation of a two 
man committee of Arab educational experts, namely Mr. M. Kamel 
Nahhass, of the U.A.R. Ministry of Education, and Professor J. Katul 
of the Department of Education of A.U.B. 
They produced t h e i r report i n A p r i l , 1960. As well as the 
setting up of the Directorate they also recommended a change i n 
the pattern of education from the existing system of two years 
preprimary, four years primary, and four years secondary, to six 
years primary, two years elementary (Junior secondary), and three 
years secondary. This followed the pattern of the Egyptian system 
then i n use throughout most the Arab countries. 
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These recommendations meant the lowering of the enrolment 
age to six years old once more and t h i s 9 along with t h e i r 
recommendation that there should be automatic promotion for the 
f i r s t three years of primary education, was adopted and introduced 
during the academic year 1960-61. 
This l a t t e r point of automatic promotion was intended 
to deal with the problem of "repeaters" during primary education, 
as i n t h e i r investigation they found that f o r t y percent of 
primary students i n each class f a i l e d to progress to the next 
grade each year and that only eight percent went straight through 
a l l grades without f a i l u r e . ^ 
In adopting the new pattern of education i t was found 
necessary to introduce during the l a s t three years of secondary 
education, the "Tawi iheyyah" (Egyptian High School Qualification 
C e r t i f i c a t e ) to prepare the boys for continuing t h e i r studies 
i n universities abroad. I n 1963 t h i s system was also adopted by 
the G i r l s ' Secondary School. I n the same year the domestic sciences 
branch of the G i r l s ' Department was discontinued and t h e i r 
curriculum brought more into l i n e with that of the boys. 
The academic year 1962-63 also saw major changes i n Technical 
Education. The entry of boys to the Technical School was r e s t r i c t e d 
to those pupils who had obtained t h e i r C e r t i f i c a t e of Primary Educati 
the period of study was extended to f i v e years and the standard of 
education raised to that of the secondary l e v e l . 
These moves were probably responsible for the subsequent 
popularity of Technical Education which for so many years had been 
the poor r e l a t i o n i n the educational f i e l d , as under the new system 
pupils i n the technical area were assured of an educational standard 
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equal to that of the normal secondary system and they were thus 
no longer looked upon as an i n f e r i o r branch of the education 
service. 
Religious education has not been mentioned so far and t h i s 
i s because i t occupies a peculiar place i n the system. 
The f i r s t modern reli g i o u s school was reported to have been 
started i n 1938 by the Shia Appeal Khadi.^ Just before the s t a r t 
of the Second World War a few students from t h i s school were sent 
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abroad to the Islands College of Lucknow i n India. This i s the 
only time a Shia rel i g i o u s school was mentioned and i t appears 
to have died out very soon afterwards. 
After Shaikh Salman came to the throne i n 1942 a small number 
of boys started to attend the "Al-Madrassa ad-Diniyah" (the r e l i g i o u s 
school), a Sunni school wholely subsidised by the Shaikh. A small 
number of i t s graduates were sent to study at Al-Azher i n Cairo. 
The l e v e l of t h i s school probably did not exceed the primary l e v e l . 
In 1960, however, the school came under the control of the 
Directorate of Education and was incorporated into the system.^ 
Pupils were allowed to attend t h i s school only after having completed 
the f i r s t three years of t h e i r primary education. The school was 
lat e r extended to cover primary, elementary and secondary levels. 
I t was renamed the "Al-Mahad ad D i n i " , and i t s curriculum was 
modelled on that of Al-Azher with the addition of the English 
language. 
The Commercial section of the Boys' Secondary School was i n 
1965 made a separate Commercial School with secondary education 
status. 
By the end of 1966 the t o t a l number of schools had risen to 
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eighty-two with a t o t a l attendance of 37,607 pupils and 1,654 
teachers, according to the Annual Report for 1966, 
This expansion of the school services placed an excessive 
burden on the Administration and i n l a t e 1965 the Directorate 
engaged Mr. D.J.S. Crozier and Mr. V.L. G r i f f i t h s to investigate 
the problems of the system. 
68 
They reported i n January 1966 and i n t h e i r findings they 
mentioned that whilst there was very l i t t l e problem with "repeaters" 
i n the secondary l e v e l , i n the primary schools the l e v e l of 
"repeaters" af t e r the i n i t i a l three years was running at about 
twenty percent. This, however, was an improvement on the previous 
le v e l of f o r t y percent. 
The r i s i n g cost of learning was one of the problems 
considered by the two experts and they recommended the a b o l i t i o n 
of the special allowances payable to pupils i n the teacher 
t r a i n i n g d i v i s i o n , both boys and g i r l s , and those to the technical 
school pupils. 
This was immediately agreed and the allowances were 
discontinued to a l l pupils with the exception of those attending 
the re l i g i o u s school. 
I n accordance with t h e i r advice the system of free transport 
for pupils was also reviewed and a charge imposed on a l l using the 
service except those pupils who, af t e r the application of a form 
of means t e s t , were deemed to be of families too poor to meet these 
charges. 
The report also recommended the closure of the teacher 
t r a i n i n g divisions of the secondary schools f o r boys and g i r l s and 
the replacement of these two separate classes w i t h a new teacher 
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tr a i n i n g i n s t i t u t e . I t was planned that these i n s t i t u t e s would 
provide a higher grade of Bahraini teacher f o r primary and 
elementary schools and would eventually be beneficial to the 
economy of the education service i n that i t would l i m i t the 
large sums of money being spent on the importation of Non-Bahraini 
teachers. 
The t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t e f o r boys, the "Mahad al-Moalemeen", 
was opened i n 1966 and a year later the g i r l s ' i n s t i t u t e was 
opened. 
The boys and g i r l s who were at that time undertaking teacher 
t r a i n i n g at the secondary schools were transferred to the new 
teacher t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t e s and once these pupils had completed 
t h e i r t r a i n i n g future enrolment took place only from those pupils 
who had completed t h e i r general academic secondary school 
education. Pupils attending the colleges undertook a two year 
course i n theoretical and pr a c t i c a l teaching and these i n s t i t u t e s 
became the highest level of education obtainable i n Bahrain, the 
important point being that they were no longer part of the secondary 
school system, but an extension beyond that point. 
Teacher t r a i n i n g took for the f i r s t time a number of d i f f e r e n t 
specialised forms i n that teachers were no longer "general subject 
t u t o r s " , but were trained to teach s p e c i f i c a l l y i n areas such as 
Arabic language and Islamic Religion, Science and Mathematics, English 
Language, Social Studies, Physical Education and Arts and Handicrafts. 
The increased interest i n technical education made i t 
necessary to open a second technical school to cater f o r the 
demand. Therefore, i n 1969 the second technical school was opened 
i n the town of Jidhaffs w i t h a view to giving a greater opportunity 
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for the boys of the surrounding vi l l a g e s to obtain a technical 
education once they had finished t h e i r primary schooling.^ 
To give a summary of the growth and development of 
education i n Bahrain the following table shows the numbers of 
schools, pupils and teachers since the inception of modern 
public schools i n Bahrain. (P.221) 
The increase could have been even greater i f education i n 
Bahrain had been compulsory as even i n 1971 of a t o t a l school 
age population (between 7 and 17) only 73 percent were attending 
Government Schools. This w i l l undoubtably increase i n the future 
as already, from the same census i t can be calculated that there 
i s approximately 77 percent attendance rate of those of primary 
school age (7 to 12). 
I t i s interesting to note that students as a percentage of 
the t o t a l population have also increased dramatically over the 
years shown. In 1950 f u l l - t i m e students as a percentage of the 
population amounted to only 5.1 percent. By 1959-60 however 
t h i s had rise n to 14.3 percent, by 1965 to 20.6 percent and i n 1971 
i t reached the figure of 23.1 percent. I f school attendance was 
compulsory the figure could be as high as 30 per cent of the t o t a l 
population. 
Another area i n which education has made an impact i s i n 
the sphere of adult education. The effect has been both social 
and p o l i t i c a l . 
With regard to the social aspect, vocational t r a i n i n g for 
adults has made the Bahrainis more e f f i c i e n t i n the jobs which they 
already hold and i n many cases has f i t t e d them for positions of 
greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , thus increasing the social m o b i l i t y of the 
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people. 
On the p o l i t i c a l side the general l i t e r a c y campaign has 
enabled previously i l l i t e r a t e people to take an active interest 
i n p o l i t i c a l events both at home and abroad for the f i r s t time. 
The forms which adult education took could be divided into 
three main sectors, in-service teacher t r a i n i n g , vocational 
t r a i n i n g (commercial or technical) and the l i t e r a c y campaigns. 
The "Complementary Evening Studies" were started i n 1950-51 
and were designed for those teachers already i n the Education 
Service who had not during t h e i r own school days obtained a 
school-leaving c e r t i f i c a t e , either primary or secondary. The 
duration of each course was two years, during which the teachers 
were encouraged to complete the primary or secondary education. 
Once a teacher had obtained either of these qualifications 
he was awarded an increment to his salary and as the scheme 
progressed the possession of these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s became a major 
consideration i n the f i e l d of promotion. 
The programme was terminated i n the mid-1960's by which 
time a l l teachers had obtained t h e i r pzimary education c e r t i f i c a t e s , 
although in-service teachers not yet holding t h e i r f u l l secondary 
c e r t i f i c a t e can s t i l l s i t for the Secondary General C e r t i f i c a t e as 
external students. 
Vocational t r a i n i n g , which was another aspect of Adult 
Education, began i n 1953-54 and covered both Commercial and 
Technical t r a i n i n g . Both evening classes were open to the general 
public f o r a very small fee and t h e i r purpose was to raise the 
standard of education and s k i l l s of the people to enable them to 
raise t h e i r standard of l i v i n g . The course of study f o r the 
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Commercial course was both theoretical and p r a c t i c a l , whilst the 
Technical t r a i n i n g was e n t i r e l y p r a c t i c a l . For both types of 
tr a i n i n g a student must not exceed the age of 35; however, for 
the Commercial studies he should hold the primary c e r t i f i c a t e 
of education. These courses finished i n 1965 although the 
Technical t r a i n i n g was l a t e r restarted i n 1966-67 with a new 
system of evening classes. For the new courses a l l primary 
school leavers, interested i n following technical studies, who 
obtained below average results and who are above 16 years of 
age, are enrolled i n these classes with the idea of preparing 
semi-skilled labourers f o r the market. 
One of the l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s new system i s t h a t , as one 
document stated, recruitment i s from those pupils who had obtained 
72 
only "below average re s u l t s " i n t h e i r primary education and 
t h i s tends to lower the standard that could p o t e n t i a l l y be 
obtained from these types of classes. 
I n an attempt to raise the l i t e r a c y level of the Bahrainis 
various l i t e r a c y campaigns have been organised. The f i r s t of 
these was i n the post-war years when BAPCO, i n co-operation with 
the Education Department, began a campaign to encourage both BAPCO 
employees and members of the general public to learn to read and 
write so that they would become more employable. These campaigns 
were continued w i t h varying degrees of success u n t i l 1955 when 
they were given an impetus by the Bahraini national clubs deciding 
to co-operate i n the scheme by i n s t i t u t i n g a series of evening 
classes throughout the island. More help was forthcoming during 
the 1960*s when a number of Bahraini university students organised 
evening classes during t h e i r vacations with a view to assisting the 
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drive to raise the l i t e r a c y l e v e l . 
As there has been no formal policy on l i t e r a c y campaigns 
as such no figures are available, although we may see the progress 
which has been made by studying the figures of the various 
censuses. 
The census of 1941 gives a figure of 10.5 percent l i t e r a c y 
f o r the t o t a l population, w h i l s t by 1950 t h i s had rise n to 12.8 
percent, the actual breakdown between adults and minors, male and 
female, not being g i v e n . ^ 
In the l a t e r censuses of 1959, 1965 and 1971 these figures 
are available and we see that the l i t e r a c y figures for the adult 
population have risen dramatically i n recent years. 
TABLE XXVI 
73 
Adult Literacy i n Bahrain (For a l l over 15 yrs of age.) 
Year % Male Pop. Female Pop. % of Total Adult Pop. 
1959 35.2 13.7 25.3 
1965 36.1 18.2 29.3 
1971 49.2 28.5 40.2 
Although to some degree the rapid percentage increase between 
1965 and 1971 may be due to a large number of l i t e r a t e school leavers 
j o i n i n g the adult population, the dramatic r i s e when compared to the 
preceding six year period can be attr i b u t e d to the success of the 
l i t e r a c y campaigns. 
I t i s interesting to note that i n comparison with other 
areas of the Arab World, Bahrain i s r e l a t i v e l y highly placed i n 
the l i t e r a c y league with a l i t e r a c y rate for a l l over 10 years of age 
of 38.3 per c e n t . ^ 
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Despite the fact that education takes up a large proportion 
of the Bahrain National Budget an even greater e f f o r t w i l l be 
required i n the future to raise the l i t e r a c y l e v e l to that of the 
developed countries of the world. 
Thus i f Bahrain i s to keep pace with the growing demand iSor 
education she must expand the services on more than one f r o n t . 
Expansion must take place not only to cater f o r the naturally 
increasing b i r t h r a t e but also for the future growth i n the 
percentage of those of above school age wishing to participate i n 
the educational programmes. 
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74 contd...... 
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Algeria 19 percent Lebanon 60 percent 
See "Al-Arabi" No. 161, Kuwait, A p r i l , 1972. 
C H A P T E R TWO 
a) The impact of Education on Bahrain Society 
We have referred e a r l i e r to education being one of the 
i n i t i a t o r s of social change, by making possible a greater degree 
of social mobility. But how far has education i n Bahrain opened 
the door to social m o b i l i t y f 
There i s no doubt that education was looked upon by the 
Bahraini public as an eff e c t i v e means of improving the l o t of 
the individual and of creating wider job opportunities, but 
several factors combined to prevent f u l l advantage being taken of 
the opportunities offered. These factors were either the 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y held social attitudes of the community or the 
li m i t a t i o n s contained w i t h i n the system i t s e l f . I n spite of t h i s , 
the very fact that children were being educated, opened up for 
the children and youth of Bahrain, much wider horizons than had 
previously been possible, and sowed the seeds of future social 
and p o l i t i c a l enlightenment. 
The social attitudes which made t h e i r effects f e l t were the 
insistence of the older element i n continuing to place great 
importance on religious i n s t r u c t i o n and the a t t i t u d e of the local 
population to manual labour, considering i t degrading and only to 
be entered into by the lowest of the social classes. 
As a Muslim society Bahrain retained many of i t s old 
t r a d i t i o n s , f i r s t and foremost being the high regard i n which they 
s t i l l held t h e i r r e l i g i o n , and the most obvious point to note i n 
th i s respect i s the continued survival of the "r e l i g i o u s school". 
This school operated independently u n t i l i t was brought undi 
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the control of the Directorate of Education i n 1960. 
Having taken control of t h i s school the older generation, 
fearing an erosion of t h e i r religious principles, brought 
pressure to bear through the council of education which resulted 
not only i n the school being retained w i t h i n the Directorate 
i n i t s existing form but also i n religious teaching being 
extended even further into a l l Government schools i n Bahrain. 
Religious Instruction was even introduced into the syllabus of the 
Technical School and extra periods of religious teaching were 
imposed i n a l l other schools i n Bahrain. 
This then was the view of the older generation, but i t 
was f l a t l y contradicted by the pupils themselves. I n the 
questionnaire prepared by Mr. Al-Hamer,* he found that when 
considering the "religious school", "The l a t t e r i s supposed to 
prepare the learned imams of the future. But not a single student 
2 
from the very school has chosen to become an imam." 
We must then ask ourselves the question, why do pupils continue 
to enrol at t h i s school? The answer to th i s question i s that the 
majority probably enrol to take advantage of the monetary 
allowances payable. 
This state of a f f a i r s could have equally applied to the 
technical t r a i n i n g and teacher t r a i n i n g divisions which up to 1966 
also paid monetary allowances to the students. 
Students from poor families were enrolling i n these divisions 
purely for the monetary allowances, those not too proud i n the 
technical d i v i s i o n , and those whose families, even though poor, 
looked down upon technical education as a loss of status, compromised 
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and enrolled for the teacher training;, even though some may 
not have been e n t i r e l y f i t t e d for i t , i n order to obtain the 
monetary allowances to supplement the family income. 
Summing up on t h i s point i t i s seen that even though 
education i n Bahrain has developed along modern l i n e s , the 
co n t r o l l i n g conservative elements of the island s t i l l f e e l 
t h e i r r e l i g i o n has an extremely important part to play i n a 
child's education even i n the complexities of modern society. 
This view which is held by the older generation who control 
the education service seems to represent i n a way a longing for 
the old t r a d i t i o n a l values embodied i n the "gutab" schools rather than 
looking to the needs of the future. 
As can be seen, one of the other factors which made the 
system less e f f e c t i v e was that the poverty of some sections of 
the community dictated the choice of education which t h e i r children 
could follow, instead of a child's a b i l i t i e s deciding which was the 
most suitable, only those families who could support t h e i r 
children f i n a n c i a l l y could r e a l l y afford to give the c h i l d the 
opportunity of a better q u a l i t y of education. Al-Hamer's 
investigations support t h i s point, when i n ascertaining the family 
background of his sample pupils, he found that only 27 of his 129 
3 
sample stated that t h e i r fathers were manual workers. 
Although education has not to date produced any great social 
mobility i t has mobilised the p o l i t i c a l forces i n the island i n that 
i t enabled the students to make themselves p o l i t i c a l l y conscious of 
the current s i t u a t i o n both i n Bahrain and throughout the Arab World. 
They were f i r s t i n taking the i n i t i a t i v e by demonstrating to a i r 
t h e i r grievances and make known t h e i r views on what they considered 
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were i n j u s t i c i e s both at home and abroad. As Sir Charles Belgrave 
said, " i t was the schoolboys who f i r s t introduced the habit of 
s t r i k e s . " ^ The students were ever-ready to take to the streets i n 
support of both p o l i t i c a l and i n d u s t r i a l actions e n t i r e l y on t h e i r 
own i n i t i a t i v e , and i t i s on these grounds that we state that they 
formed the spearhead of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s i n the island. 
The Authorities of the island were unhappy with t h i s state 
of a f f a i r s and attempted to place the blame for t h i s on the foreign 
teachers, especially the Egyptians. They were repeatedly accused 
during the 1950*s of expounding policies of p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n 
to the Bahrain students. As Sir Charles Belgrave wrote, "The 
Egyptian teachers became fervent missionaries preaching the 
dangerous gospel of Nasserism."^ 
On the same subject, Anthony Nutting stated, 
" I gathered that he (Ahmed Umran) was well aware 
of the Egyptian menace and had taken steps to meet 
i t . He had reduced the proportion of Egyptian 
teachers to a mere seven percent of the t o t a l and 
i s now sending a l l Government-sponsored students 
to the American University of Beirut instead of 
Cairo." 6 
Both writers have over-simplified the issue and have 
overlooked the basic fact that education gave to the students a 
capacity to explore new ideas f o r themselves and to open up t h e i r 
minds to new ideas and ideologies from whatever source they 
originated.^ This and the contributary fact that they were becoming 
increasingly d i s s a t i s f i e d with the conditions of the island made 
them query the "status quo" of the t r a d i t i o n a l system. Therefore, 
to single out the Egyptians as the root cause of the repeated 
student unrest was inaccurate and tends to mislead one from the 
real cause of the students' p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
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One of the grievances of the students was that the 
educational system i n Bahrain was not i n i t s e l f complete, i t was a 
closed system i n that having finished one's education i n 
Bahrain there were no f a c i l i t i e s for higher education to 
raise the level of student t r a i n i n g to the stage at which they 
would be ready to take advantage of a university education. This 
was the s i t u a t i o n up to 1962 for boys and 1963 for g i r l s , as i t 
was not u n t i l these years that i t was possible for students to 
complete a l l of t h e i r studies i n Bahrain, pr i o r to entering 
university. Before t h i s time i t was necessary f o r the student 
to go abroad for one year to obtain the Tawjopfrayypfr (University 
Entrance C e r t i f i c a t e ) at his own expense, except f o r those few 
sponsored by the Government. 
This period of study abroad i n a strange environment 
placed an extra s t r a i n on the students at t h i s c r i t i c a l time i n 
t h e i r educational careers. Even t h i s f a c i l i t y was available only 
to the General Academic students i n Arts and Sciences and the 
same opportunity was not afforded to the other divisions of 
Teacher Training, Commercial and Technical studies. Students i n 
these divisions, having completed t h e i r education i n Bahrain were 
faced with a dead end. The Authorities appeared to show no 
interest i n r e c t i f y i n g t h i s s i t u a t i o n and appeared to discourage 
students from leaving Bahrain. 
In spite of these d i f f i c u l t i e s a number of students 
q u a l i f i e d with B.A.'s and B.Sc's from foreign universities and 
began to return to Bahrain. The f i r s t ever graduates, two i n 
number, returned to the island as early as 1950 from the American 
University of Beirut. They were followed over the years by others 
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who had studied i n u n i v e r s i t i e s throughout the world. By 1967 
there was a t o t a l of 200 Bahraini graduates i n a v a r i e t y of 
spe c i a l i t i e s and t h i s number rose to a t o t a l of 302 i n 1970-71. 
Of these 254 were male and 48 female. 
Even though the number of university graduates i s 
increasing the students can s t i l l be faced with f i n a n c i a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s during t h e i r education. Having obtained the 
Tawjeeheyyeh, unless they were one of the small number of 
outstanding students who were awarded Government scholarships, 
and unless they could obtain a scholarship from a foreign university, 
they were once more faced with the prospect of supporting themselves 
f i n a n c i a l l y during the period of t h e i r studies abroad. 
Sir Charles Belgrave remarked that " I only knew two or 
three Arabs who had any genuine desire to acquire knowledge for 
the sake of learning," This was undoubtably untrue as the Bahrain 
students generally held high aspirations with regard to education. 
As Al-Hamer wrote, 
"Pr a c t i c a l l y a l l pupils ( i n the 1960's) who f i n i s h 
t h e i r primary education j o i n the Intermediate 
Schools. Approximately 86 percent of t h e i r 
graduates continue t h e i r learning i n Secondary 
School, 85 percent of whom prefer the General 
Academic School leading to the Tawjeeheyyeh 
C e r t i f i c a t e . " 8 
I n his student questionnaire he found that 40 percent of his sample 
wanted to go to university. This i s a very high proportion especially 
i n view of the fact that his sample included those undergoing 
Teacher Training, Technical, Commercial and Religious Studies who 
knew that there was very l i t t l e chance of them obtaining such an 
education. 
Another factor i n the l i m i t a t i o n s of the Bahrain educational 
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system was that i t discriminates between pupils on the grounds 
of sex, g i r l s s t i l l being barred from Technical and Religious 
educational establishments. Only i n 1970 were they allowed 
to p a r t i c i p a t e even i n the Commercial Training programmes. 
One of the reasons i n the past for t h i s discrimination 
was that the teaching profession was the only socially acceptable 
employment for females, a s i t u a t i o n which the female students 
themselves are now t r y i n g to change. Mr. Al-Hamer i n his student 
survey found that 65 percent of the g i r l s , as against 29 percent 
of the boys, wished to pursue t h e i r higher education through 
university and wished to obtain jobs such as doctors, lawyers and 
pharmacists. 
Of the 40 g i r l s questioned i n his sample he found that only 
9 
two of them wished to become teachers. 
The opening of Kuwait University i n 1966 made i t easier for 
boys and g i r l s i n Bahrain to obtain a higher education. I t was 
reported i n 1971 that there were upward of 1,100 Bahraini students 
studying abroad and that a very large proportion of these were 
attending Kuwait University.' 1" 0 
As the number of students seeking higher education increases 
so i t becomes more d i f f i c u l t f o r the Government to cope with the 
problem of employing these large number of returning graduates, and 
to create a suitable p o l i t i c a l climate acceptable to the ideals which 
these people held. 
This i s becoming an increasingly urgent problem, as the 
number of students rises as, for instance, the 1971 figure of 
1,100 students at University represents a proportion of one graduate 
per 196 members of the population. 
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The resentment of the Government to the problem of university 
graduates became apparent as early as 1953 when there were only 
four graduates i n the island and the Government Annual Report stated 
that when they returned they were "contemptuous of many things i n 
t h e i r own homes and country; they resent having to resume the l i f e 
they used to lead, and they have no i n c l i n a t i o n to s e t t l e down i n 
Bahrain."^ 
The statement at t h i s time (1953) probably referred only to 
social conditions but during the late 1950*s and the 1960's the Bahraini 
students abroad started to organise themselves into Rabita, and started 
to study closely the p o l i t i c a l and social structure of th e i r 
12 
homeland and subjected i t to severe c r i t i c i s m . 
Some students were extremely c r i t i c a l and t h i s has provoked 
the Bahrain Government to harsh countermeasures, such as banning 
cer t a i n students from re-entering Bahrain, or j a i l i n g them on t h e i r 
13 
r e t u r n , measures which i n themselves serve only to provoke further 
c r i t i c i s m and delay any solution to the problems which the island 
faces. 
b) Problems Facing Educational Development i n Bahrain 
The f i r s t problem facing both developed and underdeveloped 
countries i s the r i s i n g cost of education and Bahrain i s no 
exception to t h i s general r u l e . 
As more people are becoming educated so the demands placed 
upon the Education Service increase and as Coombs stated with 
regard to underdeveloped countries, "The setting of bold targets, 
the making of large promises, and the very expansion of education 
f i r e d an increase i n popular expectations and educational demand 
14 
that fed on i t s e l f and soon got out of hand." 
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This s i t u a t i o n i s t y p i c a l of that i n Bahrain where a 
growing percentage of the National Budget which i s being spent 
on education i s a cause fo r some concern,, being by far the 
largest item of expenditure. 
From selected years shown i n the table below i t can be 
seen how the recurrent and non-current expenditure on education 
has increased disproportionately to the growth of the National 
Budget. 
In the 1960'a, with the exception of 1961, expenditure 
on education never f e l l below 20 percent of the t o t a l expenditure, 
an extremely high f i g u r e for an underdeveloped country to bear. 
Education i s paid for e n t i r e l y by the Government and there has 
been no f i n a n c i a l support from the public since the Government 
took control of education i n the early 1930's. The r i s i n g costs 
and the need for public f i n a n c i a l support was mentioned as early 
as 1955 when Mr. Al-Umran wrote, 
"We are hoping that the wealthy element of the 
country would, as t h e i r counterparts i n other 
countries had done, participate i n the financing 
of public education and as they had once done when 
education f i r s t started, but the people are r e l y i n g 
on the Government to do everything when ^ 
i s the conscience of these people going to awake." 
The r i s i n g cost of education can be viewed from another 
angle, namely the cost per p u p i l . In 1950-51 i t was estimated 
that every boy, at a l l levels of education, was costing at the 
time Rs.500 p.a. to educate. Every g i r l Rs. 204, and boys attending 
technical school Rs.700 (excluding allowances payable to these 
students.) 
The figures for 1964 were no longer segregated between boys 
and g i r l s but quoted costs for primary, intermediate and secondary 
levels, Rs.370, Rs570 and Rs.1,000 respectively. 
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By 1966-67 the figures had become Primary Rs.387, 
Intermediate Rs.690, Secondary Rs,967s, and Technical Rs.1,784, 
and further large increases were suffered i n the following 
academic year 1967-68, when costs rose to Primary Rs.560, 
Intermediate Rs.790, Secondary Rs.840 and Technical Rs.2,181, 1 6 
massive increases i n a l l except Secondary education. 
These last increases were due to the following, which 
although exceptional f o r t h i s year, are not a ty p i c a l of those 
d i f f i c u l t i e s faced by other countries. These were increases 
i n teachers' salaries, an increase i n welfare services and an 
increase i n expenditure on books, school supplies and maintenance. 
I t was also stated that i n 1968 teachers' salaries alone 
represented 72 percent of the entire Educational expenditure. 
With regard to the lev e l and type of education, Bahrain 
tends to cover a much wider area than other Middle Eastern 
countries, but spends substantially less of her budget doing so, 
thus pointing to a more e f f i c i e n t usage of her f a c i l i t i e s . For 
instance i n 1966 on General Academic education at secondary l e v e l , 
Bahrain spent 11.5 percent of her educational budget compared with 
17.2 percent by Iraq, 33.4 percent by Jordan and 36.8 percent by 
Kuwait,^ t h i s i n spite of the fact that i n general the Bahrain 
education service i s educating a much higher proportion of the 
school-age population than the Other countries. For instance, i n 
Bahrain i n 1967, 48.8 percent of a l l the e l i g i b l e secondary school 
age group (12+ to 16+) were undergoing some form of secondary 
education, t h i s i s a high percentage when compared with countries 
such as Iraq, 29 percent, Jordan 38 percent, Qatar 20 percent, and 
18 
Saudi Arabia only 5 percent ( a l l figures f o r 1965). 
Naturally, the concern of Education i n Bahrain has been 
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concentrated on quantity not q u a l i t y , i n an attempt to raise the 
general level of education of the people. This i s a phenomenon 
shared by almost a l l other underdeveloped countries. As Professor 
C.E. Beeby wrote, 
" I t was inevitable that questions of shear 
quantity should be the f i r s t to emerge as 
attention was turned, i n the post-war years 
(by underdeveloped countries), to the 
educational system of developed countries ..... 
and i t was only to be expected that considerations 
of q u a l i t y should play a minor part." 
Successive conferences of UNESCO, during the 1960's called 
for 100 percent p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a l l countries i n primary education 
by 1980 and Bahrain i s taking steps i n order to meet t h i s 
preliminary target. 
With regard to the q u a l i t y of education i n Bahrain, although 
i t may be considered at present to be s l i g h t l y low, the people 
responsible f o r education have pu b l i c l y stated the lines along 
which they visualise education progressing. I n 1961 Mr. Umran 
summarised the main principles behind the philosophy of education 
i n Bahrain as follows ....."Freedom ... Democracy ... Raising the 
standard of l i v i n g ..... Exalting the s p i r i t u a l and moral l i f e ... 
and reinforcing the s p i r i t of both patriotism and Arab Nationalism." 
As to freedom, he said that students should be encouraged to 
think independently and not merely copy the example of others and 
to give the students the opportunity to discuss a l l things and 
choose that which i s good. 
On the subject of democracy he advocated that students should 
par t i c i p a t e i n the organisation and running of t h e i r schools and on 
the subject of Arab Nationalism, he stated that students should be 
taught by deeds, not words, the true nature of Arab Nationalism, and 
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that teachers had a very important part to play i n t h i s . 
Whilst these ideas may be considered to be important to 
the q u a l i t y of education i n Bahrain, the r e a l i t i e s of what 
actually happens w i t h i n the system are very d i f f e r e n t . 
For instance, i t was noted by Warden that around the 
time of these statements many of the high o f f i c i a l s of the 
Education Department: were i n fact sending t h e i r sons to be 
21 
educated at the Sacred Heart Catholic School, which denoted 
t h e i r own lack of f a i t h i n the Bahrain Government system of 
education. Furthermore, f o r many years i t was the standard practice 
22 
to teach Arab history only as f a r as the period of the Crusades 
which hardly met the needs of patriotism and Arab nationalism. As 
recently as 1968 many students and teachers complained at the 
serious lack i n the syllabus of any relevant teachings on local 
history and geography and as Arab nationalism spreads throughout 
the Gulf the demands for national education and the study of 
Arab society becomes more urgently needed. 
I t goes without saying that the q u a l i t y of education depends 
upon the quality of the teachers and i t i s i n t h i s repsect which 
Bahrain tends to suffer. Of the 2,380 teachers i n Bahrain's schools 
i n 1970-71 i t was reported that only 378 held university q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , 
23 
about 15.8 percent. This indicates the need for more professional 
teachers i n the education service as t h i s i 6 the only way i n which 
the qualit y may be raised. 
Another obstacle facing the r a i s i n g of q u a l i t y i n Bahrain 
education i s the lack of suitable school buildings. Even to the 
present day i t i s the policy of the Education Directorate to rent 
houses, especially i n the towns, and convert them to school use. 
These houses lack the essential f a c i l i t i e s for education, such as 
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classrooms, laboratories and playgrounds and overcrowding i s a 
very serious problem. Al=Hamer found from the teacher questionnaires 
that amongst the pressing problems which the teachers had to face 
the most serious was that of suitable school buildings. 
Nahhas and Katul reported that on t h e i r v i s i t to Umm 
Al-Hassam School (a rented school) " i t s classes are over-
crowded with students i n a way that must r e f l e c t on t h e i r a b i l i t y 
..24 
and health. 
This problem s t i l l persists. I n 1971, 57 of the t o t a l of 
111 schools on the island were of the "rented house" type. 
A further obstacle to education i n Bahrain i s the lack of 
any suitable t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s f o r the c h i l d p r i o r to the age 
of 6 years. This combined with the probable i l l i t e r a c y of the 
home background means that the c h i l d s t a r t i n g school i s completely 
ignorant of any learning and time i s wasted i n the early years 
r e c t i f y i n g t h i s problem. Al-Hamer found that 47.2 percent of 
the boys' fathers and 15 percent of the g i r l s ' fathers were 
i l l i t e r a t e . The fact that the percentage f o r g i r l s ' fathers was 
less than that of the boys' indicate that education for g i r l s i n 
Bahrain s t i l l depends to a large extent on the education and 
enlightenment of the g i r l s ' parents and that i n the main g i r l s 
whose fathers have received some education themselves are more 
l i k e l y to be allowed to attend school. 
So far there i s no law i n Bahrain which enforces compulsory 
school attendance although the public has recognised that i n order 
for t h e i r sons and daughters to gain employment education i s 
essential and therefore the percentage attendance of the t o t a l 
school age population i s s t i l l r i s i n g and i n 1971 stood at 73 
percent. 
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Even i f a c h i l d has obtained an education the prospects 
of employment a f t e r leaving school are becoming increasingly 
slim, as i n the past the Government and non-Government employees 
have been content to r e l y on expatriates and have not seriously 
pressed for adequate t r a i n i n g f o r the Bahrainis. Mr,A1-Hamer: 
i n 1968 observed that i n his experience many students were 
21 
facing great d i f f i c u l t y i n obtaining employment. 
There are two probable reasons for t h i s state of a f f a i r s , 
the obvious one being the scarcity of suitable jobs i n the island, 
especially f o r those q u a l i f i e d only i n general academic subjects,; 
and whose educational standard i s s t i l l comparatively low. The 
other i s the fact that many of the Government Departments, a l l 
banks and many business establishments use English as the i r 
business language. Meanwhile most teaching i n the Bahrain schools 
i s dominated by the Arabic language. 
The choice of the Government i n the l a t t e r case i s either 
to follow the lead of neighbouring Arab countries and pass laws 
making Arabic the o f f i c i a l language or to concentrate on teaching 
more English language i n the schools. The Government has not up 
to the present time faced up to t h i s dilemma and appears undecided 
on which course to adopt although the making of Arabic the o f f i c i a l 
language appears to be the most sensible as the Bahrainis would 
then be working i n t h e i r native tongue and the expense of importing 
even more teachers to teach the English language would be saved. 
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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
a) Some Aspects of the Social Change 
I n any given society social change i s a continuous process, 
the degree and speed of which i s dependent upon a number of 
factors which could exert t h e i r influence on that society. 
I n the case of Bahrain;these factors were c h i e f l y the 
modernisation of the administration immediately following the 
F i r s t World War,''" and the income from o i l revenues which followed 
and made possible the expansion of the administrative and social 
services. 
We propose to examine the social change i n Bahrain both 
from the point of view of the development of a socio-economic class 
structure and the changes which have occurred i n the rol e of the 
family and the changing status of the female i n Bahrain society. 
In order to do t h i s we must also consider the change which 
took place to transform Bahrain from a r u r a l to an urbanised society. 
I t should be borne i n mind that changes did not occur 
simultaneously i n a l l f i e l d s , nor once a change became apparent could 
i t be guaranteed that i t would proceed at a steady r a t e , as the changes 
had d i f f e r e n t effects on the various parts of the community, certain 
parts of the community may welcome a change which may be f i e r c e l y 
resented by another part which feels i t s interests to be threatened. 
Others resisted change for merely conservative reasons i n that they 
saw no good reason to change the status quo. 
Some parts of the community have not undergone any great 
change as they have not come into d i r e c t contact with the forces of 
the social changes, although today the number of such people i s 
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fewer. 
The degree of change however varies between towns and 
v i l l a g e s , r i c h and poor and even educated and uneducated withi n 
a family, and each have t h e i r own problems. 
The degree of contrast can often be great, as for instance 
as recently as 1960, i t was noticed that whilst there were many 
banks and monetary exchanges i n the towns, certain v i l l a g e s had 
s t i l l not yet adopted a monetary system but carried out a l l t h e i r transactions 
o 
by the bartering system with i t i n e r a n t pedlars. 
The 1920's saw the s t a r t of the dramatic changes i n Bahrain 
when fo r the f i r s t time the society f e l t the f u l l impact of B r i t i s h 
influence i n t h e i r domestic a f f a i r s , which was l a t e r termed the 
"Reforms" i n Bahrain; The B r i t i s h influence had several dir e c t 
results such as the Pearling Reforms, the establishment of a 
regular police force for the maintenance of law and order, and the 
3 
setting up of a legal system with regular courts. Many other 
reforms such as those on slavery and public health a f f a i r s were due 
to the enthusiasm of the various P o l i t i c a l Agents. The impact of 
these laws and reforms made i t s e l f f e l t even i n family l i f e where 
the result was a change i n the legal status of the woman. 
The discovery and development of o i l during the 1930's 
provided a shot i n the arm for more speedy social changes, more 
money and regular employment became available. This engendered the 
creation of new socio-economic classes such as the new working 
class of o i l employees and the extended middle classes from the 
developing trade. 
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b) The Growth of the Urbanised Society 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y Bahrain was a v i l l a g e society based on 
agricu l t u r e , pearling, f i s h i n g and other a c t i v i t i e s and there 
i s no doubt that during the period under review that the pattern 
of l i f e has changed dramatically due c h i e f l y to the new economic 
a c t i v i t i e s . Unfortunately, there are no o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s 
available for the numbers inhabiting towns and villages p r i o r 
to the 1941 census, but even from t h i s date up to the present 
day we may observe the trend of the depopulation of the countryside 
and the growth of the towns. The depopulation would possibly 
have been greater had not the o i l company provided transport 
from various d i f f e r e n t centres of population to t h e i r place of 
4 
work. Had t h i s not been done then whole family units or communities 
would have abandoned t h e i r v i l l a g e s and concentrated i n the larger 
centres of population. The same also applies to the provision of 
transport by the government of Bahrain for some of her employees 
and for students. 
Even taking t h i s into consideration there has been a major 
s h i f t i n the centres of population since the Second World War, as 
the job opportunities and q u a l i t y of l i f e i n the v i l l a g e s was very 
much lower than that of the towns and the people naturally gravitated 
towards the l a t t e r . The following table i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s trend 
From table XXVIIlwe can see the trend of the Bahrainis to 
gravitate towards the towns. With the exception of Awali, which i s 
populated by Europeans only, a l l urban centres of population have 
increased. 
In Manama for instance, 30.9% of the t o t a l population resided 
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there i n 1941 and by 1971 the percentage had risen to 41.00%, the 
actual number of inhabitants having increased by 313.5%. 
Muharraq shows the same trend up to 1965, the f a l l i n 
numbers of the 1971 census being c h i e f l y explained by the s h i f t 
i n population due to the creation of Isa Town i n 1968, 
The reason fo r the f a l l i n population of Muharraq and not 
the other towns i s probably due to the rules formulated which 
8 
q u a l i f i e d people for housing the newly-created Isa Town. 
The towns of Muharraq and Jidhafs are usually considered to 
have very close t i e s with the c a p i t a l Manama, both serving as 
dormitory towns for the l a t t e r , Muharraq being only l£ miles away 
across the causeway from Manama and Jidhafs being only 4 miles 
away on the main trunk road to the c i t y and t h i s probably accounts 
for the growth i n t h e i r populations. 
The overall picture shows that i n 1971 75% of the Bahraini 
population are concentrated i n seven towns and of these three of 
them, namely Manama, Muharraq and Jidhafs, contain almost 64% of the 
t o t a l population. The 1971 census shows that there are 65 centres of 
population w i t h i n the islands and therefore the remaining 25% of 
the population are scattered over 58 small v i l l a g e s . 
Although the r u r a l population has increased over the 30 
year period by approximately 37.7% as a percentage of the t o t a l 
population i t has decreased from 43.5% i n 1941 to 25% i n 1971. 
With the vast majority of the population being concentrated 
i n and around the Manama area the conclusion to be drawn i s that 
the job opportunities i n Government service, the o i l industry and 
other trades are much greater than i n the remainder of the island 
and t h i s urbanisation has created the new socio-economic classes. 
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c) The S t r a t i f i c a t i o n of the New Socio-Economic Classes i n Bahrain 
Social classes i n Bahrain have not previously been clearl y 
or r i g i d l y defined on the basis of wealth, although a class 
structure based on lineage or marriage was common. This system had 
i t s roots i n the Ruling Family and t h e i r a l l i e s holding the vast 
majority of the wealth and land of the island by r i g h t of conquest, 
thus creating a peasant nation of the o r i g i n a l inhabitants. 
The hold over the land and wealth of the islands was maintained 
either by force or by marriage between the various t r i b e s a l l i e d to 
the Rulers i n order that i t did not pass from them. The grant of lands 
by the Ruling Family to the chiefs of t h e i r a l l i e d t r i b e s created a 
new land-owning class and these chiefs, having new-found wealth, 
took i n turn the role of pearl merchants. Thus the al-Khalifah and the 
chiefs of t h e i r a l l i e d t r i b e s formed the t r a d i t i o n a l e l i t e of Bahrain 
society. Meanwhile the other members of the tribes were compelled to 
become pearl divers and fishermen i n order to earn a l i v i n g and along 
with the o r i g i n a l peasants formed the lowest strata of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
Bahrain society. 
The r e a l i t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n were not consciously realised 
as even the lowest classes f e l t kinship v e r t i c a l l y through the 
existing family t i e s reaching r i g h t up to the Ruling Class, rather 
than w i t h his fellow-workers. The bonds of the various sects of 
r e l i g i o n also provided a means of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n the structure. 
The only people outside t h i s system was the class of large 
merchants. The bulk of t h i s class was, at the turn of the 
century, of either Persian or Indian o r i g i n with only a very small 
number of Bahrainis, as t h i s occupation was looked down upon by the 
Ruling Family and t h e i r friends. Many Bahrainis were, however, 
merchants i n a small way as either shopkeepers or sub-agents fo r the 
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Persians and Indians and could not conceivably be included i n the 
overall term "merchant class", but rather should be c l a s s i f i e d w i t h 
the mass of the ordinary people. 
We may summarise by saying that i n the early part of the 
twentieth century there were i n terms of socio-economic classes i n 
Bahrain two main groups, the e l i t e , comprising the Ruling Family, 
the landowners, pearl merchants and large merchants, and the 
vast majority of the p o l i t i c a l l y unconscious masses. 
This l a t t e r group, u n t i l the reforms of the 1920's began to 
make themselves f e l t , had been continually subjected to various forms of 
tyranny either i n t h e i r employment, such as the abuses suffered 
by the pearl divers and the farmers, or i n t h e i r r e l i g i o n as 
i s instanced by the discrimination practiced against the Shia.^ 
The l a t t e r was i n fact more consciously f e l t and was more apparent 
than the other abuses. 
At t h i s time, p o l i t i c a l l y speaking, the Shaikh, his family 
and close associates, with the moral support of t h e i r tribes were 
the supreme rulers of the island and i t s inhabitants and even the 
wealthy merchant class did not attempt to make th e i r p o l i t i c a l views 
known for fear of repercussions. Indeed, some of the wealthy 
merchants and pearl merchants took B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s h i p ^ even 
though they were Bahraini by b i r t h , to escape the s t r i c t u r e s of the 
Ruling Class and enjoy B r i t i s h protection. 
The s i t u a t i o n with regard to the creation of new socio-economic 
classes began to l i q u i d i s e following the reforms of the 1920*s and 
the discovery and exploitation of o i l during the 1930's. 
The establishment of a more modern system of maintaining law 
and order and the modernisation and reforms w i t h i n the administration 
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brought about r e s t r i c t i o n s i n the powers of the Ruling Family 
and thus created a more relaxed p o l i t i c a l atmosphere and 
encouraged more people to enter into various businesses and 
started the formation of new socio-economic groups. 
The reforms also brought about a re-alignment of the 
power structure w i t h i n the island i n that the Al-Khalifah abandoned 
many of t h e i r old associates from the former hierarchy and i n 
order to maintain t h e i r power and influence i d e n t i f i e d themselves 
closely with the growing influence of the B r i t i s h w i t h i n the 
island group. 
These moves were made easier for the Al-Khalifah by the 
collapse of the pearling industry a f t e r which the pearl merchants 
were no longer a p o l i t i c a l or economic force to be reckoned with 
and could therefore be abandoned.^ Thus the e l i t e of the 
Al-Khalifah family and the landowners who had survived the collapse 
of pearling became the new upper class w i t h i n the island and were 
the main beneficiaries of the transfer of t h e i r allegiance to the 
B r i t i s h . Many of them became even richer as o i l revenues began 
to be paid and land values rose with the needs of the o i l company. 
The status of the wealthy merchant class did not undergo 
any great change but with the greater demands for goods following 
the discovery of o i l more Bahrainis began to take an interest 
i n the development of merchant trading businesses. The number of 
Bahrainis i n t h i s type of business grew as various p o l i t i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s 
were placed upon foreign national groups, especially the Persians, 
a fact which made i t much easier f o r the Bahrainis to establish 
themselves i n t h i s sphere of economic a c t i v i t y and eventually to 
supercede both the Indians and Persians as the major force i n the 
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12 mercantile business. 
This group of Bahraini nationals formed the core of 
emerging middle class of the island. 
The needs of the new administration created a new lower 
middle class as more salaried employees were recruited to f i l l 
the role of administrators. 
P o l i t i c a l l y , the wealthiest merchants and the top 
administrators formed bonds of common interest and gained a 
certain amount of p o l i t i c a l power although i t was usually used 
only for t h e i r own benefit. The remainder of the middle class 
did not manage to gain similar powers and t h i s created feelings 
of f r u s t r a t i o n at t h e i r impotence w i t h i n the society. 
Many of the new Bahraini businessmen were persons who had 
had previous contact with the Europeans working i n the Administration 
or for the o i l company£3 (either i n Bahrain or on the mainland) 
and had an appreciation of the new needs f o r certain types of 
commodities. 
Many of them u t i l i s e d the s k i l l s they had learnt with the 
o i l company to establish themselves i n the service industries 
whilst others successfully forecast the increased demands for certain 
types of consumer goods which were not usually a requirement of 
t r a d i t i o n a l l i f e i n Bahrain. 
To a certain degree the emergence of the new middle class 
could be a t t r i b u t e d to a deliberate policy of the o i l company i n 
Bahrain. I n 1948, Mr. Leigh White interviewing Mr. Thornberg 
states that the l a t t e r advocated the enlargement of the middle 
class i n Bahrain i n order to create a s t a b i l i s i n g p o l i t i c a l force 
14 
i n the island. This was to be achieved by the involvement of 
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local capital i n the subcontracting of work for o i l company 
projects and requirements. 
This view became r e a l i t y when the o i l company began 
i n the 1950?s to contract out some of t h e i r projects to local 
contractors and to purchase some of t h e i r requirements through 
15 
local merchants. 
Within the middle class a new group has emerged wi t h i n 
the l a s t decade or so. These are professional people such as 
doctors, lawyers, engineers, j o u r n a l i s t s , etc., who are the 
r e s u l t of the improved educational system and who provide 
a l i b e r a l influence w i t h i n the middle class. 
Bearing i n mind the d i f f i c u l t i e s of defining accurately 
the composition of the middle class and the lack of figures 
available for occupations and incomes we can draw r e l a t i v e picture 
of the numbers comprising the middle class of Bahrain. 
TABLE XXix 
Approximate Numbers of Urban Middle Class 
i n B a h r a i n ^ 
Occupation 1959 1965 1971 
Administration & Clerks 7 4830 6599 11199 
Wholesale Trades 504 1466 327 
Retail Trades 4262 5920 6339 
Total 9596 13985 17865 
29.6 % of economically active 0 r t , 0, o c , . ' 20.4 26.25 population 
Despite the apparently large size of the Bahrain middle class^ 
they wield very l i t t l e economic power as i n the main they tend either 
to be salaried people who, although they enjoy a reasonable income, 
have " l i m i t e d " earning power or small shopkeepers ( r e t a i l e r s ) who 
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i n theory have "unlimited" earning potential but who i n actual 
fact are controlled by both the wholesalers and prevailing economic 
conditions. 
These two groups may be c l a s s i f i e d as the lower middle class 
or petty bourgeoisie. The l a t t e r group have grown steadily over 
the years as we may see from the above table, the number of 
commercial establishments i n Manama alone having grown from 3326 
19 
i n 1952 to 4000 i n 1962 and to 5348 by 1969. 
The wholesale merchants, property owners and developers, 
and contractors who make up the upper middle class can be said 
to be t y p i c a l of the Arab "bourgeoise" as they d i f f e r from t h e i r 
Western counterparts i n a number of ways. 
The most noteworthy point i n t h i s respect i s the lack of 
. 20 
Western-style management and entrepreneurship, they s t i l l r e l y 
on imported goods for t h e i r businesses or engage i n only the most 
stable and riskless types of deals such as land and housing.21 
They are investors rather than entrepreneurs, placing t h e i r money 
with large foreign companies operating i n Bahrain who give an 
assured dividend or simply banking i t . The merchants, however, 
have done well for themselves by manipulating the "agent system" 
of imports and c o n t r o l l i n g the flow of goods to the r e t a i l o u t l e t s . 
The manipulation of the "agent system" by the larger Bahraini 
and foreign merchants, w i t h the backing of the Administration, 
created tensions between the various groups of merchants. The 
granting of import licences and the setting up of agencies was 
r i g i d l y controlled by the Government for the benefit of the big 
merchants and any newcomer wishing to break into a particular 
f i e l d faced a monopoly s i t u a t i o n which was almost impossible to break. 
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This si t u a t i o n f e l l harder on the newly emerging group of Bahraini 
national merchants. The discontent expressed by the smaller Bahraini 
merchants was directed mainly against the foreigners, but the 
larger Bahraini merchants, f e e l i n g t h e i r own position threatened 
were moved to grant some minor concessions to the smaller 
merchants i n an attempt to quiet the discontent. As a d i r e c t r e s u l t 
of t h i s discontent the "Bahraini Merchants' Association" was 
founded i n 1939 i n order to give a platform f o r t h e i r complaints 
and to protect t h e i r interests. As we have seen e a r l i e r t h i s 
association l a t e r became the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. 
Other l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by the Government were to 
exclude imports from countries who i n the Government's view were 
p o l i t i c a l l y unacceptable, even though the goods were cheaper. 
Bans were imposed during the 1930's on goods from Japan and Germany 
22 
which have since been removed. At the present time r e s t r i c t i o n s 
are i n operation against goods from the U.S.S.R. and up .to 1963 t h i s 
also applied to the Peoples Republic of China. 
With the exception of the largest merchants, the middle 
class as a whole did not possess any p o l i t i c a l or economic power, 
th i s being concentrated i n the hands of a few of the wealthy 
merchants. The economic power of these merchants before o i l became 
the main source of revenue^was considerable^as they were the payers 
of customs duties on which the Ruling Family depended f o r t h e i r 
income, but as the revenues began to flow i n from the o i l t h e i r 
powers of influence faded accordingly. 
Some of them, however, formed close l i n k s with the B r i t i s h 
and the top administrators and thus retained a certain p o l i t i c a l 
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influence. Meanwhile the bulk of the merchants and the 
salaried people forming the remainder of the middle class were 
frustrated i n t h e i r ambitions for the advancement of t h e i r 
careers^ and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l aspirations. 
The lack of i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l contacts by t h i s sector 
created discontent against the top administration and the foreign 
influences. This discontent was to a large extent j u s t i f i e d 
for as recently as 1969 of a t o t a l of 32 departmental heads 
w i t h i n the Administration, 16 were relatives of the Sheikh, 
24 
8 were B r i t i s h and only the remaining 8 were Common Bahrainis. 
However, the Bahrain middle class as a whole continues 
to expand and w i l l gain more influence i n the future i f the regime 
f u l f i l s i t s promises and develops a system of representative 
25 
Parliamentary Government along the lines of that of Kuwait, 
something which the i n t e l l e c t u a l s have demanded for a number of 
years. 
The other socio-economic class engendered by the changes 
was the new working class i n i t s wider sense. The economic change 
i n the society was the main factor i n i t s creation which 
transformed the people of Bahrain from the drudges of the p r e - o i l 
era, when they worked as peasants, fishermen or pearl divers, 
receiving t h e i r wages i n shares or kind, in— t o regular wages earners 
working for the o i l company, the Government and other industries 
which sprang up and i t i s understandable that they los t no time i n 
changing t h e i r former occupations to the newer and more'lucrative 
forms of employment 
The f i r s t r esult of the new system of work was the bringing 
together of the previously disputing sections of the community, 
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namely the Shia and the Sunni. Naturally changes did not occur 
overnight and at f i r s t the workers who were obliged to l i v e near 
th e i r work used to gather on a v i l l a g e , kinship or sectarian 
basis. Gradually 9 however, the r e a l i s a t i o n occurred to them that 
they were a l l employees on an equal basis of the "Al-Sharikh" or 
Company and a sense of camaraderie developed. The Sunni elements, 
descended from semi-tribes, learnt to accept orders from the Shia 
who had previously been regarded as very i n f e r i o r , furthermore 
they learnt to accept manual work as a means of earning a l i v i n g , ^ 
again something which had been regarded i n the past as degrading. 
The change, however, has been gradual and s t i l l continues and 
as yet there i s s t i l l no clear-cut/consciousness. I n d u s t r i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l disturbances have not been a struggle to catch up 
on the standard of l i v i n g of t h e i r more fortunate compatriots but 
have instead been directed against the foreign elements i n the 
island. Examples of the lack of class consciousness occurred i n 
the early 1950's when, as we have seen, the workers of Bahrain 
attempted to create Trade Unions under the auspices of the middle 
class, and provisions were made under t h e i r proposed organisation 
of the Bahrain labour Federation for Government employees and 
free-lance workers to hold seats on the council. Following the 
strikes of the l a t e 1960's a Founding Committee was formed which 
i n 1971 placed certain demands for the creation of a Federation 
of employees, which was to have again included Government 
employees and freelance workers such as doctors, lawyers and 
small merchants.27 
I t i s obvious that the interests of some groups of the 
council could be i n dir e c t c o n f l i c t with those of the workers but 
th e i r inclusion shows that the workers of Bahrain continue to think 
on national rather than class l i n e s . 
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From the foregoing we may conclude that whilst a working 
class exists as one of the socio-economic groups i n Bahrain and 
i t has a distinguished record i n i t s various attempts to obtain 
i t s r i g h t s 9 a working class consciousness has s t i l l not yet 
developed. 
The l o y a l t y of the workers however manages to supercede 
the class b a r r i e r s , as they f e e l that not only do they have common 
cause with t h e i r fellow workers i n the horizontal sense but also 
that they express t h e i r l o y a l t y v e r t i c a l l y through the usual 
class barriers on a t r i b a l or sectarian basis. 
This may be i n part due to the t r a d i t i o n a l pattern of 
family or reli g i o u s l i f e , which usually included a degree of 
nepotism, and p a r t l y to a sense of a lack of security, not yet 
having found t h e i r place w i t h i n the new pattern of l i f e of the 
island, as to date there are no recognised organisations to 
protect t h e i r interests". ^ 8 
An interesting development took place when a National 
Guard was created i n 1968 which gave r i s e to a m i l i t a r y clique, which, 
i n l i n e with occurrences i n other Arab countries, has wi t h i n a 
short time attempted to influence the course of p o l i t i c a l events £9 
This group, although i t i s now contained and controlled 
by members of the Ruling Family, consists mainly of loyal subjects 
but as expansion takes place i t may present a potential source of 
p o l i t i c a l power once more. 
d) The Changes Within the Family and Woman's Status 
The status of the fogiily and that of women has also been 
affected by the modernisation and the economic changes which have 
taken place. The degree of change has not been the same throughout 
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the spectrum of the various socio-economic groups or through 
the t r a d i t i o n a l status. 
To the e l i t e of the Ruling Family, t h e i r social 
expectations and reactions have hardly changed. Bent, describing 
the behaviour of the young sheikhs at the Majlis wrote, "The 
gay young Shaikh Mohammed, on ordinary occasions as f u l l of fun 
as an English schoolboy, sat there i n great solemnity incapable 
30 
of a smile." This s i t u a t i o n s t i l l prevails, the scene at the 
Majlis being very similar to that described by Bent at the turn 
of the century. The younger members of the family are s t i l l expected 
to behave i n a d i g n i f i e d and decorous manner at any time whilst 
i n the public eye. 
The old t i e s with the Shaikh's a l l i e d t ribes are s t i l l 
maintained today f o r social purposes, even though p o l i t i c a l l y 
they are no longer necessary. On t h i s matter Belgrave wrote, 
"Sometimes I used to see some d i g n i f i e d but shabbily 
dressed old Arab, followed by two or three t a l l sons, 
looking somewhat d i f f e r e n t to the town Arabs, being 
received with marked respect by a Khalifah Sheikh. 
When I asked the Sheikh who the v i s i t o r was he would 
say, 'That i s Shaikh of the t r j h e . 
His ancestors helped us to conquer Bahrain" 1. 31 
This i s a t y p i c a l reaction of the Ruling Family which has 
not changed over the years. 
With regard to the families of other groups, however, some 
changes have taken place. With the new economic si t u a t i o n created 
by the o i l industry, the old t i e s of "extended family" and t r i b e 
have tended to become looser and t i e s are becoming more r e s t r i c t e d 
i n that they are now changing to an "immediate family" basis. 
The old order has changed i n that nowadays i t i s not unusual for 
one of the sons to be wc~^ the major economic influence w i t h i n the 
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family and with the son being f i n a n c i a l l y independents the father 
i s no longer looked upon by the rest of the family as the source 
of power w i t h i n the family. Thus the influences of the new 
economic s i t u a t i o n have made i t necessary for the older generation 
to accept, either v o l u n t a r i l y or i n v o l u n t a r i l y , the new ideas and 
practices and a much-reduced rol e i n the everyday l i f e of the family. 
The middle class has suffered from much the same problems 
as the former group but has been even more changed by the adoption by 
th e i r offspring of an even more westernised culture. 
Publicly the e l i t e of Bahrain society s t i l l maintain t h e i r 
t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e by pa r t i c i p a t i n g i n the c u l t u r a l l i f e of the island, 
patronising the arts and supporting the old social and moral values 
but t h e i r new-found wealth has raised them so far above the mass of 
the people, both i n social prestige and pr i v i l e g e that they now 
priv a t e l y anjoy every luxury they may care to indulge. This fact 
has not passed without notice by the Bahrain people and i t has 
engendered a great amount of discontant and t h e i r privileges and 
mode of l i f e are being queried, especially by the younger generation. 
The r o l e of the woman i n Bahrain society before the economic 
changes made th e i r effects f e l t , was i n the main r e s t r i c t e d to the 
home. The only work undertaken by them outside of the home was 
usually for the wives of fishermen to clean and s e l l f i s h or for 
the wives of the peasants to help t h e i r husbands i n the f i e l d s and 
to s e l l the produce. 3 3 The wives of the males of other sections of 
the community were usually r e s t r i c t e d to running t h e i r households 
and r a i s i n g children. • I n general they were veiled, 3^ and t h e i r 
freedom of movement was r e s t r i c t e d i n what was, and s t i l l to some 
extent i s , a male-dominated society. The attitudes towards women 
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di f f e r e d s l i g h t l y w i t h i n the groups of the community. For 
instance, some tribesmen f e l t themselves at l i b e r t y to k i l l 
any female member of his family on even the suspicion of any 
offence against t h e i r moral laws .35 
However, these r i g i d attitudes have started to y i e l d . The 
new order brought with i t a new freedom f o r the women although 
i t was a freedom without s u f f i c i e n t safeguards. Slaves could be 
set free by applying to the P o l i t i c a l Agent, but once set free 
there was no employment or aftercare and many turned to p r o s t i t u t i o n 
During the Second World War, although i t was i l l e g a l , brothel 
areas were set up, a thing which was previously unknown. With 
the changing order there was nothing to stop any woman turning 
to p r o s t i t u t i o n i f she set her mind to i t as the old moral order 
was collapsing. Usually the only constraint was that i f one of 
her neighbours complained, she would be moved by the police into 
the brothel area. The administration merely turned a bli n d eye to 
the existence of t h i s area apart from the occasional "clean-up". 
The emancipation of women was brought about by the 
expansion of education, although i t s effects were more apparent 
amongst the townspeople rather than the v i l l a g e r s , and even i n the 
towns i t was i n i t i a l l y confined to the more well-to-do. 
The women i n the poorer classes and i n the v i l l a g e s were 
s t i l l i n the main, veiled and confined to t h e i r houses or v i l l a g e s . 
As recently as 1960 one observer commented that the v i l l a g e women 
were hardly evet^ allowed to go on t h e i r own outside the confines of 
the v i l l a g e or to marry outside the v i l l a g e . 
The educated townswomen, however, won a certain degree of 
emancipation when they began to become teachers i n the g i r l s ' schools? 
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Up to 1955 there was not a single organisation i n Bahrain 
for women to meet soc i a l l y or for them to play any role i n 
community a f f a i r s - I n that year, however, an association was 
set up which was called "Bahrain Women's Awakening" (Nahdhet 
Fatat al-Bahrain). I t was composed i n i t i a l l y of women from the 
e l i t e families who provided some forms of limited social services 
for the poorer families on a voluntary basis. 
Five years l a t e r another association was set up by a group 
of middle class women who played a more active r o l e i n community 
a f f a i r s by providing nursery school f a c i l i t i e s . This organisation 
was the "Care of Child and Motherhood" group (Riaut al-Tofola 
Walmomah). 
Two other groups opened up i n 1970. These were the Awal 
Association and the EifJaa. Women's Association. 
I n recent years Bahraini women have started to take 
employment i n other f i e l d s than teaching, such as working i n banks 
and o f f i c e s , i n the Government service, the o i l industry, i n hotels 
and more recently i n the police service, the l a t t e r being a great 
advance, as Bahrain i s only the second state i n the Arab world to 
employ women i n t h i s capacity. 
Despite these recent advancements the women of Bahrain s t i l l 
suffer both l e g a l l y and socially from male domination as t h e i r c i v i l 
r i g h t s are s t i l l conducted on the "Shariya" or "Urof" l i n e s , which are 
the old systems of unwritten laws. Socially, even the younger of her 
brothers has a greater say i n family a f f a i r s than she has, and there 
are s t i l l many petty r e s t r i c t i o n s placed upon her private and public 
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l i f e . Women do not enjoy equal pay with men and even i f they 
do earn wages high enough to be f i n a n c i a l l y independents, i n 
the present climate of Bahrain i t i s s t i l l unthinkable that they 
should be soc i a l l y independent. 
The status of Bahraini women s t i l l needs to be fought f o r , 
and the more educated of the women are coming to realis e that 
they have a valuable r o l e to play i n society, domestically, 
so c i a l l y and economically, but that they w i l l not achieve the 
freedom to play out t h i s role u n t i l the old order i s changed and 
they are given greater freedom w i t h i n the community. 
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FOOTNOTES 
l o This w i l l be argued i n more d e t a i l i n the p o l i t i c a l part of 
the work. 
2. Hansen,, H.H., op.cit. a p.61. She reported that i n the 
v i l l a g e of Sar, v i l l a g e r s exchanged eggs and chickens for 
sweets and shampoos with pedlars, and I b i d p.103. She 
reported that the l o c a l teacher i n the nearby v i l l a g e s t i l 
used a donkey as transport to and from the school. 
3. These were set up by the Bahrain Order i n Council which was 
i n i t i a l l y to deal with foreign nations and Bahrainis who were 
i n dispute with them. I t made i t s effects f e l t on the 
community however, which w i l l be discussed i n the p o l i t i c a l 
part of t h i s work, 
4. Hay, Sir Rupert, "The Impact of the O i l Industry on the Persian 
Gulf Shaykhdoms" - The Middle East Journal, Vol. IX - Autumn 
1955, p.364. (This step was taken i n the early years of the 
1950's a f t e r the f a i l u r e of the company to provide suitable 
l i v i n g quarters.) 
5. The figures for Manama and Muharraq include those l i v i n g i n the 
suburbs. 
6. Up to 1959 the population of Hedd was included with that of 
Muharraq. 
7. Up to 1959 Rifaa and Jidhafs were c l a s s i f i e d as Rural Areas. 
8. "Isa Town i s a newly created town situated 6 miles south of 
Manama. I t was o f f i c i a l l y opened i n Nov. 1968 and has been 
designed to eventually accommodate 35,000 people. The rules 
for obtaining a house there are that a Bahraini should be able 
to prove that a l l of his family had been Bahrain subjects f o r 
at least 2 generations' As Muharraq i s inhabited by the oldest 
Arab families i t i s possible that they took p r i o r i t y under t h i s 
system. Govt, of Bahrain pamphlet on Isa Town, undated. 
9. Al-Baker o p . c i t . , p.31, stated that a slave belonging to a 
Sheikh i n Bahrain would stand over a Shia shopkeeper and say, 
"My st i c k wants so-and-so", and i f the shopkeeper did not 
quickly oblige he was promptly beaten with the said s t i c k and 
the goods taken by force, 
10, The "New Society" Magazine No. 29, dated 1st Nov. 1970, 
and No. 33, dated 7th Dec. 1970. Bahrain. 
11. Belgrave, CD., op . c i t . , p.127. 
12. e.g., Yousef bin Ahmed Kanoo, Yousef bin Abul Rahman Fakroo, 
Mohammed A l i Al-Zayani, whose businesses, now run by th e i r 
descendants, are the largest i n the islands. 
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13» Thornburg, M,, op. c i t . , p.117, mentions a certain Abdullah 
who received some t r a i n i n g from the o i l company and subsequently 
opened his own business which quickly flourished. Also 
Belgrave, CD., p.127, mentions a certain Mohammed who worked 
for him as a kitchen boy before opening his own business which 
has since expanded to be the largest hotel i n Bahrain. 
Some writers such as Meyer, A.J., Middle Eaat-Cajaitfllism,, 
Harvard U.P., 1959, p.43, suggests that the Shia i n Bahrain 
possessed more cap i t a l than the Sunni and therefore opened 
up more businesses. This i n fact was not the case. 
14. White, Leigh - "Allah's O i l " , op.cit. I n fact the extension of the 
middle classes i n o i l producing countries was the theme of some 
American books during the l a t e 1940's. See i n t h i s respect 
Roosevelt, Kermit, "Arabs. O i l and the Hi story" TT,ondnn.. 
Victor Gollanez, 1949. 
15. BAPCO reported that i n 1958 they purchased a r t i c l e s from 211 
local merchants. This f e l l i n 1965 to 150 and i n 1966 and 1967 
to 140, See BAPCO reports f o r the respective years. 
16o Because of the lack of a defined level of income to which a 
poverty level can be related i t i s hard to define the border 
between the lower and middle classes. 
17. The figures for 1959 and 1965 do not include teachers. For 
1971, however, the figures include both teachers and professionals. 
18. Berger, Morroe, "The Middle Class i n the Arab World", Princeton 
Univ. Conference, No. 9, p.5, stated that i n 1947 the urban middle 
class i n Egypt did not exceed 10% of the economically active 
population. 
19. For the 1952 and 1969 figures see "Huna al-Bahrain", no. 217, 
Feb. 1970. For the 1962 fi g u r e see the a r t i c l e by Belgrave, 
James, "The Changing of Social Scene i n Bahrain" - Middle East 
Forum, Vol. 38, No. 7, 1962, 
20. Berger - op.c i t . , p.8, 
21. Many of the business establishments and accommodation i n Bahrain 
are owned by members of the Al-Khalifah family. They do not 
personally deal with l e t t i n g of property but farm them out to 
brokers who often abuse the system i n t h e i r f i x i n g of rents and 
taking of p r o f i t s , 
22. 1.0. - R/15/2/9/23 and 41 - "Japanese Trade A c t i v i t i e s i n the 
Persian Gulf 1934-1939" and "German Trade A c t i v i t i e s i n the 
Persian Gulf 1938=1939". 
23. Cummins, J.W. - "Report of an enquiry op.cit. Part 2, p.4, 
stated that cases w i l l arise i n Bahrain and have already r i s e n , 
when rec r u i t s (to the Bahrain C i v i l Service) from abroad receive 
a higher l e v e l of remuneration than t h e i r equals or superiors i n 
the service. 
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24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
Govt, of Bahrain Annual Report, 1969, pp.137-140. 
I n his address to the nation on the occasion of the ninth 
anniversary of his accession (1970) Shaikh Isa pledged himself 
to create a modern c o n s t i t u t i o n to "regulate the practice of 
auth o r i t i e s " . See "Huna al-Bahrain", No. 227, Dec. 1970. 
A contradiction to t h i s a t t i t u d e i s apparent when we examine 
the a t t i t u d e of the Sunni workmen, especially towards the 
Technical College, i n that they discourage t h e i r sons from 
attending the courses at t h i s school. 
"The Trade Union Movement i n Bahrain" - mimeographed - presented 
to the Founding Congress of the Bahrain National Students -
Damascus, 16-25thFeb., 1972. 
P o l i t i c a l or Trade Union Organizations. 
A premature attempted coup occurred i n 1970. The Govt, suppressed 
the publication of any news of t h i s event. 
Bent, Theodore - "South Arabia", Smith, Elder & Co., 1900, p.40. 
Belgrave, CD,, op.cit. pp. 127-128. 
Some practices adopted by the young of some middle class families 
are giving r i s e for concern i n that drink and drugs are being 
taken and addiction to these i s becoming more widespread. 
J.H.D.B. "Oil and Bahrain", The World Today, Vol. 7, 1951, 
p.82 stated that a loc a l liquor i s made by Bahrainis. 
"The Woman i n Bahrain and the Arabian Gulf", mimeograph presented 
to the Founding Congress of Bahrain National Students Union -
Damascus - Feb. 1972. 
There are two types of v e i l i n Bahrain. I n the town a fixed 
v e i l i s worn whilst v i l l a g e women normally arrange t h e i r v e i l 
only as necessary. See Hansen, H.H., "The Pattern of Women's 
Seclusion and Veiling i n a Shia Village". Folk, Vol. 3, pp.23-42. 
Belgrave, CD., op.citq, p. 101. 
For increasing l i t e r a c y rates of Bahraini women see Table XXVI. 
The number of working women i n Bahrain i s s t i l l very small. I n 
1959 they comprised only 3% of the economically active group. 
This rose to only 4% by 1965 and approx. 5% by 1971. 
The f i r s t two, recruited i n 1970, were university graduates i n 
sociology. "Huna al-Bahrain" No. 229, Feb. 1971. 
P A R T F O U R 
P O L I T I C A L C H A N G E S A O C O N F L I C T S 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In t h i s section we w i l l attempt to observe and evaluate 
the p o l i t i c a l changes and c o n f l i c t s which have taken place i n Bahrain 
since the F i r s t World War. 
In order to f a c i l i t a t e t h i s study we propose to divide the 
years concerned into specific periods. 
The f i r s t of these i s the period 1918 to 1929 which witnessed 
the passing of the old order and the introduction of a form of modern 
governmental system. 
The second i s the period of 1930 to 1939 during which a 
number of important p o l i t i c a l demands were made, and the t h i r d 
i s the years following the Second World War up to the Declaration 
of Independence i n Bahrain i n 1971. 
In order to understand the Bahrain p o l i t i c a l evolution, 
which started a f t e r the F i r s t World War and developed r a p i d l y , 
but not without major setbacks, we must consider the s t i m u l i which 
set i n motion the forces of p o l i t i c a l change. I f we accept broadly 
that the major s t i m u l i of change i n the "Third World" are factors 
such as economic development, education, improvement of communications, 
etc., then each of these forces must produce some form of reaction 
or consequence which i n turn may produce other changes. Thus we 
have a s i t u a t i o n of "input-output and feedback."^0 
The input-output notion i s more f u l l y explained by Zartman 
as "a broadening of integration (or input) i n the p o l i t i c a l system 
through quantative and/or q u a l i t i v e increases i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
and a broadening of al l o c a t i o n (or output) through an attempt 
it 
to seek out and solve problems, or i n other words "to keep the 
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2 p o l i t i c a l system i n harmony with the society and the economy." 
In general the above theoretical argument may be 
accepted as true and reasonable but occasionally local 
conditions throw up obstacles which can handicap the course 
of progress. In the case of Bahrain the input-output seems to 
have worked to a certain extent but was impeded by the handicap 
of local conservatism w i t h i n the society and/or foreign 
intervention, whether obvious or hidden, positive or negative. 
Due to the l a t t e r reason the social groups became 
r i g i d l y attached to a d e f i n i t e economic structure and status and 
thereby developed a c o n f l i c t of p o l i t i c a l ideas. Thus the p o l i t i c a l 
system did not develop i n harmony with the society but yielded 
r e l u c t a n t l y to the increasing demands of the populace? 
To attempt to single out the major s t i m u l i of p o l i t i c a l 
change would be perhaps to oversimplify the s i t u a t i o n , but we 
may safely assume that certain forces may be credited w i t h 
providing the catalyst to i n i t i a t e changes, although, needless 
to say t h e i r effect was not simultaneous and they overlapped to 
a certain extent. 
These forces, we consider to be a) Arab nationalism, 
b) Advances i n Communications, c) Cultural Conflicts and 
d) Foreign interference. 
These elements were often either i n c o n f l i c t with each other 
and/or reinforcing each other to i n i t i a t e p o l i t i c a l change. The 
cause and effect of each of these overlap one another and one 
would be hard put to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between that which caused 
change and that which was changed. 
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a) Arab N a t i o n a l i s m 
Arab N a t i o n a l i s m today may be defi n e d a s a s t a t e of mind 0 
^ t s b a s i c conceptCs however s took i t s form i n the more advanced 
c o u n t r i e s of Egypt, I r a q and S y r i a during the e a r l y y e a r s of the 
t w e n t i e t h century c u l m i n a t i n g i n the demands of the 1920's for 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The concept has of course s i n c e developed 
f u r t h e r but i f we accept t h a t the b a s i s of the concept a t t h a t 
time was the f e e l i n g of Arabs t h a t t h e i r s u b j u r a t i o n of the 
immediate p a s t was unwarrantable and t h a t as soon as they had 
the power to c o n t r o l t h e i r own d e s t i n y they could improve t h e i r 
l o t and take t h e i r r i g h t f u l p l a c e i n the world; we go some way to 
understanding the f o r c e of the movement. 
We can f i n d m a t e r i a l evidence of these f e e l i n g s i n Bahrain 
i n the formation of a L i t e r a r y Club^ i n the e a r l y 1920's to 
study the l i t e r a t u r e being propagated by Arabs abroad. P r i o r to 
t h i s , l i t e r a t u r e and l e a f l e t s p ublished by the v a r i o u s Arab 
s e c r e t s o c i e t i e s i n I s t a n b u l s P a r i s and B e i r u t , were brought 
c l a n d e s t i n e l y to the i s l a n d and c i r c u l a t e d amongst the fore-runners 
of the L i t e r a r y Club. Magazines and papers such a s " S e r k e s " , 
" a l - H i l a l " , "Mukhtataf", " A l j e r i d a h " , "al-Muayyd", " a l - L i w a " , 
"al-Ahram", a l - A h a l i , " a l I s t a k l a l " , " a l - B i l a d " , " a l-Kabas" and 
o t h e r s were to be found i n the L i t e r a r y Club during t h a t p e r i o d . 
At t h a t time Arab N a t i o n a l i s m was not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d and 
did not have s p e c i f i c s u p r a - n a t i o n a l g o a l s , i t was p a t r i o t i c r a t h e r 
than n a t i o n a l i s t i c . We may assume however, t h a t the B s h r a i n i e l i t e , 
i n the absence of d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h the au t h o r s , placed t h e i r own 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on t h e s e aims and a p p l i e d them to t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 
s i t u a t i o n . 
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During t h i s e a r l y period Arab N a t i o n a l i s m and I s l a m i c 
N a t i o n a l i s m were i n t r i c a t e l y i n t e r t w i n e d and the two o f t e n 
c o n f l i c t e d and clouded the t r u e aims of each, A c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
debate occurred i n 1908 between the adherents of the two 
movements i n B a h r a i n , when one of the Arab N a t i o n a l i s t s 
e u l o g i s e d Mustafa Kamel and s t a t e d t h a t more mourners followed 
h i s corpse than followed t h a t of Ahmed b i n Hambel, a g r e a t 
Muslim l e a d e r of the n i n t h century. 
During the debate which took p l a c e over the f o l l o w i n g 
months i t became apparent t h a t a number of the more enlightened 
B a h r a i n i e l i t e were prepared to put a s e c u l a r l e a d e r on the same 
plane as a r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r , a v e r y brave step to take i n those 
days<>^ 
Correspondence between B a h r a i n i s and o t h e r Arabs, both 
a t home and abroad provide us w i t h an o u t l i n e of the c u r r e n t 
views held on Arab N a t i o n a l i s m . 
Shaikh Ibrahim b i n Mohammed a l - K a l i f a h , w r i t i n g to R i h a n i 
i n the e a r l y 1920's s t a t e d , "the most important c o n v e r s a t i o n between 
b r o t h e r s i s how to u p l i f t one's n a t i o n to t h a t of the more advanced 
n a t i o n s and how to draw the a t t e n t i o n of the e l i t e to the demands 
g 
of the time o . . . . " Although "the n a t i o n " i s not c l e a r l y defined 
here, i t seems t h a t the w r i t e r i s r e f e r r i n g to B a h r a i n . 
Another of the B a h r a i n i e l i t e , w r i t i n g to the same person, 
d i s p l a y s another t r a i n of thought when he s a i d , 
" T e l l the West t h a t I ( R i h a n i ) v i s i t e d Egypt, Hejaz, 
Yemen, I r a q , Najd and Bahrain and saw i n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s 
people shake o f f the dust and s t a r t to work, ....... 
people w i l l come to shake hands w i t h you as f r i e n d s but 
not as masters. T e l l them t h a t the Arab people a r e your 
f i r s t t e a c h e r , so do not r e t u r n bad f o r good, be as t h e i r 
a d v i s e r and l i b e r a t o r but not t h e i r dominator."^ 
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Here we f i n d the b a s i c i d e a s of Arab N a t i o n a l i s m i n the 
way i n which he r e f e r r e d to the "Arab people" even though he 
f i r s t r e f e r r e d to i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s . 
b) Advances i n Communications 
Here we apply the term communications i n i t s broadest 
sense to i n c l u d e a l l forms of communications, both m a t e r i a l and 
s o c i a l o As Deutsch r i g h t l y s t a t e d , 
" w i t h i n any geographical s e t t i n g and any population, 
economic, s o c i a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l development 
m o b i l i s e d i n d i v i d u a l s f o r r e l a t i v e l y more i n t e n s i v e 
communicationso We may c a l l t h i s the s o c i a l and 
p o l i t i c a l p u b l i c , the m o b i l i s e d population."1° 
I n the e a r l y 1920's t h e r e was h a r d l y what could be c a l l e d 
a m o b i l i s e d p u b l i c , as communications of a l l forms i n Bahrain 
were s t i l l i n t h e i r i n f a n c y . For i n s t a n c e t h e r e was o n l y one 
simple p r i n t i n g machine i n the i s l a n d which was i n s t a l l e d i n 1915 
and up to 1918 only one car.*^" The p u b l i c a t i o n s of the p r i n t i n g 
p r e s s had a v e r y l i m i t e d c i r c u l a t i o n due to the v e r y high l e v e l 
of i l l i t e r a c y and communications even between the towns and 
v i l l a g e s of the i s l a n d were i n f r e q u e n t and based on word of mouth. 
As education developed and p h y s i c a l communications, such as 
roads, were improved so the numbers of the "m o b i l i s e d p u b l i c " were 
g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d . 
During these e a r l y y e a r s , however, the main form of 
communication w i t h the o u t s i d e world was by the t r a v e l s undertaken 
by the B a h r a i n i merchants, who corresponded w i t h t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s 
i n B a hrain w i t h regard to t h e world p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . These 
l e t t e r s were o f t e n read a t the M a j l i s to communicate the news to 
those who may be i n t e r e s t e d i n such developments. An example of 
these l e t t e r s was t h a t w r i t t e n by Abdulla al-Zayed from I n d i a . 
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The t o p i c s which he came a c r o s s were 9 a) the s i t u a t i o n i n England, 
i n which he attempts to d e s c r i b e and a n a l y s e the background to 
the L l o y d George r e s i g n a t i o n a f f a i r ; b) the s i t u a t i o n i n I n d i a , 
d e s c r i b i n g the new laws and r e g u l a t i o n s proclaimed by the B r i t i s h 
to counter the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l i s t movement. I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s 
he a l s o d i s c u s s e d the c u r r e n t events and s i t u a t i o n s i n both 
12 
I r e l a n d and Egypt. 
Thus i t may be seen t h a t i n i t i a l l y , i n the e a r l y y e a r s of 
the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , ^afe except f o r the educated m i n o r i t y 
(mostly S u n n i ) , communications were i n a p r i m i t i v e s t a t e , but 
t h a t the seeds of f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l awareness were p r e s e n t i n 
the strong c u r i o s i t y of the m i n o r i t y i n the o u t s i d e world. 
c ) C u l t u r a l C o n f l i c t s 
There has always been a c u l t u r a l gap between the two main 
s o c i e i t i e s i n Bahrain, namely the Sunnis and the S h i a s . T h i s 
gap has over the y e a r s generated a great amount of d i s t r u s t 
and to some extent promoted c o n f l i c t s between the two communities. 
The Sunnis T r i b e s looked upon themselves as "pure" Arabs, 
because t h e i r a n c e s t r y was known and e a s i l y t r a c e a b l e w h i l s t 
the S h i a , who formed the a b o r i g i n a l population looked upon the 
Sunnis as "conquering f o r e i g n e r s " . The m i s t r u s t was t h e r e f o r e 
mutual. An eyewitness of the e a r l y 1920's d e s c r i b e d t h e i r 
a n i m o s i t y , 
"A Sayyd, d i s t i n g u i s h e d by h i s green turban passed 
by and a shopkeeper's f r i e n d spat on the ground and 
h i s s e d something. When I asked him what he s a i d he 
r e p l i e d , ' I s a i d t h a t the man was a dog. You ^ 
never can t r u s t those S h i a , they a r e two-faced'". 
The w r i t e r went on to say t h a t i t became evident to him t h a t t h i s 
f e e l i n g was g e n e r a l l y h e l d by the Sunnis and was r e c i p r o c a t e d by 
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the S h i a . T h i s a n i m o s i t y , however, r e s u l t e d from h i s t o r i c a l 
and economical f a c t o r s such as the oppression of the R u l i n g 
F a m i l y and the c o n t r o l by the Sunnis of the i s l a n d ' s economy. 
The m i s t r u s t e v e n t u a l l y i n i t i a t e d p o l i t i c a l demands from 
a l t e r n a t e s e c t i o n s of the community, e i t h e r Shia or Sunni. These 
demands continued to be made over the y e a r s u n t i l such times as 
the c u l t u r a l gap between the two s i d e s had been narrowed by other 
elements. As Deutsch put i t , 
"the channels of c u l t u r e , l i k e those of s o c i e t y , 
c o n s i s t of m a t e r i a l f a c i l i t i e s . L i k e those of 
s o c i e t y they o r i g i n a t e d through p r o c e s s e s of 
h i s t o r y , a r e changed by h i s t o r y , and may be 
destroyed by i t . " * ^ 
I n B ahrain, however, the c u l t u r a l gap has not been e n t i r e l y 
destroyed by h i s t o r y but so f a r i t may be assumed t h a t the gap 
has been bridged as Arab N a t i o n a l i s m spread through the two 
communities. 
d) F o r e i g n I n t e r f e r e n c e . 
I n t e r f e r e n c e i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d i n Bahrain was c a r r i e d 
out mainly by the B r i t i s h , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the F i r s t World War, 
although t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i s to be seen from a much e a r l i e r time. 
T h i s i n t e r f e r e n c e c o n t r i b u t e d to the other elements i n 
e i t h e r a p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e manner to determine the course of 
p o l i t i c a l events i n Bahrain. 
To condlude, we may assume t h a t these four elements sometimes 
c o n f l i c t e d or r e i n f o r c e d each o t h e r , but a t any time they were the 
cause of more p o l i t i c a l demands. Over the y e a r s f o r e i g n i n t e r f e r e n c e 
and c u l t u r a l c o n f l i c t s have g r a d u a l l y faded i n t o the background 
l e a v i n g Arab N a t i o n a l i s m and communications as the d r i v i n g f o r c e s 
behind p o l i t i c a l change i n the i s l a n d . 
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The d i s c o v e r y and e x p l o i t a t i o n of o i l from the 1930 ?s 
onward s amongst other t h i n g s provided a stimulus f o r the 
improvement of communications through education and p r o s p e r i t y . 
I t a l s o i n c r e a s e d the degree of f o r e i g n involvement. These 
f a c t o r s combined to g i v e r i s e to the p o l i t i c a l demands of the 
f u t u r e . 
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C H A P T E R O N E 
THE PASSING OF THE OLD ORDER (1918-1929) ; 
With the end of the F i r s t World War the B r i t i s h 
c o n s o l i d a t e d t h e i r i n f l u e n c e over a l a r g e a r e a of the Arab 
Middle E a s t . T r a d i t i o n a l l y they had a strong foothold i n the 
Gulf Area, e s p e c i a l l y i n Bahrain. From the e a r l y y e a r s of the 
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y the two main i s s u e s which appeared to concern 
the B r i t i s h , a s f a r as the i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n i n Ba h r a i n was 
concerned, were the j u r i s d i c t i o n over f o r e i g n e r s i n the i s l a n d 
and the s t a t u s of the Customs.^ 
With regard to the l a t t e r , the chaos of the Bah r a i n Customs 
was a cons t a n t source of d i s c u s s i o n as e a r l y as the v i s i t of Lord 
Curzon to Bahrain i n 1903. When Curzon mentioned the reforms 
r e q u i r e d to Shaikh I s a he r e p l i e d t h a t i t was a matter concerning 
o n l y h i m s e l f . Curzon was reported to have warned Shaikh I s a t h a t 
2 
the matter could not, and would not, be dropped. 
Since t h a t time, u n t i l r e a l reforms were introduced i n the 
e a r l y 1920's the Bahrain Customs was a f a v o u r i t e t o p i c of the 
3 
l e t t e r s and d i s p a t c h e s of the P o l i t i c a l Agents. 
As to the former, j u r i s d i c t i o n over f o r e i g n e r s , i t came 
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s e a r l y as 1904, when i n September of t h a t 
y e a r , an i n c i d e n t took p l a c e i n v o l v i n g Shaikh A l i , a nephew of 
Shaikh I s a , i n which a German c l e r k i n the employ of Messrs. 
Wonkhaus was beaten up. Another i n c i d e n t i n which two P e r s i a n s were 
i n j u r e d took p l a c e i n November and inv o l v e d the same nephew. 
Mr. Wonkhaus made r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to the German Consul i n 
4 
ByShire f o r compensation and the P e r s i a n s to the Shah. 
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These a c t i o n s alarmed the B r i t i s h both a t home and i n the Gulf 
as they f e l t t h e i r s e c u r i t y a s " p r o t e c t o r s " of the a r e a to be 
threatened by other powers such as the Germans and Persians."* 
Major Percy Cox, who had r e c e n t l y been appointed a s 
B r i t i s h R e s ident, a r r i v e d i n Bahrain empowered to i n v e s t i g a t e 
the a f f a i r s and w i t h a u t h o r i t y to make use of B r i t i s h Naval 
powers i f n e c e s s a r y . A f t e r prolonged n e g o t i a t i o n he took Hamed, 
the h e i r apparent, a s a hostage and d e l i v e r e d an ultimatum on the 
23rd February, 1905, th a t I s a should expel h i s nephew, Shaikh A l i 
b i n Ahmed f o r a period of f i v e y e a r s and t h a t he should pay 
Rs 2000 to the P e r s i a n s as compensation and to p r o h i b i t the use 
p u b l i c l y of "sukhra" or for c e d labour of f o r e i g n e r s and employees 
of Europeans. I s a y i e l d e d to the ultimatum on the 25th February, 
when he r e a l i s e d t h a t Cox was prepared to bombard Manama i f the 
terms of the ultimatum were not f u l f i l l e d . * * 
The ultimatum, however, contained a f o u r t h , and important 
demand: " I am to warn you th a t f u r t h e r r e j e c t i o n of a d v i c e (from 
the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Agent) i n important matters w i l l nfflt be 
t o l e r a t e d . " ^ 
T h i s warning marked the t u r n i n g p o i n t i n B r i t a i n ' s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Bahrain. 
g 
The Customs i s s u e was not r a i s e d p u b l i c l y a t t h i s atage 
but a l l f o r e i g n e r s were brought under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
A f t e r the a f f a i r s of 1905 the r e l a t i o n s between the B r i t i s h 
9 
A u t h o r i t i e s and Shaikh I s a were f a r from normal although both 
t r i e d to make the b e s t of the s i t u a t i o n . The B r i t i s h a p p a r e n t l y 
were s t i l l not s a t i s f i e d w i t h the i n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the 
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i s l a n d . As Lorimer put i t , "they (the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s ) 
were not c r e d i t a b l e to the p r o t e c t i n g B r i t i s h power. 
I n f a c t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Shaikh I s a was a t y p i c a l l y 
t r a d i t i o n a l feudal one. Apart from the Customs, which were 
l e a s e d by I s a f o r h i s own ends, th e r e was no form of "government". 
Law and order was kept by the Amirs of the v a r i o u s towns and 
v i l l a g e s , a s s i s t e d by a small number of t h e i r own bodyguards who 
a l s o a s s i s t e d i n the l e v y i n g of t h e i r own t a x e s . I n a d d i t i o n 
to t h i s the Qadis were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a p p l y i n g the r e l i g i o u s 
law. 
Two o t h e r i n f o r m a l bodies were a l s o i n e x i s t e n c e , 
" M a i l i s a l U r f " , f o r the r e s o l v i n g of d i s p u t e s between merchants, 
and the " S a l f a h " Court f o r a d j u d i c a t i n g on matters concerning 
the p e a r l i n d u s t r y . Members of both of these bodies were s e l e c t e d 
and appointed by the Shaikh. 
With t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s i t was hard f o r any person 
without i n f l u e n c e to o b t a i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y form of j u s t i c e . 
A f t e r 1905 not only f o r e i g n e r s r e s i d i n g i n Bahrain began 
to enjoy the b e n e f i t of B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n , but a l s o the P o l i t i c a l 
Agents "were a u t h o r i s e d to manumit s l a v e s i n s u i t a b l e and 
- . „11 deser v i n g c a s e s . 
The l a t t e r p o i n t d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d mainly the Sunni t r i b e s 
of Bahrain but a p p a r e n t l y Shaikh I s a was prepared to concede t h i s 
p oint so long as the Customs matter, which was r a i s e d c o n s t a n t l y 
12 
i n the pre-war y e a r s , was f o r g o t t e n . 
I n order to r e g u l a r i s e the p o s i t i o n of the P o l i t i c a l Agent 
wi t h regard to j u r i s d i c t i o n over B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s and f o r e i g n e r s 
on the i s l a n d , i t was suggested i n 1908 t h a t an Order i n C o u n c i l 
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should be i s s u e d on the l i n e s of the I n d i a n F o r e i g n J u r i s d i c t i o n 
Act of 1 8 9 0 . 1 3 
I n the course of the ensuing correspondence on the 
s u b j e c t , the thought was expressed t h a t i t would be d e s i r a b l e 
to o b t a i n from the Shaikh a formal request to be r e l i e v e d from 
e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n over f o r e i g n e r s . T h i s r e q u e s t came i n 
J u l y 1909 i n the form of a l e t t e r from Shaikh I s a to the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent i n which I s a s t a t e d , 
" I t i s not hidden from you t h a t I have had c o n s i d e r a b l e 
t r o u b l e i n many c a s e s ( t h a t a r o s e ) i n my t e r r i t o r y i n 
which f o r e i g n e r s were i n v o l v e d . For t h i s r e a s o n I 
wish t h a t I may not be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e i n t h e s e c a s e s , 
and I would be g r a t e f u l to the B r i t i s h Government i f 
they removed t h i s t r o u b l e and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y from me. 
I mean t h a t (the B r i t i s h Government) should e x e r c i s e 
a u t h o r i t y i n a l l c a s e s , and i n c a s e s t h a t occur between 
f o r e i g n e r s and my s u b j e c t s i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t you and 
I should s e t t l e them j o i n t l y . " 
I t i s apparent from t h i s l e t t e r t h a t Shaikh I s a surrendered 
completely h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n over f o r e i g n e r s to the B r i t i s h , but 
i n f a c t I s a l a t e r claimed t h a t t h i s was not what was i n h i s mind 
a t the time as by " f o r e i g n e r s " he claimed t h a t t h i s a p p l i e d only 
to s u b j e c t s of the major recognised powers, not the dependents 
of the p e t t y Arab po t e n t a t e s i n the Gulf Area, some of whom had 
s p e c i a l arrangements w i t h him. T h i s s p e c i f i c p o i n t became the 
s u b j e c t of repeated arguments between I s a and the B r i t i s h . The 
b a s i s of I s a ' s argument was contained i n the Agreement reached 
14 
between h i m s e l f and the B r i t i s h i n 1880. 
As the B r i t i s h Government i n I n d i a pointed out, however, 
t h e r e was no documentary evidence of any such agreement w i t h other 
Shaikhs and t h a t the B r i t i s h were prepared to acknowledge any such 
agreements only i f such evidences were produced and the other 
p a r t i e s were to r e c o g n i s e them.''""' 
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D e s p i t e t h e s e arguments the p r e p a r a t i o n of the Bahrain 
Order i n C o u n c i l was continued and was e v e n t u a l l y published 
16 
i n the London Gazette on 15th Augusts, 1913. Due to n e c e s s a r y 
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Turks over spheres of i n f l u e n c e i n the 
Gulf and l a t e r due to the outbreak of the F i r s t World War, the 
Order was suspended and was not a p p l i e d u n t i l e a r l y 1919. 
Because of i t s f a r - r e a c h i n g e f f e c t s on the i n t e r n a l 
p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n of Bahrain i t i s worthwhile here to quote 
some of i t s p r o v i s i o n s . 
The Order was i n seven p a r t s , w i t h seventy-nine a r t i c l e s 
and a schedule. Besides g i v i n g the P o l i t i c a l Agent j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over a l l f o r e i g n e r s he was a l s o g i v e n the r i g h t to s e l e c t h a l f 
the members of the " M a j l •?g a l - u v f " t and a l s o , i n c o n j u n c t i o n 
w i t h the Shaikh, to apppoint the judges of the " S a l i f a h " c o u r t , 
both being p r i v i l e g e s e x e r c i s e d e x c l u s i v e l y by the Shaikh. The 
Qadis or judges of the r e l i g i o u s c o u r t s , were s t i l l to be appointed 
by the Shaikh but only a f t e r acceptance by the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
The Order a l s o provided f o r the s e t t i n g up of other 
c o u r t s , a C h i e f Court, which was to have a l l the powers of a High 
Court of J u d i c a t u r e ( A r t i c l e 1 4 ) , headed by the P o l i t i c a l Resident 
i n the G u l f a n d a D i s t r i c t Court ( A r t i c l e 35) i n which the 
P o l i t i c a l Agent was deemed to be a D i s t r i c t Judge. 
A t h i r d c o u r t was a l s o i n s t i t u t e d , t h i s was the J o i n t Court 
composed of the P o l i t i c a l Agent and an o f f i c i a l appointed by the 
Shaikh. 
The Order a l s o introduced v a r i o u s r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s , the 
l i k e of which the B a h r a i n i s had never experienced b e f o r e . I t gave 
the P o l i t i c a l Agents tremendous power and meanwhile deprived the 
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t r a d i t i o n a l l o c a l c o u r t s of t h e i r a u t h o r i t y . For i n s t a n c e , 
A r t i c l e 14 s t a t e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the S h a r i a ( R e l i g i o u s 
C o u r t s ) , "the judgment passed by the Qadi cannot be c a r r i e d i n t o 
e f f e c t u n t i l i t i s r a t i f i e d by the P o l i t i c a l Agent, and the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent i s empowered to r e v i s e the f i n d i n g s and sentence." 
T h i s meant t h a t the B r i t i s h not only c o n t r o l l e d the 
J u d i c i a r y w i t h r e s p e c t to c a s e s between B a h r a i n i s and f o r e i g n e r s , 
but a l s o i n t e r f e r e d i n the t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o u s law c o u r t s by 
which the community s e t great s t o r e . 
A r t i c l e 2 1 ( i ) s t a t e d , 
"Where i t i s shown by evidence or oath, to the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the D i s t r i c t Court, t h a t any 
B r i t i s h s u b j e c t has committed, or i s about to 
commit, an o f f e n c e a g a i n s t t h i s order, so as 
to be dangerous to peace and good order, or i s 
endeavouring to excit&enmity between the 
people of Bahrain and H i s Majesty, the c o u r t s 
may p r o h i b i t t h a t person from being w i t h i n the 
l i m i t s of t h i s Order, during any time t h e r e i n 
s p e c i f i e d , not exceeding two y e a r s . " 
Besides these p r o v i s i o n s , which were f e l t to be unacceptable 
by a number of people i n Bahrain, the c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e was r a i s e d , 
who were " f o r e i g n e r s " and who " B a h r a i n i s " ? 
The Order i n A r t i c l e 8 (2) d e f i n e d the f o r e i g n e r s as those 
" w i t h r e s p e c t to whom the Shaikh of B a h r a i n has agreed w i t h His 
Majesty f o r , or consented t o , the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n by 
His Majesty"; a vague phrase, which d i d not d e f i n e who was, or was 
not, s u b j e c t to B r i t i s h r u l e of law. 
As we have a l r e a d y s t a t e d the Bahrain Order i n C o u n c i l d i d 
not come i n t o e f f e c t u n t i l 1919, although Shaikh I s a and h i s 
18 
c o n f i d a n t s were no doubt aware of i t s c o n t e n t s . 
During the war y e a r s the Bahrain Shaikhs were l o y a l and 
h e l p f u l to the B r i t i s h Government, Bahrain hosted His Majesty's 
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f o r c e s f o r a short time d u r i n g 1914 9 Shaikh I s a and h i s sons 
a c t i v e l y helped the B r i t i s h to such an extent t h a t he was 
i n v e s t e d by the B r i t i s h w i t h the C . S . I , i n 1915 and 1919 w i t h 
the K.C.I.E. 
The i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n i n Ba h r a i n appears to have been 
q u i e t during the war y e a r s . 
I n November, 1918 C a p t a i n Norman N.E. Bray a r r i v e d i n 
Bah r a i n to take up the appointment of P o l i t i c a l Agent. The 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of h i s appointment was t h a t he was the f i r s t of a 
number of men who were assigned to t h i s post from the C i v i l 
19 
Commission i n Baghdad. S h o r t l y a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l the Bahrain 
Order i n C o u n c i l was introduced and h i s f i r s t a c t i o n was to 
nominate the members of the " M a j l i s a l - U r f " . T h i s move was, 
however, re s e n t e d by Shaikh I s a who di s m i s s e d one of the 
20 
members appointed by C a p t a i n Bray. When the l a t t e r p r o t e s t e d , 
Shaikh I s a r e l e n t e d under p r e s s u r e , a p p a r e n t l y f o r the time being 
o n l y , f o r when Shaikh I s a r e c e i v e d an i n v i t a t i o n to send h i s 
youngest son to London the opportunity was s e i z e d by him to 
21 
correspond w i t h people i n high o f f i c e t h e r e v i s a v i s the 
s i t u a t i o n i n Bahrain and the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Order i n C o u n c i l . 
Shaikh A b d u l l a embarked f o r h i s v i s i t i n May, 1919 
accompanied by-Captain Bray, who i n h i s r e p o r t summed up the 
p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Bahrain a s , t h e r e being, 
"a c o n s i d e r a b l e f e e l i n g of h o s t i l i t y to o u r s e l v e s 
due to r e l i g i o u s , economical, p e r s o n a l and war 
reasons ..... a l s o t h e r e i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e p a r t y 
h o s t i l e to the Shaikh and consequently to o u r s e l v e s . 
I n c o n t r a s t to t h i s I f i n d no B r i t i s h p a r t y and a 
ge n e r a l l a c k of touch e s p e c i a l l y w i t h those 
h o s t i l e to o u r s e l v e s . " 
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Ca p t a i n Bray goes on to l i s t h i s proposals to remedy 
the s i t u a t i o n and suggested t h a t the P o l i t i c a l Agent should 
hold a f o r t n i g h t l y M a j l i s , t h a t a p r o - B r i t i s h p a r t y be formed 
and encouraged, s c h o o l s , l o c a l i n d u s t r i e s , and so f o r t h 
were to be promoted. 
I n h i s r e p o r t C a p t a i n Bray seems to have overlooked the 
r e a l i s s u e s such a s the row over the Bahrain Order i n C o u n c i l 
and the suppression of the Sh i a community. Although he 
mentioned those who were h o s t i l e to the Shaikh, he d i d 
not a s c r i b e to them the reason f o r t h e i r h o s t i l i t y , t h i s 
being the growing f e e l i n g among the e l i t e t h a t they should have 
the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n r a t h e r than be " r u l e d " by the 
B r i t i s h . 
I n September, 1919, a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l i n B r i t a i n , Shaikh 
23 
A b d u l l a handed a l e t t e r to S i r Arthur H i r t z e l . I n t h i s l e t t e r 
he requested;- 1) That Shaikh I s a should have e q u a l i t y w i t h 
neighbouring Arab r u l e r s i n the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n over a l l 
s u b j e c t s except those of Great B r i t a i n and other g r e a t European 
powers. 2) That Shaikh I s a should be s o l e a d j u d i c a t o r -sssgr whom 
were s u i t a b l e persons to serve i n the M a j l i s a l - U r f and the S a l i f a h . 
3) That B r i t i s h a s s i s t a n c e should be forthcoming to enable him to 
24 
e s t a b l i s h a port a t Zubara on the mainland. 4) That Shaikh I s a 
should have the r i g h t to correspond d i r e c t l y w i t h London should 
n e c e s s i t y a r i s e . 
There was no immediate r e p l y to t h i s l e t t e r . However, on 
the 6th November, 1919 a new P o l i t i c a l Agent a r r i v e d i n Bahr a i n . 
He was Major H.R.P. Dickson, who, l i k e h i s p r e d e c e s s o r , had 
served i n I r a q and had a reasonable knowledge of the Arab language 
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and customso Besides his post as P o l i t i c a l Agent i n Bahrain he 
was also assigned to be the l i a i s o r between the C i v i l Commission 
i n Baghdad and Ibn Saud. Apparently Major Dickson much preferred 
25 
Ibn Saud to Shaikh I s a 9 His opinion of Shaikh Isa was expressed 
i n one of his l e t t e r s as, 
"a very old and weak man, imbued with sincere 
feelings of friendship and regard for His 
Majesty's Government, swayed and confused i n 
his weakness by v i r i l e and astute minds and 
delicate intriSues, dictated for the most part 
by e v i l intentions to himself, to us and to 
both, helped i n t h i s by the characteristics 
of the Arab m e n t a l i t y . " 2 6 
In the same l e t t e r Major Dickson gave an overall picture 
of the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Bahrain. Some of the points noted 
by him weres-
"a) The p o l i t i c a l atmosphere of Bahrain, while 
not i n any way dangerous, i s wholly unsatisfactory, 
b) There i s a strong a n t i - B r i t i s h sentiment which 
i s longstanding and deepseated. c) B r i t i s h 
prestige rests on e n t i r e l y false standards, namely 
on fear and not on respect." 
Dickson went on to c l a s s i f y the opposition to the B r i t i s h 
as those either honest or dishonest and finished by c l a s s i f y i n g 
leading members of the Bahrain community into two l i s t s , a 'black' 
l i s t and a 'white' l i s t , with sub-classifications into either 
Arabs or Persians. 
After a few months i n Bahrain, Dickson decided to force 
the issue of the setting up of the Majlis al-Urf, which had as yet 
27 
not been convened. Shaikh Isa gave as his excuse for not 
doing so, the fact that he was s t i l l waiting for a reply from his 
28 
l e t t e r to London. Later, however, he r e l u c t a n t l y agreed on 
condition that i t would operate only for six months and then the 
29 
s i t u a t i o n would be reviewed. 
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In the course of compiling a reply to Abdulla's l e t t e r 
of the 4th September, 1919 the B r i t i s h Government of India 
considered the views of Captain Bray, Major Dickson, the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident and the C i v i l Commissioner i n Baghdad. Dickson, however, 
refused categorically to allow Shaikh Isa j u r i s d i c t i o n over the 
coastal Arabs on the basis that t h i s "would deprive him of 
30 
important sources of information from the mainland." 
The f i n a l answer to Shaikh Abdulla's l e t t e r came from the 
Government of India on the 5th May, 1920. Shaikh Abdulla was 
informed that with regard to the second point, the procedure 
for the selection of members of the Majlises was c l e a r l y l a i d 
down i n the Bahrain Order i n Council and that i t was not w i t h i n 
t h e i r competence to a l t e r t h i s . 
I n reply to the t h i r d point they stated that the request 
was an old one which had received much consideration and the 
Government of India was unable to accede to t h i s request i n view 
of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved. As to the fourth request i t was 
stated that the p o l i t i c a l relationships of Bahrain were to be 
conducted with the Government of India, and i t was proper that 
Shaikh Isa should conduct his business through them, and that 
the l a t t e r (Government of India) would i f necessary pass any 
correspondence to the Government i n London. 
With regard to the f i r s t , and most important request, 
however, the Government of India agreed that Shaikh Isa could 
exercise j u r i s d i c t i o n over the subjects of other Arab r u l e r s , 
31 
subject to the formal concurrence of those ru l e r s . 
Dickson promptly wrote to Ibn Saud and to Shaikh Abdulla 
bin Jasim al=Thani of Qatar asking them i f they would allow t h e i r 
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subjects to be under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of Isa. Naturally enough, 
both ru l e r s gave a negative answer. Ibn Saud was at that time cws. 
adherent of the B r i t i s h and was well aware of the Bahrain 
int e r n a l s i t u a t i o n and Ibn Tfe&ni, with his longstanding animosity 
32 
for the Al-Khalifah was not prepared to grant t h i s request either, 
Dickson did not consult with Shaikh Isa before sending 
these l e t t e r s and did not consult w i t h other Arab Gulf p r i n c i p a l i t i e s 
such as Kuwait, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi and Muscat. 
After receiving the two replies he published a notice on 
26th November, 1920 stating -
" A l l foreign subjects including Persians and 
subjects of Arab rulers and chiefs other 
than those of Bahrain, were, while i n Bahrain 
e n t i t l e d to B r i t i s h protection." 
The issue of t h i s note was a blow to Shaikh Isa's and 
Abdulla's e f f o r t s to gain j u r i s d i c t i o n over subjects of neighbouring 
countries and was probably the breaking point i n Shaikh Isa's 
relations with the B r i t i s h , at least i n private. 
The most important point, however, was that at that time 
the term "Bahrain subject" was not c l e a r l y defined and Major 
Dickson was i n a position to place persons who sought his aid 
under B r i t i s h protection. 
These actions brought vigorous opposition from Shaikh Isa, 
his supporters and other Arab t r i b e s , even the petty Shaikhs outside 
the towns f e l t t h i s to be a d i r e c t challenge to th e i r t r a d i t i o n a l 
powers. To the Bahrain public at large, Dickson's actions, 
especially with regard to the placing of some women under B r i t i s h 
protections, was completely unacceptable. 
One incident, involving a g i r l of the Dawasir t r i b e , who were 
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powerful and prosperous pearl merchants of Budayya, was 
33 regarded by them as humiliating and h u r t f u l to th e i r pride-
The opposition during the approximately two years of 
Dickson's o f f i c e grew almost d a i l y and came from many quarters. 
Shaikh I s a s and his youngest son Abdulla s who was more 
p o l i t i c a l l y active than his elder brother Hamed, and other 
petty Shaikhs and t h e i r supporters were vigorous i n t h e i r 
opposition on the grounds that Dickson was i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h 
t h e i r authority. Members of the tribes and the more conservative 
elements i n the island also opposed Dickson because they f e l t 
that he was i n t e r f e r i n g with the accepted moral code and pattern 
of behaviour of the community. 
Even the more enlightened elements opposed Dickson's 
actions on p r i n c i p l e , as they f e l t them to be unwarranted interference 
by the B r i t i s h . 
Other sections of the community, however, especially 
foreigners, were enthusiastic i n t h e i r support of the measures 
as they f e l t that t h e i r position was much more secure under the 
B r i t i s h protection. Others such as the Shia, although they 
were Bahrainis, because they had been oppressed f o r so long, 
began to take the opportunity to win more concessions from the 
34 
Ruling Family, and were delighted to see t h e i r Rulers discomfited. 
Dickson summed up the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n mid-1920 when 
he wrote that there were f i v e important p o l i t i c a l personalities i n 
35 36 Bahrain, Shaikh Isa and his wife, Shaikh Hamed, Shaikh Abdulla 
and Jasim al-Shirawi (Abdulla's friend and secretary to Shaikh I s a ) . 
He gave as his sources of Arab (Sunni) discontent, a) the propaganda 
of the Caliphate movement i n India, and b) the Egyptian newspapers 
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which were beginning to ar r i v e i n Bahrain which carried a n t i -
B r i t i s h a r t i c l e s . 
As to the reasons f o r the Shia discontent he gave the 
following. Resentment of the long history of tyranny by the 
Ruling Family which included such things as, ( i ) They were 
37 
forbidden to own land. ( i i ) They were obliged to support, 
free of charge, the horses, donkeys, and camels of the Ruling 
Family and t h e i r hangers-on, and to supply free food to any 
passing member of the Ruling Family i f so requested, ( i i i ) They 
had to submit to forced labour at any time, ( i v ) Fish, dates 
and vegetables had to be provided, g r a t i s , for the Ruling Shaikh's 
table, these to be provided by each v i l l a g e i n turn. 
Dickson considered that the majority of the Persians i n 
38 
Bahrain could be counted upon as being p r o - B r i t i s h . 
The long-standing problem of the customs revenue, which was 
regarded by the Shaikh as his personal income, was not pressed 
during t h i s period although Dickson examined the s i t u a t i o n 
closely and i n May, 1920, he reported that his estimate of Shaikh 
Isa's revenue was i n the region of Rs.20,000 per month and i n 
addition to t h i s he claimed 5% of a l l livestock coming to Bahrain. 
He estimated that Shaikh Isa retained about Rs. 80,000 per annum 
for his personal use and that the leading members of the Ruling 
Family shared the remainder. 
They also claimed as a p r i v i l e g e the free supply of items 
such as firewood, charcoal and butter from the importing merchants. 
In a l l , the customs system was i n chaos. 
Although he had no legal r i g h t to do so Major Dickson also 
interfered i n the newly-created municipality by i n s i s t i n g on 
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choosing half of the council members. This dispute was resolved 
by a compromise between Dickson and Shaikh Isa, whereby the Shaikh 
chose the council members, hal f of whom were to be foreigners under 
B r i t i s h protection, and that t h i s half of the council should be 
approved by Dickson.^ 
During Dickson's period of o f f i c e , therefore, the Bahraini 
relations with the B r i t i s h were very strained, especially amongst 
those who opposed these new B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s , mainly Sunnis 
whether pro or anti-Khalifah. 
The termination of Major-Dickson's term of o f f i c e i n l a t e 
1920 brought a feeling of r e l i e f to those who had opposed him. 
Some of them believed that he was removed from Bahrain as a resul t 
of the protests they had made against his policies and because of 
the f r i c t i o n and i l l - f e e l i n g s generated by those p o l i c i e s . This 
however, was untrue as events were to prove. 
The new P o l i t i c a l Agent, Major Clive Daly, who was assigned 
to the post turned out to be a tough, single-minded soldier who, 
l i k e his predecessor, had served i n Iraq. He vigorously pursued 
Dickson's policies and put more and more people under B r i t i s h 
protection, and i n addition to t h i s began to deport people who 
opposed him, whether foreigners or B a h r a i n i s F o r instance, on 
19th November, 1921, he convicted and deported Jasim al-Shirawi f o r 
42 
alleged conspiracy against the Bahrain Order i n Council. A few 
weeks l a t e r he deported Haffez Wahbah the f i r s t headmaster of Bahrain' 
43 
only school. Daly was apparently t r y i n g to isolate Isa and his 
youngest son, Abdulla, from what he considered were e v i l advisers. 
Furthermore, he appointed a Bahraini of Persian o r i g i n , Khan Sahib 
44 
Mohammed Sharif Kutbaddin, as head of the municipality, which 
- 296 -
controlled a small force of "market guards", the only law-
keeping force i n Manama. The appointment of a Persian as head 
of the municipality was a cause of considerable i l l - f e e l i n g and 
when Mohammed Sharif began to r e c r u i t Persians to the force of 
market guards t h i s added fuel to the flames. 
Daly apparently preferred to deal with Shaikh Hamed and 
put pressure on Isa to delegate more authority to him. His view 
of Hamed was that "he was extremely popular w i t h a l l communities, and 
t 
i n addition to being heir apparent, i s i n every way the most 
suitable person to manage a f f a i r s " . With respect to int e r n a l a f f a i r s 
he wrote, 
"Bahrain i s i n a constant state of unrest owing 
to the p o l i t i c a l intrigues of a small party under 
the leadership of Shaikh Abdulla." 
He finished the same l e t t e r by saying, 
" I am constantly approached by leaders of every 
community and requested to appeal to the ^ 
Government fo r some a l l e v i a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . " 
I t appears that Shaikh Isa yielded to a cert a i n extent to 
th i s pressure by appointing Hamed to take control of some aspects 
of the administration under his guidance. This was a popular move 
and one of the few acts for which Daly received praise from the 
Bahrainis 
Shaikh Hamed, however, was hard put to carry out his new 
duties due i n part to his own mild nature and weaknesses and i n 
part to the r i v a l r y of his younger brother, Abdulla. 
The oppression of the Shia, especially i n the country areas, 
continued, and they turned more and more to the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
He reported these oppressions i n d e t a i l and granted B r i t i s h 
protection to any person he f e l t was suffering from the tyrannies 
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47 of t h e i r r u l e r s . The fact that so many people were granted 
protection gave them a greater sense of security and increased 
t h e i r freedom of expression and t h i s gave r i s e to increased 
p o l i t i c a l demands. 
On the occasion of the v i s i t of L t . Col. A.P. ffrevor, the 
P o l i t i c a l Resident from Bushire, on the 21st December, 1921, he 
was met by a crowd of Shia who presented him with a p e t i t i o n 
specifying t h e i r grievances, as follows 
"We beg to state to the possessor of great wisdom, 
the chief of the Gulf, that the Shia community 
i s i n a state of great humiliation, and subject 
to public massacres, they have no refuge, the 
evidence of none of them i s accepted ( i n the 
courts), the properties are subject to plunder, 
and t h e i r selves l i a b l e to maltreatment at any 
moment. 
Trevor l a t e r reported that the Shia said to him that i f they 
(the B r i t i s h ) were not prepared to persuade the Shaikh to remove 
the oppressions and create a reasonably e f f i c i e n t government, the 
B r i t i s h should remove t h e i r protection from the Shaikh so that they 
could persuade other Arab rulers to depose the Shaikh and administer 
the country i n his p l a c e . ^ 
Trevor suggested that as p a c i f i c means had f a i l e d to persuade 
the Shaikh i t was the time for more direc t action. The Government 
of India was not enthusiastic at that time towards the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident's suggestion and i n January, 1922 the Government of India 
expressed the view that they were not prepared to consider drastic 
action regarding the misgovernment of Bahrain u n t i l a l l l o c a l 
resources of bringing pressure to bear were exhausted and that 
intervention only became imperative i n order to secure protection 
of foreigners and to secure His Majesty's i n t e r e s t s , and that they 
were not anxious to intervene between the Shaikh and his subjects 
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neither would they consider putting a l l of the Shia population 
under B r i t i s h protection. They concluded by saying that i f the 
Shaikh was prepared to introduce reasonable forms of reforms, 
49 
the Government would lend t h e i r moral support to back him. 
However, L t . Col. Trevor was instructed to v i s i t Bahrain 
i n the immediate future to restore the P o l i t i c a l Agent's 
prestige and to t e l l the Shaikh that he was running a great r i s k 
from his own subjects, and also to remind Shaikh Hamed that his 
future as a rul e r depended upon his behaviour and co-operation with 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent. This course of action was recommended i n 
order that i t would be brought home to Shaikh Isa that although 
no immediate action was contemplated he was being very closely 
watched. 
To the public, however, i t appeared from the absence of 
immediate action that the Government of India was not prepared 
to become d i r e c t l y involved at that time, despite the wishes of 
th e i r representatives on the spot. News of t h i s reluctance of 
the B r i t i s h to become involved soon f i l t e r e d down to the Shia 
community^ who took matters into t h e i r own hands and began to 
exert p o l i t i c a l pressure culminating i n the demands presented to 
Shaikh Isa on 16th February, 1922.^ These demands were:-
1. No-one, except the r u l e r (Shaikh I s a ) , and Shaikh Hamed had 
the r i g h t to decide cases of dispute or tes^swe the r i g h t to punish 
i n any way. 
2. Cases which Shaikh Hamed could not decide to the s a t i s f a c t i o n 
of both parties were to be referred by him to Shariah, Majlis al-Urf 
or Salifah courts, as the case may be. 
3. No-one should be dragged o f f to the ruler's court without notice 
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but be summoned to attend on the w r i t t e n authority of Shaikh 
Hamed. 
4. Documents concerning the lease of gardens by the Ruling Family 
to t h e i r subjects (Shia) to be i n duplicate and a copy to be 
retained by each party to the agreement and to be witnessed by 
independent witnesses. No conditions other than those contained 
i n the document were to be enforced. 
5. Steps were to be taken to stop the Shaikh's camels entering 
the private gardens and grazing there and damaging crops. 
6. Sukrah (forced labour) of the owners of donkeys to cease 
and the Ragabyyah (Poll-tax) to be abolished. 
7. The practice of placing the Shaikh's calves with the cows 
belonging to the Bahama (Shia) to f a t t e n free of charge should 
cease. 
8. The prisons should be put i n proper order and a reasonable 
52 
building should be provided for that purpose. 
As we can see from the demands the emphasis was placed on 
Shaikh Hamed rather than Shaikh Isa, presumably because the former 
was made i n favour with the B r i t i s h and i t appeared that he would 
be more well-disposed to t h e i r demands. 
Although the above-listed demands were j u s t i f i e d , i t must not 
be assumed that a l l the Ruling Family treated the Shia community 
wit h contempt, indeed a small number of them saw the advantages of 
retaining the support of the Shia community, and of maintaining 
good relations with them. 
Isa replied to these demands w i t h i n the space of a few days, 
a f t e r consulting with the other members of the Ruling Family, and 
announced that he agreed i n p r i n c i p l e to a l l the demands with certain 
- 300 -
reservations. These were that the status of prisoners depended 
e n t i r e l y on the kindness of the r u l e r and that the Ragkabyyah 
should continue as had been the custom of his forefathers. He 
did, howevers make one further promise which the Shia themselves 
had not demanded. This was that the Shia were to be allowed to 
53 
elect two members of t h e i r community to serve on the Majlis al-Urf. 
Shaikh Isa also issued an order for the opening of a 
Government office,, with two regular clerks, to deal with public 
a f f a i r s and also made preparations to establish a regular court 
54 
for the settlement of cases between his subjects. This court took 
shape a few months l a t e r as a j o i n t court,/on the bench were Shaikh 
Hamed and Daly."'"' 
These f i r s t small steps marked the beginning of a form of 
organised administration i n Bahrain and appeared to calm the internal 
p o l i t i c a l scene, at least temporarily. 
To Shaikh Hamed was delegated the d&fcy of running the day-to-day 
a f f a i r s of these o f f i c e s , under the constant supervision of the 
P o l i t i c a l Agent. As Hamed wrote to the l a t t e r , 
"My dear f r i e n d , I cherish hopes that you are pleased 
with my conduct of a f f a i r s since I took over, i n spite 
of the d i f f i c u l t i e s which I have experienced from the 
opposition of my younger brother (Abdulla) for which 
reason there may have been delay i n carrying out some 
of the improvements we-bgth desire, but I am sure you 
are s a t i s f i e d with me. 
Shaikh Abdulla did at that time undoubtably oppose both Daly 
and Shaikh Hamed, but Daly's constant support for Hamed and the 
imminence of the long-awaited v i s i t by Trevor created a feeling of 
fear and panic w i t h Abdulla and before Trevor's v i s i t took place he 
wrote to Daly, the P o l i t i c a l Agent, admitting his previous opposition 
to him and Shaikh Hamed and promising to mend his ways. 
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On the 7th March, 1922, Trevor, acting upon the instructions 
of the Government of India, v i s i t e d Bahrain i n the warship H.M.S. 
Cyclamen to review the s i t u a t i o n and to reassert the authority of 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent. He delivered warnings to Isa, Hamed and 
Abdulla. To the l a t t e r he gave the warning that i f he continued 
his present behaviour he would c e r t a i n l y get into trouble from 
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the B r i t i s h . The terms of Isa's warning were unknown but 
Trevor evidently f e l t a certain amount of sympathy for him i n his 
position as an old man i n a changing world. 
His warning to Hamed consisted of advice to take a strong 
l i n e against the tyranny of the other members of the Ruling Family. 
I n f a c t , Hamed could not put into e f f e c t any immediate steps 
to check the power of the Al-Khalifah, especially those who were 
set i n t h e i r ways and had practiced for many years the things now 
prescribed. 
Shaikh Khalid bin A l i (Shaikh Isa's brother) for instance 
supplemented his income by the p o l l - t a x which he levied on the Shia 
vil l a g e s w i t h i n the sphere of influence, especially those of S i t r a , 
and he was very loath to give t h i s up. Many older members of the 
Al-Khalifah family were i n much the same position. 
After Trevor's v i s i t Daly was able to report, however, that 
he was i n the confidence of both Abdulla and Hamed and that they 
were, under Daly's instructions, looking for ways to reform the 
administration of both the system of j u s t i c e and that of taxation. 
These items concerned not only the Shia but also the Sunni section 
of the community. 
Besides the Ragabyyah and the"date-garden" taxes, there was 
also a fi s h - t a x . These applied to the Shia only and could be collected 
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by any local Shaikh. The Sunni s however, paid only a "pearl-tax" 
which was collected by the Ruler. 
Reforming the tax system meant the more even d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of the tax load and t h i s meant s h i f t i n g the emphasis from the Shia 
to the whole community. This the t r a d i t i o n a l e l i t e of the Sunni 
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society were simply not prepared to accept. The Dawasir, fo r 
instance, who lived semi-independently i n Budayyia, started to 
oppose the scheme and were not under any circumstances prepared 
to pay. They were not alone i n t h e i r opposition to the proposed 
reforms and even Shaikh Hamed did not whole-heartedly support their 
introduction. 
The idea of equality of taxation appeared to many of the 
Sunni as B r i t i s h interference. The Dawasir started to communicate 
wit h Ibn Saud, the support of Shaikh Isa and his sons began to 
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fade i n the face of the strong opposition, and Daly r e a l i s i n g 
t h i s t r i e d to e n l i s t the support of the Government of India to 
carry through the reforms. 
The Government of India, however, continued to maintain t h e i r 
former a t t i t u d e , that they did not wish to in t e r f e r e between a rul e r 
and his subjects, but authorised the P o l i t i c a l Resident to encourage 
the Shaikh to go on with his schemes. They said that 
"nothing should be done to encourage the idea 
that the reforms were being introduced at the 
Government's (of India) d i c t a t i o n " , 
60 
but that they would lend the Shaikh t h e i r moral support. 
Throughout t h i s manoeuvering there was i n fact a small number 
of the more enlightened Sunnis who looked favourably on the reforms 
proposed. The head of t h i s section was Abdul Wahab al-Zayani,^ who 
had been campaigning fo r some time for the introduction of a 
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representative council on democratic l i n e s . But although 
he opposed Shaikh Isa, he also opposed the B r i t i s h , on the 
grounds t h a t , whilst he agreed with the reforms as good, they 
represented interference by an outside power i n what was 
essentially a Bahraini a f f a i r , i n which the i n i t i a t i v e should 
come from the Bahrainis. His opposition to both parties naturally 
l i m i t e d his public support. 
Whilst the events w i t h i n Bahrain appeared to be developing 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , a l b e i t slowly, i n the second half of 1922, events 
outside the island determined the course of future B r i t i s h policy. 
The Persian Government and the Persian Press were observing 
closely the developments on the island. The Persian national 
feelings were r i d i n g high at that time and during 1921 and 1922, 
campaigns were launched i n the Persian press against B r i t i s h 
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interference i n Bahrain. A vigorous assault was made against 
Mohammed Sharif Kutbaddin accusing him of being pro-British and 
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act i v e l y helping them to control the island. Questions were 
raised over the status of Bahrain and the measures taken to protect 
the Persian community there. 
Bearing i n mind the long-standing claim of the Persians 
to Bahrain and i n view of t h i s l a t e s t attempt to discomfit them, 
the B r i t i s h Government decided at la s t to act and play a more 
active r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of Bahrain to preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of any Persian interference. 
On 7th December, 1922, the Foreign Office informed the India 
Office that they desired, "to express t h e i r earnest hope that steps 
might be taken f o r t h w i t h for the introduction at Bahrain of reforms 
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tending to ensure the equitably treatment of Shia." 
The Government of India forwarded the Foreign Office's views 
to the P o l i t i c a l Resident and added to them that the persecution 
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of Shia by the Sunni offered the opportunity for a n i t - B r i t i s h 
a g i t a t i o n i n Persia and elsewhere and that steps should be taken 
to counter t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , and also asked f o r his assessment 
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of the s i t u a t i o n . 
The P o l i t i c a l Agent and the P o l i t i c a l Resident took a 
fresh look at the condition of the island and i n January, 1923 they 
l i s t e d the following causes of unrest i n l e t t e r s between 
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{themselves and & the Government of India. 
1. A vast increase i n the wealth of the Ruling Family had taken 
place due to increasing customs duties and the f o r c i b l e seizure 
of Shia property. 
2. Recent events i n Iraq, India and Egypt had engendered more 
positive ideas of democracy i n the island which had been fed by 
the newspapers and foreigners v i s i t i n g the island. 
3. That the Rulers were more ignorant and less travelled than 
many of t h e i r subjects. 
I n the l e t t e r Daly, r e f e r r i n g to Shaikh Isa, remarked that 
he was " p r i v i l y obstructive and w i l l never agree to the exploitation 
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of o i l i n Bahrain, except under pressure." Daly i s here r e f e r r i n g 
to B r i t i s h interests and h i n t i n g that stronger action against Isa 
w i l l be needed. 
Trevor i n his l e t t e r wrote, "for the sake of the well-being 
of the Shia population and of our good name the administration of 
Bahrain i s i n great need of improvement." 
Both men agreed on the areas i n which reforms were needed. 
They were;-
iy Equality of taxation. 
2) Proper courts to be constituted. 
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3) The drawing up of rules to safeguard the pearl 
divers' interests. 
Trevor added tha t , 
"the Shaikh may not y i e l d even to strong 
pressure and that the Government must be 
prepared to back up moral pressure by material 
force i f they are determined to carry t h e i r 
reforms." 
The Government of India r e l u c t a n t l y agreed to take steps 
towards introducing the necessary reforms. I n A p r i l , 1923 
the Viceroy of India telegraphed the Secretary of State that they 
agreed to secure the introduction of administratis?© and f i n a n c i a l 
reforms i n Bahrain, but th a t , 
"we are anxious to use every endeavour to induce 
Shaikh Isa, ostensibly on his own i n i t i a t i v e , i t 
should be explained to Shaikh Isa that his subjects 
were prevented from r i s i n g against him by our 
protection alone, and that we shall back him up 
i n carrying out reforms. F a i l i n g that even i f i t 
means his enforced retirement and the deportation 
of Shaikh Abdulla we are determined to carry out 
reforms ourselves. D O 
I n reply the Secretary of State gave the required authority 
a n d t h i s was passed to the P o l i t i c a l Resident to take the appropriate 
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steps as the opportunity arose. 
At the end of A p r i l , Trevor l e f t Bushire on leave and was 
replaced temporarily by L t . Col. S.G. Knox who decided to look 
again at the whole issue concerning Bahrain. In early May he 
wired the Government of India stating that a l l the facts had not been 
put to them and that matters i n Bahrain were not any worse than the 
B r i t i s h had already tolerated for the past twenty years and he 
requested that action should be delayed w h i l s t he appraised the 
. . 70 si t u a t i o n . 
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Knox backed up his telegram by a long despatch analysing 
the situation- He argued that the Persians were a g i t a t i n g not 
merely i n support of t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s but were i n effe c t 
reasserting t h e i r claim to sovereignty over the island and that 
appeasement of the Persians would not work without t h i s 
A-+- 71 pre-condition. 
With regard to the in t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n he argued that the 
very fact that so many people were free to approach the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent and Resident indicated the degree of freedom they enjoyed 
i n the island. On the matter of equal taxation, Knox regarded 
the s i t u a t i o n as being f a r from scandalous and considered that 
the need for reform of the pearl industry was not peculiar to 
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Bahrain, but applied to the Gulf Area i n general. 
Knox's argument appeared to be an assertion that w h i l s t 
things were not perfect i n the island i t would not serve the best 
interests of the B r i t i s h Government to precipitate any action 
which might bring about the forced abdication of Shaikh Isa, 
as t h i s would step up opposition to the B r i t i s h rather than 
gain them support. 
I n reply to his e a r l i e r telegram, and probably before his 
f u l l despatch was received, Knox received a cable from the 
Government of India stating that the Foreign Office i n London 
considered that the time had come to force the d i r e c t issue with 
Persia and that should the l a t t e r appeal to the League of Nations, 
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"misrule would be the only serious flaw i n our case." 
I r o n i c a l l y , whilst Knox was t r y i n g to explain his point of 
view v i s a v i s the i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n i n Bahrain, a serious r i o t 
took place on the island. The cause of the r i o t was very minor 
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indeed, being an argument over a watch stolen from an Arab 
by a Persian 9 but the existing state of tension between the 
two communities magnified the incident out of a l l proportion. 
Between the 10th and 13th May, 1923, the r i o t s continued 
spasmodically and resulted i n the deaths of f i v e people. I t has 
been suggested that the two men behind the r i o t were Mohammed 
Sharif Kutbaddin who, as head of the police, was reported to 
have encouraged his men to open f i r e , and Abdulla a l - Q i s i b i 9 an 
agent of Ibn Saud, who was accused of i n c i t i n g the Arabs to r i o t . ^ 
The strange f a c t i s that both men who were accused of 
st a r t i n g the trouble were both "foreigners" under B r i t i s h 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , and therefore they had no connection with Shaikh Isa 
The trouble of the island, however, gave the B r i t i s h 
Government of India the perfect opportunity to put t h e i r plans 
into e f f e c t , and Knox, the man who had argued against interference 
was delegated to carry them out. 
On 15th May, Knox, accompanied by two of His Majesty's 
warships, Triad and Crocus, arrived i n Bahrain and as a f i r s t 
immediate step deported A l - Q i s i b i to the mainland and dismissed 
Mohammed Sharif from his post. 
Over the following days Knox negotiated with Shaikhs Hamed 
and Abdulla the voluntary abdication of the i r father. This was 
f i e r c e l y resented by Shaikh Isa who refused to w r i t e a l e t t e r of 
voluntary resignation to Knox but instead t o l d Knox to write him 
a l e t t e r which made the true position clear, that any abdication 
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was not voluntary but was being demanded by the B r i t i s h . The 
alternative he offered to Knox was to consult the tribes to see 
i f they wished Isa to continue as t h e i r r u l e r . 
- 308 -
Knox saw the delays of argument were harmful to his 
case so on the 26th May, 1923, he asked the leading members of 
Bahrain's community to assemble i n a M a j l i s . Two to three 
hundred were present, and at t h i s Majlis he announced the formal 
abdication of Shaikh Isa. 
Although Isa was blamed for these troubles by the time 
they occured he was merely a figurehead ru l e r except for his 
continued appropriation of the customs duties. As to his status 
at that time Rihani wrote, 
"Shaikh Isa was no longer (early 1923) the 
rul e r of Bahrain, t h i s function having been 
delegated with the consent, the sanction, 
or on the order, as you w i l l , of^ghe B r i t i s h 
Agent to his son, Shaikh Hamed." 
At the Majlis of 26th May, Hamed addressed the meeting and 
started his speech by saying, " I n obedience to the orders of the 
High Government, today I assume on my shoulders the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of the Government of t h i s c o u n t r y ; a n obvious in d i c a t i o n to 
the true s i t u a t i o n with respect to the "abdication". 
Knox's speech, however, was more elaborate and comprehensive 
and during the course of i t he blue-printed the future B r i t i s h 
policy which was to be adopted, not without his own interpretations 
and comments. 
Some of them were, 
"Recent deplorable events have merely emphasised 
and accentuated an i n s i s t a n t cry for the reform 
of the administration on modern l i n e s . And the 
B r i t i s h Government, looking to the general good, 
have i n t h e i r wisdom decided that i t i s time that 
new blood was introduced and the Administration 
strengthened, and I am here as the mouthpiece of 
my Government to promise the help of that 
Government to Shaikh Hamed i n a l l paths of lawful 
endeavour both against external aggression and 
inte r n a l sedition. I t i s my earnest hope that 
the measures of reform we i n i t i a t e today w i l l 
bring the Sunni community into l i n e with other 
communities." 
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He continued to outline the reforms and policies and 
started by saying, 
"the Customs Revenues9 a f t e r deduction of 
necessary working expenses, they must pay 
a l l such revenues to Shaikh Hamed and Shaikh 
Hamed alonec" 
His second warning., to the Qadis stated, 
"but to any Qazi who permits the interference 
or advocacy of i n f l u e n t i a l persons or t h e i r 
submitting to Shara w i l l be dismissed from 
his appointments, he he Sunni or Shia." 
Addressing the Al-Khalifah family he stated, 
" i t i s my duty to warn you that you must not 
expect that because you have taken the trouble 
to be born you have therefore the r i g h t to 
l i v e on the rest of the community, whether 
by allowance from the revenues of these islands 
or by preying on the poor and helpless." 
To the Sunnis, especially the Dawasir, he said, 
"You have frequently met such threats i n the past 
by a counter threat to leave the islands i n a 
body and go over to Bin Saud. I f that i s your 
in t e n t i o n , i n God's name, go; But, do not be 
surprised i f your lands and houses are confiscated 
to the State and given to others." 
To the Shia community he addressed the following remarks. 
"Much of the a g i t a t i o n of recent years has been f i c t i t i o u s . 
I cannot subscribe to the opinion that recent misrule 
is either more tyrannical or more flagrant than i t 
has often been i n the past. You must not expect equality 
at a bound and Sunni privileges cannot be swept away at 
once, i f at a l l . You have found recently that you have 
a voice, and foreign advisers have taught you how to 
use i t . Be careful that you do not, by clamouring 
unju s t l y , destroy the benefits you may reasonably 
expect from the inauguration of the present regime." 
Immediately following the Majlis the order was issued to 
redirect the Customs revenues to the Eastern Banks as Government 
assets instead of private property, and Mr. Bower of the Imperial 
Indian Customs Service was assigned temporarily to the post of 
Chief Customs O f f i c i a l . 
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A C i v i l L i s t was drawn up and the amounts to be paid 
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to each person on i t were cl e a r l y specified. 
The P o l i t i c a l Agent and Shaikh Hamed assumed j o i n t 
control of the c i v i l administration soon afterwards. 
A series of incidents of p o l i t i c a l unrest followed upon 
the enforced abdication of Isa. These came from two quarters. 
F i r s t , from the more conservative elements such as some of the 
Al-Khalifah and those of the Dawasir t r i b e and secondly, from some 
of the embryonic p o l i t i c i a n s of the islands, who, although moderate 
i n t h e i r views, regarded the recent developments as detrimental 
to the future self determination of the island. 
The former reacted vigorously to the B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e s . 
On the 19th May, when they saw the way i n which the s i t u a t i o n 
was developing, members of the Dawasir tribes attacked the Shia 
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v i l l a g e of A a l i and k i l l e d two people. As the c u l p r i t s were 
not traced the blame for the incident was placed upon the 
Dawasir leader, Ahmed al-Dosari, who was i n fact not even on the 
island, being at sea with the pearling f l e e t . He was compelled to 
return to Bahrain and was fined the sum of Rs.15,000 i n reparation 
for the acts of his t r i b e . 
A few months l a t e r another incident took place i n which a 
follower of Shaikh Khalid b i h - A l i , k i l l e d a member of the Shia 
community of S i t r a . Again the head of the family, Shaikh Khalid, 
was held responsible and was fined Rs.2,000. 
Other members of the Al-Khalifah family made t h e i r moves 
by means of l e t t e r s and p e t i t i o n s to the High Commission i n Baghdad 
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and to t h e i r friends and supporters on the mainland. 
This barrage of telegrams and l e t t e r s grew to such an extent 
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that the P o l i t i c a l Resident was moved to issue a warning to 
a l l Gulf Shaikhs that they should not receive any member of the 
Al-Khalifah family, and to ignore t h e i r overtures on t h i s matter. 
A l l approaches were to be referred to th e i r local P o l i t i c a l 
Agents. 
The second opposition party preferred to make p o l i t i c a l 
moves to ensure that t h e i r grievances were heard. 
Once the diving season finished and the more moderate 
elements returned home, they gathered support for t h e i r proposed 
moves. 
On 26th October, 1923, a meeting was held under the name 
of the "Bahrain National Congress" at which certain demands were 
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formulated. Twelve members of the meeting were chosen to 
present t h e i r demands which were:-
" 1 . The continuance of our chosen r u l e r , Shaikh Isa, 
i n the administration of in t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the 
Government as heretofore without the intervention of 
the B r i t i s h Consul who should abide by the f r i e n d l y 
relations whieh are binding to us as well as to 
Great B r i t a i n . Should Shaikh Isa decide to appoint 
his son. Shaikh Hamed as r u l e r we would expect from 
him as we would expect from his father. 
2. That the whole administration should be conducted 
i n accordance with the Mohammedan Law and the Urf, 
which i s part of i t , and complies with i t . 
3. That a Consultative Council (Majlis Shura) should 
be formed from members of the general public which 
w i l l attend to the interests of the country and to 
any matters which may arise i n accordance with the 
practice of other countries. 
4. That a Committee of four people should be formed 
to act as a Divers' Court and i t s members should be 
knowledgeable of diving a f f a i r s . 
5. The B r i t i s h Consul should abide by the contents 
of the Treaties contracted between the Government 
of Bahrain and the High Government and should not 
in t e r f e r e i n int e r n a l a f f a i r s . 
6. This Congress appoints twelve members to pursue 
these resolutions and seek to f u l f i l l these 
resolutions by peaceful means." 
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The people who were elected to present these demands 
were i n fact e n t i r e l y from the Sunni community. 
There was no evidence to suggest that any Shia was 
represented at t h i s Bahrain Congress. The two main leaders, 
however, Abdul Wahab al-Zayani and Ahmed bin Lahij apparently 
t r i e d to e n l i s t the support of the Shia leader. A note, which 
the w r i t e r discovered i n the P o l i t i c a l Agent's records was sent 
by Zayani to Abd A l i bin Mansoor Al-Rajab requesting a meeting 
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to discuss the matters mentioned. This of f e r of a meeting 
was apparently refused and the fact that the note ended up 
i n the P o l i t i c a l Agent's records shows that apparently the Shia 
s t i l l mistrusted the Sunni to co-operate i n taking j o i n t action. 
I t was an attempt, however, by the moderate Sunnis to bridge 
the gap between the two communities which under the circumstances 
proved to be unbridgeable. 
The Congress demands, although moderate, were at that 
time considered r a d i c a l . They did not i n s i s t , as did others, that 
Shaikh Isa should remain as r u l e r , but accepted Shaikh Hamed 
provided that the handover of power was voluntary. 
Their demands for the formation of a Consultative Council 
representing a l l the people (Shia and Sunni) was an extremely 
progressive move which, i f accepted, would have sown the seeds 
of a more con s t i t u t i o n a l form of government. 
The Congress representatives submitted t h e i r demands to 
Trevor, who by t h i s time had returned from leave, i n the hope 
that he may take a more reasonable view than Knox. 
In the meantime the leader of the Dawasir t r i b e refused 
to pay the f i n e imposed on him f o r the k i l l i n g of the A a l i 
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vi l l a g e r s and wrote to Trevor appealing against the convictions. 
Trevor replied to these notes i n the form of a general 
proclamation to the Bahrain people i n which he said that he 
wished, 
"to inform and assure the public i n Bahrain that 
His Majesty's Government, aft e r thorough o f f i c i a l 
enquiries, ascertained that i n the month of Shawal 
l a s t , that the state of a f f a i r s i n Bahrain was 
much i n need of reforms, consequently His Majesty's 
Government issued orders to begin the necessary 
reforms. I declare to the people that the orders 
of His Majesty's Government w i l l be executed i n 
a l l circumstances and the programme of reforms 
which we have already begun w i l l continue 
steadily without the least hindrance.85 
In view of the continuing troubles Trevor f e l t that the 
proclamation was not enough and that further action was required 
to quell the unrest. He therefore proposed to the B r i t i s h 
Government of India that the leaders of the Congress should be 
deported, as he considered them to be agitators. He also 
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proposed the expulsion of the Dawasir en masse. 
Trevor v i s i t e d Bahrain between 1st and 7th November, 1923, 
and af t e r consultation with Shaikhs Hamed and Abdulla he inv i t e d 
the Congress representative to an assembly at the B r i t i s h Agency 
on the 7th November, ostensibly to discuss t h e i r demands. Having 
assembled there Trevor detained Abdul Wahab a l - Z a y a n i a n d Ahmed 
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bin L a h i j , who were deported that same night to India. 
The Dawasir t r i b e were given ten days i n which to completely 
evacuate Budayyia, f a i l i n g which, Trevor threatened that the town 
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would be bombarded. 
In the face of t h i s threat the Dawasir evacuated the town 
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and l e f t Bahrain completely before the ultimatum expired. After 
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t h e i r departure t h e i r houses and gardens were confiscated by 
the State as Knox had forecast. 
Following these events i n November of 1923 the s i t u a t i o n 
became more stable and reforms to the administration began 
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to proceed. From these actions however, i t appears that the 
B r i t i s h were i n favour of reforms when imposed by themselves 
but not when proposed by the indigenous Bahraini population. 
In early 1924 a B r i t i s h Customs O f f i c i a l was appointed 
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to straighten out the issues of the Customs Revenues and 
i n 19255Daly, r e a l i s i n g that he was not i n the best position to 
assist Shaikh Hamed, engaged a B r i t i s h Advisor who was to be 
employed by Shaikh Hamed to assist him i n managing the a f f a i r s 
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of state. The new Adviser was Mr. Charles D. Belgrave, who 
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eventually took up his position i n 1926. 
From 1923 up to the end of the decade advances were made, 
a l b e i t slowly, i n the reform of the administration and courts, 
etc., and new departments such as the Land Registration Department 
were created. P o l i t i c a l resentment, however, did not die out 
but continued to simmer below the surface, breaking out into 
occasional acts of v i o l e n c e . ^ 
Abdul Wahab al-Zayanicontinued his opposition from his 
e x i l e i n India. He fought vigorously against his i l l e g a l 
deportation and on behalf of Shaikh Isa, by appeals i n the Indian 
Courts and to the Viceroy. He enlisted the support of various 
people, notably Jinna, who acted as his Counsel. He continued 
his campaign without success u n t i l his death i n 1925 i n Bombay. 
The Government of India were well aware of the deep 
involvement of t h e i r representatives i n Bahrain, and as early as 
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95 December, 1923 queried whether they had gone too f a r . I n 
mid-1924 the Government of India instructed the l o c a l 
representatives not to proceed further or faster along the 
lines of reform they were seeking, unless they could carry the 
Shaikh whole-heartedly with them.^ The Government also 
expressed the opinion that the P o l i t i c a l Resident and P o l i t i c a l 
Agent had shown a tendency to treat the island too much along 
the lines of a native state i n India. 
By the l a t e 1920's Bahrain possessed a reasonably e f f i c i e n t 
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and modern administration and Mr. Belgrave, who by that time had 
completed a few years service, was i n charge of a l l the Departments 
This s i t u a t i o n was paradoxical i n that whilst the B r i t i s h 
Government of India wished to moderate B r i t i s h influence, 
Mr, Belgrave, as head of the administration, with the help of a 
small number of B r i t i s h c i v i l servants, actually increased t h i s 
involvement. 
As was pointed out by Sir Denys Bray, who v i s i t e d Bahrain 
i n 1927, i n the capacity of Foreign Secretary to the Government of 
India. 
"The B r i t i s h involvement i n Bahrain i s more 
than i s desireable. A B r i t i s h Financial 
Adviser, B r i t i s h Police Superintendent and 
B r i t i s h Customs Manager, t h i s i s more B r i t i s h 
than Ratal, which i s a Border state. 
Bray acknowledged that Bahrain was the keystone of the B r i t i s h 
position i n the Gulf, but added that, 
"no treaty could adequately cover i t (the 
B r i t i s h position i n Bahrain) unless i t were a 
treaty extinguishing the Shaikh's sovereignty 
to a degree less than that possessed by an 
Indian chief. 
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The passing of the old order i n Bahrain proved to be 
a painful p e r i o d * ^ and the forces of change which brought t h i s 
about were those of foreign intervention and the c u l t u r a l gap 
between the communities. These forces of communication and 
Arab nationalism were s t i l l very much i n t h e i r infancy but 
were yet to grow more powerful. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Further d e t a i l s of t h i s point w i l l be discussed l a t e r i n t h i s 
chapter, 
2. A despatch from P o l i t i c a l Resident, L t . Col. L.B.H. Howarth, 
to Foreign Sec. of Govt, of India, No. 295. S. dated 1st Sept., 
3. For these l e t t e r s see Bidwell, R. "The A f f a i r s of Arabia, 1905-06" 
Foreign Office Confidential p r i n t , two volumes, Frank Cass and 
Co. 1971. Vol. I , p.88 and 137. 
4. Letter from P o l i t i c a l Resident to the Govt, of India, No. 420, 
dated 17th Dec. 1904. 
5. Although, as Rihani reported (p.264) compensation was paid by 
Shaikh Isa to Mr. Wonkhaus, H.M. Govt, instructed her 
Charge d'Affaire i n Berl i n that i f the Wonkhaus a f f a i r was 
raised he should state that i t had been brought to the attention 
of H.M. Govt, and a ship would be sent to investigate. F.O. 
despatch of 5th Dec. 1904, No. 261. German a t t i t u d e during 
t h i s period i n the Gulf see, Staley Eugene, "Business and P o l i t i c s 
i n the Persian Gulf", "The Story of the Wonkhaus Firm". P o l i t i c a l 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 48, 1933. pp. 367-385. 
6. For deta i l s of these events see Busch, B.C., op.cit., pp. 148-153. 
For the documents of the period see Bidwell, Robin - "The A f f a i r s 
of Arabia 1905-06" Frank Cass and Co. 1971. 
7. Eor the f u l l text see Bidwell op . c i t . , Vol. I Pt. 2. pp.65-67. 
8. Lorimer, op . c i t . , p.942, t e l l s us that the I n d i a n Govt, suggested 
that the Customs issue should be investigated, but, "the proposal 
did not commend i t s e l f to the High Government." 
9. Shaikh Isa sent a p e t i t i o n to the Govt, of India i n l a t e 1905 
protesting about the conduct of the Pol. Agent and Pol. Res. 
See Bidwell o p . c i t . , Vol. 2. Pt. V I I I , pp. 6-7. 
10. Lorimer, o p . c i t . , p.943. 
11. Despatch referred to i n footnote 2, and Lorimer op . c i t . , p.944. 
12. Letter from P o l i t i c a l Agent, Capt. F.B. Prideaux to the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident, No. 620, dated 7th Dec, 1907. 
13. F.O. 371/535. 44/2218. 
14. The text of the agreement on t h i s point stated, "This engagement 
does not apply t o , nor a f f e c t , the customary f r i e n d l y correspondence 
with the l o c a l authorities of neighbouring states on business of 
minor importance." 
15. Viceroy's telegram to Sec. of State for India, of 6th July, 1912, 
repeating telegram from P o l i t i c a l Resident, 
1927. 
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16. Also p u b l i s h e d i n London Gazette on 1 3 t h J u l y s 
1915, and 2 6 t h J u l y , 1917. The Order i n C o u n c i l 
was amended many times e s p e c i a l l y 1948 , 5 1 , 59-61 
and 1967. 
17. A l t h o u g h t h e P o l i t i c a l Resident i n Bushire was 
nominal head of the J u d i c i a r y , i n p r a c t i c e t h e 
Judge i n t h e Chi e f Court of B a h r a i n was t h e P o l i t i c a l 
Agent. 
18. S i m i l a r Orders i n C o u n c i l were a p p l i e d t o Muscat, 
T r u c i a l S t a t e s , Qatar and Kuwait. For these see 
Li e b e s n y , H e r b e r t , J. - " I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s 
of A r a b i a " - M i d d l e East J o u r n a l V o l . I , 1947, 
pp. 148-168, a l s o " B r i t i s h J u r i s d i c t i o n i n the 
State s o f the P e r s i a n G u l f " - M.E. J o u r n a l , V o l . I I , 
1949, pp. 330-332, a l s o same a u t h o r , V o l . I X , 1955, 
pp. 384-396, a l s o V o l . X, 1956, pp. 33-42; 
19. Previously the P o l i t i c a l Agents had been recruited from the 
P o l i t i c a l Dept. of the Govt, of Inda. During the early 1920's 
a t o t a l of three men came from Baghdad then the practice reverted 
to India. For opinions of the conduct of these men see Irl a n d , L.W. 
Iraq: A Study i n P o l i t i c a l Development. London 1937. 
20. This was Abd A l i b i n Mansoor Al-Rajab. (Shia) . 
21. Letter from L t . Col. A.T. Wilson, C i v i l Commissioner i n Baghdad, 
to Shaikh Isa b i n A l i , dated 13th May, 19198inviting him to send 
his younger son Abdulla to London. The same i n v i t a t i o n was also 
extended to one of Ibn Saud's sons, Feisal and Abdulla completed 
t h e i r journey together. 
22. Demi-official, w r i t t e n aboard "Lawrence", the 27th May, 1919, 
from Bray to L t . Col. Wilson, C i v i l Commissioner, Baghdad. 
23. Deputy Under Secretary of State for India. 
24. This demand was for backing i n his long-standing feud with 
al-Thani of Qatar over the ownership of Zubara. For det a i l s of 
t h i s see Al-Baharna o p l c i t . , p.37 & pp. 247-249 although he 
did not mention the above incident. 
25. One act of preference for Ibn Saud was the occasion i n 1920 
when he exerted pressure on Shaikh Isa to reduce the t a r i f f on 
goods re-exported to the mainland, i n preference to a l l other 
states who paid a higher rate. 
26. Memorandum No. 6.C - 5th Jan. 1920, from Major Dickson to C i v i l 
Commission i n Baghdad and Deputy P o l i t i c a l Resident i n Bushire. 
27. Letter from Major Dickson to Shaikh Isa dated 10th Jan. 1920, 
re f e r r i n g to the fact that since Shaikh Abdulla l e f t for England 
no move had been made to convene the Majlis al-Urf. 
28. Letter from Shaikh Isa to Major Dickson - 13th Jan. 1920. 
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29. The Majlis members were appointed on 16th Jan. 1920, Shaikh 
Isa's nominees were Abdulla Hassan al-Dawsari, Abdul Rahman, 
Mohammed al-Zayani, Abdul Aziz Hassan al-Qusabi, Yusef Abdul 
Rahman Fakro, and Abdul A l i b i n Rajab, the l a t t e r being the 
only Shia. Names contained i n l e t t e r from Shaikh Isa to 
Dickson, 21st Jan. 1920 (30th Rabi al-Awal 1338). The f i r s t 
three asked to be excused from service. To add to the 
confusion Dickson also nominated Abdul Aziz Hassan al-Qusabi 
as one of his choices as he regarded al-Qusabi as a foreigner. 
30. Letter from Dickson to the P o l i t i c a l Resident, 6th Dec. 1919. 
31. Letter from M.A. Cater, Sec. to Govt, of India to Shaikh 
Abdulla bin Isa al-Khalifa, D/0 No. 1145/EA. 
32. Telegram of C i v i l Commission, Baghdad to Govt, of India, 
No. 4601, 15th A p r i l , 1920 and l e t t e r from Ibn Saud to 
Dickson, 22nd July, 1920 and l e t t e r from Abdulla b i n Jasim 
al-Thani, 29th July, 1920. 
33. The writer's informant, Saud bin Abdul Aziz al-Dawsari, now 
l i v i n g i n Damatn, stated that the woman mentioned absconded 
from her home following a domestic quarrel and sought Dickson's 
aid. Their attempts to affect her return were met with rebuffs 
from Dickson. Dickson did not mention t h i s specific incident 
i n his book, "Kuwait and Her Neighbours", George Man & Unwin, 
1956, but mentions a similar incident i n Suq Ashukh, i n South 
Iraq, which confirms his a t t i t u d e to t h i s type of a f f a i r . 
34. Letter from Dickson to the Po l i c a l Resident, dated 20th March, 
1920. 
35. Isa's wife was Isha b i n t Mohammed, daughter of Mohammed bin 
Khalifah who was deported i n 1869 by the B r i t i s h , and the mother 
of Abdulla. She was an extremely powerful and i n f l u e n t i a l member 
of the al-Khalifah. I t was reported that she dominated Shaikh 
Isa and even held her own courts, f i n i n g , imprisoning or otherwise 
punishing those who had given offence to her. 
36. Shaikh Abdulla, besides being a shrewd p o l i t i c i a n , was a notorious 
rake and was involved i n many incidents. Dickson repotted that 
Ibn Saud's view of Abdulla was that "Abdulla i s a snake with two 
faces. One day he w i l l b i t e , Hamed i s straight forward and the 
Govt. (The B r i t i s h ) would do well to t r u s t him rather than the 
snake who steals men's wives." 
37. Dickson i s exaggerating on t h i s point as a number did own land, 
although they were very few. Most Sunnis however would not usually 
s e l l land to a Shia. 
38. F.0. P o l i t i c a l Diary of the P o l i t i c a l Agent i n Bahrain, for A p r i l 
and May, 1920, No. 150, of 3rd June, 1920. 
3$. Letter from Major Dickson to the P o l i t i c a l Resident, dated 12th 
May, 1920. 
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40. This half of the council (the P. Agent's choice) was to be 
three Persians, two Mohammedan Indians and one Hindu Indian. 
This step made the opposition to Dickson even more vigorous. 
From an undated l e t t e r signed by a number of Bahraini notables 
which was addressed to Shaikh Isa. I t opposed the new council 
on general grounds and especially on the rumours of the opening 
of a cinema. 
41. Rihani i n his f i r s t e d i tion of "Muluk al-Arab" stated that 
Major Daly had been a L t . Col. i n Iraq but had been demoted 
because of his a t t i t u d e during the revo l t i n Iraq i n 1920. The 
writ e r has not been able to establish the t r u t h of Rihani's 
statement. Daly had, however, been a P o l i t i c a l Governor of a 
Diwaniya i n Iraq and i t was i n Daly's region that the revolt 
began. Philby, H. St. John, i n his book "Arabian Days", Robert 
Hale Ltd., London, 1948, p.193, referred to him as, ''one of 
Wilson's toughest men", and went on to say that i t was on his 
insistence that Daly was transferred from Iraq. I n Bahrain he 
gained an even greater reputation as a "tough man". Even 
nowadays anyone using the Bahraini adage of "Khutat Daly", 
l i t e r a l l y "Daly planned", means that his orders are not 
negotiable and not to be deviated from. Besides his p o l i t i c a l 
work he interested himself f u l l y i n the social l i v e s of the 
islanders even to the extent that the people t r a v e l l i n g i n 
boats between Manama and Muharraq were for the f i r s t time i n 
the i r l i v e s forced to wear undergarments i n order not to give 
offence to anyone as they waded ashore. 
42. Daly convicted al-Shirawi under Part I I I , Section 21(i) of the 
Order i n Council. This specific section i n f a c t gave him power 
to deport only foreigners. When t h i s was pointed out to him 
following al-Shirawi's appeals from his exil e i n India, he 
wrote back that his name was Shirazi (from Shiraz i n Persia) and 
he was therefore a foreigner. The Shirawi family was i n fact a 
notable Arab family of Bahrain with no Persian connections 
whatever. See Daly's l e t t e r fo the P o l i t i c a l Resident, No. 
59/C/1923. 
43. See l e t t e r from P o l i t i c a l Agent to P o l i t i c a l Resident, No. 6-C 
of 8th Jan. 1922. Wahbahalso played an important ro l e i n Kuwaiti 
P o l i t i c s p r i o r to his a r r i v a l i n Bahrain. 
44. Daly harrassed Abdulla, who was the f i r s t head of the new 
municipality u n t i l he resigned his duties, a f t e r which Daly 
assigned the post to Kutbaddin, who was Daly's confidant. 
45. Letter from Major C. Daly to P o l i t i c a l Resident dated 23td Nov. 1921 
46. Letters of thanks from leading members of Bahrain communities, 
headed by the Qadis of the two sects, w r i t t e n i n June and July, 1921. 
These were w r i t t e n during the early months of his tenure of o f f i c e 
and may not have been s p e c i f i c a l l y because of the pressures he was 
exerting on Abdulla. This support from the more enlightened people 
waned as Daly's "tough" reputation was established. 
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47. An example of t h i s tyranny i s to be found i n l a t e 1921 when 
members of Shaikh Khalid bihriAli's family attacked a v i l l a g e 
i n Sitra and k i l l e d the father of a Shia family and badly 
injured the son, leaving him to die. The son survived 
however, a f t e r h o s p i t a l i s a t i o n and he l a t e r demanded B r i t i s h 
protection to escape further r e p r i s a l s . The Shia community 
quoted t h i s incident as a prime example of the tyranny they 
suffered. Letter from A.P. Trevor, P o l i t i c a l Resident to 
Mr. D. des. Bray, Foreign Sec. to Govt, of India, no. 495-S, 
30th Dec., 1921. 
48. I b i d . 
49. Telegram from the Foreign Sec, to the Govt, of India to the 
P o l i t i c a l Resident No. 119-S, dated 30th January, 1922. 
50. Two members of the Shia community who were i n frequent contact 
with Daly and who looked upon him as t h e i r helper i n gaining 
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l demands were Khalef al-Qsfoor (the Shia Qadi), 
and Abd A l i bin Mansoor al-Rajab. (See F.N. 20) 
51. At t h i s time Hamed was absent from Bahrain, being i n India from 
6th Jan. to 20th Feb., 1922. 
52. P e t i t i o n presented to Shaikh Isa on 15th Jamada I I , 1340 A.H. 
included i n a l e t t e r from Major Daly to L t . Col. Trevor (P.S.), 
no. 34-C, dated 18th Feb. 1922. 
53. Proclamation by Shaikh Isa bin A l i to the Petitioners of Our 
Subjects, dated 17th Jamada I I , 1340 A.H. (18th February, 1922). 
54. Letter from C. Daly to A.P. Trevor, dated 11th March, 1922. 
55. Besides t h i s court there was a lower court presided over by 
Mohammed Sharif. I t was known by the Bahrainis as "Mahkamet Khan 
Bahardur". 
56. Letter from Shaikh Hamed to Major C. Daly dated 7th March, 1922, 
forwarded to the P o l i t i c a l Resident. 
57. Trevor on his v i s i t to Bahrain imposed fines f o r t h e i r 
misdemeanours on Shaikh Abdulla and his son, Mohammed. The 
writer's informant, Shaikh Abdul Rahman, the son of Mohammed, 
stated that f o r non-payment of these finds certain shops i n 
Manama belonging to Abdulla and his son were confiscated and sold 
by the B r i t i s h to pay the fines. 
58. From a l e t t e r i n the c o l l e c t i o n referred to i n footnote 12,(Introduction) 
from A. al-Zayed to Shaikh Ibrahim bin Mohammed al-Khalifah 
mentioning the grievances. Unfortunately undated but probably 
w r i t t e n around 1923. In the l e t t e r Zayed mentioned the high 
emotions of the Sunnis over the proposal to tax t h e i r gardens. 
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59. Letters from P o l i t i c a l Agent to P o l i t i c a l Resident, 
No. 446-S, dated 28th June 1922, and No. 111/C, dated 7th 
July, 1922. 
60. Telegram from Foreign Office, Simla to P o l i t i c a l Resident 
dated 2nd May, 1922. 
61. Letter from P o l i t i c a l Agent to P o l i t i c a l Resident dated 
17th Oct. 1923, 
62. See Asr I-Azadi, Nos. 69-70 dated 30th July 1922 and No. 
116 of 21st Sept. 1922 also Istakhr No. 17 dated 25th July 
1922. (Both papers were published i n Shiraz). 
63. Asr-I-Azadi, No. 120 dated 17th Oct. 1922, and No. 122 of 
25th Oct. 1922, also Istakhr, No. 24, dated 17th Sept. 1922. 
64. Telegram from Foreign Secretary (Home Govt.) to the India 
Office (London), 7th Dec, 1922. 
65. Telegram No. 915-S, from F.O., Simla to P o l i t i c a l Resident, 
Bushire. 
66. Letter from P.A. to P.R. on 8th Jan. 1923, and l e t t e r from 
P.R. to D.C. Bray Foreign Sec, Govt, of India, No. 42-S, 
27th Jan. 1923. 
67. Daly stated i n his l e t t e r that Isa would not grant the concession 
to d r i l l for o i l to W.N. D'Arcy, a B r i t i s h prospector. This was 
speculation, as Isa had already given a f i r m undertaking to the 
B r i t i s h Govt, that he would consult them before making any move. 
68. Telegram from Viceroy of India to H.M. Sec of State for India, 
dated 17th A p r i l , 1923. 
69. Telegram No. 1626 from Sec. of State to Viceroy dated 17th 
A p r i l , 1923 and telegram No. 459X from Foreign Sec. to Govt, 
of India to P o l i t i c a l Resident dated 19th A p r i l , 1923. 
70. L t . Col. Knox's telegrams of 6th May, 1923 and telegram No. 421, 
dated 9th May, 1923. 
71. The Persian press campaign of 1922 resulted i n a motion being put 
forward at the Persian Majlis to give Bahrain the r i g h t to elect 
a member to take a seat at that M a j l i s . This matter was referred 
to a sub-committee for discussion. (Teheran telegram No. 112, 
17th A p r i l , 1923). The committee reported i n favour of the 
motion i n May, 1923 and Bahrain was given the r i g h t to elect 
such a member to the Persian M a j l i s . (Telegram from Sir P-
Loraine, despatched 6.30 p.m. 15th May, received 8.30 p.m. 
16th May, 1923). I t was probably t h i s action by the Persians 
which s t i r r e d the Govt, of India into action and hardened t h e i r 
resolve. 
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72. Letter from L t . Col. S.G, Knox, Deputy P.R., to the Foreign 
Sec. of Govt, of India, dated 11th May, 1923. 
73. Telegram No. 634-S, dated 14th May, 1923. 
74. Letter from C. Daly to the P o l i t i c a l Resident, dated 13th 
May, 1923. 1.0. documents refer to the May r i o t s as Majdi-
Persian r i o t s . This probably referred to the n a t i o n a l i t y of 
the two persons accused of causing the r i o t s . I n actual f a c t 
many sections of the Bahrain communities were involved. 
75. Knox stated i n his telegram from Bahrain to the Govt, of India 
that Isa t o l d him, "you can k i l l me or turn me out but while 
I am a l i v e I w i l l not r e t i r e . " Telegram dated 24th May, 1923. 
The state of a f f a i r s i n Bahrain was i n complete contrast to the 
B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e which was adopted i n Oman when the Sultan of 
Oman, during the C i v i l War there, offered to abdicate i n the 
face of the advancing Imamate Forces. The B r i t i s h then refused 
t h i s o f f e r of abdication and backed up the Sultan with B r i t i s h 
forces. (Wingate, Sir R., "Not i n the Limelight" - Hutchinson 
of London & Co., 1959). I t i s also i n contrast with the 
a t t i t u d e of the B r i t i s h administration i n Iraq, when following 
the 1920 disturbances, d i r e c t B r i t i s h control was withdrawn and 
the number of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s reduced. 
76. Rihani, Ameen, "Around the Court of Arabia" (English version of 
Muluk a l Arab) Constable & Co. Ltd., London - 1923, p.267. 
77. Hamed's speech was read on his behalf by his brother, Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Isa. 
78. Later Knox reported that when he was i n Bahrain he met a leading 
member of the Persian community who informed him th a t , "with a 
few, and unimportant exceptions no Persian i n Bahrain desired 
Persian ru l e i n the island". Telegram from P.R. (Bushire) 
to Foreign Sec. of India, Simla, No. 112/481 dated '29th May, 
1923. 
79. The long-standing Customs issue was thus resolved and Daly 
reported on the 10th June that the Customs were eff e c t i v e i n 
Muharraq as well as Manama. Prior to t h i s the Muharraq Customs 
was controlled by A l i bin Abdulla bin Mohammed who was apparently 
involved i n large scale embezzlement i n addition to taking the 
25^% allowed by Shaikh Isa. In Manama the custom for certain 
merchants such as Yousef Kanoo and Yousef Fakroo was that they 
were allowed to s e t t l e t h e i r customs t o l l annually. Daly 
reported that even these large amounts were not properly recorded 
and sometimes completely omitted from the customs accounts of the 
Hindu merchant charged by Shaikh Isa with t h e i r administration. 
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80. The C i v i l L i s t included Shaikh Isa (Rs. 4,000 per month 
from the Customs and Rs. 2,000 per annum from C i v i l L i s t ) . 
Letter from P o l i t i c a l Resident to Govto of India No. 283-s 
of 15th June, 1923. For some years Shaikh Isa refused to 
draw t h i s money. The L i s t specified that payments were to 
be i n cash not kind, and Shaikh Hamed agreed that no additional 
money was to be paid to any person without f i r s t consulting the 
P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
81. Telegram from P.A. to P.R. No. 80/C, 19th May, 1923. 
82. Letter from Mohammed bin Abdulla to the High Commission i n 
Ba|fedad dated 20th Safer 1342 AH (3rd Oct., 1923), and telegram 
from Shaikh Isa to Foreign Office, London (sent from Kuwait), 
24th Oct., 1923 - F.O. 371/8942. 
83. The twelve representatives elected were;- Abdul Wahab al-Zayani, 
Abdul L a t i f b i n Mahmood, Said Abdulla b i n Ibrahim, Hussein bin 
A l i al-Manai, Shahin bin Sakr al-Jalahma, Mohammed b i n Rashid 
bin Hindi, Isa bin Ahmed al-Dosari, Ahmed bin Jasim bin Jowdr, 
Mohammed, bin Sahah, Mahena bin Fadle, Jabr al-Muselem and Ahmed 
bin L a h i j • Some confusion exists over the Congress and the 
na t i o n a l i t y of i t s members. Some authorities state that the 
opposition was mainly Persian, but as may be seen from the names 
a l l were from well-known Bahraini families. Faroughy, op.cit., 
p.28 and Adamiyat op.cit., p. 180 stated that the movement has 
a Persian bias and that Zayani himself was a Persian. With 
regard to the date of the Congress, Adamiyat (op.cit. P. 190) 
gives the date as 1913 and Humaidan, A.,(op.cit. p.60) as 1912. 
Unfortunately, a thesis by Qasim, Jamal Zakariya, Ain Shems 
University, Cairo, 1966 adds further the confusion by giving the 
date as 1912 and stating that Zayani was head of the Shia 
community of Bahrain. The writ e r ' s sources of information, 
however, d e f i n i t e l y indicate that the Congress took place i n 1923 
and that a l l the representatives were Sunni Arabs. 
84. Note dated 5th Rabia Al Awal 1342 A.H. (16th Oct., 1923). 
85. Proclamation issued 28th Oct., 1923. 
86. Telegram from Trevor to Foreign Sec, (Delhi), 2nd Nov., 1923, 
affirmative reply was received 4th Nov. 1923. 
87. Ahmeb bin Lahij at f i r s t excused himself from attending on the 
grounds that he was suffering from eye trouble, but Hamad, at 
the suggestion of Trevor, sent men to ensure his forced attendance. 
Hamed, ea r l i e r that day, wrote a l e t t e r to Trevor asking for his 
help i n the deportation of Zayani and bin L a h i j . 
88. Telegram from P.R. to Foreign Sec. (Delhi), No. 622-S of 1923. 
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89. Signal from CO. of HM.MS. Crocus to the P o l i t i c a l Agent of 
Bahrain asking for information on Budayyia s i t u a t i o n . Signal 
No. 567 of 16th Nov., 1923. The Dawasir emigrated to Damam 
on the mainland. Meanwhile the f ) 6 1 i t i c a l Resident telegraphed 
Shaikh Ahmed al-Jaberof Kuwait warning not to accept the 
Dawasir w i t h i n his t e r r i t o r y . (Telegram of 6th Nov., 1923). 
90. There were no international questions asked over Britain's r o l e 
i n the forced abdication of Isa and t h e i r assumption of control 
of the island. The only protest came from Sharif Hussain when 
he asked the High Commissioners, Herbert Samuel, to persuade the 
Government to re-examine the case. His request was ignored. 
Letter from L.D. Wakely the Under-Sec. of State s Colonial Office, 
13th March, 1924. Ibn Saud made no o f f i c i a l protest at the time 
although Dickson i n his book "Kuwait and Her Neighbours" o p . c i t . , 
p. 11A stated that Ibn Saud t o l d him i n 1937 that i n his opinion 
the actions taken i n the forced abdication of Isa had damaged 
the B r i t i s h cause i n Arabia for the next hundred years. Apparently 
Ibn Saud, although he had no power to help Isa, f e l t sympathy for 
him and on 26th Feb., 1930, without reference to Shaikh Hamed or 
the B r i t i s h made a f l y i n g v i s i t to Bahrain to c a l l on Shaikh Isa 
i n Muharraq. (That was 27th Ramadan 1348 A.H.). 
91. Mr. Claude de Grenier took up his appointment on 14th Jan., 1924 
on a three-year basis - Letter from Govt, of India to P.R., 
No. 480X, 10th A p r i l , 1924. 
92. Letter from F.B. Prideaux to Major Daly dated 27th August, 1924 
mentioning the importance of an Adviser and pointing out that i t 
was improper for the P o l i t i c a l Agent to administer the a f f a i r s of 
state. 
93. Mr. CD. Belgrave, l a t e r , Sir Charles, was appointed i n i t i a l l y 
f o r four years from Jan. 1926, subject to three months' notice 
by either party, at a salary of Rs. 1,000 per month r i s i n g to 
Rs. 2,200 per month. (Telegram from Govt, of India to P.R. 
No. 142N, 23rd Oct., 1925). Sir Charles Belgrave continued i n the 
service of the Bahrain Govt, u n t i l 1957. Daly's service i n 
Bahrain ended i n August, 1926 a f t e r Belgrave was f i r m l y settled 
i n his job. 
94. On 8th Jan., 1924 a r a i d was carried out by members of Shaikh 
Khalid bin A l i ' s family on the v i l l a g e of Wadyan, near S i t r a , 
and a man and woman k i l l e d . (Letter from P.R. to Govt, of India, 
No. 50-S, 17th Jan., 1924). A few months la t e r another r a i d 
was carried out by persons unknown on Tubli v i l l a g e . The major 
p o l i t i c a l incident took place, however, when on 13th Oct., 1926, 
a group of men f i r e d on Shaikh Hamed i n an attempt to assassinate 
him, near Budayyia (Letter from Major C.C.I. Barrett, Pol. 
Agent i n Bahrain, to Pol. Resident, No. 108/5/1, 15th Oct., 1926). 
There was no immediate arrest despite intensive investigations and 
offers of rewards, u n t i l i n 1928 the Govt, put her hasids on the 
people alleged to be responsible. These men were Shaikh Hamood 
bin Sabah, who was the head of Majl i s at Tajar, Shaikh Hamed bin 
Abdulla al-Gatam, Shaikh Ibrahim bin Khalid bin A l i , whose brother 
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94. contd...,. 
had been deported over the 1924 incident mentioned above. A l l 
of them were members of the al-Khalifah family and i t was 
claimed that they had been supported by a group of hired k i l l e r s . 
Shaikh Hamed did not take any drastic action but merely fined 
them. Hamood was also found g u i l t y of the Tubli r a i d and was 
fined Rs.2,000. The injured party refused to accept the 
reparation and the f i n e became the f i r s t subscription towards 
the building of the Shia Jafariya school. 
95. Telegram from Govt, of Inda to Pol. Res. No. 1688-S, 8th Dec, 1923 
96. Telegram from Foreign Office (India) to Prideaux, Pol. Res., 
25th July, 1924. 
97. The Majlis al-Urf, the Salifah Court and the Joint Court 
gradually faded i n t o insignificance as Bahraini Court to cover 
a l l c i v i l disputes was established and were provided over by 
Shaikh Hamed's son, Salman, and Mr. Belgrave. This reduced 
the involvement of the Pol. Agent as there were less cases to 
be heard by the Appeal Courts. Religious cases were s t i l l 
referred to the Qadis,. Shia or Sunni, t h e i r power however, was 
reduced by the creation of a Wakfs Dept. i n July 1927, and l a t e r 
by a Minor's Dept. 
98. Letter from Foreign Sec. to Govt, of India to the Pol. Res., 
No. F164-N/29, 29th May, 1928. 
99. I b i d . 
100. Some of the Dawasir t r i b e l a t e r returned to Bahrain i n the late 
1920's but found that conditions there were changed and they f e l t 
that they could no longer l i v e on the island, so they returned 
to Damam. 
C H A P T E R T W O 
THE GROKTH OF POLITICAL AWARENESS (Wti's) 
a) 1934-35 A f f a i r s . 
The early 1930's witnessed the s t a r t of the expansion 
of commerce i n Bahrain as o i l prospectors moved i n and preparations 
were made to exploit the o i l f i nds. P o l i t i c a l l y , however, i t was 
a period of increasing demands. The reforms of the 1920's with the 
setting up of a modern administration with regularised finances, a 
new police force and the customs revenues reformed, opened the 
eyes of the people to the need f o r reforms i n other areas. 
Although the courts had undergone some s l i g h t reforms the 
si t u a t i o n was f a r from satisfactory. The courts had to a certain 
extent been centralised but j u s t i c e s t i l l lay i n the hands of 
the Sunni as i t was administered i n the main by the Al-Khalifah family. 
In the c i v i l courts for instance, there were two levels, the 
Higher Court and the Lower Court. In the former the bench consisted 
of Shaikh Salman, eldest son of Hamed, assisted by Belgrave and the 
lower courts were e n t i r e l y staffed by members of the al-Khalifah, whose 
attitudes were far from tolerant,'' especially to the Shia community. 
As there was no w r i t t e n code of law, procedures were a r b i t r a r y and 
every adjudicator put his own in t e r p r e t a t i o n on the law. Sentences 
for the same of fence were inconsistent from one court or one judge 
to the next, depending e n t i r e l y upon his personal feelings on the 
matter before him. Even two people i n the same court arraigned on 
the same offence were l i k e l y to receive d i f f e r e n t sentences. 
The people who suffered most from these vagaries of j u s t i c e 
tended to be the Shia and the poorer members of the Sunni community, 
namely those without influence. 
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After the 1920 reforms, however, the Shia community had 
begun to realise i t s own p o l i t i c a l strength provided they acted 
i n concert. This was true especially of the new Shia merchant 
2 
class which had begun to blossom i n Manama. 
The dire c t cause of the demands of 1934-35 was the 
inconsistency of the courts which we have already mentioned. 
The troubles began when Belgrave l e f t Bahrain f o r a period 
of leave during the summer of 1934. I n his absence Shaikh Salman 
3 
took sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the courts and, as was the practice, 
decisions on cases were made on the Shaikh's whim. 
The Shia apparently took t h i s opportunity to express t h e i r 
further grievances. They f e l t that j u s t i c e could not be 
administered by the whim of the r u l e r , but that a w r i t t e n code of 
law should be drawn up and applied i n odder that j u s t i c e was the 
same for a l l sections of the community. This, and other demands 
were put to Belgrave and Shaikh Hamed l a t e i n 1934. 
The l i s t of demands, which were presented by eight leading 
4 
members of the Shia community of Manama and the v i l l a g e s , on 
20th December, 1934, read as follows:-
" 1 . Court cases should be dealt with properly 
i n accordance with laws, namely that i n every 
judgment passed i n a case, the section of the 
proper law applied should be quoted. 
2. As we (the Shia) form the majority of the 
inhabitants i t i s but j u s t that we should be 
represented on the Municipal Council and the 
Majlis al-Urf with a proportional number. 
3. We require to restore our r i g h t s on the Board 
of Education of which we have been deprived 
for many years." 
As can be seen the demands consisted basically of two main 
points, the c o d i f i c a t i o n of the law and proportional representation 
on the Majlis al-Urf, Municipality Council and the Board of Education. 
The Shia had small numbers of representatives on Majlis and 
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the Municipality Council but none on the Board of Education, which 
was i n fact hardly i n existence at that time. 
Hamed saw i n the demands similar features to those which 
had preceded his father's enforced abdication. He was bewildered 
and was unsure of the course which he should adopt. Belgrave, 
however, who had a firmer grasp of the s i t u a t i o n advised Hamed not 
to y i e l d to the demands. This view was confirmed by other members 
of the al-Khalifah family. 
Upon receiving t h i s advice, Shaikh Hamed replied to the 
petitioners on the 29th January, 1935 i n a vague manner, promising 
only that a committee would be formed to co l l e c t and codify previous 
decrees and that comparisons would be made with the laws of other 
Islamic countries to choose those which they f e l t could best be applied 
to Bahrain fo r cases i n the c i v i l and criminal courts. He stated 
i n his reply that t h i s could not be undertaken l i g h t l y and that i t 
could not be completed quickly. With regard to the issue of seats 
on the Municifgl Council, Shaikh Hamed agreed to promote the numbers 
of " a l l of our subjects" against those of the foreigners, but added 
that , 
"as you are aware the foreign nationals, 
especially i n Manama, have an important place 
with regard to commercial a c t i v i t i e s and 
finance, but, Inshallah, we w i l l deal with 
the subject i n the forthcoming elections." 
Referring to the matter of the Majlis al-Tujar Hamed's reply 
was t h a t , " i t consists of leading members of various national groups 
and i t i s capable of dealing with cases referred to i t " , and he 
added that i f there were any members of the Shia community with the 
knowledge and a b i l i t y to be of service to the Majlis then his 
appointment would be considered. 
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On the subject of the Board of Education Hamed contented 
himself with saying merely that educational progress was 
satisfactory and that as finances were improved they would 
consider the construction of new schools. 
Apparently these replies did not s a t i s f y the petitioners 
as they soon sought a meeting with Belgrave and Shaikh Hamed. 
The meeting took place on 1st Febnaary 1935, at which Sfekikh 
Hamed, with Belgrave's support, resisted any further concessions,^ 
The p e t i t i o n e r s , attempting to carry t h e i r demands, t o l d Hamed 
that without the support of the Shia he could not continue as 
Shaikh and that unless t h e i r demands were met they would refer 
the matter to the P o l i t i c a l Agent.'' They were prepared to take t h i s 
step as they f e l t that the B r i t i s h authorities had been t h e i r 
firmest supporters i n the past. On the continued refusal of t h e i r 
demands they asked for a meeting with the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
This took place the following day. The committee which 
met L t . Col. G.Loch, the P o l i t i c a l Agent, consisted of only the 
four Shia members from Manama. They stated to Col. Loch that i f 
Shaikh Hamed refused to accept t h e i r demands and lawful means of 
persuasion f a i l e d , they were prepared to take other measures. They 
also t o l d Loch that they had the backing of the entire Shia 
community and that they had friends i n India who were prepared to 
publicise t h e i r cause to the world. 
Although the B r i t i s h were far from happy with Shaikh Hamed's 
administration they continued to support him. Loch's reply to the 
delegates was that the matters raised were of a purely i n t e r n a l 
nature which was w i t h i n the discretion of the Ruler to s e t t l e as he 
thoughTpest. I n addition to t h i s Loch warned the representatives 
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that i f there was any trouble a r i s i n g from the reply to the i r 
demands - "they (the eight committee members) and most of the 
Q 
common f o l k would be held responsible." 
This then was the P o l i t i c a l Agent's public a t t i t u d e . 
Howeverj he wrote to his superior, 
" I t w i l l not be easy for the al-Khalifah 
to maintain t h e i r t r i b a l form of r u l e , but 
i t is i n many respects well-suited to the 
island and measures are gradually being 
taken to adapt i t to the complicated 
and changing circumstances of the Bahrain 
of today."10 
The P o l i t i c a l Resident looked at the s i t u a t i o n from a 
d i f f e r e n t viewpoint, to that of the P o l i t i c a l Agent and Belgrave. 
He considered that the l a t t e r T s r o l e i n the Government of Bahrain 
was alarming. He observed that Belgrave was -
"Judge, Financial Adviser, Head of Police, 
besides other minor jobs, and from the 
p o l i t i c a l point of view i t i s undesirable 
that we should be associated i n public 
opinion with a measure of interference 
i n , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for Bahrain 
in t e r n a l a f f a i r s . " * * 
Fowle, the P o l i t i c a l Resident, suggested that the PolitasM 
Agent should make representations to Shaikh Hamed that he should 
12 
pay regard to the wishes of the majority of his people. 
This point of view was f l a t l y rejected by the Govt, of India 
who stated t h a t , 
"no representations should be addressed to 
the Shaikh suggesting the introduction of 
popular i n s t i t u t i o n s of a democratic nature 
or carry the implication that the support 
of the Government to the Ruling Family w i l l 
depend upon the degree to which the Ruler 
meets the aspirations of the Shia."*^ 
I t appears that the Govt, of India was inclined to the view 
of t h e i r "man on the spot" that the t r i b a l form of government was 
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that most suited to the island, a view which contrasted sharply 
with those held pr i o r to Shaikh Isa's abdication i n 1923. This 
change of a t t i t u d e was probably due to the fact that the B r i t i s h 
authorities now f e l t t h e i r interests to be secure^ and that 
they would be best served by maintaining the status quo. 
Thus i t was brought home to the Shia that yesterday's a l l i e s 
were not prepared to support them further i n what they considered 
t h e i r legitimate demands and i t was from t h i s time that i t became 
necessary for them to cast about i n a search for new a l l i e s who 
shared t h e i r aspirations. I t was t h i s disappointment which l a t e r 
helped close the gap between Sunni and Shia as they joined forces 
to lend weight to t h e i r p o l i t i c a l demands. 
Following the meeting of the 1st February the Government of 
Bahrain kept i t s promise and set up a t r i p a r t i t e committee headed 
by a member of the al-Khalifah along with a member from both the 
Shia and Sunni communities.^"' 
The committee apparently was only a sop to appease public 
opinion as the meeting of the committee were irregular and no 
16 
tangible results were ever achieved. Besides t h i s , the expanding 
economy, as o i l became king during the la t e 1930's, diverted the 
minds of the people for a time from p o l i t i c a l to economic matters, 
b) The 1938 A f f a i r s 
The second half of the 1930's saw the beginnings of the 
material benefits which were to be enjoyed by the Bahrainis. This 
was brought about by the steadily increasing flow of revemaes. 
Besides the natural increase i n employment which was brought about, 
the revenues enabled new departments such as the Public Works and 
Health Services to be set up and the existing departments to be 
expanded. 
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The i n f l u x of foreigners who were either working or 
seeking employment with the o i l company inevitably came into 
close contact with the Bahrainis and opened t h e i r eyes to 
many new ideas and customs. The section of the community which 
was most receptive to these new ideas was the newly emerging 
middle class comprising mainly petty merchants, Government and 
BAPCO employees, and the increasing number of students.^ 
Mith improving communications a greater interest i n foreign 
18 
a f f a i r s was to be found. I r a q i propaganda began to ci r c u l a t e 
f r e e l y and t h i s combined with the a f f a i r s i n Dubai and Kuwait i n 
1938 produced a reaction i n Bahrain as the people studied these 
a f f a i r s , drew lessons from them and compared them to t h e i r 
own situations. 
Locally, however, the Government and BAPCO were both i n 
need of a source of trained labour to carry out the i r operations 
on the island and i t was to India that they both turned for t h e i r 
supply. 
The importation and employment of Indians i n many posts 
i n the Administration and the O i l Industry was seen by the Bahrainis 
as a r e s t r i c t i o n of t h e i r job opportunity and many were prepared 
to exert pressure to remove t h i s new a l i e n influence. 
Belgrave, who at that time had been i n post f o r twelve years, 
completely dominated the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the island,and the very 
fact that he held almost unquestionned authority increased the 
resentment. People often t r i e d to avoid Belgrave's influence by 
contacting the shaikhs through u n o f f i c i a l channels, even t h i s proved 
to be almost impossible f o r as Belgrave stated, 
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"Often when I saw the Shaikh he would 
push some l e t t e r s or petitions i n t o the 
outside pocket of my coat saying s 'Take 
those, read them some other time, and 
deal with them as you think best'".19 
I t seems here that Belgrave enjoyed the complete confidence 
of the Shaikh but not of the new middle classes, who t r i e d to avoid 
him. 
Thus i t was that d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n grew i n the island during 
1938 as the people found no way of expressing t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
without the interference of Belgrave and other foreigners w i t h i n 
the Administration. 
The P o l i t i c a l unrest of 1938 had distinguishing features 
which were not be found i n any of the previous p o l i t i c a l disturbances. 
The f i r s t , and most important, of these features was that for the 
f i r s t time the Shia and Sunni communities combined i n presenting 
a j o i n t p e t i t i o n , and the second was that two levels of leadership 
became apparent as the events progressed. The l a t t e r was to 
introduce f o r the f i r s t time a radical influence to the movements. 
The f i r s t l evel was comprised of certain elements of the merchant 
classes, some of whom had taken part i n the 1934-35 a f f a i r s and were 
accorded some sort of o f f i c i a l and recognised status i n the movement. 
The second l e v e l , however, was composed mainly of students 
and o i l - f i e l d workers who were united i n t h e i r ardent d i s l i k e of 
the high-handed manner of the Administration. 
The p o l i t i c a l atmosphere of the island grew gradually worse 
during 1938 as the people became increasingly d i s s a t i s f i e d and 
f e l t the need for a reform of the Administration. Besides t h i s , 
intrigues were afoot w i t h i n the Ruling Family i t s e l f as Shaikh 
Salman, Hamed's eldest son, had s t i l l not been declared as 
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heir-apparent, a s i t u a t i o n which alarmed him as he saw the 
p o s s i b i l i t y , on the sudden death of his father, of the Family 
20 
electing Shaikh Abdulla as the Ruler of Bahrain. With these 
apprehensions i n mind he encouraged meetings of the leaders 
of the Sunnis and Shia to exert p o l i t i c a l pressures for reforms, 
a l l of which included his naming as heir-apparent. 
These various meetings i n support of Salman were mainly 
21 
organised by Yousef Fakroo, a merchant who took i t upon 
himself to organise support for Salman and to press for 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms. 
The demands which came from these meetings, besides the 
naming of Shaikh Salman as successor to the Ruler, were that, 
a) A Legislative Committee should be formed, 
b) Reforms should be carried out w i t h i n the Police Department 
c) The Laws of Bahrain should be Cofflified. 
d) The Inspector of Education should be dismissed, and 
e) The two Shia Qadis were to be dismissed and replaced 
22 
by others more acceptable to the community. 
Later, two other demands were added. These were that, 
f ) The Nationals of Bahrain should receive preference 
over others for employment by BAPCO. 
g) The members of the Legislative Committee suggested 
(a) should consist of three Shia and three Sunni 
members presided over by Shaikh Salman. 
During the formulating of these demands the Sunni a c t i v i s t s 
t r i e d to e n l i s t the support of t h e i r Qadis, and i n the course of 
doing so, attempted to persuade the Qadis by adding two further r i d e r 
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These were tha t , even with increasing foreign elements on the 
island, r e s t r i c t i o n s should remain on the sale of liquor as 
23 
before and that women should not be emancipated by law. 
These demands, however, were never o f f i c i a l l y presented 
to the Government. The Sunni Qadis were reluctant to be drawn 
into the dispute and expressed the view that the demands should 
be presented not to the Shaikh but to Belgrave, as i f they were 
presented to the former there was very l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of any 
action being taken on them. 
I n view of the reluctance of the Qadis to associate 
themselves with the demands, and the probable evasiveness of Salman 
the merchants l o s t heart and the impetus of the f i r s t l evel of 
leadership dwindled for the time being. 
As there was reluctance to present these demands personally 
i n Bahrain some persons took the opportunity to have them 
publicised abroad. An a r t i c l e appeared i n an Egyptian magazine 
24 
i n September, 1938, which was w r i t t e n anonymously and e n t i t l e d 
"Gloomy despair i n Bahrain, An Ardent C a l l . " The w r i t e r referred 
to the degree of intervention by foreigners i n Bahrain as 
"colonisation" and referred to Belgrave as being detrimental to the 
whole administration. The w r i t e r went on to commend the example 
of the Kuwaitis i n securing t h e i r own Legislative Council. I n a 
c a l l to Arab Nationalism he said, "Give up fear and sloth. Don't 
think that England w i l l put you a l l on the mouths of cannon. These 
are your r i g h t s and we c a l l you i n the name of Nationalism to 
25 
concentrate your cause on the following demands." 
He then summarised the demands as, creating a Legislative 
Council, with Salman as President, the sole power over the 
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Administration to be i n the hands of the Council, only Shaikh 
Hamed to have overriding authority of the Council and that 
foreign influences should be removed. 
The above points expressed popular feeling w i t h i n 
Bahrain at the time but i n the absence of anyone to present 
the demands the second le v e l of leadership, namely the 
students and workers, decided to force the issue. 
Starting i n October public meetings were held i n the 
market places and beside the o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n an attempt 
to express t h e i r feelings and to explain more f u l l y the reasons 
for t h e i r demands. 
Events took a new turn when on the night of 22nd October, 
1938, posters were d i s t r i b u t e d and hung on many houses and 
business establishments throughout the main centres of population 
of the island. 
The posters read as follows. 
"Good news, 0 noble Nation. You w i l l get 
r i d of the oppressions. You have heard i n the 
meetings of headers and speakers of the Nation 
what has proved to you that the oppression 
w i l l be removed from you* Be prepared u n t i l 
you get another order." 
The people behind the poster campaign appeared to be well 
organised as on the 31st October, 1938, another poster appeared 
i n answer to the f i r s t one, which read, 
"We thank the representatives of the Nation 
for t h i s good news which granted the 
removal of oppression we are 
prepared f o r the next order." 
Although the posters were pr i m i t i v e and confused i n th e i r 
message they had t h e i r desired effect i n producing a reaction from 
the Administration. 
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Between the two dates the P o l i t i c a l Agent produced a report 
on the grievances which the Bahrainis were expressing. He stated 
that the grievances expressed to him were that -
1. With regard to education,, the people wished to put things to 
r i g h t s as they disagreed with the policy of the present Inspector, 
who, i n nine years of o f f i c e , had not succeeded i n raisin g the 
standard of education above primary l e v e l . I t was f e l t that 
school-leavers were not s u f f i c i e n t l y educated to be employed even 
as minor clerks. 
2. In the Bahraini courts the judges were uneducated and ignorant 
27 
of the law, besides which, there were no codes to guide them. 
3. As there was no o f f i c i a l Inspector of Police, the PSlice Force 
was i n chaos, and people were often arrested and held without charge. 
Mr. Narayan, Belgrave's secretary, and Mr. Jelaladin of the 
Passport Office, who were both Indians, often interfered i n police 
work. 
4. In the Shariah, the Sunni courts needed to be reorganised and 
that the Shia Qadis were not wanted by the people and that the Shia 
should be allowed to elect two new Qadis who were acceptable to them. 
5. The BAPCO labour relations were bad and the Bahrainis alleged 
that men were dismissed on false pretences before they reached the 
top l e v e l of earnings and re-engaged l a t e r at the lower s t a r t i n g rate 
of pay. I n addition they claimed that the Indians were given 
p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment. 
28 
6. The Secretary of the Municipality was useless and corrupt. 
7. The Passport Office was i n chaos and the Head of the Department 
was accepting bribes for the issue of passports to persons not l e g a l l y 
e n t i t l e d to them. 
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8. The Indians i n the Customs Department were harassing the 
Bahrainis and giving preference to merchants of Indian o r i g i n . 
9. The administration of the Minor's Department should be 
removed from the C i v i l Administration and be returned to the 
Qadis i n the Shariah courts. 
10. The Majlis al-Tujar should be elected, not appointed. 
11. The state of the prisons was inhuman and that "Shaikh Hamed's 
f e t t e r s " , which weighed up to 14 lbs., should be abolished. In 
addition, the c i v i l servants employed the prisoners i n t h e i r 
29 
houses to provide free labour f o r themselves. 
12. Women who engaged i n p r o s t i t u t i o n should be prosecuted Iby the 
30 
police and not protected by them as at present. 
In a l l i t appeared that Belgrave's insistence on attempting 
to oversee a l l the works of the Administration brought him to r e l y 
heavily upon his imported Indian O f f i c i a l s , and that w h i l s t at 
no time could the finger of suspicion be pointed at Belgrave, many 
of these o f f i c i a l s abused t h e i r position of t r u s t and engaged i n 
corrupt practices. 
The P o l i t i c a l Agent appeared to consider that of a l l the 
grievances the one concerning the courts was the important one, 
and he recommended i n his next report that, nwe should advise the 
Shaikh that no member of his Family should be appointed to the 
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court unless he has some t r a i n i n g . " 
On 27th October, the P o l i t i c a l Agent backed up his l e t t e r 
by a telegram to the P o l i t i c a l Resident i n which he stated that 
one of the prime demands of the people was the setting up of an 
Administrative Council to supervise a l l functions of the 
Administration i n order that power should no longer be concentrated 
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i n one person's hands. 
The Bahrain Government, i n an attempt to get to the root 
of the problem, issued a Proclamation stating that, 
The Government also, i n an attempt to placate the Shia, 
took action i n one of the i r complaints and dismissed the most 
unpopular Shia Qadi and his &Serk and appointed three new Qadis 
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i n his place. 
Soon after t h i s Belgrave interviewed those whom he 
considered to be the leading Shia and attempted to persuade them 
to break t h e i r new alliance with the Sunis and modify t h e i r 
demands, i n return for which he promised them more concessions. In t h i s he was pa r t l y successful, for as he reported 
l a t e r , the party he saw made no references to the estteblishment 
of a Legislative Council and th e i r grievances were only the 
absence of a codified system of law and t h e i r lack of representation 
as Shia on the Municipal Council and i n the Government Departments 
3 A 
as they f e l t that the Sunnis held the lion's share of the posts. 
At t h i s stage i t was f e l t that action was needed against 
the agitators for reform. As the P o l i t i c a l Agent pointed out i n 
one of his reports, the more time went by without action against 
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them, the longer time they had to gather support. 
During the f i r s t week of November, rumours were r i f e that a 
st r i k e of the Bahrainis employed by BAPCO was planned to take place 
i n support of the overall p o l i t i c a l reforms demanded. 
Although these rumours at the time perturbed the Government, 
Belgrave f e l t that his e f f o r t s and promises of co-operation would 
"anyone who wished to draw the attention of 
The Government to any matter can ask for an 
interview (with the Shaikh) and state what 
he has i n mind." 
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neutralise the Shia and the view was held that the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of " j o i n t action by the Shia and Sunni appeared to be receding." 
With t h i s i n mind the Government decided to take action 
against the Sunnis. On the 5th November, 1938, Saad al-Shamlan, a 
local Wakil, and Ahmed al-Shirawi, a BAPCO employee, were arrested 
as suspected ringleaders of the disturbances. The following 
day the Government proclaimed that there was no reason for anxiety 
and that business should be as usual and the Government were 
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prepared to take action against any "irresponsible persons". 
The action of the arrests disturbed the public feelings and the 
Government proclamation did l i t t l e to calm them. 
As soon as the arrests became known, on the 6th November, 
a large crowd of students and BAPCO workers gathered i n the 
Grand Friday Mosque i n Manama, baricaded themselves i n and demanded 
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to see the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
When the l a t t e r refused to see them on the grounds that 
they were Bahraini subjects, they formed a demonstration procession, 
paraded through the streets to the market place and closed down the 
market i n protest. 
I n the evening of that day the Government again took action 
and arrested A l i - b i n Khalifah al-Fadhl, a former secretary to the 
Municipal Council, as the leader of the demonstration. 
39 
As the arrests proceeded the younger element became more 
furious and on the 8th November l e a f l e t s were dis t r i b u t e d i n 
Manama, demanding a general s t r i k e u n t i l such time as the 
prisoners were released and also praising the unity of the people. 
They were signed by the "Society of Free Youth". 
Whilst t h i s was going on Belgrave again interviewed the 
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Shia leaders and extracted from them a promise to keep the Shia 
quiet and uninvolved as the arrested persons were Sunnis. BAPCO 
also issued a statement saying i n effect that unless the workers 
did not return to th e i r jobs by 9th November they would be 
,. . , 40 dismissedo 
The Society of Free Youth, which apparently kept the names 
of i t s members secret, bombarded the P o l i t i c a l Agent w i t h l e t t e r s 
and p e t i t i o n s . Their demands ranged over both the p o l i t i c a l and 
i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d s and included the following;-
1) The freeing of the arrested men and the declaring 
of a general amnesty. 
2) The establishment of both a Judiciary and Education 
Council. 
3) The setting up of a Workers' Council and regulation 
of the hours of work.^* 
Except for the specific demand for the freeing of the 
arrested men, the other demands are characterised by t h e i r 
vagueness as they detailed nothing of the proposed composition 
and objectives of the Councils demanded. 
Due to the lack of leadership the students and workers were 
unable to maintain support for the s t r i k e , which started to collapse 
A 2 
afte r the 10th November. I t did make i t s point, however, i n 
showing the extent of the p o l i t i c a l unrest which was present on the 
island. 
The P o l i t i c a l Resident for instance, asked for a report on 
the progress of the ad hoc committee which had been set up i n 1935 
A 3 
to consider the codifying of Bahrain law and Shaikh Hamed l a t e r 
asked the B r i t i s h to help him i n obtaining the services of an expert 
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i n legal matters from either Egypt or Sudan.**** 
With the collapse of the s t r i k e a committee was formed 
to continue the struggle f o r t h e i r demands and to t r y to obtain 
them by more peaceful means. 
This committee was formed of the moderate elements, a l l the 
committee members were merchants, and some of them had been 
involved i n the discussions with Shaikh Salman to which we 
referred e a r l i e r . Their f i r s t action was to present, on the 
12th November, f i v e specific demands. These were as follows:-
"1) Education. To form a committee of eight members, 
four Sunnis and four Shias. This committee to 
supervise education, arrange curriculum of studies 
for the schools, employ headmasters and teachers 
from outside and send students abroad. 
2) Courts. To improve the courts by changing the 
present magistrates and to form a bench of three 
judges, one Sunni, one Shia and one to be the 
choice of the Government, for each court. To form 
a special criminal court of one judge only employed 
from Iraq; and should be employed u n t i l such time 
as a Bahrain subject w i l l be able to take his place. 
3) Municipalities. To improve the municipalities by 
appointing Bahrain subjects i n place of foreigners. 
4) Labour Committee. To form a Labour Committee 
acknowledged o f f i c i a l l y by the Government to look 
a f t e r the a f f a i r s of Bahraini labourers whether they 
are employed by companies or others and to protect 
t h e i r r i g h t s . 
5) To avoid any uninteational misunderstanding i n future 
between the Government and the people we request the 
selection of six persons, three Sunnis and three 
Shia to represent the people."^5 
The demands were moderate indeed as they contained no reference 
to the setting up of a Legislative Council, but instead asked only f o r 
a Consultative Council to avoid misunderstandings. Nor did they make 
any reference to the burning issue of Belgrave's maladministration 
which had been the target of the pamphleteers when they claimed t h a t , 
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"we started demanding the dismissal of t h i s 
man who l i v e s on the income of the nation and 
is not ashamed of i n t r i g u i n g against them. 
No sooner had we claimed these ri g h t s p u b l i c l y 
than the despotic nature of the Adviser was 
enraged. He imprisoned some of us without 
t r i a l and ordered the Police to beat our 
countrymen, wi t h sticks and r i f l e butts. We 
respect and l i k e H.H. Shaikh Hamed and our 
l o y l a t y to him w i l l no doubt make us confident 
that H.H. w i l l favour his nation by dismissing 
t h i s individual who i s not wanted i n t h i s 
country."46 
The Government replied promptly to the f i v e demands of the 
merchants on the 13th November, 1938. In the reply the Shaikh 
agreed to the setting up of an Advisory Council for Education but 
denied them the power of f i n a n c i a l control or the appointment and 
dismissal of s t a f f and suggested that an o f f i c i a l of the Ministry 
of Education, Baghdad should v i s i t Bahrain to look at the school 
administration and report to the Government. 
The setting up of the Advisory Council, however, did not 
materialise at that time although the second suggestion was acted 
upon. 
With reference to the demands concerning the courts Shaikh 
Hamed replied that he thought t h i s demand to be " e n t i r e l y 
unconstitutional"J and that the "magistrates should be appointed 
by the Government, not elected by the people". 
To the matter concerning the Municipalities he expressed the 
opinion that the matters raised would be best dealt with by the 
Municipality Councils themselves. He went on to say that he was not 
aware of a preponderance of foreigners on the s t a f f s of the 
municipalities. 
Concerning the appointment of a Labour Committee he disagreed 
with the suggestion that such a Committee should be established. He 
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suggested instead the appointment of one person, as a Bahrain 
Government representative, to act a go-between i n discussions 
between Bahraini employees and BAPCO. 
He also refused the l a s t request, for a Consultative 
Committee as he saw no need for such a body and considered, 
"that the proposed committee would embarrass the Government 
and give r i s e to disturbances."^ 
Despite these rather sceptical censures to the requests 
Belgrave went even fu r t h e r , and i n order to prove that not a l l 
Bahrainis were i n favour of the demands he turned to the t r i b a l 
structure which t r a d i t i o n a l l y supported the al-Khalifah and 
obtained from them l e t t e r s stating that they disassociated 
themselves from the demands and that they had at no time been 
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consulted about them. 
The o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h reactions seemed to be contradictory. 
The P o l i t i c a l Agent, Weightman, tended to back up Belgrave's 
point of view that everything was under control and would very 
soon s e t t l e down, as they considered the agitators to be i n the 
minority. The p o l i t i c a l Resident, however, expressed other views. 
He considered that the Bahrain people had no "legal channels" 
through which to express t h e i r grievances and he suggested 
that i t would be advisable to set up an Advisory Council f o r t h i s 
49 
purpose. 
The P o l i t i c a l Agent, however, argued that there was no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the Shaikh accepting an Advisory Council and went 
on to say that furthermore the administration was a " B r i t i s h 
Administration", and that, " i f we support an Advisory Council, 
Belgrave's and de Grenier's would be an embarrassing position, 
- 346 -
and we should not appear to be supporting the rebels.""^ 
He concluded his l e t t e r by saying that i n his opinion the 
Bahrain Government was a "good government"."^ 
Although the P o l i t i c a l Resident replied to t h i s by 
saying that "good government (by the B r i t i s h ) was no substitute 
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for self-government", The P o l i t i c a l Agent's point of view 
carried the day and no actions were taken to set matters to 
ri g h t s . 
BAPCO also took strong measures against the leaders of 
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the s t r i k e w i t h i n the company and dismissed eighteen of them. 
When at a la t e r date, representations were made by the 
Sharia Qadis to Shaikh Hamed for the release of the prisoners 
arrested during the troubles, the P o l i t i c a l Agent advised him 
not to do so and t o l d Shaikh Hamed that he should t e l l the Qadis 
to mind t h e i r own business. 
I n December Shaikh Hamed appointed Shaikh A l i b i n Ahmed 
al-Khalifah as the Government Representative to BAPCO. His terms 
of reference, however, were very limited and f e l l far short of 
the Committee's demands. 
Belgrave, however, succeeded i n hushing up the matters 
which arose during the troubles and expressed his opinions i n 
two long l e t t e r s to the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
He dismissed the unrest as being fermented by people with 
personal grievances and considered the leaders to be acting 
e n t i r e l y from s e l f - i n t e r e s t and not from any regard for the people. 
His views on the proposed Advisory Council were summed up as follows 
"The words 'Executive' or 'Advisory' mean nothing 
to the people of Bahrain. The i n s t i t u t i o n of a 
Council by orders of the B r i t i s h Government would 
be universally regarded as the f o r c i b l e removal of 
power and authority from the hands of the Shaikh 
and his successors."-'^ 
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As to the Shaikh's views on the council, Belgrave continued, 
"The idea of the Council has been discussed 
by the Shaikhs since the recent p o l i t i c a l 
unrest. They one and a l l regard any 
suggestion of a Council as being the swan-song 
of the Khalifah as Rulers of Bahrain. The 
Shaikhs believe that the B r i t i s h Government 
would not wish to undermine t h e i r position 
as Rulers of Bahrain. They are certain that 
with a Council i n Bahrain (however i t might 
be styled or formed) the Khalifah would not 
remain the Ruling Family. 
Belgrave i n the second l e t t e r regarded his position as sine qua non. 
He wrote, 
" I f e e l that I should say that His Highness and 
his brothers and the people who have voiced 
t h e i r complaints have a l l stated that i f I had 
remained i n the Courts the present complaints 
would not have been made. 1 knew that t h i s was 
In r e f e r r i n g to the Court here Belgrave appeared to be 
thinking s t i l l i n terms of the 1934-35 a f f a i r s but s t i l l ignored 
the fact that there was no codified law, a fact which was now 
irrelevant as i t was now only one of many complaints. 
The most important p o l i t i c a l demands which was made, however, 
was the formation of a Legislative Council along the lines of those 
of Kuwait and Dubai, which although they were short-lived f i r e d the 
inspirations of the Bahrain people. I t had been stated that a Gulf 
Committee was formed i n Basra during 1938 to advance the ideas of 
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self-determination throughout the Gulf Area. There appears to have 
been no dire c t contact, however, with the people of Bahrain although 
the w r i t e r did f i n d a number of t h e i r l e a f l e t s which had been 
circulated there during late 1938. 
In summing up i t may be said that although the 1938 a f f a i r s 
produced very few tangible proofs of progress, t h i s m$y have been due 
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to a lack of organised leadership and the calculated reactions 
of Belgrave. I t d i d , however, give us proof of the growth of a 
mobilised public and a greater p o l i t i c a l awareness, especially 
amongst the younger generation of students and workers who had 
experienced the effects of modern communications. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This of course did not apply to a l l members of the al-Khalifah, 
as we have mentioned before 9 as at that time some of the members 
of the family suffered pangs of conscience over the Shia s i t u a t i o n . 
One of them, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Wahab 
al-Khalifah, whose father was known as the "Wazir" of Shaikh 
Isa, was moved i n early 1934 to declare himself a Shia. See l e t t e r 
from Col. G. Loch, Pol. Agent, to the Pol. Res., T.C. Fowle, 
7th Nov., 1934. 
2. Starting from the second half of the 1920's many Shia gravitated 
towards Manama and some of them set up shops and became 
prosperous merchants. There were of course Shia merchants p r i o r 
to t h i s time, but they were very few and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l actions 
were l i m i t e d . Prior to t h i s time most p o l i t i c a l action tended 
to be i n i t i a t e d by the r e l i g i o u s leaders. 
3. Letter from Pol. Agent to Shaikh Hamed, No. C/98 dated 8th Feb. 
1934, also l e t t e r from Shaikh Hamed to P.A. dated 23rd Du al-Qada 
1353 A.H. (9th March 1934). I t should be borne i n mind that t h i s 
was not Belgrave's f i r s t absence but that i t was i n d i r e c t l y a 
cause of the troubles. 
4. The representatives were Mansoor al-Areydh, Mohsen a l - T a j i r Abdul 
Rasoor bin Rajab, Abd A l i al-Aliwat, Abdul Aziz al-Boory, A l i 
bin Abas a l - A a l i , Hasan bin Mohammed al-Marhoon a l - B i l a d i and 
Ahmed bin Nasr al-Barbari. The f i r s t four were from Manama. 
5. Majlis al-Urf had apparently begun to lose i t s powers of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n and was i n the process of being replaced by the 
Majlis al-Tujar, whose function was l a t e r mainly to safeguard the 
interests of merchants. 
6. Being aware of Shaikh Hamed's weakness we may assume that Belgrave 
was the mastermind behind the handling of the whole a f f a i r . 
7. Letter from C. Belgrave to the P.A,, L t . Col. G. Loch dated 
4th Feb., 1935. 
8. As early as 1932 the P.R., H.V. Biscoe, w r i t i n g to the For. Sec. to 
the Govt, of India, stated t h a t , " I have never had any i l l u s i o n s 
regarding Shaikh Hamed, I have always considered him to be a 
perfectly useless i n d i v i d u a l , u t t e r l y u n f i t t e d to perform the 
duties of r u l e r of Bahrain". Dated 25th Feb., 1932. 
9. Letter from L t . Col. G. Loch, to P.R., No. C/112/1 - lb dated 
18th Feb. 1935. 
10. 
I b i d . 
11. Letter from Col. T.C. Fowle, P.R., to the For. Sec. to the Govt, 
of India, No. C/43 dated 18th March, 1935. 
12. I b i d . 
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13. Letter from Dept. for Sec. to the Govt, of India to the 
P.R., No. F.235.N/53 dated 6th Nov., 1935. 
14. At t h i s time the o i l concessions had been f i r m l y established 
and furthermore negotiations had been completed i n A p r i l of 
that year for the establishment of a naval base on the island. 
See Belgrave "Personal Column", p.106. B u r r e l l , R.M. i n his 
a r t i c l e on the Gulf, published i n "Arabian Peninsular" 
op. c i t . , p.168 stated that the agreement on the naval base was 
not signed u n t i l 12th Oct. 1934. In addition to t h i s the 
newly established a i r lines were beginning to use Muharraq as 
a staging point on the India route. 
15. The committee was headed by Shaikh Salman, the other members 
being Yousef b i n Ahmed Kanoo (Sunni) and Mansoor al-Arayed (Shia). 
See Govt, of Bahrain Proclamation No. 1038, 6a dated 9th March, 
1935, also Belgrave's l e t t e r to the P.A., No. 256, dated 3rd 
March, 1935. 
16. I t has been reported that at a meeting on 18th January, 1936 
which was attended by the P.A., P.R., Belgrave and Shaikh 
Abdulla b i n Hamed (who apparently replaced Salman as head of 
committee)m i t was decided that the areas of law to be covered 
were 1 a) Diving Law, b) I r r i g a t i o n Laws, c) Land Laws, d) Fish 
Traps, e) Bankruptcy, and f ) Motor Vehicles. I n Feb., 1937 
an interim report was issued which stated that i n addition to 
the above they were also considering matters concerning 
g) Pre-emption, h) Court and case regulations, i ) Inter-Pleaders 
j ) Rules governing Wakils, and k) Partnerships. See l e t t e r from 
P.A. to Pol. R., No. C/16 - lb/5, dated 24th Feb., 1937. 
17. I n 1935 the f i r s t modern p r i n t i n g press was i n s t a l l e d i n Bahrain 
by the pioneer Abdulla al-Zayed. See Al-Khatir, M. "Nabighah 
al-Bahrain", Arabian Co., Bahrain, 1972, p.38. The year 1937 
also saw the opening i n Bahrain of the f i r s t cinema i n the Gulf 
Area. 
18. King Ghazi's encouragement of propaganda became a bye-word i n 
Bahrain and a folksong praising him and d e t a i l i n g t h e i r grievances 
against foreigners ( B r i t i s h and Indian) became very popular i n 
Bahrain. 
19. Belgrave, CD. op.cit., p.68. 
20. Shaikh Hamed secretly appointed Shaikh Salman as heir-apparent 
during 1940, (Belgrave o p . c i t . , p.118 & 124) but Shaikh Salman 
was not informed u n t i l 1942. The method of appointing successors 
i n the Gulf States was precarious indeed, i t being usual for the 
successor to be named by the dying Ruler at the l a s t moment. I t 
has been suggested that Shaikh Abdulla al-Salim sympathised w i t h 
the 1938 movement i n Kuxrait probably i n order to secure his status 
as potential successor muc|s as Shaikh Salman did. The same (contd.).. 
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20 . eontd..., .. 
si t u a t i o n occurred i n Dubai i n 1938 when Shaikh Ju:raaal-Maktum 
supported the demands there for a Legislative Council to gain 
support against his brother Said, who was the Ruler, and the 
Ruler's son Rashid. Mana, the ruler's uncle was also ac t i v e l y 
involvedo The Kuwaiti a f f a i r s are alluded to i n "Al Jamal Yahya" -
"The Constitutional Methods i n Kuwait" - Kuwait Univ. Press 
(Arabic) 1970-71, p.130. See also Al-Adsani, Khalid, "Half Year 
of Constitutional Rule i n Kuwait" - Arabic 1947. As to the Dubai 
a f f a i r s evidence i s very scant even to t h i s day arid most references 
are based on hearsay. 
21. Fakroo, A Sunni, contacted Mohasin and Mohammed al-Taji-r and 
Said Ahmed al-Alawi, who were a l l Shia, and meetings took place 
at f i r s t i n the garden of Shaikh Salman. After a few meetings 
they were joined by two other Sunnis, Mohammed b i n Yousef b i n 
Nasr and Abdul L a t i f bin Mashari. 
22. This demand was added a f t e r a meeting took place at Sanabis 
v i l l a g e i n the house of Ahmed bin Qamis (Shia). 
23. With the i n f l u x of foreigners rumours were r i f e that the sale of 
alcohol was to be made legal. With regard to women the former 
practice of the P o l i t i c a l Agents of protecting women had been 
taken over by the courts who granted women "freedom" from t h e i r 
families. This freedom had been abused as many women so freed 
had turned to p r o s t i t u t i o n . The sit u a t i o n became such that 
the mainland peoples associated the Bahrain "Huriyah" or freedom, 
with p r o s t i t u t i o n . The people who t r i e d to e n l i s t the Qadis to 
th e i r cause were Kahil al-Mouaid, Yousef Kanoo and Abdul Rahman 
al-Zayani. 
24. "Al Rabita al-Arabia", 14th Sept. 1938, a monthly magazine started 
i n Cairo i n 1936 by a well-known h i s t o r i a n , Amin Said, with the 
object of promoting Arab Nationalism. 
25. Belgrave suspected the following people as possibly being authors 
of the a r t i c l e , Ibrahim a l Arayed, A l i - a l - T a j a r , Said Mahmoud al-Alawi, 
Mohammed Dowarkr, ( a l l Shia), and Abdulla al-Zayed and Mohammed S. 
al-Sharawi (Sunni). Si g n i f i c a n t l y a l l were young people, some 
holding government posts such as Dowerkr, head of the Minors' Dept. 
and Mahmoud al-Alawi, head of Belgrave's Advisory Bureau. The 
l a t t e r i s now Minister of Finance for Bahrain. 
26. Letter from the Pol. Agent, H. Weightman to the Pol. Res., T. Fowle, 
dated 24th Oct. 1938. 
27. The judges were at that time a l l for the Al-Khalifah family. They 
were Shaikhs Mobarak and Doyaj, sons of Shaikh Hamed, Shaikh A l i bin 
Ahmed, Shaikh Mohammed bin A l i , and Shaikh A l i bin Mohammed. These 
Shaikhs sat i n the Lower Joint Courts assisted by an Indian w n o w a s 
P o l i t i c a l Agent Assistant. 
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28. This was Mohammed Salah al-Shater who took up o f f i c e i n 1934 
and who s t i l l holds i t to the present day. 
29. Narayan, Belgrave's secretary, and Mohammed K h a l i l , the Indian 
head of the Land Dept. were often mentioned i n connection with 
t h i s practice. 
30. A l l these points were mentioned i n a l e t t e r from the Pol. Agent 
to the Pol. Resident dated 26th Oct., 1938, 
31. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., No. C/666/ - lb/5 dated 
27th Oct., 1938. 
32. Also mentioned i n the telegram was the resentment of Belgrave's 
power and the feeling that i f he stayed i t should be only as 
Financial Adviser. He ci t e d the agitators as Mohasin and 
Mohammed a l - T a j i r , Said bin Said Khalfan, Abd A l i al-Aliwafr r 
Mansoor al-Arayed, Said Ahmed al-Alawi ( a l l Shia), and A l i 
Abdulla Abul, Ibrahim bin Jowder, Sa'ad al-Shamlan, A l i bin Khalifah 
al-Fadhl, K h a l i l al-Mouaid and some of the Kanoo's (Sunni). 
33. Shaikh A l i bin Safer was dismissed and Bakr al-Asfoor, A l i bin 
Hassan and Mohammed Kar i , were appointed from a Joint Shia Court. 
Shaikh Abdul Mouhasin a l H e l l i , who had been recently recruited 
from Iraq, was appointed Appelate Qadi. 
34. Letter from Belgrave to Weightman dated 3rd Nov., 1938. He met 
Mohasin and Mohammed a l - T a j i r , Mansoor al-Arayed, Said Saied, 
Tahr Mohasin and Abdulla Abo Deeb. 
35. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., 3rd Nov., 1938, 
36. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., No. C/680-ib/S, 5th Nov., 1938. 
37. Proclamation No. 3/1357, 6th Nov., 1938. 
38. The si t u a t i o n was exacerbated when Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa and 
some of his bodyguards attacked the demonstrators i n the mosque 
and beat many of them. 
39. A t o t a l of four people were arrested and held i n custody. The 
fourth being another local Wakil, Ibrahim Kamal. The l e t t e r was 
one of the writer's sources of information for the events of t h i s 
period. 
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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
TEE YEARS OF CONFLICTS (1950's) 
a) The Background 1938-53 
The post-war period i n Bahrain witnessed the growing 
p o l i t i c a l maturity of the Bahrainis. This growth became increasingly 
apparent, especially during the 1950's, which were yet another 
episode i n the struggle which had started i n earnest during the 
1930's. 
This came about i n part due to the establishment of greater 
physical and social communications during the war years with 
items such as the completion i n 1941 of Shaikh Hamed's causeway, 
l i n k i n g the two main islands, which promoted mobility between 
the communities and also the establishment, with B r i t i s h 
encouragement, of the l o c a l newspaper "Al-Bahrain". I t was 
started i n March, 1939 and was quickly used as a propaganda medium 
by the B r i t i s h for the A l l i e d cause.''" Although i t was mainly 
international war news which was published, the able edi t o r , 
Abdulla al-Zayed, took a deep interest i n social, economic and 
sometimes p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s , not only of the island but of the 
whole Gulf area. 
Al-Zayed, who usually wrote under a nom de plume, often 
c r i t i c i s e d the Government and BAPCO for various aspects of t h e i r 
p o l i c i e s . 
"Al-Bahrain" was also used by other men of l e t t e r s outside 
Bahrain to express t h e i r opinions. Prominent wr i t e r s such as 
Abdul Razakh al-Basir of Kuwait, Mohammed A l i Lugman of Saudi 
Arabia and others made use of the newspaper to disseminate t h e i r 
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ideas.^ 
On 4th November, 1940 the Bahrain Broadcasting Station 
was s t a r t e d s under the auspices of the B r i t i s h authorities i n 
the Gulf. Like the newspaper i t s prime objective was to spread 
war propaganda to the region i n the face of growing Axis 
broadcasts. 
The spread of p o l i t i c a l propaganda during the war opened 
the people's minds further so that they began to examine 
c r i t i c a l l y t h e i r own status. Despite the fact that i t was 
i l l e g a l at that time to l i s t e n to the Berlin. Arab Service 
broadcasts many Arabs i n fact did so, and assessed for themselves 
the c o n f l i c t i n g views presented. 
Because of the past B r i t i s h policies i n t h e i r treatment 
of the Bahrainis, a number were only too w i l l i n g to l i s t e n to 
the Axis broadcasts and one contemporary w r i t e r described how the 
people of Bahrain were clandestinely repeating news of the Berlin 
broadcasts i n the majlis and coffee shops and that some carried 
copies of H i t l e r ' s book, "Mein Kampf", concealed i n t h e i r garments. 
The p o l i t i c a l atmosphere, although not ac t i v e l y h o s t i l e to the 
B r i t i s h , was far from being p r o - B r i t i s h , i n spite of the intensive 
4 
A l l i e d propaganda. 
Having played t h e i r part i n the war e f f o r t the newspaper 
and the broadcasting station ceased to e x i s t . ^ One of the by-products 
of t h e i r existence, however, was the tremendous impact they had 
i n forming the future p o l i t i c a l conduct of the Bahrainis. They 
learnt f i r s t hand the ways and means of modern media and how to 
apply these media i n t h e i r own c o n f l i c t s . 
During t h i s period (1938-53) the Bahrainis also participated 
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i n the setting up of various clubs and societies which, whilst 
they were formed ostensibly as sporting or c u l t u r a l societies, 
rapidly developed into crucibles of p o l i t i c a l thought for the 
exchange of ideas and views. 
The passing of the L i t e r a r y Club towards the end of 
the 1920*s which we cited e a r l i e r , l e f t a vacuum which was not 
f i l l e d u n t i l the l a t e 1930's. 
In 1937, for instance, the "Al-Shabiba" f o o t b a l l club 
i n Muharraq, changed i t s name to "Nadi al-Bahrain" following 
i t s move from the f i e l d of sport to social and c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
This was the f i r s t of a number of clubs which followed s u i t and 
engaged i n other than sporting a c t i v i t i e s . 
A number of the Muharraq notables associated themselves 
with the new society. The f i r s t president of the club was Abdul 
Aziz al-Shamlan, who w i l l be mentioned again l a t e r . A year 
l a t e r the " a l - A h l i " club was founded i n Manama to draw together 
the enlightened elements of that town. This was followed by the 
formation of the "Nadi al-Aruba" (The Pan-Arabism Club) i n 1942. 
The l a t t e r was founded mainly on the i n i t i a t i v e of the Shia community 
and a small number of enlightened Sunnis. 
These were followed by other clubs and societies throughout 
the towns and villages of Bahrain. 
I n i t i a l l y they were formed as meeting places where interested 
parties could gather to discuss world a f f a i r s and participate i n 
other a c t i v i t i e s . They also served as a substitute for the local 
news media due to lack of newspapers or broadcasting service between 
the years of 1945 and 1949. 
The clubs and societies flourished a f t e r the war and reached 
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t h e i r peak during the early 1950's. 
The membership of the clubs covered a wide f i e l d and 
included such groups as students and graduates of the Secondary 
School, petty merchants, employees of foreign companies, 
schoolmasters, other Arabs and Bahrainis. 
I t may safely be assumed that these clubs served as the 
catalyst for p o l i t i c a l ideas, enhanced and lubricated by the 
growing material prosperity and the growth of l i t e r a c y , 
Belgrave expressed his apprehensions at the r o l e these 
clubs began to play on the internal p o l i t i c a l scene especially 
i n the post-war years and early 1950's as follows:-
v "Bahrain was quiet yet I was aware of a 
, new ?indefinable feeling of an emerging 
p o l i t i c a l consciousness. One sign of 
t h i s was the increasingly important 
part which the Arab clubs played i n the 
l i v e s of the educated young men." 
During the 1940's Bahrain was not free from p o l i t i c a l and 
i n d u s t r i a l unrest. In 1942-43 the previously described o i l - f i e l d 
s t r i k e took place, which was followed by a similar period of 
unrest i n 1947-48. One contemporary Arab w r i t e r ^ placed the blame 
for the l a t t e r on the Shaikhs, whereas i t was more probably due 
to the local policies of BAPCO. 
P o l i t i c a l problems aft 4>ther parts of the Arab world also 
had t h e i r e f f e c t , mainly on the occasion of the proposed p a r t i t i o n 
of Palestine between Jews and Arabs. The Bahrainis took to the 
streets to demonstrate th e i r support of the Arab cause i n l a t e 1947. 
Apart from t h i s the local branch of the Moslem Brotherhood 
sponsored a token force to take part i n the Palestinian War. This 
small force did i n fact take part i n the f i g h t i n g i n Palestine i n 
1948. 
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The B r i t i s h policy v i s a v i s the Gulf Area had also 
undergone some changes during t h i s period. Against a background 
of decreasing influence i n Persia and an increasing interest i n 
the Gulf p r i n c i p a l i t i e s , Bahrain became the focal point of 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t . The Residency was transferred from Bushire 
g 
to Bahrain and the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force i n s t a l l a t i o n s 
became the main B r i t i s h bases i n the Gulf. 
Following the independence of India and Pakistan i n 1947 
the authority for the Gulf Area was handed over by the India 
Office to H.M.G.'8 Foreign Office i n London. This new s i t u a t i o n 
of d i r e c t contact with London, without intermediaries, brought 
about a new style i n the implementation of policies which had 
not previously been experienced. 
During the early years of the 1950?s Bahrain was i n a 
state of p o l i t i c a l turmoil; although i n the beginning i t was 
immature i t was immensely robust. Broadsheets were dis t r i b u t e d 
under d i f f e r e n t names demanding p o l i t i c a l and administrative 
reforms. Many of the former members of 1938 - Society of Free 
Youth and others had now grown up and were searching for ways 
to express t h e i r feelings and ideas. A number of interested 
parties obtained permission to edit and publish a monthly 
magazine which took the name of "Sout al-Bahrain" (The Voice 
9 
of Bahrain) and commenced publication i n l a t e 1949. 
Abdul Rahman al-Baker, who we w i l l mention i n more d e t a i l 
l a t e r , was ac t i v e l y involved i n the venture. 
"Sout al-Bahrain", during i t s f i v e year l i f e , made a deep 
impression on the p o l i t i c a l , social and c u l t u r a l l i f e not only of 
Bahrain, but also of the surrounding regions, by providing a 
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platform f o r the viewpoints d>f a l l social classes and age groups. 
The eloquent a r t i c l e s touched on a l l aspects of l i f e i n the 
islands. 
Other newspapers followed i n the wake of the "Sout al-Bahrain". 
(The o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n of these newspapers was to publish d a i l y 
but i n fact most published only weekly). These new papers 
included those such as "Al-Qafilah", which l a t e r changed i t s name 
to "Al-Watan". under the editorship of A l i Sayer, "Al-Mizan" and 
"Al-Khamila". 
"Al-Qafilah/Al-Watan" were probably the most bona fi d e i n 
t h e i r approach to the existence of l o c a l problems and they were 
not slow to openly c r i t i c i s e , and often antagonise, the administration. 
During the period under review (1938-53), the economy 
flourished, the o i l industry i n Bahrain estimated i t s local 
disbursments at s l i g h t l y over 41 m i l l i o n rupees.^ 
Up to the end of 1372 AH. (9th Sept. 1953) the purchase 
value of the Reserve Fund amounted to 46.45 m i l l i o n rupees (face 
value of maturity 49.32 m i l l i o n Rs.)^"* 
With t h i s increased material prosperity the Bahrainis s t i l l 
f e l t the need for an increased p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the a f f a i r s of 
the administration of the island, which manifested i t s e l f i n 
the views expressed by the newspapers. 
Belgrave, on his return to the island i n l a t e 1953 
observed 9 
"We (Belgrave and Shaikh Salman) returned to Bahrain 
i n September (1953)„ Outwardly everything seemed 
as before, but I soon found that below the surface 
there was a strange undercurrent of p o l i t i c a l unrest. 
I t manifested i t s e l f by floods of anonymous notices 
and l e t t e r s and by v i o l e n t a r t i c l e s i n the lo c a l 
press. The l o c a l newspapers were edited by 
irresponsible young men who found that the more ^ 
v i o l e n t l y they wrote the better sales they had." 
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The press was i n fact only echoing the growing 
discontent f e l t towards the administration and the status quo. 
Although Shaikh Salman had assumed the Rulership i n 1942, up to 
1953 there had been no change i n either the styl e or p o l i t i c a l 
machinery of the Government and very few advances had been made 
i n other f i e l d s such as welfare. 
Belgrave, as sole i n i t i a t o r and executor of a l l policies 
drawn up, seemed reluctant, apart from creating a few small 
essential departments, to widen the concept of the government. 
I t was s t i l l , f or example, v i r t u a l l y impossible to complete 
a course of Higher Education on the island, and his a t t i t u d e to 
administrative and legal reforms appeared to be summed up by his 
reported remarks to a Bahraini student of law when he said, 
"Why are you studying law? Bahrain w i l l not need lawyers for a 
13 
hundred years to come", t h i s despite the fact that the 
Bahrainis had attempted to have a q u a l i f i e d judge appointed as 
early as 1934. 
His a t t i t u d e towards education and edueated people by 
and large, i s possibly explained by his nostalgic statement t h a t , 
"education continued to be a permanent 
'pain i n the neck'. I often wondered whether 
i n the long run i t did not do more harm than 
good to the people of Bahrain. Every year a 
large proportion of the population became 
l i t e r a t e , to the extent of being able to 
read and w r i t e , but I don't think were any 
happier than they used to be."*^ 
As to his style of government and his method of i n i t i a t i n g new 
projects he wrote, 
"When I wanted to introduce something new I 
found that the best plan, after obtaining the 
Shaikh's consent, was to explain my idea to 
two or three leading Arabs, not always the same 
men, and after being taken into my confidence 
they came to regard the project as t h e i r own and 
therefore gave i t t h e i r support." 1- > 
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His descriptions of working i n the garden of his weekend 
house of Jidda Island, the prison colony, with the prisoners, 
and of his fish-doping expeditions with both police and prisoners'^ 
leads one to conclude that he saw himself i n the r o l e of a 
co l o n i a l f s t y l e D i s t r i c t Officer with almost complete powers to do 
as he wished. Circumstances and times, however, had changed and 
th i s r o l e was no longer v a l i d , a point which the people, i f not 
Belgrave, appeared to appreciate. 
This then was the si t u a t i o n inside Bahrain, but outside 
Bahrain, especially i n the Arab world and other countries around 
the Gulf, there were new and far-reaching events taking place. 
Egypt's revolution of 1952 and the growth of the influence of 
Pan-Arabism i n the Levant did not pass without t h e i r effects upon 
the people of Bahrain. Furthermore, Mossadeq's confrontation with 
the B r i t i s h also made i t s impact. But by and large the Bahrainis 
began to turn more and more to Cairo for t h e i r aspirations during the 
1950's, as against t h e i r observance of the events i n Baghdad 
during the 1930's. This, i n combination with the i n t e r n a l 
s i t u a t i o n , combined to produce the ingredients of the p o l i t i c a l 
confrontations of 1953-56. 
b) The Conflicts of 1953-56 
As we may note from the preceding section the p o l i t i c a l 
scene i n Bahrain was one of turmoil. The new i n t e l l i g e n s i a were 
no longer prepared to tolerate the tutelage of Belgrave. On the 
mainland, especially i n the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia 
and i n Kuwait, the prosperity brought about by o i l had made a much 
greater impact upon the material prosperity of the people there, 
than had taken place i n Bahrain. The Bahrainis, especially those 
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who had experienced the higher wages and standards of l i v i n g of 
the o i l workers of the mainland, considered the s i t u a t i o n of the 
Bahrainis to be humiliating i n comparison. 
I r o n i c a l l y , however, the spark which caused the p o l i t i c a l 
unrest was a t r a d i t i o n a l one, the c u l t u r a l gap between the Sunnis 
and Shia. In September 1953, during the celebration of Muharram, 
a Shia f e s t i v a l , a number of scuffles and serious r i o t s took place 
which were l a t e r a t t r i b u t e d to a c h i l d i s h action by one of the 
A l - K h a l i f a h . ^ The animosity which followed the incidents, and 
the mishandling of the s i t u a t i o n by the police, caused the more 
l i b e r a l elements of both communities to recognise the grim future 
which lay ahead i f these t r a d i t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s continued. 
There had been no major c o n f l i c t s between the two sects 
for many years p r i o r to 1953 and the members of the clubs and 
societies and the press had been actively campaigning f o r many 
years i n e f f o r t s to reconcile the two factions. 
These campaigners saw i n the Muharram incidents a deliberate 
attempt by the regime to undo a l l the good work which had gone 
before. By the end of the year, therefore, the two sides established 
tentative contacts with each other and eventually, a f t e r meetings i n 
which al-Baker was actively involved, more formal meetings were 
18 
arranged to t r y to r e c t i f y the s i t u a t i o n . 
Whilst t h i s was going on, however, the h o s t i l i t i e s continued 
between the two sides, occasionally erupting i n t o violence. The 
major incidents which took place i n these a f f a i r s happened i n 
June 1954 at Sitra camp, between elements of the two sects. During 
the scuffles a Sunni was k i l l e d . The police arrested the alleged 
ringleaders of the Shia who were, a f t e r t r i a l , sentenced to various 
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periods of imprisonment. The sentences were considered by the 
Shia community to be excessively harsh and a f t e r heated meetings 
and demonstrations on the 2nd July, 1954, the Shia began to 
march on Manama Fort i n an attempt to free the prisoners. 
The police, apparently apprehensive at the fervour of the 
demonstration, opened f i r e with the resultant loss of the l i v e s 
of four Shia.^ 
Following t h i s incident a general shutdown of business 
occurred, p a r t l y from fear and p a r t l y from the i n d u s t r i a l action 
of sympathisers. The shutdown lasted for a week before a gradual 
return to work took place. An investigation of the incidents 
was ordered by Shaikh Salman but t h i s came to nothing except for 
a reprimand to the police for t h e i r actions. 
The July incidents at l a s t brought home to the Bahrainis 
the need for greater understanding between the two communities 
and for a measure of j o i n t action and co-operation. Throughout 
these incidents Al-Baker and his friends continued t h e i r 
endeavours to establish a rapport between the two sides and 
t h i s l a i d the foundations of future co-operation. 
Al-Baker's policy began to bear f r u i t l a t e r i n the year 
following i n d u s t r i a l action by taxi-drivers i n September, 1954. 
On t h i s occasion the taxi-drivers went on s t r i k e i n protest 
against the Government's decision that a l l t a x i services must be 
f u l l y insured. The drivers however, f e l t that the existing 
insurance premiums were too high and that the regulations promulgated 
by the foreign insurance companies were unduly r e s t r i c t i v e and 
they therefore decided to s t r i k e and brought the island's transport 
services to a s t a n d s t i l l . 
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Al-Baker and some others intervened to act as intermediaries 
and were instrumental i n resolving the dispute. Part of the 
solution consisted of the formation of a t a x i - d r i v e r s ' Co-operative 
Compensation Society to which a l l taxi-drivers were to subscribes 
i n return for which s they were to be insured at much more 
competitive rates and they were to receive help and advice i n 
running t h e i r businesses. The f i r s t General Secretary of the 
Society was Al-Baker himself, assisted by a committee of prominent 
Bahrainis. 
The significance of t h i s step was not merely a commercial 
one but meant that for the f i r s t time i t brought together the 
Sunni and Shia working classes on a co-operative working basis, 
working with and assisting one another. 
The Government, f a i l i n g to recognise the change i n the 
p o l i t i c a l climate saw Al-Baker's r o l e i n t h i s new venture as a 
challenge to their own authority and threatened to withdraw his 
21 
passport and citizenship. 
This move, however, proved to be the straw which broke 
the camel's back, f o r , on hearing of t h i s threat, Al-Baker's 
supporters and others of the enlightened elements decided to force 
the issue of p o l i t i c a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and embarked upon a series 
of public meetings. The f i r s t of these took place i n early October 
i n the Al-Khamis mosque i n Manama. Members of a l l the various 
clubs and societies, as well as the notables of the towns and 
v i l l a g e s , were inv i t e d to attend and the meeting resulted i n a 
number of resolutions being put forward. 
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These were:-
1. That a united front should be presented to f i g h t the 
dictatorships, personified i n the form of Sir Charles Belgrave, 
and to guide the people i n obtaining t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . 
2. That a proclamation should be issued to express resentment at 
the Government action against Al-Baker i n the threats to withdraw 
his passport and ci t i z e n s h i p , as t h i s was f e l t to be 
contradictory to the rig h t s of the c i t i z e n . 
3. That a further meeting be held w i t h i n a week at Sanabis v i l l a g e 
at which a l l sections of the community should be represented i n 
order to elect delegates for the formation of the Front, who 
would carry out the wishes of that meeting, i n representations 
to the Government. 
4. That attempts should be made to mobilise public opinion i n 
support of t h e i r campaign. 
After t h i s meeting a war of nerves developed between the 
campaigners and the Government. A r t i c l e s appeared i n the press 
which i n d i r e c t l y attacked Belgrave and aspects of the Administration. 
A B r i t i s h w r i t e r , v i s i t i n g Bahrain at that time, described 
Belgrave's position, s t a t i n g , "As Head of Police he could arrest a man 
t r y him i n the Courts of Law as Head of Judiciary, sentence him and 
22 
judge the appeal against sentence as Head of the Court of Appeal." 
Against t h i s background i t i s understandible that the Bahrainis 
should f e e l j u s t i f i e d i n seeing i n Belgrave the fig u r e of a di c t a t o r . 
The Sanabis meeting took place as planned on 13th October, 1954 
23 
and hundreds of Bahrainis, from both sects, were i n attendance. 
The meeting resulted i n the creation of a General Assembly 
of 120 members to represent a l l sections of opinion i n Bahrain. 
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Besides t h i s a Higher Executive Committee (H.E.C.) was formed. 
This consisted of eight prominent Bahrainis, four Sunni and four 
Shia. 
A number of resolutions were passed at t h i s meeting f o r 
the HoE.C. to act upon. These were that the H.E.C. should ask 
the Government that;-
1. A Legislative Council should be formed. 
2. A codified system of Criminal and C i v i l Law should 
be adopted. 
3. The creation of Trades Unions should be permitted. 
4. A Higher Appeal Court should be i n s t i t u t e d . 
Wasting no time the H.E.C. drafted a l e t t e r to the 
Government incorporating these proposals and i n the meantime 
they started to issue Bulletins to keep the people informed 
of t h e i r actions and to raise funds. 
The l e t t e r to the Shaikh was also released f o r publication 
and appeared i n the newspaper "Al-Qafilah". The l e t t e r read, 
"Your Highness, I t i s now more than a quarter of 
a century since a modern administration was introduced 
into t h i s country. I t was adequate at that time but 
i s not s u f f i c i e n t to meet the needs of the present 
day. The Country has since advanced so c i a l l y and 
c u l t u r a l l y but the administration has stood s t i l l . 
I t i s t h i s which has brought about the gap between 
the Government and the people which has resulted i n 
the unrest we are witnessing today. 
Your Highness, t h i s unrest i s of benefit to 
no-one, either r u l e r or ruled and i n order that 
matters may take t h e i r natural course there should 
be a radical improvement i n the Governmental system, 
which should allow the people a greater degree of 
par t i c i p a t i o n i n the conducting of t h e i r a f f a i r s . 
The people have demonstrated t h e i r awareness both 
i n the press and at various mass meetings and they 
desire to f u l f i l the refomrs upon which depend the 
improvement of t h e i r progress and welfare. In 
order to remove the cause of the unrest mentioned 
above we present to Your Highness, on behalf of the 
contd.... 
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people 9 the following demands which we t r u s t 
you grant s and by doing so you w i l l w r ite a 
shining page i n the history of t h i s country. 
1. The Creation of a Legislative Councils, 
freely elected and representative of a l l 
the people. 
2. To draw up a Code of Law, C i v i l and Criminal, 
drafted by experienced Lawyers corresponding 
with the country's t r a d i t i o n s . These 
should be endorsed by the Legislative Council. 
3. Permission should be granted for the 
formation of Trades Unions both for the 
workers and the self-employed, 
4. The formation of a High Court f o r the purpose 
of resolving disagreements arising between 
the Legislative and Executive Authorities and 
also f o r s e t t l i n g any disputes between the 
Government and any c i t i z e n . 
Your Highness, we wish to assure you that 
these demands do not aim to in t e r f e r e with the 
position of the Ruler and do not c o n f l i c t with 
the interests of the B r i t i s h Government."25 
Despite the fairness of the demands and the moderation of 
the language the Government f l a t l y rejected a l l of the demands. A 
few days l a t e r , on the 2nd November, the Government proclaimed 
that the so-called committee was not representative of the people 
and that the Government would endeavour to do i t s best to introduce 
reforms 
The Government was apparently i n a predicament i n that they 
did not know how to accede without loss of face. Belgrave l a t e r 
explained his reasons f o r advising the Government to reject the 
demands when he said, " I sympathised with some, but by no means a l l , 
of the aspirations of the i n t e l l i g e n s i a but I mistrusted the men 
who led them."^ 
The H.E.C. promptly escalated the c o n f l i c t and gathered 
support, both moral and f i n a n c i a l , from the community. 
The eloquence of Al-Baker and Al-Shamlan, joined by a poet 
28 
from Muharraq, inflamed the passions of the people and they l o s t no 
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opportunity to whip up support, speaking at meetings throughout 
the island, including religious meetings and f e s t i v a l s . 
I n an attempt to assuage these passions the Government 
granted some minor concessions which included the promise of 
the setting up of elected committees to supervise, but not 
administer, the Health and Education services. 
On the 17th November, during the celebration of the 
Prophet's B i r t h , the H.E.C. took the opportunity to turn the 
f e s t i v i t i e s i n t o a p o l i t i c a l r a l l y . Thousands of people turned 
up that afternoon i n the Ide Mosque i n Manama, and an eyewitness 
account described the enthusiasm of the people. Referring to 
Shamlan he stated, 
"We stood inside the speakers' roped-off 
area whilst Abdul Aziz (Al-Shamlan) gave 
an impassioned speech, interrupted by the 
cheers from a crowd of several thousands. 
At the end of i t some of the crowd broke 
through the rope and flung themselves 
upon him, hugging and kissing him."29 
The popular support for the H.E.C. forced the Government to 
reconsider i t s position and clandestine talks took place between 
themselves and the H.E.C. 
Meanwhile the H.E.C. attempted i n d i r e c t l y to contact the 
local B r i t i s h Authorities to t r y to establish t h e i r attitudes to 
the H.E.C., and one of the H.E.C. members at that time gained the 
impression that they were i n sympathy with some of t h e i r demands. 
The w r i t e r , however, was informed that at that time the 
B r i t i s h were s t r i c t l y neutral and were merely observing the 
30 
sit u a t i o n and noting developments. 
I n the atmosphere the H.E.C. l e a f l e t s appealed to the people 
for t h e i r co-operation i n not provoking any trouble i n view of the 
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negotiations which were taking place. 
I t appeared, however, that the talks with the Government 
did not make any progress with the main demand for a Legislative 
Council, although certain other concessions were won. I n view 
of t h i s the H.E.C. decided to force the issue and to proclaim 
a General Strike. 
On the 2nd December, 1954, the H.E.C. issued i t s B u l l e t i n 
No. 8 which stated, 
"Because the authority has ignored your 
repeated demands for reforms and because 
of the growing discontent of the groups 
and individuals who are pressing the 
demand for more positive action ........ 
we announce a peaceful General Strike, 
the purpose of which i s to sound the 
people's grievances and to demonstrate 
that the people stand behind t h e i r 
representatives." 
The H.EoC. specified that the s t r i k e was to l a s t f o r one 
week and that i t was to begin on Saturday, 4th December. 
The s t r i k e was extremely ef f e c t i v e and brought Bahrain to a 
complete s t a n d s t i l l . The H.E.C. organised the essential services 
and no vehicles moved i n the island without t h e i r authorisation. 
Within a day of the l i f t i n g of the s t r i k e Shaikh Salman 
announced i n a Proclamation, the formation of an ad hoc committee 
31 
to supervise the Education, Health and Police Services. The 
Proclamation went on to c i t e the l a t e s t improvements i n the 
Administration such as the appointment of a B r i t i s h J u d i c i a l Adviser, 
two B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s to the Police, an additional doctor i n the 
hospital and the forthcoming elections for a new Municipality 
Council. 
The H.E.C. replied to the Proclamation and acknowledged the 
reforms c i t e d by the Government but stated that they were no 
- 371 -
substitute for the more radical reforms which they were demanding. 
They cited the Government's suppression of the "Al-Qafilah" 
newspaper and the encouragement of employers by the Government 
not to pay the wages of some of the s t r i k e r s , as unhealthy signs 
of lack of co-operation and s i n c e r i t y on the part of the 
33 
Government. They also repeated t h e i r o r i g i n a l demands. 
Because of the opposition of the H.E.C., the ad hoc 
committee never materialised but the Government went ahead with 
i t s plans f o r Municipal Elections, which were to be held on the 
19th February, 1955, despite threats by the H.E.C. to boycott them. 
Furthermore, the H.E.C presented an ultimatum to the Government 
that i f they did not reply to t h e i r o r i g i n a l demands they would 
i n i t i a t e certain actions. These included the following steps. 
1. That the H.E.C. would demand from a l l citizens p a r t i c i p a t i n g , 
now or i n the future, i n any council, elected or appointed, to 
withdraw from those councils. Those who did not comply with t h i s 
would be proclaimed as t r a i t o r s . 
2. That the H.E.C. would create special councils i n the towns and 
villages of Bahrain to act as ar b i t r a t o r s between the people on 
c i v i l matters without reference to Government Departments. 
3. That i f the above steps were taken, and wi t h i n two months no 
action was forthcoming from the Government, the H.E.C. would 
organise p o l i t i c a l r a l l i e s to parade through Manama and Muharraq 
i n which a l l men, women and children would pa r t i c i p a t e . 
4. That i f a l l t h i s produced no res u l t the H.E.C. would take further 
34 
crucial steps which would be announced at the time. 
Thus, by issuing the ultimatum the H.E.C. put themselves 
i n an i r r e t r i e v a b l e position, i n that i f the Government stood f i r m 
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they had committed themselves to actions which they may not have 
been able to carry through. I f t h i s happened they would then 
suffer a loss of confidence on the part of t h e i r supporters. 
As another means of pressing t h e i r case the H.E.C. 
approached the B r i t i s h Government by means of handing a memorandum 
to the P o l i t i c a l Resident f o r forwarding to the Foreign Secretary. 
I n the memorandum, which was handed i n on the 21st February, 1955, 
the H.E.C. described i n d e t a i l t h e i r demanded reforms. 
The reply to the memorandum was received by the General 
Secretary of the H.E.C. on the 17th March, 1955 and was deeply 
disappointing. Far from supporting t h e i r views, the reply 
instead detailed measures that the Bahrain Government had already 
taken toward reform and went on to describe future improvements 
which were to be made. The Foreign Secretary advised the H.E.C. 
that instaed of oppsoing the Government, i t s interests would be 
best served by working i n close co-operation with i t . 
I n spite of the disappointment, the H.E.C. replied to the 
l e t t e r disputing i n d e t a i l the facts contained therein, i n the 
hope of changing the Foreign Secretary's views but t h i s proved 
35 
to be of no a v a i l . 
Therefore, lacking any progress on the p o l i t i c a l f r o n t the 
H.E.C. moved into the social f i e l d to maintain t h e i r support i n 
the country. One of t h e i r more notable successes was i n obtaining 
a number of scholarships from Cairo University and r e c r u i t i n g and 
36 
selecting Bahraini Secondary School-leavers to f i l l thenu 
At t h i s time the H.E.C. also took the f i r s t steps, which we 
mentioned e a r l i e r towards founding Bahrain's f i r s t Trade Union and 
37 
drawing up t h e i r own labour l e g i s l a t i o n . 
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In view of these developments the Government hastened 
the setting up of a Labour Law Advisory Committee i n order to 
combat these moves» To f o r e s t a l l c r i t i c i s m on other points 
the Government proposed the establishment of permanent councils 
to supervise both Health and Education. They also adopted, after 
modification to s u i t l o c a l conditions, a Criminal Code of Law 
which had been drawn up o r i g i n a l l y by legal experts i n the Foreign 
Office for general use i n British-administered areas of the Gulf. 
I t was announced that the Criminal Code would take effect 
from August, but the H.E.C. counter attacked on the grounds 
that the laws had been drawn up without reference to the people 
of Bahrain and that certain a r t i c l e s had been w r i t t e n i n to enable 
38 
the Government to ban the H.E.C. as an i l l e g a l organisation. 
This f i e r c e attack forced the Government to suspend the 
introduction of the Code i n d e f i n i t e l y and to announce l a t e r that a 
legal expert from Egypt would be appointed to study the Bahrain 
laws and make recommendations for any changes thought necessary. 
The H.E.C. showed t h e i r readiness to particpate i n the 
proposed committees and a f t e r negotiations with the Government 
i t was agreed that each committee should consist of one half elected 
members and one half Government nominees. The po l l i n g day for 
the Education Council elections was announced as 9th February, 1956. 
The H.E.C. then embarked on an intensive and well-organised 
p o l i t i c a l campaign and encouraged support f o r the H.E.C.'s own 
nominees (three Sunni and three S h i a ) . ^ 
On p o l l i n g day eighty percent of the Bahrain electorate went 
to the p o l l s and the re s u l t was that the H.E.C. sponsored candidates 
won a landslide v i c t o r y by gaining ninety-two percent of the p o l l . 
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After the sweeping v i c t o r y and demonstration of the support 
they enjoyed the H.E.C. asked the Government for formal 
recognition. 
The v i c t o r y , however, soon turned sour as the Government 
immediately appointed two of the other candidates who had been 
so disastrously defeated at the polls amongst th e i r nominees on 
the Council. The H.E.C. candidates then refused to take t h e i r 
seats on the Council u n t i l the Government nominees were changed.^ 
This the Government eventually did but not without taking 
another step which upset the people. Having replaced the two 
offending members by others more acceptable they then appointed 
as Chairman of the Council Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa, the Ruler's 
uncle, thus assuring themselves of a permanent majority; the 
H.E.C. sponsored members, therefore, continued to refuse to 
take t h e i r seats on the council. 
Whilst t h i s was going on two unfortunate incidents took 
place. The f i r s t of these was during Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's v i s i t on 
the 2nd March 1956. Whilst t r a v e l l i n g from the a i r p o r t to Manama 
his car was mobbed by a crowd shouting anit-Belgrave slogans. 
42 
Whilst the H.E.C. immediately condemned t h i s action p u b l i c l y , 
i t proved to be the breaking point as far as the B r i t i s h were 
concerned i n that i t appears that from t h i s time they decided pri v a t e l y 
that i t would be p o l i t i c to r i d themselves of the H.E.C., as we 
w i l l see l a t e r . 
After t h i s incident the atmosphere i n the island was very 
tense and a number of minor disturbances and scuffles with 
the police took place, but a serious r i o t developed on the 11th 
March following an incident i n the vegetable market near the (now old) 
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Municipality building. A row developed i n i t i a l l y between a 
Municipality o f f i c i a l and a s t a l l holder but as more people 
became involved the o f f i c i a l f l e d chased by a crowd. The police 
promptly opened f i r e on the crowd k i l l i n g three and wounding 
43 
many others. 
These k i l l i n g s , and the fact that the Government had 
s t i l l not granted them recognition, moved the H.E.C. to c a l l a 
general s t r i k e i n protest at the i n c i d e n t ^ The c a l l was taken 
up enthusiastically by the people and once again Bahrain business 
was brought to a halt i n a s t r i k e which lasted for one week 
before the B r i t i s h , acting as mediators, were able to arrange 
a compromise. 
The mediation started on 13th March when Mr. C.A, Gault, 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent, met members of the H.E.C, but without 
re s u l t s . Following upon t h i s , a second meeting was arranged 
for 16th March at which the H.E.C. presented the following 
demands as a condition for ending the s t r i k e . 
1. The Government should recognise the H.E.C. 
2. A Public Enquiry should be held into the k i l l i n g s of 11th March 
and the c u l p r i t s punished. Compensation to be paid to the 
rel a t i v e s of the unfortunate dead. 
3. Sir Charles Belgrave to be relieved of his post. 
4. Dr. Abdul Razaq al-Sanhouri, the Egyptian legal expert, should 
be i n v i t e d to come to Bahrain to study the Codification of C i v i l 
and Criminal Law with the assistance of a democratically chosen 
committee. 
After prolonged negotiations a compromise was reached. This 
involved the H.E.C. dropping, for the time being, demands for a 
- 376 -
Legislative Council and not to press f o r Sir Charles Belgrave's 
dismissal (although i t was verbally promised that he would be 
r e t i r e d before the end of the year). 4"* I n exchange for t h i s 
the Government agreed to recognise the H.E.C.s provided that 
i t changed i t s name i n view of the fact that i t had been connected 
with previous troubles, and that i t s General Secretary, Al-Baker 
should go into self-imposed e x i l e for a period of six months.^ 
Following the agreed compromise the s t r i k e was l i f t e d 
on the 17th March and the committee became known as the Committee 
for National Unity (C.N.U.).47 
A Foreign Office statement which was issued reflected 
the lightening of the Bahrain s i t u a t i o n . 
"We are glad to learn that the si t u a t i o n 
i n Bahrain i s now quiet. We have every 
confidence i n the Ruler of Bahrain and 
his Advisor, and we w i l l continue to give 
him a l l necessary support i n carrying out 
his programme of gradual development, both 
i n the material well-being of the country 
and i n i t s orderly co n s t i t u t i o n a l advancement." 
On the 18th March, 1956, i n the presence of Al-Baker, 
Al-Shamlan, Al-Aliwat and Mohasin a l - T a j i r Sheikh Salman signed 
the recognition document giving legal status to the C.N.U. The 
agreement was witnessed by the P o l i t i c a l Agent, Mr. C.A. Gault. 
On the same day the Shaikh announced that a committee would 
49 
be set up to investigate the a f f a i r s of 2nd - 16th March and 
that the Chairmanship of the Education Council had been vacated 
and would be f i l l e d by a member elected from the Council. He also 
announced the creation of an Administrative Council, consisting 
of nominees of the Shaikh, and chaired by Shaikh Abdulla b i n Isa."^ 
I t was stated that the functions of the Council would be, 
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"to arrange matters between Government departments 
i n order to improve t h e i r functions, to contact 
the people and to carry out our orders. The 
Councils, however, should not i n t e r f e r e with the 
State's finances, nor with p o l i t i c a l or foreign 
a f f a i r s . " 
Despite the fact that the Council was composed mainly of 
al-Khalifah the terms of reference appeared to be very l i m i t e d 
and i t s powers minimal. 
The C.N.U., however, under i t s new General Secretary, 
al-Shamlan, saw the Council, which was without any elected 
members, merely as a continuation of the Ruler's policy of denying 
the people a place i n t h e i r own Government. They attacked the 
Council vigorously"^ f o r i t s composition and aims and included 
Belgrave i n t h e i r attacks as the suspected architect of t h i s 
52 
new move. 
The Government on her side continued with what fefeos? regarded 
as necessary reforms and concessions. I n May and June they stated 
t h e i r intentions to establish a Health Council i n the near future 
they proclaimed a new Press Law and the creation of a new Government 
post. Secretary to the Government. This position was awarded to 
53 
Mr. G.W.R. Smith, formerly Head of the customs Department. 
The lack of consultation i n the moves increased the 
frustrations of the C.N.U. and so i n July they issued a b u l l e t i n to 
the Bahrainis i n which they made public t h e i r differences w i t h the 
Government. They refused to accept the Administrative Council as i t 
was constituted and disagreed with i t s functions and aims. 
They expressed resentment, on pri n c i p l e at Belgrave's continued 
presence at the meetings between C.N.U. and the Government and they 
also objected strongly to the new Press Law which limited the freedom 
- 378 -
54 of the press. I t was a lengthy b u l l e t i n which showed clearl y 
t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n s and fading hopes and finished by quoting a 
text from a prominent Egyptian w r i t e r , 
"People who enter, w i t h t h e i r Rulers or Colonisers, 
into bargains with t h e i r freedom, are signing 
at the same time the document of t h e i r slavery. 
By these acts they prove themselves to be s t i l l 
i n the cradle, incapable of seeing with t h e i r own 
eyes, hearing w i t h t h e i r own ears or standing on 
th e i r own two feet." 
In the same b u l l e t i n the C.N.U. blueprinted t h e i r plans 
and hopes for the future. They cite d goals such as f u l l employment 
fo r the Bahraini people, the f i g h t against corruption w i t h i n the 
Administration, the improvement of the Health and Education services, 
the founding of Trades Unions, plans for expanding the economy by 
developing other industries and f i g h t i n g for a free press. 
Thus, whilst i t appeared that the C.N.U. realised that i t s 
demands would only be met r e l u c t a n t l y , they were prepared to adopt 
a r e a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e and to continue negotiations peaceably with 
the Government, especially a f t e r the announcement i n August that 
Sir Charles Belgrave would terminate his period of service as 
Advisor to the Shaikh the following summer. 
Whilst events were proceeding f a i r l y peacefully i n Bahrain, 
however, the Arab world elsewhere was i n a turmoil. Nasser's 
announcement on the 26th July of the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal started events on a c o l l i s i o n course between himself and the 
B r i t i s h , Also Al-Baker made a number of v i o l e n t l y a n t i - B r i t i s h 
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speeches i n Beirut and Cairo. 
These events were reflected i n Bahrain as the press began openly 
to attack the B r i t i s h over t h e i r policy towards Egypt. On "Egypt 
Day" (14th August) the C.N.U. organised a p o l i t i c a l r a l l y i n support 
- 379 -
of Egypt and two days l a t e r they called a one day s t r i k e as 
further evidence of the i r support.^ 
During the period up to November of that year n a t i o n a l i s t i c 
feelings were r i d i n g high and t h i s was increased by the return of 
Al-Baker i n l a t e September. As the fervour increased f r i c t i o n 
broke out between the leaders of the C.N.U. over which course 
should be adopted i n i t s struggle, and personal jealousies and 
co n f l i c t s of opinion became apparent. 
On the 29th October, 1956, however, an ewent occurred 
which completely changed the s i t u a t i o n . The I s r a e l i s invaded 
Sinai. The following day students from Manama Secondary School 
took to the streets to demonstrate. They were joined by boys and 
g i r l s from other schools and they paraded through Manama and 
Muharraq shouting a n t i - I s r a e l and a n t i - B r i t i s h slogans, overturning 
and setting f i r e to cars and damaging property. Some C.N.U. 
members went into the towns i n an attempt to calm the students 
and restore order, but they had no option i n view of the popular 
feelings except to sympathise with t h e i r objectives but disapprove 
of the methods of the students otherwise they would have l o s t much 
of t h e i r support. 
They therefore issued, the following day, t h e i r 77th and l a s t 
b u l l e t i n which condemned the I s r a e l i s , along with the B r i t i s h and 
the French fo r t h e i r attack on Egypt, and praised Egypt and Arab 
Nationalism. The b u l l e t i n called on Shaikh Salman to support his 
people i n the condemnation and to disregard the advice of "i m p e r i a l i s t 
They called upon a l l people to unite against the "new Crusaders". 
They called for peaceful processions of demonstration to 
support t h e i r campaign and ended the b u l l e t i n by c a l l i n g f o r a 
- 380 -
general s t r i k e , " u n t i l f urther notice!" 
On Friday, 2nd November the processions were formed and 
the march started peacefully, but during the parade some elements 
got out of hand and began to stone Government and certain commercial 
establishments and these attacks progressed to f i r e - r a i s i n g . During 
the day, Ibrahim Fakroo, a member of the C.N.U. committee, was 
arrested by the police i n Muharraq. 
Over the next few days as the s i t u a t i o n became calmer the 
C.N.U. attempted to negotiate for the freeing of t h e i r colleague. 
The Government, however, were i n no mood to negotiate and 
imposed a curfew immediately following the disturbances and had 
decided to force a showdown with the C.N.U. On the night of 5th 
November the Government declared a State of Emergency and B r i t i s h 
troops, who had been stationed there since the March s t r i k e were 
employed i n an active role i n enforcing security. During the 
early hours of the 6th November Al-Baker, Al-Shamlan, A l - A l i w a t 
and Ibrahim bin Moosa were arrested by the police and troops, 
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and were l a t e r transferred to Jidda island along with Fakroo. 
The Government declared the C.N.U. an i l l e g a l organization 
and added that anyone issuing statements or b u l l e t i n s under t h i s or 
any other name would be arrested. 
The s t r i k e , however, continued, although with police and 
troops saturating the towns l i t t l e could be done. 
A number of other members of the C.N.U. General Assembly 
were arrested and others made good t h e i r escape, fleeing to Qatar, 
Kuwait and Beirut. 
The f i v e members of the C.N.U. committee were h a s t i l y brought 
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to t r i a l and sentenced, three to exile and two to imprisonment,. 
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After the arrest and t r i a l of the leaders of the C.N.U, 
things could not be the same i n Bahrain. A l l the hard-won 
gains i n the social, p o l i t i c a l and i n d u s t r i a l spheres collapsed, 
the press was completely banned and Bahrain entered a period of 
p o l i t i c a l repression, 
c) The Years of Repression 
With the collapse of the C.N.U. i n la t e 1956 many of the 
i n t e l l i g e n s i a f l e d the country and took refuge i n other parts of 
the Arab world. Some, less fortunate, were arrested and committed 
to prison and the Bahrain p o l i t i c a l scene entered a new and rather 
repressive phase. 
This change was contrary to the expectations of some 
observers who saw the p o l i t i c a l climate as one from which advances 
could be made. S i n c l a i r , for instance, w r i t i n g i n December, 1956, 
observed t h a t , "The Bahrain Administration has brought a rather 
high degree of p o l i t i c a l consciousness to the people and they 
appear to be ready for the next s t e p . " ^ Whilst there was 
undoubtedly a great amount of p o l i t i c a l consciousness the actions 
of the Bahrain Government ensured that the "next step" never 
materialised. 
In the months following the November disturbances the B r i t i s h 
troops were used extensively to carry out police duties under the 
State of Emergency Decree. I n the meantime the police force was 
i t s e l f reinforced by an intensive r e c r u i t i n g campaign from South 
Yemen and the Jordanian Bedouins. Furthermore a special branch 
was set up wit h i n the police force, headed by a B r i t i s h o f f i c e r , 
for the specific purpose of investigating and dealing w i t h any 
suspicious p o l i t i c a l occurrences. 
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Only when the police force had been strengthened and had 
f i r m control of the s i t u a t i o n were the B r i t i s h troops withdrawn 
to t h e i r bases. 
The c i v i l authorities then gradually tightened t h e i r 
control u n t i l by the end of the decade Bahrain was v i r t u a l l y 
a police state. 
Following the departure of Sir Charles Belgrave i n 1957, 
Mr. G.W.E.. Smith assumed f u l l control as Secretary to the Government. 
Lacking the former's i n i t i a t i v e and contacts, Smith followed f a i r l y 
narrow and predictable lines of government with the result that a l l 
the other departments gradually came to be dominated by the Police 
Department, who often influenced the appointment of Heads of 
Departments and other high-ranking o f f i c i a l s . 
A fter the closure of the private newspapers i n 1956 there was 
no free press i n Bahrain u n t i l 1966. During t h i s period the only 
news media i n Bahrain were the Bahrain Broadcasting Station, which 
had been re-opened i n 1955, and Government l e a f l e t s and publications. 
Both were very closely controlled by the Government and used very 
much as pure propaganda devices by them. 
In the face of the oppressive and f r u s t r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n the 
new generation began to look for new ideas i n an attempt to f i n d a 
way out of t h e i r dilemma. 
This unrest manifested i t s e l f i n the actions of many Bahraini 
students studying abroad who suddenly found themselves free of the 
s t r i c t u r e s of t h e i r homeland. Some, for instance, who were studying 
i n Beirut and Cairo indulged themselves i n the new Arab p o l i t i c a l 
movements. Those i n Beirut were often deeply influenced by the 
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Ba'athist movement, and persons such as A l i Fakroo, during the 1950' 
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became leading figures i n the Ba'athist cause, especially i n 
A.U.B. c i r c l e s , and were outspoken c r i t i c s of the Bahrain 
Government. The Arab Nationalist Movement also found ready 
adherents amongst the Bahraini students there and people such 
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as Mohammed al-Ansari (A.U.B.) and Abdul Rahman al-Zamel 
(Cairo Univ.) became leading advocates of the Movement. 
The organ of the Arab Nationalist movement, "Al-Hurih", 
found a wide market and was eagerly read by many Bahrainis. 
Both organisations did not f i n d i t very d i f f i c u l t to convey 
t h e i r messages and win r e c r u i t s w i t h i n Bahrain i t s e l f , as many 
students, on returning to Bahrain for t h e i r vacations, or on the 
completion of t h e i r studies, promptly enlisted the support of 
t h e i r friends and younger students and established c e l l s of both 
movements throughout Bahrain. 
The Communists also found i t f a i r l y easy i n such a repressive 
atmosphere to gain many r e c r u i t s . Clubs such as "nadi a l - F a j r " , 
on the outskirts of Manama, and "Nadi al-Noor" became hives of 
Communist a c t i v i t y during the l a t e 1950's and early 1960's. Prominent 
amongst the members of the movement i n Bahrain were Yusef a l - A j a j i 
and Ahmed al-Dhawadi. 
Although they were the smallest i n number, the Communists 
were the most active both inside and outside of Bahrain to the 
extent that they were the f i r s t ever delegates from the Gulf 
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area to attend an Arab Communist conference i n Beirut i n Many, 1965. 
Although many of the Bahraini youth found a haven i n these 
p o l i t i c a l organisations, because of the s t r i c t police supervision, 
none of them were able to take the lead i n promoting open c o n f l i c t 
w i t h the Government. The Special Branch of the Police were extremely 
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active i n the early 1960's. On the smallest pretext they 
arrested, imprisoned or deported anyone they considered to be 
a potential agitator. Some students, returning to Bahrain f o r 
t h e i r vacations, found that they were prevented from leaving 
the country again because of t h e i r alleged p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s 
i n Beirut or Cairo. I n addition they were often denied a work 
permit and were thus prevented from finding work either at home 
or abroad. 
This s i t u a t i o n continued although not without protest. 
One such protest occurred i n March 1965 when the s i t u a t i o n suddenly 
erupted. The i n i t i a l cause was the fact that for a number of 
months before, BAPCO had been making redundant hundreds of her 
Bahraini employees, following the v i s i t of a "chopper" committee during 
the winter and the commissioning of the new automatic p l a n t . ^ 
On the 5th March the students of Manama Secondary School 
decided to demonstrate against the sackings and organised a s i t - i n . 
The police intervened f i e r c e l y and a number of students were injured. 
The students then broke out from the school and took to the streets 
to continue t h e i r demonstration. 
This action caused the p o l i t i c a l factions i n Bahrain, Ba-athists, 
Arab Nationalists, Communists and others, to j o i n forces i n forming 
an underground organisation which became known as the National Front 
for Progressive Force (N.F.P.F.) 
After two days of r i o t i n g the s i t u a t i o n deteriorated further 
as the police began to arrest the alleged leaders of the students. 
The N.F.P.F. then issued l e a f l e t s c a l l i n g for a general 
s t r i k e , which started on the 10th March. Up to the end of the month 
Manama and Muharraq were wracked almost d a i l y by vio l e n t demonstrations. 
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Violence was the most s t r i k i n g feature of the demonstrations, 
apart from the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of women i n large numbers. 
I t was reported that i n certain areas the lo c a l 
population stormed the police stations and seized stores of 
arms. In the two main towns the population barricaded the 
streets i n defiance of the police, who opened f i r e on numerous 
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occasions, k i l l i n g and wounding many people. During the 
course of the disturbances two members of the hated Special 
Branch were severely injured i n bomb a t t a c k s . ^ 
The N.F.P.F. then took the opportunity to formulate a 
set of demands which were reported to be ; 
1. To stop the a r b i t r a r y dismissal of BAPCO employees and allow 
them to return to t h e i r jobs. 
2. To recognise the r i g h t of the workers to form t h e i r own 
Trades Unions. 
3. To l i f t the State of Emergency which has existed since 1956 
and to allow the foundation of a free press and to re-establish 
freedom of speech. 
4. To free a l l p o l i t i c a l prisoners, to grant an amnesty to a l l 
those involved i n the disturbances and to allow the return of 
p o l i t i c a l exiles. 
5. To dismiss a l l foreign employees w i t h i n the police forces.^ 7 
The demands were never formally presented and came to nothing 
Gradually the Government re-established i t s control of the 
island, large numbers of people were arrested and a curfew was 
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imposed which lasted u n t i l mid-April. 
To many of the people i n Bahrain the March r i o t s of 1965 
were a nightmare, and the months following were very tense and 
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apprehensive, because of both the violence which took place 
and the savage o f f i c i a l reaction. 
The "Guardian" drew a comparison between the unrest of 
1953-56 and that of March 1965, to the former the paper 
concluded that the unrest was the resul t of the desires on 
the part of the middle class whilst the a f f a i r s of March 1965 
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were b u i l t on the strength of the working class. 
"The Observer" noted that i t was regrettable to suppress 
too severely what was a completely reformist movement and that 
the policy of using force to maintain so-called order could only 
lead to greater disappointment.^ 
The harsh suppression of the disturbances i n March can 
probably be i n part explained by the need of the B r i t i s h for a 
f r i e n d l y Government to be i n control of Bahrain, which was to 
become t h e i r major base i n the area, following the decision to 
withdraw from Aden, which had t i l l then been a major staging-point 
i n the Middle East for B r i t i s h troops. 
The idea of moving to Bahrain was f i r s t mooted during 
Shaikh Isa bin Salman's v i s i t to London i n 1964. Reports 
appeared i n the press i n August, 1965 stating that B r i t a i n was 
re-negotiating the lease on her bases i n Bahrain with the intent i o n 
of meeting the Bahrain Government's demands for a substantial 
and r e a l i s t i c rent i n l i e u of the token £250 per annum they had 
been paying previously.''''" 
During the v i s i t of Shaikh Khalifah b i n Sulman, the Head of 
the Finance Department at that time, to London between 11th 
and 23rd May, 1966 negotiations took place between himself and 
Mr. Walter Padley, Minister of State for Foreign A f f a i r s , at which 
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an agreement was concluded whereby the B r i t i s h Government 
agreed to pay an i n i t i a l lump sum of £1,000,000 followed by 
yearly payments of £500,000 as rent for her bases i n Bahrain. 
I t was also announced, following the agreement, that B r i t a i n 
would encourage investment i n local Bahraini-owned businesses, 
besides which they also promised to rent houses and f l a t s as 
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accommodation fo r her Army o f f i c e r s . Both of these moves were 
an e f f o r t to stimulate the local economy. 
The duration of the lease was not specified but could be 
terminated by either side on receipt of f i v e years' notice to 
q u i t . 
The issue of whether B r i t a i n should maintain a continued 
presence "east of Suez" was a very controversial one i n B r i t i s h 
home p o l i t i c s , especially i n view of the state of the economy 
and Britain's experiences i n Aden. B r i t i s h experts i n the area 
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presented many c o n f l i c t i n g views. "The Economist" was one of 
the f i r s t to voice i t s reservations over the wisdom of moving the 
B r i t i s h troops to Bahrain from Aden, especially i n view of the 
Bahrain p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . I t went on to say, " I t i s doubtful 
whether the B r i t i s h servicemen who w i l l be moving into the area 
(Bahrain) realise what a hornets' nest they are landing on."^ 
However, w i t h i n a very short time the B r i t i s h changed 
t h e i r policy towards a B r i t i s h presence i n the Gulf. I n January 
1968 i t was announced that B r i t i s h troops would be withdrawn 
by the end of 1971. 7 5 
This put the small lower-Gulf Shaikhs and especially 
Bahrain, into a serious predicament. For Bahrain t h i s meant 
that they would lose t h e i r B r i t i s h "protection" they enjoyed both 
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from t h e i r own people and from foreign intervention. The 
l a t t e r was important i n view of the unsettled Iranian 
claim to sovereignty over the islands. This issue was, however, 
later settled by diplomatic means which have been mentioned 
e a r l i e r , but the former remained to be resolved. 
Between 1968 and 1970 intensive a c t i v i t y took place i n 
diplomatic c i r c l e s between Bahrain and the lower-Gulf States 
i n an e f f o r t to form a union of United Arab Afiiirates. The 
negotiations were extended and a number of mediators attempted 
to f i n d a solution but old feuds, t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s and t r i b a l 
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l o y a l t i e s proved to be an insurmountable stumbling block. 
The Government of Bahrain decided eventually to go i t s 
own way, especially i n view of the U.N. Security Council 
resolution of 11th May, 1970, which recognised that the people of 
Bahrain wished to be independent and to be accorded recognition 
as such. 
Encouraged by the recognition and i n view of the f a i l u r e 
of negotiation to found the U.A.A., the Government on the 14th 
August, 1971 formally announced i t s independence as an Arab State. 
The following day Shaikh Isa bin Salman, the Ruler, and 
Sir Geoffrey Arthur, the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident i n the Gulf, 
exchanged notes which ended the 1882 and 1892 Treaties between 
Bahrain and the B r i t i s h and established instead a new "Treaty 
of Friendship", v a l i d for ten yea r s . ^ 
Administratively, however, there had been no change i n the 
Governmental system since the setting up of the Administrative 
Council i n 1956. As we have mentioned t h i s Council was, i n 
e f f e c t , on paper only and was never a properly functioning u n i t . 
The f i r s t change did n o t occur u n t i l 1970 when a State 78 Council was established headed by Shaikh Khalifah b i n Salman. 
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The creation of t h i s council was intended to give the Administration 
a new image but i n fact i t was very much the old style as i t 
was s t i l l not an elected council but consisted mainly of members 
of the al-Khalifah family and some Heads of Departments. Furthermore 
some unrest was f e l t i n regard to i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n . A r t i c l e 8, 
for instance s stated that the resolutions of the council should 
be decided by a simple majority, provided that the head of the 
Council (the Shaikh's brother) agreed to the decision. 
After the Proclamation of Independence t h i s council changed 
i t s name to the M i n i s t e r i a l Council but there was no change i n 
either structure or membership. 
Despite the continued p o l i t i c a l repressions there s t i l l 
existed a small amount of organised p o l i t i c a l unrest. The most 
frequently recurring events were the arrests and t r i a l of students 
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returning from abroad, fo r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . A secret 
society was discovered i n mid-1970 c a l l i n g i t s e l f the East Arabian 
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Liberation Front, which consisted of former Ba'athists. During 
t h e i r t r i a l l a t e r i n the year i t alleged that the organisation had 
i n i t s possession quantities of arms and explosives 
The most active p o l i t i c a l section, however, i s the P a t r i o t i c 
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (P.F.L.B.), which i s a left-wing 
movement operating clandestinely i n Bahrain, but more openly abroad. 
Their main aim i s to oppose the existing system of government and 
to work fo r reform to more democratic l i n e s . 
At the time of w r i t i n g they are organising opposition to 
the composition of the proposed Foundation Council f o r which 
elections are to be held during December, 1972. Their reason 
for opposition is that whilst twenty-two members are to be 
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elected to the Councils, which i s to draw up a w r i t t e n Constitution, 
p r i o r to the establishment of a Legislative Assembly, i t i s 
s t i l l intended that the Government should reserve the r i g h t 
to make up the remainder of the Council by the appointment of 
ten further members by decree and i n addition granting a seat 
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on the Council to every minister, thus attempting to ensure 
themselves of a majority on the Council. 
d) C r i t i c a l Assessment of P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s 
From the 1920's onward, through the Second World War and 
up to the present day Bahrainis have developed on increasingly 
sensitive p o l i t i c a l consciousness. The four major elements 
which we have cited e a r l i e r , namely the c u l t u r a l gap, Social 
communications, Arab nationalism and foreign influence have a l l 
contributed either p o s i t i v e l y or negatively, to t h i s development. 
The c u l t u r a l gap between the two communities i n Bahrain 
has s t i l l not yet by any means been bridged, but the very fact 
that a greater degree of collaboration has taken place since 
the 1950's indicates that t h i s i s no longer a major issue. 
The influence of Arab Nationalism has been f e l t i n the 
p o l i t i c a l trends of the islands but because the concepts of 
Arab Nationalism were only very vaguely defined at f i r s t the 
effect i n the early years was i n t e l l e c t u a l rather than p o l i t i c a l . 
Even today, when the supreme goals of Arab Nationalism have become 
f a i r l y defined as l i b e r a t i o n , socialism and un i t y , they have never 
been t r u l y absorbed i n Bahrain as p o l i t i c a l aims. A l l the p o l i t i c a l 
struggles have centred on l i b e r a l demands and reforms with i n the 
system. 
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The p o l i t i c a l e l i t e would sometimes c i t e the examples 
of other Arab countries, as i n 1938, or i d e n t i f y themselves with 
various Arab National movements, i.e. Ba'athists or Arab Nationalists. 
As these movements never formulated a policy with regard to 
the future p o l i t i c a l events of Bahrain the effects were therefore 
minimal. 
P o l i t i c a l support for other Arab countries occurred from 
time to time, i . e . Palestine 1947-48!} Algeria 1954-58 and Egypt 
during 1956, on an emotional rather than an ideological basis. 
This a t t i t u d e appears to be changing as events move nearer home 
for the Bahrainis and today many are actively involved w i t h the 
Popular Front f o r the Liberation of Oman and the Gulf who are 
presently f i g h t i n g the Government forces of Oman. Summing up 
we may say that i n the past Arab Nationalism has been applied 
i n Bahrain i n an e f f o r t to solve t h e i r own domestic problems and 
only recently have the Bahrainis grasped the true aims of 
Nationalism on a pan-Arab ideological f r o n t , with t h e i r support, 
on a loc a l basis, of progressive forces at work i n Oman and 
elsewhere. 
The widely-held view of foreign observers was that p o l i t i c a l 
unrest i n Bahrain was engendered mainly by outside forces, 
especially with regard to the unrest of 1953-56. Contributing 
to t h i s view the Economist of March, 1956 stated t h a t , "There are 
about eight hundred Bahrainis being educated i n Egypt so that 
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i t s influence is constantly renewed." In fact at that time there 
was hardly a f r a c t i o n of that number of Bahrainis i n Egypt but 
the idea that the Egyptians were behind the 1953-56 unrest 
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Was s t i l l put forward by many w r i t e r s . Others, however, took 
another view i n that the unrest began as a desire for genuine 
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86 reforms but that i t l a t e r became "servant to Egypt". 
The l a t t e r a t t i t u d e was reflected by B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s . 
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd 9 Foreign Secretary at the time, i n replying 
to a question on Bahrain from Mr. Warby, stated, " I do not 
agree that there i s any sorry state of a f f a i r s i n Bahrain. And 
I am not so sure of the origins of the so-called 'Popular 
Movement'".87 
Events l a t e r revealed that Egypt had nothing whatsoever 
to do with the unrest during 1953-56 i n Bahrain. Confirmation 
of t h i s came from many quarters. The l a t e Al-Baker t o l d the w r i t e r 
that he met Nasser during his s e l f - e x i l e of March to September, 
1956, and that during the interview Nasser expressed hardly any 
enthusiasm for t h e i r cause and held out l i t t l e hope of any 
support. 
This view i s confirmed by H. Trevelyan who stated th a t , "He 
(Nasser) had t o l d me that the accusations about his a c t i v i t i e s 
against the B r i t i s h i n Aden and Bahrain were groundless, since 
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he had no organisation i n either place". I n fact the unrest 
was due simply to a reformist movement i n Bahrain who were, i n 
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Nutting's words attempting to gain a "Magna Carta" The aims of 
the movement, which were expressed to the w r i t e r by Al-Shamlan i n 
1971, were "to f i g h t denominationalism w i t h i n Bahrain society and 
to bring the i n t e l l i g e n s i a , p e t i t e bourgeoise and labouring 
classes under one umbrella, with a view to f u l f i l l i n g the legitimate 
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goals of the people". Even allowing f o r the time i n t e r v a l 
between 1956 and 1971, during which the influence of Arab Nationalism 
has spread more widely, we f i n d no mention of Arab Nationalism 
i n t h i s statement but rather idealism and patriotism. 
Al-Baker, w r i t i n g i n 1965, expressed the view that he 
0 
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refused to recognise any substitutions of Shaikh Safiman as 
Ruler of Bahrain, and expressed the committee's l o y a l t y to the 
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Al-Khalifah, which pointed to the fact that they desired 
progressive reforms rather than revolution. They were i n 
fact general reformists without any set ideology and both 
Al-Baker and Al-Shamlan denied the writer's suggestion that 
they wished to form a p o l i t i c a l party. Support for t h i s 
argument comes from the New Statesman which, when comenting 
on the a f f a i r s of 1953-56, referred to the events as the 
actions of a reformist movement which, "seemed to lack the 
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congenital Anglophobia which makes Arab Nationalism elsewhere. 
The other facts which influenced the p o l i t i c a l scene 
i n Bahrain from the 1920's was, as we have stated e a r l i e r , the 
growth of B r i t i s h influence. 
The i n i t i a l interference i n 1923 seemed to be motivated 
by humanitarian reasons and was p o s i t i v e l y constructive. There 
may be reason to doubt t h i s , however, as on the same s i t u a t i o n 
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i n Iraq (suppression of the Shia) the B r i t i s h adopted a d i f f e r e n t 
a t t i t u d e . I t may i n fact have been a manoeuvre to gain influence 
and control of the strategically-placed island and to obtain 
control of i t s administration. Although at that time B r i t a i n 
did not appear to have any long term policy with regard to the 
island, the presence of a B r i t i s h Advisor as early as 1926 
shows that they intended to keep the i n i t i a t i v e which they had 
gained. Having appointed the Advisor they v i r t u a l l y ceased to 
make constructive and progressive reforms and seemed more interested 
i n merely maintaining the status quo. The B r i t i s h Authorities i n 
the Gulf saw the very fact that there was a highly-placed B r i t i s h 
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employee i n the Bahrain Government as being s u f f i c i e n t to 
maintain a "progressive and improved government". They 
overlooked the fact that sometimess consciously or unconsciously, 
a vested interest developed. Human nature being as i t i s 
people holding power often r e s i s t reforms i n an attempt to 
safeguard that same power. 
The safeguarding of the B r i t i s h interests was constantly 
i n the minds of the authorities of the Gulf and the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident, as early as 1929, i n r e f e r r i n g to the importance of 
the B r i t i s h Advisor, stated, " i f the European Advisor were removed 
Shaikh Hamed would surely f a l l under the influence of some i n t r i g u i n g 
Syrian or Egyptian who would, for a consideration, play in t o the 
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hands of Persia or Najd". 
The basis of the argument changed over the years but a 
reason could always be found for the continued presence of the 
Advisor. 
The B r i t i s h declined to look objectively or sympathetically 
on the p o l i t i c a l aspirations of the Bahraini people, seemed at 
times to be cynically exploiting the divisions w i t h i n the community 
for the maintenance of t h e i r own influence. This i s instances i n 
th e i r encouragement of the Shia and the undermining of the Arab 
t r i b e s ' authority i n 1923 as opposed to th e i r a t t i t u d e i n 1938, 
when Belgrave cited the l o y a l t y of the Arab tribes to the Shaikh 
as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the maintenance of the status quo. 
Looking back over Belgrave's long service i n Bahrain leads 
one to ask the question, was he merely an employee of the Shaikh 
or was he an instrument of B r i t i s h rule? Writing on t h i s subject 
he stated. 
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"One of my personal problems was how to 
weight my l o y a l t y to the Shaikh with the 
lo y a l t y I owed the B r i t i s h . This was not 
easy, especially when the Shaikh and thgc 
B r i t i s h did not always see eye to eye". 
He does not t e l l us, however, whether he supported any particular 
party i n these disputes, indeed a further statement of his leads 
us to the opinion that he himself was often confused by the 
sit u a t i o n and the role he played, and sometimes wondered whether 
he was being used, when he said, 
"So often the a t t i t u d e was as though the 
Resident was the headmaster of a school, 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent the form-master, the 
Shaikh the head boy and I - well I do not 
quite know what - neither f i s h , fowl nor 
good red herring." 
I n t h i s statement he i s probably underrating his own r o l e , 
however, as i t i s more l i k e l y that he was "head boy" rather than 
the Shaikh. 
During his service i n Bahrain a myth grew that Belgrave 
was biased towards the Shia. This charge was repeated by many 
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w r i t e r s , even by al-Baker. This i s probably an image that he 
cultivated f o r his own purposes and used for p o l i t i c a l ends. He 
played t h i s r o l e successfully for a time, as he often used his 
very influence w i t h the Shia to neutralise them as p o l i t i c a l forces 
u n t i l , during the period 1953-56 when he was no longer able to 
maintain t h i s r o l e . 
He himself, i n the la t e r stages of t h i s p o l i t i c a l unrest, 
f e l t that he was no longer persona grata to the B r i t i s h . He noted 
tha t , "He (the Shaikh) knew that the B r i t i s h authorities would 
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l i k e me to leave as soon as possible". This idea of the removal 
of Belgrave was probably the f i r s t major change of policy by the 
B r i t i s h towards Bahrain f o r a long time. 
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As i t appeared la t e r the B r i t i s h had no inte n t i o n of 
backing the demands of the 1953-56 p o l i t i c a l movements, despite 
what appeared at the time to be t h e i r support during t h e i r attempts 
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at mediation. In fact early i n March, following the scenes 
involving Selwyn Lloyd, and whilst the mediation was going on, 
the B r i t i s h Cabinet had decided to take action. As Nutting 
revealed l a t e r , 
"when r i o t s broke out i n Bahrain following 
the Foreign Secretary's b r i e f v i s i t , Eden 
put the blame on the Committee of National 
Union. The "whiff of grapeshot" school 
suggested that troops of the Strategic 
Reserve be sent from Aden to quell the r i o t s , 
and when the War Office pointed out that 
there was not enough troops to spare, Eden 
proposed to i n v i t e Nuri es-Said to help w i t h ^ ^ 
the despatch of an I r a q i police detachment." 
Nutting went on to say that i t was fortunate that t h i s proposition 
was not put into e f f e c t as the I r a q i police authority convinced 
Nuri es-Said that the police would not f i r e on fellow-Arabs. He 
continued, however, "He (Eden) wanted a demonstration of strength, 
an assertion of Britain's power and influence to raise her battered 
nlOl 
prestige. 
This view was confirmed to the w r i t e r by Sir Bernard Burrows, 
the P o l i t i c a l Resident i n the Gulf at that time (1954-58) who 
stated that we (the B r i t i s h ) decided to take action after the 
Selwyn Lloyd incident i n 1956. This a t t i t u d e was taken by the 
B r i t i s h i n s p i t e of the fact that the H.E.C. had immediately 
pub l i c l y condemned the action of the r i o t e r s . 
Further confirmation of t h i s a t t i t u d e i s clear i n the reply 
of the Foreign Secretary to a question by Mr. Philips Price on the 
19th March, 1956, concerning what advice that he had given to the 
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Shaikh of Bahrain about associating the people of the island 
more act i v e l y with the government of the t e r r i t o r y . 
He saidj "H.M.G. are not responsible for the internal 
a f f a i r s of Bahrain but i n view of our association and friendship 
with the Ruler we are naturally concerned that Bahrain should 
remain as i t has been i n the past, a stable and well-ordered 
102 
state, under the present House." 
This statement was made only one day following the 
completion of the negotiations i n which the B r i t i s h were mediators 
and the subsequent acknowledgment by the Bahrain Government of 
the C.N.U. Possibly the mediation was j u s t an attempt to buy 
time, for Mr. C. Gauit informed the w r i t e r , "at that time we 
wanted to keep the s i t u a t i o n quiet."^°^ 
The lack of B r i t i s h support for the reforms can be seen i n 
the fact that the small gains made during the negotiations of 1956 
were to evaporate before the end of that year i n the face of 
renewed repressions. 
I f the negotiated reforms of elections to the Health and 
Education Councils and the recognition of organised labour had 
been backed by the B r i t i s h a f t e r t h e i r part i n the negotiations 
they would probably have continued and progressed. 
The future downfall of B r i t i s h policy i n the Gulf area 
was elaborated upon by Mr. Paul Johnson, who, w r i t i n g i n 1958, 
put the view that, 
" i t i s d i f f i c u l t to think of any single act 
more calculated to place strength into the hands of 
Britain's worst enemies i n the Middle East, to 
complete the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , once and for a l l , i n 
the eyes of every Arab, between B r i t i s h policy and 
the worse b r u t a l i t i e s of feudal reaction." 
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He went on to suggest t h a t , 
"the Ruler of Bahrain, f o r example, should 
be t o l d that he had precisely two years i n 
which to draw up a cons t i t u t i o n and come to 
terms with his subjects."105 
As we have already stated, Bahrain, during the 1960's 
tended to be a police state. An Indian lawyer, who practiced 
i n Bahrain for seven years stated, 
" I n Bahrain, Britain's p e t i t e South Africa 
i n the Arabian Gulf, when every o f f i c e r 
of authority (Bahrain State Police), has 
the uncommon benefit of happy i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
and the res u l t i s a government gg p l u r a l i t y 
of unassailable English whims'. Later he 
went on to say, "Prison, perhaps i s the 
easiest place to go to i n Bahrain."107 
The uncertainty of the long-term B r i t i s h policy towards 
the Gulf area made the s i t u a t i o n worse, as the Ruler counted on 
continuing support from the B r i t i s h . 
Mr. G. Thompson, Minister of State for Foreign A f f a i r s , 
w h i lst v i s i t i n g Bahrain on 10th May, 1965, announced that his 
Government had no intention of changing Britain's r o l e i n the 
108 
Gulf. A year l a t e r the new lease for B r i t i s h bases i n Bahrain 
was signed and was taken as a sign that a B r i t i s h presence would 
continue. As we have seen, however, less than eighteen months 
l a t e r the decision to withdraw put the rulers of the Area, especia 
the Ruler of Bahrain, i n a delicate s i t u a t i o n . 
The consequences of the B r i t i s h withdrawal i n 1971 remain 
yet to be seen. 
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C.N.U., B u l l e t i n No. 68, 13th Aug., 1956. 
"The Economist" - Nov. 10th, 1956, re p o r t e d under the t i t l e 
" R i o t s i n the O i l Sheikdoms", t h a t , " I n Bahrain s e v e r a l 
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P A R T F I V E 
C O N C L U S I O N 
CONCLUSION 
From the end of the F i r s t World War up to 1971, the year 
of independence, t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t Bahrain has undergone 
gr e a t changes i n the s o c i a l and economic spheres of l i f e and t h a t 
these i n t u r n have p o l i t i c i s e d the i n h a b i t a n t s of the i s l a n d s i n 
t h e i r f e e l i n g s and views toward the concepts of modern government 
and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
E c o n o m i c a l l y Bahrain has always been r e l a t i v e l y prosperous 
i n comparison to other Gulf s t a t e s and the r u l e r s p r i d e themselves 
on the f a c t t h a t Bahrain, u n l i k e other G u l f c o u n t r i e s such as 
Saudi A r a b i a , Kuwait, Oman, e t c . , has never had to r e l y upon 
s u b s i d i e s from f o r e i g n governments to s u r v i v e . On the c o n t r a r y 
they took p r i d e i n the f a c t t h a t they had been i n a p o s i t i o n to 
s u b s i d i s e t h e i r neighbours, as they d i d f o r Ibn Saud, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
during the second decade of the century.* 
The B a h r a i n i s maintained t h i s r e l a t i v e standard of wealth 
when the a r r i v a l of the o i l e r a gave a f u r t h e r impetus to t h e i r 
economy. 
The we a l t h , however, brought i t s own problems, J e a l o u s i e s 
were s t i r r e d by envious neighbouring r u l e r s u n t i l such time as 
they gained t h e i r own o i l revenues and i n a d d i t i o n the Bahrain 
r u l e r s themselves became overproud. On the matter of s u b s i d i e s 
from other Governments the A l - K h a l i f a h took the view t h a t i t was 
almost a p e r s o n a l i n s u l t t h a t they, the wealthy r u l e r s of Bahrain, 
should be o f f e r e d f o r e i g n f i n a n c e . They f a i l e d to see the d i f f e r e n c e 
between p e r s o n a l wealth and the u t i l i s a t i o n of help and c a p i t a l , 
from whatever i t s source, as a means of improving the l o t of t h e i r 
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people and c r e a t i n g new i n d u s t r i e s and job o p p o r t u n i t i e s . T h i s 
can be i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t they were content f o r many 
y e a r s to a l l o w the B r i t i s h the use of t h e i r bases i n B a h r a i n 
for a nominal r e n t u n t i l the hard economic f a c t s of the c o s t of 
running a modern a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was brought home to them as the 
country's budget moved i n t o d e f i c i t . 
T h i s complex about f o r e i g n a i d proved to be a major handicap 
i n the country's economic growth as the Government r e f u s e d to 
countenance the r a i s i n g of loans f o r the c r e a t i o n of new i n d u s t r i e s 
to d i v e r s i f y the nature of the economy and to m a i n t a i n h e a l t h y 
economic growth by moving away from the concept of a s i n g l e - p r o d u c t 
economy. I t i s only v e r y r e c e n t l y t h a t the Government has changed 
i t s viewpoint on the matter and accepted grants and g i v e n f o r e i g n 
2 
c a p i t a l the opportunity of i n i t i a t i n g new p r o j e c t s i n Bahrain. 
I n doing so, however, they seem to have panicked and moved too f a r 
i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , i n the c a s e of ALBA, 
tax exemptions, r e l i e f from import and export d u t i e s , grants of 
land and cheap gas s u p p l i e s have encouraged the company to s e t up 
i t s production f a c i l i t i e s i n Bahrain. At the same time the 
continued s u p p r e s s i o n of the work f o r c e and the r e f u s a l to a l l o w the 
formation of t r a d e s unions have placed the working people of Bahrain 
i n a p o s i t i o n of weakness from which they cannot hope to b e n e f i t 
to any g r e a t extent from t h e i r r e c e n t i n n o v a t i o n s . Furthermore, 
the f a i l u r e of the main modern i n d u s t r i a l employer i n B a h r a i n , the 
o i l company, to pass on to the n a t i v e workers the i n d u s t r i a l 
e ngineering s k i l l s n e c e s s a r y i n the p r e s e n t day means th a t even 
w i t h new companies such as ALBA the B a h r a i n i s a r e again to be placed 
only i n the lower l a b o u r i n g c l a s s of the companies, w i t h l i t t l e 
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hope of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or advancement. U n t i l t h i s t a k e s p l a c e 
the t r o u b l e s of the p a s t w i l l re-appear i n the f u t u r e due to 
the f r u s t r a t i o n of the hopes of the B a h r a i n i s to gain p o s i t i o n s 
of power and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y i n t h e i r own l a n d . 
Over the y e a r s f o r e i g n observers have o f t e n c i t e d B a hrain 
as an example of good government i n comparison w i t h other Gulf 
S t a t e s . One of the main reasons f o r t a k i n g t h i s view was the 
f a c t t h a t B a h r a i n had s e t up a Reserve Fund i n t o which was paid 
3 
one t h i r d of the o i l revenues. What was overlooked was the f a c t 
t h a t an equal amount of money was going i n t o the Shaikh's pocket 
each y e a r , a f a c t which o f t e n caused the r i c h young members of the 
A l - K h a l i f a h f a m i l y to become completely b l a s e and to f a i l u t t e r l y 
to a p p r e c i a t e the needs and problems of t h e i r s u b j e c t s . 
Welfare s e r v i c e s such as Health and E d u c a t i o n enabled the 
people to m a i n t a i n a reasonable degree of h e a l t h and l i t e r a c y but 
t h e s e v e r y t h i n g s c r e a t e d a need f o r more job s and b e t t e r housing 
as the people r a i s e d t h e i r aims of l i f e . No p l a n seems to e x i s t , 
however, to f i l l t h e i r needs and development of the l i m i t e d 
economy o f t e n appears to be more haphazard than planned. 
The p o p u l a t i o n of Bahrain i s now i n c r e a s i n g a t a r a t e of 
four percent per annum, which, b e s i d e s the s t r a i n i t p l a c e s on the 
w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s a l s o e x e r t s a p o l i t i c a l s t r e s s . As Duverger 
pointed out, 
"The theory of demographic p r e s s u r e d e s c r i b e s 
the s i t u a t i o n i n under-developed c o u n t r i e s , 
where population growth proceeds a t an 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y r a t e , g r e a t l y aggravating 
p o l i t i c a l antagonism." 
The output of the e d u c a t i o n a l system of Bahrain f a r exceeds 
the c a p a c i t y of the i n d u s t r i e s of the i s l a n d to absorb the 
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s c h o o l - l e a v e r s and graduates. T h i s s i t u a t i o n , w i t h the absence 
of any proper wage p o l i c y , has l e d to too many people cha s i n g 
too few jobs w i t h the consequent d e p r e s s i o n of wage l e v e l s i n 
an employers' market. 
T h i s has l e d to a s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n which even the 
i n t e l l i g e n s i a a r e a t v a r i a n c e w i t h one another, those w i t h j o b s 
supporting the Government and employers i n order to safeguard 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and those without j o b s , i n s p i t e of t h e i r 
education, becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y f r u s t r a t e d and b i t t e r . 
The Government has taken some measures to a l l e v i a t e t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n by the c r e a t i o n of new j o b s w i t h i n the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
As we have seen t h i s l e d to the Government, r a t h e r than the o i l 
company, becoming the l a r g e s t employers of labour i n the i s l a n d s . 
Although the number of j o b s was i n c r e a s e d the s e r v i c e s 
provided by the Government were not and t h i s has l e d to the 
s i t u a t i o n whereby people a r e being employed i n j o b s where t h e r e 
i s l i t t l e or no work, Government spending has soared and money 
i s now being drawn from the Reserve Fund to o f f s e t t h i s i n e f f i c i e n t 
i n c r e a s e i n Government expenditure. 
I n a d d i t i o n to the above the idea of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
supremecy of the A l - K h a l i f a h f a m i l y has a l s o c r e a t e d problems 
due to the p r a c t i c e of appointing members of the F a m i l y , o f t e n 
uneducated, i n key j o b s or as Heads of Government Departments, 
a form of the t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l nepotism which s e r v e s only to 
exacerbate the s i t u a t i o n . 
The denominational problems between Shia and Sunni have 
diminished somewhat over the y e a r s but t h e r e i s s t i l l a gap to 
be bridged and m i s t r u s t to be overcome. The p r e s s u r e s of modern 
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l i v i n g and modern employment have thrown the two s i d e s together 
and t h e r e a r e si g n s t h a t i n r e c e n t y e a r s the people a r e coming 
to r e a l i s e t h a t t h e i r problems a r e not ones of denomination but 
of c l a s s , w i t h the poorer s e c t i o n s of both communities beginning 
to i d e n t i f y themselves more w i t h t h e i r f e l l o w workers than t h e i r 
s e c t s . Evidence of t h i s s h i f t of o p i n i o n away from r e l i g i o u s 
s e c t s to c l a s s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s seen i n the work of the t h i n k e r s 
of the i s l a n d . One B a h r a i n i poet has even gone so f a r as to 
compare the s a c r i f i c e s of Hussain, a S h i a s a i n t , w i t h those of 
modern day r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s such a s Che Guevara,"* an id e a which 
o n l y a few ye a r s ago would have provoked extreme i n d i g n a t i o n and 
even v i o l e n c e . 
I n the s o c i a l sphere Bahrain has undoubtedly absorbed much 
of the modern c u l t u r e s and accepted many in n o v a t i o n s . I n s t a n c e s 
of t h i s a r e numerous. I n s t e a d of employing the t r a d i t i o n a l 
"musawet", or neighbourhood s t r e e t - c r i e r , the modern techniques 
of advertisement by r a d i o and p r e s s a r e used. C h i l d r e n no longer 
p l a y hopscotch i n the s t r e e t s but take p a r t i n b a s k e t b a l l and 
f o o t b a l l matches, and most important of a l l women are becoming 
i n c r e a s i n g l y emancipated. 
The emancipation of women i n Bahrain i s one of the most 
s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e s of the changes which have taken p l a c e . I n the 
past i t was considered shameful to even mention the name of any 
of one's female r e l a t i v e s w h i l s t i n male company. Men never 
addressed t h e i r wives by t h e i r f i r s t names, but r e f e r r e d to them 
as "mother of .........", or "daughter of " 
Now, however, the women a r e i n c r e a s i n g l y t a k i n g t h e i r 
p l a c e s i n j o b s , i n o f f i c e s and s c h o o l s , or t a k i n g employment i n 
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v a r i o u s forms of s k i l l e d or s e m i - s k i l l e d manual work, and although 
t h e r e i s s t i l l a long way to go towards complete emancipation 
t h e s e f i r s t s t e p s w i l l no doubt pave the way towards t h i s g o a l . 
P o l i t i c a l l y , e s p e c i a l l y from the p o i n t of view of d e l e g a t i o n 
of power to the people, Bahrain has not progressed v e r y f a r . 
The r u l e r s of B a h r a i n , l i k e t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n other 
Gulf s t a t e s , p l a c e great emphasis on t h e i r " n a t u r a l r i g h t to r u l e " . 
I n B a h r a i n , however, w i t h the presence of a B r i t i s h Advisor f o r 
so many y e a r s , one would have expected t h a t t h i s viewpoint would 
have been somewhat modified e s p e c i a l l y w i t h regard to the o p i n i o n 
expressed i n 1937 by T.C. Fowle, P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t a t the time, 
when he s t a t e s t h a t , "Our p o l i c y i n B a h r a i n , as I see i t , i s to 
t e a c h the B a h r a i n i s to govern themselves".^ 
Although t h i s statement i s r a t h e r vague i t i m p l i e s t h a t 
a t l e a s t the r u l e r should have been t r a i n e d to run a modern 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and d e l e g a t e some of h i s powers a c c o r d i n g l y . I n 
a c t u a l f a c t l i t t l e or no change took p l a c e and as l a t e as 1966 
Mr. David Holden pointed out t h a t , "the present r u l e r , Shaikh I s a , 
r e t a i n e d n e a r l y as much personal a u t h o r i t y as h i s f a t h e r or h i s 
grandfather."^ 
The withdrawal of the B r i t i s h from the i s l a n d s i n 1971 has 
a t l a s t brought the Shaikh i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h h i s people without 
the " p r o t e c t i o n " and help of the B r i t i s h and i t remains to be 
seen whether the r u l e r i s capable of f a c i n g up to the new s i t u a t i o n 
or whether the t r i b a l c o n f l i c t s , even w i t h i n the r u l i n g f a m i l y , 
r e a s s e r t themselves and become ma n i f e s t i n events such as have 
taken p l a c e r e c e n t l y i n Qatar and S h a r j a h . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y the growing importance of the Gulf and the 
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s t r a t e g i c a l p o s i t i o n of Bahrain appears to be a t t r a c t i n g the 
a t t e n t i o n of other powers such as the Americans. I n i t i a l moves 
have a l r e a d y taken p l a c e , such as the t r a n s f e r of the Middle 
E a s t Headquarters of the F i r s t N a t i o n a l C i t y Bank from B e i r u t 
to B a h r a i n , the s i g n i n g of a l e a s e by the U.S. Government f o r 
the r e n t i n g of the former B r i t i s h Naval base on the i s l a n d , 
and the frequent v i s i t s to Bahrain by high-ranking American 
9 
Government o f f i c i a l s . 
These moves by the American show the growing l i n k s being 
e s t a b l i s h e d between themselves and the e x i s t i n g regime, but 
t h i s may e v e n t u a l l y d r i v e the U.S. Government i n t o a p o s i t i o n of 
supporting the Government of Bahrain a g a i n s t p r o g r e s s i v e p o l i t i c a l 
reforms i n order to m a i n t a i n t h e i r f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . 
The i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c i s of Bahrain, however, a r e s t a t i c 
f o r the p r e s e n t . The Government on the one hand i s encouraging 
the merchants to come together i n trade a s s o c i a t i o n s and on 
the other i s c o n t i n u i n g to discourage a s i m i l a r a s s o c i a t i o n of 
workers. 
Any attempts a t r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l changes i n the f u t u r e 
appear to be doomed to f a i l u r e without the a c t i v e support and 
co-operation of movements w i t h i n other major Arab c o u n t r i e s . The 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s t a k i n g p l a c e i n the near f u t u r e appears to be 
remote c o n s i d e r i n g the fragmented s t a t e of many of the movements 
of the Arab w o r l d . ^ 
D e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t i t i s a c a d e m i c a l l y u n d e s i r a b l e to 
f o r e c a s t i n terms of time and events what changes w i l l occur, i t 
i s s u f f i c i e n t to s t a t e t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y of any r a d i c a l 
p o l i t i c a l change i n Bahrain i s dependent upon changes i n the r e g i o n 
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as a whole, and e s p e c i a l l y i n Saudi A r a b i a . 
I t i s time, however, t h a t the Bahrain Government r e a l i s e d 
t h a t t h e r e i s more to independence than a f l a g and a n a t i o n a l 
anthem. To s u r v i v e i n the e r a of l a r g e p o l i t i c a l and economic 
b l o c s , B a h r a i n , as a small s t a t e should be looking towards union 
w i t h other s t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h i n her own geographical and 
economic sphere. 
The worst enemy of the B a h r a i n Government appears to be 
i t s own apathy which i s nowhere b e t t e r i l l u s t r a t e d than i t s 
a c t i o n s f o l l o w i n g the u n r e s t s of 1953-56 and of March, 1965. The 
Government on both o c c a s i o n s c a l l e d f o r r e p o r t s to r e v i e w and 
make recommendations on the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , presumably f o r study 
to avoid the same mistakes i n the f u t u r e . But on both o c c a s i o n s 
i n s t e a d of a c t i n g upon the recommendations of the r e p o r t s o n l y 
v e r y few of the recommendations were implemented and the 
problems were l e f t to r i s e a gain i n the f u t u r e . 
The r e c e n t s t e p s which have been taken towards the formation 
of Bahrain's f i r s t L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l may mark the t u r n i n g p o i n t 
i n Bahrain's i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . 
Much of the outcome, however, s t i l l depends.upon the extent 
to which the r u l e r i s prepared to delegate h i s a u t h o r i t y to a 
d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d assembly. 
The events up to the p r e s e n t suggest t h a t i f any power i s 
conceded i t w i l l be done r e l u c t a n t l y and on a v e r y l i m i t e d b a s i s . 
- 414 -
FOOTNOTES 
1. Telegram from Keyes, P o l . Agent i n B a h r a i n , to Trevor, 
P o l . R e s i d e n t . , 27th June, 1915. 
2. The Govt, have accepted a grant from Kuwait w i t h a view to 
e s t a b l i s h i n g new i n d u s t r i a l v e n t u r e s . See "Sada al-UsBou", 
No. 71, Bahrain, 2nd March, 1971, 
3. See, e.g., C h i l d s , J.R., " F o r e i g n S e r v i c e s F a r e w e l l - My 
Years i n the Near E a s t " - Univ. of V i r g i n i a , 1969, p. 158. 
4. Duverger, M., "The Study of P o l i t i c s " ( T r a n s l a t e d by Robt. 
Wagoner) Thomas Nelson & Sons, London, 1972, p.43. 
5. "Huna a l - B a h r a i n " , No. 230, March, 1971, p.23. 
6. L e t t e r from T.C. Fowles, P o l . Res., to Mr. J.C. Walter, 
I n d i a O f f i c e , London, D.O. No. 88S, 23rd D e c , 1937. 
7. Holden, David, " F a r e w e l l to A r a b i a " - Faber and Faber, 
London, 1966, p. 179. 
87 "Arab Report and Record", 1 s t to 15th J a n . , 1972, No. 1. News 
of the s i g n i n g of the l e a s e was f i r s t p u blished i n the U.S.A. 
p r e s s i n l a t e 1971 and confirmed by the Bahrain Govt, on 
23rd Dec. 1971. These s e c r e t moves provoked a sharp r e a c t i o n 
from other c o u n t r i e s i n the Arab world. 
9. Such as the v i s i t to Bahrain by Mr. Rogers, Sec. of S t a t e 
f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s to the U.S. Govt. §ee "Al-Seyassah", 
Kuwait, 4 t h J u l y , 1972, No. 1445. 
10. T h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s r e f l e c t s i t s e l f upon the B a h r a i n i s as 
f o r example the B a ' a t h i s t s of B a h r a i n f i n d themselves t o r n 
between the adherents of the Baghdad or Damascus d o c t r i n e s . 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
Manuscript C o l l e c t i o n s 
i ) I n d i a O f f i c e R e c o r d s 
A. ) P o l i t i c a l & S e c r e t Memorandum, R e f e r e n c e L/P & S. 
L / 1 0 / 8 1 B a h r a i n S i t u a t i o n . 
B. 1 3 1 . B a h r a i n , 1 9 0 1 . 
B. 1 5 1 . B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s on t h e C o a s t o f A r a b i a , 
K u w a i t , B a h r a i n , K a t e r , 1 9 0 5 . 
B. 3 9 3 . P o l i t i c a l C o n t r o l i n t h e P e r s i a n G u l f , 
O c t o b e r , 1 9 2 8 . 
B. 3 9 6 . B a h r a i n ( 1 9 0 8 - 1 9 2 8 ) . 
B. 4 2 0 . Q u e s t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f B a h r a i n . 
B. 4 3 6 . H i s t o r i c a l memorandum on B a h r a i n , 1 9 3 4 . 
B. ) P o l i t i c a l & S e c r e t D e p a r t m e n t , R e f e r e n c e L/P & S / 1 0 . 
1 5 0 8 / 1 9 0 5 P a r t I B a h r a i n S i t u a t i o n , 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 1 4 . 
P a r t I I B a h r a i n S i t u a t i o n , 1 9 0 5 - 1 9 1 3 . 
P a r t s I I I , I V & V B a h r a i n S i t u a t i o n , 1 9 0 5 - 1 9 1 2 . 
5 2 2 / 1 9 2 2 P a r t I P e r s i a n G u l f : B a h r a i n A f f a i r s . 
P a r t I V P e r s i a n G u l f : B a h r a i n A f f a i r s . 
C. ) R e p o r t on P e r s i a n G u l f . R e f e r e n c e R/15/1 
1 9 / 2 0 N a j d - B a h r a i n R e l a t i o n s , 1 9 2 2 - 2 3 ; 
1 9 / 2 1 B a h r a i n R e f o r m s , 1 9 2 2 - 2 3 . 
1 9 / 2 2 B a h r a i n R e f o r m s , 1 9 2 2 - 2 3 . 
1 9 / 2 3 B a h r a i n R e f o r m s , 1 9 2 3 . 
19/24 B a h r a i n R e f o r m s , 1 9 2 4 - 2 5 . 
1 9 / 2 5 B a h r a i n R e f o r m s , 1 9 2 7 - 3 0 . 
1 9 / 2 6 D i s t u r b a n c e s o f B a h r a i n b e t w e e n N a j d i s & P e r s i a n s , 
1923 . 
19/27 R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n S u n n i s & S h i h a s , 1 9 2 3 - 2 8 . 
- 4 1 6 -
1 9 / 2 8 B a h r a i n A g i t a t i o n , 1 9 3 5 - 3 8 . 
R e f e r e n c e R / 1 5 / 2 
1 / 1 P o l i t i c a l : S h a i k h I s a b i n A l i A l - K h a l i f a h . 
1 / 5 1 P o l i t i c a l : T y r a n n y o f R u l i n g F a m i l y i n B a h r a i n , 
2 3 . 1 1 . 2 1 , 9 . 1 0 . 2 3 . 
1 / 6 0 P o l i t i c a l : Dawsir T r i b e & T h e i r R e m o v a l f r o m 
B a h r a i n 3 . 7 . 2 2 , 2 6 . 5 . 2 8 . 
1 / 6 1 P o l i t i c a l s S u n n i - S h i a h R e l a t i o n s , 2 1 . 8 . 2 3 , 
1 1 . 9 . 2 9 . 
1 / 7 0 J u r i s d i c t i o n : J u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r F o r e i g n e r s 
i n B a h r a i n , 2 1 . 1 . 0 5 , 2 7 . 3 . 2 7 . 
1 / 7 3 P o l i t i c a l : R u s s i a n A c t i v i t i e s i n t h e P e r s i a n 
G u l f , 2 1 . 5 . 2 9 , 3 0 . 1 2 . 2 9 . 
1 / 1 2 0 A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P o l i t i c a l : T r a n s h i p m e n t o f 
C a r g o a t B a h r a i n , 2 . 1 0 . 3 1 , 2 5 . 1 . 3 3 . 
1 / 1 2 5 P o l i t i c a l : B a h r a i n N a t i o n a l i t y & P r o p e r t y Law, 
6 < > 5 o 3 3 , 1 7 . 6 . 3 7 . 
1 / 1 2 6 P o l i t i c a l : B a h r a i n N a t i o n a l i t y & P r o p e r t y Law, 
5 . 7 . 3 7 , 9 . 1 . 3 9 . 
1 / 1 3 9 P o l i t i c a l : I m p o s i t i o n o f E c o n o m i c S a c t i o n s 
a g a i n s t I t a l y , 2 8 . 1 0 . 3 5 , 1 8 . 9 . 3 6 . 
1 / 1 4 0 P o l i t i c a l : P a l e s t i n e D i s t u r b a n c e s , 1 . 8 , 3 6 , 
3 . 8 . 3 9 . 
1 / 1 5 0 A d m i n i s t r a t i o n : F i n a n c e s o f t h e B a h r a i n S t a t e , 
1 7 o X « 3 2 y I l o 2 o 3 3 o 
R / 1 5 / 2 / 2 
2 / 1 4 P e r i o d i c a l P u b l i c a t i o n s 3 . 1 . 3 4 , 
1 6 . 1 1 . 3 8 . 
2 / 1 5 P e r i o d i c a l P u b l i c a t i o n s 2 . 1 1 . 3 8 , 
2 1 . 9 . 3 9 . 
R / 1 5 / 2 / 4 
4 / 9 P o l i t i c a l : M . E . I . C . P u b l i c i t y 1 3 . 8 . 3 9 , 
1 8 . 6 . 4 3 . 
4 / 2 9 P o l i t i c a l : R e p o r t o f T r e a t y o f A l l i a n c e 2 3 . 7 . 3 4 , 
b e t w e e n U.K. & B a h r a i n 2 5 . 8 . 3 4 . 
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4/44 
5/2 
5/5 
5/14 
5/28 
5/36 
5/37 
5/50 
6/18 
6/20 
6/26 
6/40 
6/41 
6/42 
6/45 
6/104 
6/122 
Ba h r a i n S t a t e : Bahrain Development 23.12.37, 
12.9.45. 
R/15/2/5 
J u d i c a l : N a t i o n a l Work B i l l s of Exchange, 
Documentary B i l l s , Notes of P r o t e s t 1.5.26, 
14.3.35. 
P e r s o n a l i t i e s : Shaikh A b d u l l a b i n I s a 
( h i s i n t r i g u e s ) 18.6.21, 
18.2.29. 
P e r s o n a l i t i e s : A b d u l l A z i z Q o s a i b i & 
A b d u l l a h Q o s a i b i . 
J u d i c i a l : O r g a n i z a t i o n & F a c t i o n of S a l i f a h 
Court 5.2.27, 
26.1.29. 
J u d i c i a l : F o r e i g n J u r i s d i c t i o n ( P r o b a t e ) 
Order i n C o u n c i l 1935. 
P e r s o n a l i t i e s : Jasim Mohammad E l - C h i r a w i & 
10.11.21 
16.6.23. 
His Uncle, , 
P e r s o n a l i t i e s : Ahmed b i n Lahaj 7.11.23 
26.5.24 
R/15/2/6 
Bahrain S t a t e : A l l o w a n c e s , e t c . , t o 
A l - K h a l i f a h f a m i l y 13.10.26 
8.5.37. 
Ba h r a i n S t a t e : Shaikh A b d u l l a ' s v i s i t t o 
London 14.5.19. 
27.9.20. 
Waqof Department: i t ' s f o r m a t i o n 13.8.27 
22.3.39. 
B a h r a i n Government P r o c l a m a t i o n 7.5.26/8.10.29. 
Ba h r a i n Government P r o c l a m a t i o n 4.9.29/2.10.33. 
Ba h r a i n Government P r o c l a m a t i o n 15.1.35/18.4.40. 
Bahrain S t a t e : Arab & P e r s i a n Schools i n Bahrain 
28.6.28, 
9.11.44. 
Bahrain S t a t e : Complaints from & A g a i n s t : 
Bahrain S t a t e O f f i c i a l 1.7.33, 17.12.50. 
Bahrain S t a t e : Census of Bahrain P o p u l a t i o n 
14.11.38, 
28.8.50. 
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8/1 
8/5 
8/24 
8/25 
9/1 
9/18 
9/37 
10/36 
10/37 
10/38 
10/39 
10/40 
10/73 
10/85 
12/29 
29/3 
R/15/2/8 
M i s c e l l a n e o u s : P u b l i c P o s i t i o n s , e t c . 12.8.21 
3.7.24. 
Bahrain S t a t e : Reform i n the P e a r l I n d u s t r y 
B a h r a i n Government Annual Report 16.7»30 s 
11.7.31. 
Bahrain Government Annual Report 9.6.32 s 
17.9.32. 
R/15/2/9 
Ba h r a i n Reforms 
Sunni i n t r i g u e s 
B a h r a i n Reforms 
Ba h r a i n Reforms 
R/15/2/10 
10/21 BAPC0 Labour 
I n s t i t u t i o n of Reforms & 
10.4.22. 
30.8.30. 
1) Reforms i n B a h r a i n Court;, 
2) F o r m a t i o n of 2nd Court s 
3) P r e p a r a t i o n of C i v i l & 
C r i m i n a l Codes . 
Grant of Passports & P e r m i t s 
by B a h r ain Government 1.5.29 
14.7.30 
2.11.38/4/5.44. 
Trade Reports 12.9.18/10.9.25. 
Trade Reports May 1925. 
21.8.26. 
6.9.33/30.10.36. 
21.10.36/3.9.40. 
Trade Reports 
Trade Reports 
Trade Reports 
P r o h i b i t e d of C e r t a i n Japanese goods i n t o 
B a h r a i n 17.2.34, 
2 2 o 3 o 3 4 o 
American Trade interest i n Bahrain 26.1.36. 
27.5.38. 
R/15/2/12 
P o l i t i c a l s D e p o r t a t i o n of i n d i g e n t P e r s i a n s 
from B a h r a i n 12.6.36 
11.12.44. 
R/15/2/29 
P o l i t i c a l : I n s t i t u t i o n of B a h r a i n & Kuwait 
N a t i o n a l i t y 6.3.34 
17 .3.34. 
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R/15/2/31 
31/16 Shaikh Sulman b i n Hamad a l - K h a l i f a h 18.2.34 
3.9.45 
31/13 A l - K h a l i f a h P r o p e r t y i n Bahrain 19.11.31 
7.6.41. 
R/15/2/35 
35/2 S o c i a l L e g i s l a t i o n i n Bahrain & Reforms of 
Bahrain Laws 13.12.38, 
30.8.42. 
35/4 The D i v e r R i o t of 1932 
R/15/2/A 
A/1 A l Bu Smeit T r i b e 1.1.01. 
8 . 6 o 17 . 
A/2 Correspondence w i t h t h e A d v i s o r 6.4.35, 
31.12.45. 
R/15/2/D. 
D/7 Custom d u t y on T r a n s i t Cargo t o the Mainland 
28.2.30 
3 * 3 o 2 1 o 
R/15/2/K/17 
Papers above women t a k i n g r e f u g e i n the Agency 
a g a i n s t murder by t h e i r r e l a t i v e s 9.1.35 
20.5.50. 
R/15/2/6 
6/4 Ba h r a i n S t a t e ; R e c r u i t m e n t f o r B a h r a i n P o l i c e 
5.4.26 
5.2.30. 
6/5 Bahrain S t a t e : R e c r u i t m e n t f o r B a h r a i n P o l i c e 
20.4.34 
10.4.37 
R/15/2/9/0. 
P o l i t i c a l : I n d i a n I n t e r e s t i n B a h r a i n 11.8.32 
25.4.49 
R/15/2/12/8 
P o l i t i c a l ! C i r c u l a r s 23.12.33 / 24.10.40. 
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R/15/2/29/1 
P o l i c y of H.M.G. i n A r a b i a A f f a i r s 18.3.33 
23.5.50. 
R/15/2/31/6 
Appointment of H e i r Apparent to Shaikh Hamad 
30.12.32 
28.3 .40. 
31/14 Shaikh K h a l i f a b i n Hamad 
31/15 Shaikh Mohammad b i n I s a . 
31/16 Shaikh Sulman b i n Hamad. 
R/15/2/A/40 
Ma j l e s s a l - O r f 2.4.19/27.11.20. 
R/15/2/G 
G/2 Correspondence w i t h I s a b i n A l i 
G/l Correspondence w i t h Hamad & Isa 1934-35. 
R/15/2/V/7 
E n g l i s h A r a b i c School 1919 
Bahrain 
i i ) F o r e i g n O f f i c e Records 
F o r e i g n Correspondence 1906-1939. 
Shaikh r e f u s e s p e r m i s s i o n t o 
German Trade 44/38391 
Shaikh promises t o adhere t o 
T r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s 44/1243 
P e r s i a n Claim t o S o v e r e i g n t y of 
Bah r a i n 34/3105 
1907 
Memorandum as t o c o n s o l i d a t e 
B r i t i s h P o s i t i o n a t B a h r a i n t o 
meet German C o m p e t i t i o n i n 
P e r s i a n Gulf 34/38128 
Group 
l e t t e r s 
F.O. 
Turkey 
F.O . 
P e r s i a 
F.O. 
P e r s i a 
Class 
No . 
371 
Piece 
No . 
156 
149 
105 
313 
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Group Class 
1908 l e t t e r s No. 
Piece 
No . 
Proposed order i n C o u n c i l 
44/2218 
Steps t o be t a k e n t o e n f o r c e 
His M a j e s t y ' s r i g h t of 
p r o t e c t i o n 44/12220 
Proposed o c c u p a t i o n o f the 
I s l a n d 44/15998 
F .0 . 
Turkey 
535 
541 
542 
1909 
B r i t i s h P r o t e c t i o n & P e r s i a n 
P r o t e c t i o n 44/A2161 
I n a d v i s a b i l i t y of r a i s i n g 
g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n of 
s o v e r e i g n t y 44/A13414 
J u d i c i a l Powers of P o l i t i c a l 
Agent 44/16304 
765 
770 
1911 
B r i t i s h P r o t e c t o r a t e , suggested 
f o r m a l d e c l a r a t i o n - view of 
I n d i a O f f i c e 44/1759 2-1698 
B r i t i s h agreements w i t h Shaikh 
Communication of Texts t o 
P o r t e 44/42135/21F. 
1242 
1234 
1912 
Warning t o Shaikh I s a a g a i n s t 
breach of T r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n 
t o HMG. 44/42794/10752 
Warning t o Shaikh I s a to e n t e r 
i n t o no agreement or c o r r e s -
pondence w i t h any o t h e r power 
tha n H.M.G. 44/51615/49955 
P.O. 
Turkey 
371 
1534 
1539 
1913 
Hakki Pasha's v e r s i o n of proposed " 
A n g l o - T u r k i s h agreement r e s p e c t i n g 
B a h r a i n 44/17067/9241 
Turks asked not t o use Bahrain as " 
base f o r o p e r a t i n g a g a i n s t B i n Saud 
i n K a t i f 44/25792/22076 
1769 
1820 
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Group 
l e t t e r s 
Q u estion of d i r e c t correspondence F=0. 
between Shaikh of B a h r a i n & Wali Turkey 
of Basra 44/37425 
1914 
U n d e r t a k i n g by Shaikh i n r e g a r d " 
t o w o r k i n g o i l i n h i s t e r r i t o r i e s 
44/30827/188 
E x p e d i t i o n f o r P e r s i a n G u l f t o " 
advance t o Bahrain on account 
of w a t er supply W.44/59601/54319 
1916 
Trade Report 1914-1916, 134/207719 F.O. 
P e r s i a 
Class 
No . 
Piece 
No . 
1821 
2115 
2143 
2723 
T r e a t y concluded w i t h B a h r a i n F.0 o 
44/144440 Turkey 
2766B 
1917 
F i l e r e s p e c t i n g proposed " 
m o d i f i c a t i o n & i s s u e of o r d e r i n 
c o u n c i l 44/8280 
Arms & ammunition f o r Shaikh of " 
Bah r a i n W.44/27404 
1918 
Petro l e u m r i g h t s a t B a h r a i n W.34/2894 
F.O. 
P e r s i a 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Report f o r 1916 " 
W34/37512 
D e c l a r a t i o n of B r i t i s h P r o t e c t o r a t e F.O. 
a t B a h r a i n W.44/200174 Turkey 
Request f o r exchange concessions F.O. 
334/205646 P e r s i a 
3041 
3048 
3264 
3269 
3420 
327 5 
1919 
Trade Report on Bahrain f o r 
1917-18. 144/83237 
F.O. 
Turkey 
371 4229 
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Group Class Piece 
l e t t e r s No. No. 
Ca p t a i n N.E. Bray as P o l i t i c a l F.0-. " 4208 
Agent W.44/18253 Turkey 
K.C.I.E. f o r Shaikh I s a " " 4210 
44/25003 
Proposed v i s i t t o U.K. of Shaikh " " 4214 
A b d u l l a son of Shaikh I s a w i t h 
son o f b i n Saud W.44/43839 
Major Dickson P o l i t i c a l Agent " " 4240 
W.44A/163803 
1920 
Customs T a r i f f s d i s p u t e between " " 5261 
Shaikh & Bin Saud. N e g o t i a t i o n s 
f o r s e t t l e m e n t E6262/6262/44 
German e n q u i r y as t o s t a t u s of " " 5271 
Bahrains l i q u i d a t i o n o f 
R. Wonkhaus & Co. 
E.8654/8654/44 
S i t u a t i o n , Reports by P o l i t i c a l " " 5261 
Agent & a t t i t u d e of Shaikh 
A b d u l l a & Jassim a l - C h i r a w i , 
a c t i v i t i e s of Akhwan &. 
E.6262/6262/44 
Correspondence between Shaikh & " " 5278 
Govt, of I n d i a r e g a r d i n g 
P o l i t i c a l r e q u e s t s by Shaikh of 
B a h r a i n . E . 9827/9827/44 
1921 
Trade Report 1919-20. E.4124/4124/91 
F.0. " 6262 
Arab i a 
1922 
Ba h r a i n order i n c o u n c i l r e p o r t " " 7721 
i n w o r k i n g of i n 1921. 
E.6323/1644/91 
P e r s i a n Govt, c l a i m t h e " " 7721 
B a h r a i n i s as P e r s i a n s u b j e c t s . 
E.7162/1644/91 
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Group Class Piece 
l e t t e r s No. No. 
Bahrain (Shaikh o f ) immunity of F.O. 371 7721 
Sunnis from T a x a t i o n w h i l e A r a b i a 
Shihas are h e a v i l y t a x e d . Shaikh 
proposed r e f o r m s . HMG's pre s s u r e 
E .10351/1644/91 
T y r a n n i c a l conduct ofs (Shaikhs) " " 7721 
P e t i t i o n of s u b j e c t s t o P o l i t i c a l 
O f f i c e r . E . 1644/1644/91 . 
A t t i t u d e of Shaikh A b d u l l a & " " 2721 
Essa, warned by H.M.G. 
E.6978/1644/91 
1923 
Trade Report f o r 1921-22, " " 8942 
E .8558/67/91 
Trade Report f o r 1922-23, " " 8942 
E .12023/67/91 
P e r s i a n C l a i m t o S o v e r e i g n t y o f ; " " 8942 
( B a h r a i n ) i n c i d e n t of n o t i f i c a t i o n 
by P e r s i a n C o u n c i l of Na j a f t o 
be i g n o r e d . E.11737/67/91 
P e r s i a n c l a i m - suggested " " 8942 
a r b i t r a t i o n , E .11733/67/91 
H.M.G.'s o b j e c t i o n t o a r b i t r a t i o n , " " 8942 
E.10468/67/91 
P r o t e s t by Shaikh of Bah r a i n a g a i n s t " 8942 
P e r s i a n a t t e m p t t o i n f r i n g e h i s 
s o v e r e i g n t y E,10404/67/91 
Report on order i n c o u n c i l f o r " " 8941 
1922, E.4040/67/91 
B r i t i s h P o s i t i o n i n P e r s i a n Govt. 11 " 8941 
r e p o r t e d d e s i r o u s of r e f e r r i n g 
q u e s t i o n t o League of N a t i o n s , 
E.4278/67/91 
Measures t o compel Shaikh " " 8941 
i n t r o d u c e r e f o r m s , E.5608/67/91 
Shaikh t o be f o r c e d t o r e s i g n and " " 8941 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t r a n s f e r r e d t o 
Shaikh Hamed : Bin Saud t o be 
n o t i f i e d o f change. E.5868/67/91 
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Shaikh Essa's c o m p l a i n t o f 
i n t e r f e r e n c e of B r i t i s h 
P o l i t i c a l Agent i n i n t e r n a l 
a f f a i r s : of H.M.G. t o i g n o r e 
E. 10765/67/91 
A r r e s t & D e p o s i t i o n of Emir of 
Bahrain*': Order f o r E.1107/ 
2 32/91 
Reforms i n ; Progress of 
E.8326/67/91 
Summary o f Govt, of I n d i a 
correspondence on q u e s t i o n o f 
r e f o r m s . E.11633/67/91 
O p p o s i t i o n by Sunni T r i b e s t o 
r e f o r m s . E . 10766/67/91 
Bin Saud's i n t r i g u e s t o induce 
Sunni T r i b e s t o m i g r a t e from 
Bahrain t o Najd. E . 10914/67/91 
A p p l i c a t i o n of I n d i a n Court 
Fees Acts King's r e g u l a t i o n . 
E.87/87/91 
Group Class Piece 
l e t t e r s No. No. 
F.O. 371 8942 
A r a b i a 
8945 
8941 
8942 
8942 
8942 
8942 
8942 
8942 
8942 
8947 
10004 
Proposed r e f o r m s i n : memo by 
Co l . Knox g i v i n g reasons why 
contemplated reforms should 
not be c a r r i e d o u t . E.6140/67/91 
R e l a t i o n s between Sunnis & " 
Shihas and r e f o r m s . Correspondence 
between Bushire & Govt, of I n d i a . 
E.12024/67/91 
R e l a t i o n between Sunnis & Shihas: " 
a t t a c k on B a h r a i n Shihas. 
E.11069/67/91 
P r o t e c t i o n of Shihas and i n i t i a t i o n " 
of r e f o r m s i n . E.7736/67/91 
F r i c t i o n between s u b j e c t s of Bin " 
Saud & N a t i v e s of B a h r a i n : P r o t e s t 
t o Bin Saud a g a i n s t a c t i v i t y of 
h i s agent a t B a h r a i n . E.8476/678/91 
1924 
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I n f l u e n c e of Bin Saud i n .... 
as To P o s s i b l e development 
of Sea P o r t i n Najd t o 
c o u n t e r a c t E.715/151/91 
A l l e g e d s t o p p i n g o f shipments 
from I n d i a t o Najd v i a Bahrain 
E.1308/118/91 
Reform i n Govt, of I n d i a ' s 
r e q u e s t f o r Budget statements 
e t c . E.118/118/91 
S a t i s f a c t o r y 
Budget f o r . 
King Hussin's r e q u e s t f o r 
r e - i n s t a l l a t i o n of Shaikh I s a 
and i n q u i r y i n t o cause of His 
d e p o s i t i o n : H.M.G. i g n o r e 
r e q u e s t . E.2755/118/91 
Group Class Piece 
l e t t e r s No. No. 
F.O. 371 10005 
A r a b i a 
10004 
10004 
10004 
10004 
f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , 
E.970/118/91 
Appeal t o V i c e r o y o f I n d i a " " 10004 
a g a i n s t h i s d e p o s i t i o n and 
a t t i t u d e of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s : 
improvement i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as 
r e s u l t of Shaikh I s a ' s d e p o s i t i o n 
E .8190/118/90 
Proposed v i s i t t o U.K. accompanied " " 10004 
by P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r . E.6997/118/91 
1925 
Trade Report f o r the year ending " " 10820 
31st March 1924. E.356/356/91 
Appointment of f i n a n c i a l a d v i s o r " " 10820 
a t : E.7279/356/91 
P e t i t i o n t o Govt, of I n d i a " " 10820 
a p p e a l i n g a g a i n s t h i s ( t h e Shaikh) 
e n f o r c e d a b d i c a t i o n . E.3658/356/91 
Proposed v i s i t t o U.K. ( t h e " " 10820 
Shaikh) E. 1450/356/91 
1926 
Levy Corps: appointment of " " 1142 
commander. E.4994/419/91 
Corps a b o l i s h e d & r e p l a c e d by " " 1142 
I n d i a n detachment. E.5726/419/91 
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Attempted a s s a s s i n a t i o n (on 
the Shaikh) E.6896/419/91 
1927 
P o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n 
E.2033/184/91 
Report on w o r k i n g order i n 
C o u n c i l . E.1619/364/91 
Exodus of Dawasir T r i b e . 
E.3022/184/91 
1928 
1927 Trade Report. 
E.3672/3672/91 
Question of d e c l a r i n g B r i t i s h 
P r o t e c t o r a t e View of Govt, of 
I n d i a . E.5061/3164/91 
Suppression of smuggling from 
Bahrain i n t o P e r s i a . 
E.2179/51/91 
I t s ( B a h r a i n ) v a l u e as a n a v a l 
base. E.352/51/91 
Report on w o r k i n g of Order i n 
C o u n c i l 1927 E.1784/1784/91 
L e t t e r s from Shaikh I s a & Hamed 
a s k i n g H.M.G. t o defend Bahrain 
from o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
B a h r a i n (Finances) Budget 
e s t i m a t e s . E.6011/51/91 
Report on w o r k i n g of Order i n 
C o u n c i l . E.1626/1626/34 
Group Class Piece 
l e t t e r s No. No. 
F.O. 371 1142 
A r a b i a 
" 12247 
" 112249 
" 12247 
" " 13018 
F.O. " 13070 
P e r s i a 
F.O. " 12997 
A r a b i a 
12997 
12997 
13013 
12997 
12998 
F.O. " 13797 
Pers i a 
Question of r e t u r n of the 
Dawasir T r i b e t o ..... E.1652/51/91 
So v i e t Steamship a c t i v i t y at 
( B a h r a i n ) E.5627/119/34 
i t i i 13789 
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B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s F.O. 
proposed new p o l i c y q u e s t i o n of &eabia 
r e t e n t i o n o f c e r t a i n B r i t i s h 
o f f i c i a l s & appointment of 
u n o f f i c i a l P e r s i a n agent. 
E.6149/33/91 
Bahrain (customs & " 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n T a r i f f . ) 
Customs due a t : a t t i t u d e o f 
Bin Saud: P o s i t i o n o f h i s 
agent, and j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over N a j d i s i n B a h r a i n . 
E.4338/2479/91 
Bahrain ( F i n a n c e s : Budget. " 
E.5165/33/91 
1930 
Report on w o r k i n g Order i n " 
C o u n c i l . E.1832/1832/91 
1929 Trade r e p o r t . " 
E.5052/5052/91 
Serious economic s i t u a t i o n " 
E.6800/6800/91 
B r i t i s h share i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " 
and p o l i c i n g o f : views of Govt, 
of I n d i a . E.75/75/91 
T r a n s f e r o f B r i t i s h r e s i d e n c y 
a t B ushire to B a h r a i n . 
E.4402/68/34 
B r i t i s h J u r i s d i c t i o n and 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f L o c a l Law. 
E.1335/28/91 
Group Class Piece 
l e t t e r s No. No. 
371 13720 
13740 
13720 
14479 
14484 
14484 
14457 
F.O. " 14530 
Pers i a 
F.O. " 14454 
A r a b i a 
14479 E f f e c t o f v i s i t o f B i n Saud to 
B a h r a i n . E.1992/1992/91 
S t r i k e of s c h o o l masters a t 
B a h r a i n . E.2391/75/91 
Bahrain P e t r o l e u m Company, O i l 
Concessions i n B a h r a i n . T r a n s f e r 
of r i g h t s t o E.1221/28/91 
14457 
14454 
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Group 
l e t t e r 
F.O. 
A r a b i a 
F.O. 
Pers i a 
1931 
R e t e n t i o n of B r i t i s h O f f i c e r s 
i n B a h r a i n . fi.545/271/91 
Economic s i t u a t i o n - e x t e n s i o n 
of e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g . Report 
on f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , 
1931 Budget. E.271/271/91 
Question of T r a n s f e r of n a v a l 
base of Henjam t o B a h r a i n . 
E.3928/841/34 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Report 1930: 
e x t r a c t i o n from P e r s i a n Gulf 
Report E.4088/4088/34 
Question of H.M.G. d e c l a r i n g " 
P r o t e c t o r a t e over B a h r a i n : 
F.O. m i n u t e s t r e g a r d i n g b r i n g i n g 
whole m a t t e r b e f o r e Permanent 
C o u r t . E.2168/18/34 
1932 
1931 Trade Report. E.6209/6209/91 F.O. 
A r a b i a 
R e o r g a n i s a t i o n of P o l i c e 11 
Force a t B a h r a i n . E.6504/782/91 
D i s t u r b a n c e s among p e a r l d i v e r s " 
a t B a h r a i n 
B a h r a i n (Finances) F i n a n c i a l " 
s i t u a t i o n . E.782/782/91 
St a t e Budget f o r 1931. Report " 
on E.5369/782/91 
R e c o g n i t i o n of Shaikh Hamad by " 
Govt, of I n d i a on death of 
Shaikh I s a . E .6879/6568/91 
1933 
E x t e n t of Shaikh of Bahrain " 
dominions. E.2559/167/91 
Date of i n s t i t u t i o n of Bahrain " 
n a t i o n a l i t y . E . 7589/7589/91 
Class 
No . 
371 
Piece 
No . 
15276 
15276 
15350 
15357 
15337 
16008 
16005 
16005 
16004 
16005 
16008 
16841 
16853 
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Group 
L e t t e r 
F o r e i g n Consular r e p r e s e n t - F.O. 
a t i o n i n B a h r a i n , v i s i t of A r a b i a 
U n i t e d S t a t e s M i n i s t e r & 
Consul a t Baghdad t o B a h r a i n , 
a t t i t u d e of H.M.G. E.5501/3520/91 
T r a n s f e r of Henjam n a v a l base F.O. 
t o B a h r a i n . E.7715/1620/34 P e r s i a 
Purchase of land f o r use as " 
n a v a l base and R.A.F. purposes; 
map proposed area & c o a s t . 
A t t i t u d e of A d m i r a l t y . 
E.7012/1620/34 
R i o t of May 1932, s u g g e s t i o n F.O. 
t h a t r e p o r t should be sent t o A r a b i a 
A n t i - S l a v e r y & A b o r i g i n e s 
P r o t e c t i o n S o c i e t y . E.2738/55/91 
Treatment of p e a r l f i s h e r i e s a t " 
Bahrain E.2738/55/91 
S i t u a t i o n ( B a h r a i n D i a r i e s ) . " 
E.5301/5301/91 
Exemption from customs dues of " 
c e r t a i n a r t i c l e s i m p o r t e d by 
Bahrain Petroleum Company. 
E.3167/167/91 
Class 
No . 
371 
Piece 
No . 
16852 
16965 
16965 
16838 
16838 
16853 
16842 
Levy of t r a n s i t dues on goods 
from Saudi A r a b i a . 
E .368/368/25 
N a t i o n a l i t y employees (BAPC0) 
E.2097/167/91 
F.O. 
Hedjaz & Najd 
F.O. 
A r a b i a 
16868 
16842 
1934 
1933 Trade Report. E.4732/373/91 
Question of F o r e i g n Consular 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t . E.955/955/91 
Status of f o r e i g n e r s i n B a h r a i n 
E.2369/2369/91 
A c q u i s i t i o n of l a n d a t B a h r a i n 
f o r A d m i r a l t y & A i r Force 
purposes. E.231/231/91 
17816 
17820 
17825 
17811 
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Group 
L e t t e r 
Class 
No . 
Piece 
No . 
Ban of e n t r y of Japanese F.O. 
sh i p i n t o B a h r a i n . A t t i t u d e A r a b i a 
of Govt, of I n d i a . E.152/152/91 
Bahrain ( B r i t i s h Naval Base). F.O. 
Proposed p r e p a r a t i o n of Bahrain P e r s i a 
i n event of P e r s i a n demand f o r 
e v a c u a t i o n of Henjam: Proposed 
meeting o f M i d d l e East o f f i c i a l 
sub-committee t o c o n s i d e r . 
E.6198/2850/34 
Record of meeting of M i d d l e East " 
O f f i c i a l sub-committee on 12th 
& 15th Oct. E.6407/2850/34 
371 17806 
19911 
F.O. 
Saudi A r a b i a 
B a h r a i n (customs t a r i f f ) ; 
t r a n s i t dues, E.101/101/25 
T r a n s i t dues: d i s p u t e w i t h 
Saudi A r a b i a : Proposed 
c o n f e r e n c e : F.O. memo 
r e c o r d i n g meeting a t F.O. on 
8 t h Oct. E . 6564/101/25 
Ba h r a i n (Finances) F i n a n c i a l F.O. 
s i t u a t i o n memo E.276/276/91 A r a b i a 
1935 
F o r t n i g h t l y i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s " 
E.185/185/91 
Report on wo r k i n g of ord e r i n " 
C o u n c i l . E.1729/1729/91 
19911 
17930 
17931 
17813 
18911 
1 8 9 1 8 
R e g i s t r a t i o n of f o r e i g n e r s and " 
n a t i o n a l i t y law q u e s t i o n : 
Proposed r e v i s i o n of ord e r i n 
c o u n c i l . E . 7 6 2 / 7 6 2 / 9 1 
P r o h i b i t i o n of ownership of " 
r e a l p r o p e r t y by f o r e i g n e r s 
under new n a t i o n a l i t y law. 
I o 0 . minute Mr. Bugglay. 
E . 2 1 5 9 / 7 6 2 / 9 1 
B a h r a i n (Shaikh o f ) . Question F.O. 
of T i t l e of Highness f o r Saudi A r a b i a 
p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t . F.O. minutes 
E . 7 5 7 0 / 2 0 6 / 2 5 
1 8 9 1 7 
1 8 9 1 7 
1 9 0 0 7 
- 432 -
Group 
L e t t e r 
F.O. 
A r a b i a 
F.O. 
Saudi A r a b i a 
1936 
I n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t . 
E.299/299/91 
Proposed appointment of R.A.F 
I n t e l l i g e n c e O f f i c e r a t 
Ba h r a i n F.O. f o r P e r s i a n 
G u l f . E.1238/1238/91 
B a h r a i n : Customs a d m i n i -
s t r a t i o n . Customs n o t i c e s . 
E.156/16/25 
B a h r a i n : Customs t a r i f f . 
Agreement w i t h Saudi A r a b i a . 
E.29/16/25 
Bah r a i n (Finances) F i n a n c i a l F.O. 
s i t u a t i o n r e p o r t . E.877/877/91 A r a b i a 
B a h r a i n (Law of Access) " 
D r a f t n a t i o n a l i t y and 
P r o p e r t y Law. E . 1815/414/91 
1937 
I n t e l l i g e n c e summaries " 
E247/247/91 
C o n d i t i o n s of l i f e i n B a h r a i n , " 
i n q u i r i e s r e f e r r e d t o 
1.0. E.6112/6112/91 
J u r i s d i c t i o n over F o r e i g n e r s " 
, L e g a l m i n u t e s . E.49/49/91 
Claim t o Zobarah & " 
S o v e r e i g n t y over Nairn T r i b e . 
E.4062/2382/91 
1938 
Proposed t r a n s f e r of r e s i d e n c y 
from B u s h i r e t o B a h r a i n . 
E.2532/461/34 
1939 
Bin Saud's v i s i t t o B a h r a i n 
Class 
No . 
371 
F.O. 
P e r s i a 
F.O. 
A r a b i a 
391 
371 
371 
Piece 
No . 
19975 
19976 
20055 
20055 
19976 
19975 
20776 
20775 
20775 
20783 
21898 
23188 
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Books, Reports and A r t i c l e s 
ABRAHAM, K.V, " B r i t i s h J u s t i c e i n B a h r a i n " , 
Kangalathu House, K e r a l a , I n d i a . 1963 
ABU HAKIMA, Ahmad " H i s t o r y of E a s t e r n A r a b i a 1750-1800" 
Mustafa Khayats, B e i r u t , 1965. 
T a r i k h a l K u w a i t , P a r t I , 1967 
P a r t I I 1970 Kuwait. 
ADAMIYAT, Fereydoun The Bahrain I s l a n d s ; A Legal and 
D i p l o m a t i c Study o f the B r i t i s h - I r a n i a n 
C o n t r o v e r s y F r e d e r i c A. Praeger, 
I n c . , New York. 1955. 
ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF, A Handbook of A r a b i a , V o l . I . London, 
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 1916. 
AITCHISON, C.U. A C o l l e c t i o n o f T r e a t i e s , Engagements 
and Sanads R e l a t i n g t o I n d i a and 
Ne i g h b o u r i n g C o u n t r i e s V o l . I I , 
Govt, o f I n d i a , D e l h i , 1933. 
ALBAHARNA, 
Husain M, 
The Legal S t a t u s o f the A r a b i a n G u l f 
S t a t e s Manchester U n i v e r s i t y Press 
1968. 
A L I , Syaf Bin Mosahamah F i Nigash a l Wadha F i 
a l - K h a l i j a l - A r a b i Al-Tawon Press, 
Cairo 1970. 
AMIN, N. F a r i s The N a t i o n a l Movement and t h e i r a t t i t u d e s 
toward f o r e i g n e r s i n the Arab World. 
Al-Abhath V o l . V I No. 10, March, 1953 
pp.3-16. 
ANIS, Mohammed Al-Dawlah al-'Uthmaniyyah wa al- S h a r q 
a l - ' A r a b i . C a i r o , n.d. 
AL-ANSARI, 
Mohammed, J, 
Aqtab al-Harakah a l - A d a b i y y a h f i a l - B a h r a i n 
K h i l a l a l - M i ' a h Sanah a l - A k h i r a h 
(Mimeographed) Bahrain 1966. 
Lamahat min a l - K h a l i j a l - A r a b i c i t e d as: 
Aspects of the A r a b i a n Gulf B a h r a i n , 
1970. 
A l - K a l i j , I r a n , a l - A r a b : an Arab P o i n t 
of View Al-Nahar P u b l i c a t i o n , B e i r u t , 
1972. 
ANTONIUS, George The Arab Awakening J.B. L i p p i n c o t t . 
Republished i n A r a b i c , B e i r u t , 1966 & 1969. 
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ARAMCO 
AL-ARRAYED, J a l i l 
ASHIR, A.E. 
C o n f i d e n t i a l ; Saudi Royal Schedule 
11th January, 1967. 
The Nine Arab Ami r a t e s - Background 
I n f o r m a t i o n (Mimeographed) n.d. 
The Development of Teacher T r a i n i n g i n 
Ba h r a i n . E d u c a t i o n J u b i l e e pp.27 = 30. 
B a h r a i n Trade D i r e c t o r y - F i r s t E d i t i o n 
1959, F i f t h E d i t i o n 1963, Seventh E d i t i o n 
1967 . 
AUSTIN, H.H,, 
B r i g . Gen. 
Gun-running i n the Gulf John Murray, 
London, 1926. 
AZAM, Abdulwahab 
(ed.) 
AL-BAKER, 'Abdul 
Rahman 
Ardh A l Mamlakh A l A r a b i a h A l Saudieh 
Saudi A r a b i a 1955, ( A r a b i c ) 
Al-Awda' a l - S i y a s i y y a h f i a l - B a h r a i n . 
c i t e d as; The P o l i t i c a l S i t u a t i o n i n 
Ba h r a i n . Cairo? Dar a i - K i t a b a l - A r a b i , 
1956 
BALFOUR, P a u l , 
Ho Go 
BAPCO 
BEATTY, J. 
BEEBY, C.E. 
Min A l - B a h r a i n i l a a l Manfa, B e i r u t , 1965 
Recent Developments i n the P e r s i a n Gulf 
R.C.A.S.J., V o l . L V I , 1969, p p . 1 2 - 1 9 . 
C o n f i d e n t i a l BAPCO - L o c a l and F o r e i g n 
C o n t r a c t P a y r o l l s . 
The B a h r a i n Petroleum Company L i m i t e d , 
Annual Reports 1954 t h r o u g h 1971. 
B a h r a i n I s l a n d e r BAPCO Weekly Paper 
B a h r a i n S t r i k e s O i l , The Readers' D i g e s t , 
V o l . XXXIV, No. 204, ( A p r i l , 1939) pp.62-64 
The Q u a l i t y o f E d u c a t i o n i n Developing 
C o u n t r i e s , London, 1966. 
BELGRAVE, C h a r l e s , 
D. 
Ba h r a i n , R.C.A.S.J. V o l . XV, No. 4 
(Oct. 1928), pp.440-445. 
Personal Column, Hutchinson & Co. L t d . , 
London, 1960. 
The P i r a t e Coast, G. B e l l , London, 1966. 
The Portuguese i n the Ba h r a i n I s l a n d s 
1521-1602, R.C.A.S.J. V o l . X X I I , No. 4, 
pp .617-630. 
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BELGRAVE 9 C h a r l e s , P e r s i a n Gulf - Past and Pr e s e n t , 
D. R.C.A. S.J.,, V o l . LV, 1968 , pp.28-34 . 
BELGRAVE, James, A B r i e f Survey of t h e H i s t o r y of the 
H.D. Bah r a i n I s l a n d s , R.C.A.S.J. V o l . 39, 
(Jan. 1952), pp.57-68. 
: The F u t u r e of t h e Bahrain I s l a n d s , 
The Arab World, Oct. 1951, pp.14-17. 
The Changing of S o c i a l Sense i n B a h r a i n , 
Middle East Forum, V o l . 38, No. 7, 
B e i r u t , 1962. 
Welcome to B a h r a i n , 7 t h E d i t i o n , B a h r a i n , 
1970. 
BELING, W.A. Pan-Arabism and Labor, Harvard M i d d l e 
E a s t e r n Monograph S e r i e s , Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960. 
Recent Developments i n Labour R e l a t i o n s 
i n B a h r a i n , M.E.J. , V o l . X I I I , No. 2, 
S p r i n g , 1959. 
BEN-MOSHH, E l i e j e r B a h r a i n - Centre of D i s p u t e , New Outlook 
May 1958, pp.28-32. 
BENT, Theodore Southern A r a b i a , Smith E l d e r & Co., London, 
1900. 
BERGER. Monroe 
The Bahrain I s l a n d s i n the P e r s i a n G u l f , 
Proceedings of t h e Royal Geographical S o c i e t y , 
New S e r i e s , V o l . XCC, 1890, pp.1-19. 
The M i d d l e Class i n the Arab World, The 
P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Conference, n.d. 
BERREBY, J.J. Le G u l f e P e r s i q u e , P a r i s Payot, 1959, 
T r a n s l a t e d t o A r a b i c . 
BIDWELL, R. The A f f a i r s of A r a b i a 1905-06, F o r e i g n 
O f f i c e C o n f i d e n t i a l P r i n t , 2 V o l s . , Frank 
Cass & Co 1971 
AL-BINALI, Jasini! 
Mohamed 
E d u c a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g f o r Manpower Development 
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A P P E N D I X 1 
BAHREIN ORDER IN COUNCIL 
At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 12th day of August, 1913 
PRESENT 
The KING's Most Excellent Majesty 
Lord Presidento 
Mr. Secretary Harcourt. 
Sir William Carington. 
Mr. Fischer. 
Sir Louis Mallet. 
Whereas by Treaty, Capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other 
lawful means His Majesty the King has j u r i s d i c t i o n i n Bahrein; 
Now, therefore, His Majesty, by v i r t u e and i n exercise of the 
powers i n t h i s behalf by the Foreign J u r i s d i c t i o n Act, 1890, or 
otherwise i n His Majesty vested, i s pleased, by and with the advice 
of His Privy Council, to order, and i t i s hereby ordered, as follows:-
PART I . - Preliminary and General. 
1. This Order may be cited as "The Bahrein Order i n Council, 
1913." 
2. The l i m i t s of t h i s Order are the islands and i s l e t s of 
Bahrein, including the t e r r i t o r i a l waters thereof, and e l l other 
t e r r i t o r i e s , islands, and i s l e t s which may be included i n the 
P r i n c i p a l i t y and be the possessions of the r u l i n g Sheikh of Bahrein, 
together with t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l waters. 
3. This Order i s divided into parts, as follows:-
Parts. Subject. A r t i c l e s . 
I Preliminary and General .................o... 1-10 
I I Application of Law of B r i t i s h India and of the 11-13 United Kingdom 
I I I 
IV 
V 
VI 
V I I Miscellaneous Provisions ..................... 
Schedule 
CXltniTlcll !Mclt l t l&2rS o o o o o o o » » o o o o o » o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
C XVXX M£L t^^ 31TS o o o o * * Q O O O o o o a o o o o o o o Q 6 0 0 0 0 0 o e a o 
Bahrein Subjects and Tribunals 
i s t r a t i o n 
14-34 
35-43 
44-50 
51-59 
60-79 
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4. In the construction of t h i s Order the following words and 
expressions have the meanings hereby assigned to them, unless there 
be something i n the subject or context repugnant thereto, that i s 
to says-
"Administration" means l e t t e r s of administration, including the 
same with w i l l annexed, or granted for special or li m i t e d purposes, 
or li m i t e d i n duration. 
"Bahrein" includes a l l places and waters w i t h i n the l i m i t s 
of the Order. 
"Bahrein subject" means a subject of the Sheikh of Bahrein. 
" B r i t i s h ship" means a merchant-ship being a B r i t i s h ship 
w i t h i n the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and, except 
where the context otherwise requires, includes a ship belonging 
to any B r i t i s h subject as hereinafter defined. 
" B r i t i s h subject" includes a B r i t i s h protected person. 
"Judicial Assistant" means the o f f i c e r f o r the time being 
holding the o f f i c e of J u d i c i a l Assistant under the provisions of 
the Persian Coast and Islands Order i n Council, 1907. 
"Chief Court" means a Court held by the P o l i t i c a l Resident 
as hereinafter defined, 
" D i s t r i c t Court" means a Court held by the P o l i t i c a l Agent 
or by the J u d i c i a l Assistant. 
"The Court" means a Court held by the P o l i t i c a l Resident, 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent, or the Judicial Assistant to the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident. 
"Joint Court" means a Court composed of the P o l i t i c a l Agent 
and an o f f i c i a l appointed by the Sheikh of Bahrein. 
"Majlis-el-Urf" means a C i v i l Court composed of not less 
than four members selected by the P o l i t i c a l Agent i n concert with 
the Sheikh of Bahrein. 
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"Salifah Court" means a Court consisting of one or more 
Judges who have knowledge of the local diving and customary 
marine law, and are appointed by the Sheikh of Bahrein and 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent i n concert. 
"Kazi" means any o f f i c i a l Kazi appointed by the Sheikh 
of Bahrein and accepted by the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
"Foreigner" means any person not a B r i t i s h or Bahrein 
subject. 
"Imprisonment" means imprisonment of either description 
as defined i n the Indian Penal Code. 
"Month" means calendar month. 
"Oath" or " A f f i d a v i t " includes affi r m a t i o n or declaration. 
"Offence" means any act or omission made punishable 
by any law for the time being i n force. 
"Person" includes corporation. 
" P o l i t i c a l Agent" means His Majesty's Agent at Bahrein 
appointed by the Governor-General of India i n Council, including 
a person acting temporarily with the approval of the Governor-General 
of India i n Council for such P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
" P o l i t i c a l Agency" means the o f f i c e , residence, Court, or 
other appointed place of business of the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
" P o l i t i c a l Resident" means His Majesty's P o l i t i c a l Resident 
i n the Persian Gulf, including a person acting temporarily with 
the approval of the Governor-General of India i n Council for such 
P o l i t i c a l Resident. 
"Rules of Court" means rules of Court made under the 
provisions of t h i s Order. 
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"Secretary of State" means one of His Majesty's Principal 
Secretaries of State. 
"Sheikh of Bahrein" means the r u l i n g Sheikh of Bahrein, or 
his duly accredited representative for the time being. 
"Ship" includes any vessel used in. navigation, however 
propelled, with her tackle, f u r n i t u r e , and apparel, and any boat 
or other c r a f t . 
"Treaty" includes any capitulations, convention, agreement 
or arrangement made by or on behalf of His Majesty with any State 
or Government, King, Chief, people, or t r i b e , or to the benefits 
of which His Majesty has succeeded, whether the Sheikh of Bahrein 
is or i s not a party thereto. 
" W i l l " means w i l l , c o d i c i l , or other testamentary instrument. 
Expressions used i n any enactments applied to Bahrein, or 
i n any Rules, Regulations, or Orders made under t h i s Order, s h a l l , 
unless a contrary intention appears, have the same respective 
meanings i n t h i s Order. 
5. (1) I n t h i s Order words importing the p l u r a l or the singul 
may be construed as re f e r r i n g to one person or thing, or to more 
than one person or thing, and words importing the masculine as 
re f e r r i n g to the feminine, as the case may require. 
(2) Where t h i s Order confers any power of imposes any 
duty, then, unless a contrary inte n t i o n appears, the power may be 
exercised, and the duty shall be performed from time to time as 
occasion requires. 
(3) Where t h i s Order confers a power, or imposes a duty 
on, or with respect t o , a holder of an o f f i c e , as such, then, 
unless a contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised and 
the duty shall be performed by, or w i t h respect t o , the holder f o r 
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the time being of the o f f i c e or the person temporarily acting 
for the holder. 
(4) Where t h i s Order confers a power to make any 
Rules, Regulations, or Orders, the power s h a l l , unless a 
contrary intention appears, be construed as including a power 
exercisable i n the l i k e manner and subject to the l i k e consent 
and conditions, i f any, to rescind, revoke, vary, or amend the 
Rules, Regulations, or Orders. 
(5) This A r t i c l e shall apply to the construction of any 
Regulations, Rules, or Orders made under t h i s Order, unless a 
contrary indention appears. 
6. Where t h i s Order refers to any specified Act or Acts 
of Parliament, such reference s h a l l , unless a contrary intention appears 
be deemed to include any Act or Acts amending or substituted 
for the same. 
7. I n the event of the death, incapacity, removal or 
absence from Bahrein of the P o l i t i c a l Agent for the time being, 
a l l and every the powers, a u t h o r i t i e s , and immunities by t h i s 
Order granted to him s h a l l , u n t i l His Majesty's further pleasure 
i s s i g n i f i e d through the Governor-General of India i n Council, 
be vested i n the P o l i t i c a l Resident. 
8. The powers conferred by t h i s Order shall extend to the 
persons and matters following, i n so far as by Treaty, grant, usage, 
sufferance, or other lawful means, His Majesty has j u r i s d i c t i o n 
i n r e l a t i o n to such persons, matters, and things, that i s to says-
(1) B r i t i s h subjects, as herein defined, w i t h i n the 
l i m i t s of t h i s Order. 
(2) Foreigners with respect to whom the Sheikh of Bahrein 
has agreed with His Majesty f o r , or consented t o , the exercise of 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n by His Majesty. 
(3) Bahrein subjects registered i n the P o l i t i c a l Agency 
as being i n the regular service of B r i t i s h subjects or foreigners; 
with the proviso that a l l cases wherein such Bahrein subjects 
are concerned shall be dealt with i n accordance with the provisions 
of Part V of t h i s Order. 
(4) The expression "person to whom t h i s Order applies" 
shall be construed i n accordance with the above three sub-Articles. 
(5) The property and a l l personal or proprietary r i g h t s and 
l i a b i l i t i e s w i t h i n the said l i m i t s of B r i t i s h subjects and of 
foreigners w i t h i n Sub-Article (2) and of Bahrein subjects with i n 
sub-Article (3) whether such persons are themselves w i t h i n or without 
the l i m i t s of t h i s Order. 
(6) B r i t i s h ships and ships belonging to foreigners with i n 
sub-Article (2) with t h e i r boats, and the persons and property on board 
thereof, or belonging thereto, being w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order; 
provided that j u r i s d i c t i o n over foreign ships shall not be exercised 
otherwise than according to the practice of the High Court i n England 
i n the exercise of j u r i s d i c t i o n over foreign ships. 
(7) I f any question arises whether the subjects or 
citizens of any country, State, or t r i b e have or have not been placed 
under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of His Majesty by agreement wi t h , or the 
consent of, the Sheikh of Bahrein, i t shall be referred by the Court 
to'"-the P o l i t i c a l Resident, and a c e r t i f i c a t e under his hand and seal 
shall be conclusive on the question, and j u d i c i a l notice shall be 
taken thereof. 
9. A l l His Majesty's j u r i s d i c t i o n exercisable w i t h i n the 
l i m i t s of t h i s Order for the hearing and determination of criminal and 
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c i v i l matters, or fo r the maintenance of order, or f o r the control 
or administration of persons or property, or i n r e l a t i o n thereto, shall 
be exercised, under and according to the provisions of t h i s Order, 
so far as t h i s Order extends and applies. 
10. Nothing i n t h i s Order shall be deemed to relieve any 
o f f i c e r or person i n the service of His Majesty of the dyty, as far 
as there i s proper opportunity, of promoting r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and 
encouraging and f a c i l i t a t i n g the settlement i n an amicable way, and 
without recourse to l i t i g a t i o n , of matters i n difference between 
persons subject to t h i s Order, or between persons subect to t h i s 
Order and persons who are not subject to t h i s Order, w i t h i n the 
l i m i t s of t h i s Order. 
PART I I . - Application of Law of B r i t i s h India and of 
the United Kingdom. 
11. (1) Subject to the other provisions of t h i s Order, and 
to any Treaties for the time being i n force r e l a t i n g to Bahrein, 
His Majesty's criminal and c i v i l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n Bahrein s h a l l , so 
far as circumstances admit, be exercised on the principles o f, and 
i n conformity w i t h , the enactments f o r the time being applicable 
as hereinafter mentioned of the Governor-General of Bombay i n Council, 
and i n accordance with the powers vested i n , and the course of 
procedure and practice observed by and before, the Courts i n the 
Presidency of Bombay beyond the l i m i t s of the ordinary o r i g i n a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay according 
to t h e i r respective j u r i s d i c t i o n and authority, and so far as such 
enactments, powers, procedure, and practice are inapplicable, shall 
be exercised i n accordance with j u s t i c e , equity,, and good conscience. 
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(2) The enactments mentioned i n the Schedule to 
th i s Order shall as from the commencement of t h i s Order apply 
to a l l persons subject to t h i s Order. 
(3) Any other existing or future enactments of 
the Governor-General of India i n Council, or of the Governor 
of Bombay i n Council, may be applied to Bahrein by King's Regulations 
under A r t i c l e 70 of t h i s Order. 
(4) Any Act of the Governor-General of India i n Council, 
or of the Governor of Bombay i n Council, whether passed before 
or a f t e r the commencement of t h i s Order, amending or substituted 
for any Act of either of those Legislatures which applies or may 
be applied to Bahrein, s h a l l , subject to the provisions of t h i s 
A r t i c l e , also apply to Bahrein. 
(5) The Court may construe any enactments i n force i n 
Bahrein, under the provisions of t h i s A r t i c l e , with such alterations 
not affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper to 
adapt the same to the matter before the Court. 
12. The enactments described i n the f i r s t schedule to the 
Foreign J u r i s d i c t i o n Act, 1890, shall apply to Bahrein, as i f i t 
were a B r i t i s h colony or possession, but subject to the provisions 
of t h i s Order, and to the exceptions, adaptations, and modifications 
following, that i s to say;-
( i ) The P o l i t i c a l Resident i n the Persian Gulf i s hereby 
substituted f o r the Governor of a colony or B r i t i s h possession, and 
the Chief Court i s hereby substituted for a Superior Court or Supreme 
Court, and the D i s t r i c t Court for a Magistrate or Justice of the 
Peace of a colony or B r i t i s h possession. 
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( i i ) For the portions of the Merchant Shipping Acts, 
1854 and 1867, referred to i n the said Schedule, shall be 
substituted Part X I I I of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 
( i i i ) I n Section 51 of the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act, 
1874, the Court of the P o l i t i c a l Agent i s substituted for a Court of 
Probate i n a colony. 
(i v ) With respect to the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881 -
(a) So much of the 4th and 5th sections of the said Act as 
relates to sending a report of the issue of a warrant, together 
with the information, or a copy thereof, or to the sending of a 
c e r t i f i c a t e of committal and report of a case, or to the information 
to be given by a Magistrate to a f u g i t i v e , shall be excepted, 
and i n l i e u of such information the person acting as the Magistrate 
shall inform the f u g i t i v e that i n the B r i t i s h possession or 
protectorate to which he may be conveyed he has the r i g h t to apply 
for a w r i t of habeas corpus or other l i k e process. 
(b) So much of the 6th section of the said Act as requires 
the expiration of f i f t e e n days before issue of warrant shall be 
excepted. 
(c) The P o l i t i c a l Resident shall not be bound to return a 
f u g i t i v e offender to a B r i t i s h possession unless s a t i s f i e d that 
the proceedings to obtain his return are taken with the consent of 
the Governor of that possession. 
(d) For the purposes of Part I I of the said Act, Bahrein, 
Muscat, the Persian Coast and the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman, 
Aden, and B r i t i s h India, shall be deemed to be one group of 
B r i t i s h possessions. 
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13. Where,, by v i r t u e of any Imperial Act 9 or of t h i s Order, 
or otherwise, any provisions of any Imperial Acts, or of any Law 
i n force i n India, or of any Orders i n Council other than t h i s Order, 
are applicable w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order, or any forms, 
Regulations, or procedure prescribed or established by or under 
such Act, Law, or Order, are made applicable for any purpose of 
th i s Order, or any other Order r e l a t i n g to Bahrein, such Acts, Laws^ 
Orders, forms, Regulations, or procedure may be construed or used with 
such substance as may be necessary having regard to loc a l circumstances, 
and anything required to be done by, t o , or before any Court, Judge, 
o f f i c e r , or authority may be done by, t o , or before a Court, Judge, 
o f f i c e r , or authority having the l i k e or analogous functions, or by, 
to , or before any o f f i c e r designated by the Secretary of State or by 
the Court (as the case may require) for that purpose; and i n case 
any d i f f i c u l t y occurs i n the application the Secretary of State, or 
with his previous or subsequent assent the Governor-General of India 
i n Council, may di r e c t by, t o , or before whom and i n what manner 
anything i s to done, and such Act, Law, Order, form, Regulation, or 
procedure shall be construed accordingly. 
Where under any such Imperial Act, Law, or Order, any 
publication is required to be made, as respects any j u d i c i a l 
proceeding i n any "Gazette" or otherwise, such publication shall 
be made by such mode as the Court shall think f i t to d i r e c t . 
PART I I I . - Criminal 
14. (1) Subject to the other provisions of t h i s Order, the 
Code of Criminal Procedure and the other enactments r e l a t i n g to the 
administration of criminal j u s t i c e i n B r i t i s h India f o r the time 
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being shall be applicable to Bahrein, The P o l i t i c a l Resident i n 
the Persian Gulf shall hold and form a Court, to be called the 
Chief Court which shall have a l l the powers of a High Court of 
Judicature; the P o l i t i c a l Agent at Bahrein shall be deemed to 
be the D i s t r i c t Magistrate and Sessions Judge; the Judicial 
Assistant to the P o l i t i c a l Resident shall be deemed to be the 
Additional D i s t r i c t Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge; and 
the powers of the Governor-General i n Council and of the Local 
Government under those enactments shall be exercisable by the 
Secretary of State, or, with his previous or subsequent assent, 
by the Governor-General of India i n Council. 
Notwithstanding, i n any case t r i a b l e by a Subordinate 
Magistrate under Chapters XVI to XXIII inclusive of the Indian 
Penal Code, i f both the complainant and defendant are Mahommedans 
and are acquiescent i n such procedure, the P o l i t i c a l Agent may 
order the case to be t r i e d by a Kazi, a representative from the 
Agency attending to record b r i e f l y the proceedings. In such sui t s , 
the judgment passed by the Kazi cannot be carried into effect u n t i l 
i t i s r a t i f i e d by the P o l i t i c a l Agent, and the P o l i t i c a l Agent i s 
empowered to revise the finding and sentence as i f the Kazi were a 
Sub-ordinate Magistrate, or to return the case fo r r e - t r i a l to the 
same or another Kazi. The sentence of the Kazi, when r a t i f i e d by 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent, shall for a l l purposes be regarded as i f i t 
were the decision of the P o l i t i c a l Agent i n the D i s t r i c t Court. 
(2) Any j u r i s d i c t i o n exercisable by the Chief Court i n 
criminal matters under t h i s Order may be exercised by the Judge of 
that Court either w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order or elsewhere. 
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15o I n cases i n which the Code of Criminal Procedure 
requires the sentence of a Court of Session to be confirmed by 
the High Court, the sentence shall be referred for confirmation 
to the Governor-General of India i n Council instead of to the 
Chief Court. 
16. Where a person subject to t h i s Order i s accused of 
the commission of an offence the cognizance whereof appertains 
to the Court, and i t i s expedient that the offence be inquired 
of, t r i e d , determined, and punished i n a B r i t i s h possession, the 
accused may (under the Foreign J u r i s d i c t i o n Act, 1890, section 6) 
be sent f o r t r i a l to Bombay. 
The Chief Court may, where i t appears so expedient, by 
warrant under the hand and seal of the P o l i t i c a l Resident, cause 
the accused to be sent for t r i a l to Bombay accordingly. 
The warrant shall be s u f f i c i e n t authority to any person 
to whom i t i s directed to receive and detain the person 
therein named, and to carry him to and deliver him up at Bombay 
according to the warrant. 
Where any person i s to be so sent to Bombay, the Court 
before which he i s charged shall take the preliminary examination, 
and shall bind over such of the proper witnesses as are B r i t i s h 
subjects i n t h e i r own recognizances to appear and give evidence on 
the t r i a l . 
17. (1) The P o l i t i c a l Resident may by General Order prescribe 
the manner i n which, and the places at which, sentences of imprisonment 
are to be carried into execution w i t h i n the l i m i t s of the Order. 
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(2) The Court may, i n any case by warrant sealed with 
i t s seal, cause an offender convicted and sentenced to imprisonment 
before the Court to be removed t o , and imprisoned i n , any place 
that shall be prescribed by the P o l i t i c a l Resident under the 
Authority provided for i n subsection (1) of t h i s A r t i c l e . 
18. Where an offender convicted before any Court under 
t h i s Order i s sentenced to imprisonment, and the P o l i t i c a l Resident 
proceeding under Section 7 of the Foreign J u r i s d i c t i o n Act, 1890, 
authority i n that behalf being hereby given to him, considers i t 
expedient that the sentence should be carried into effect elsewhere 
than w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order, and the offender i s accordingly 
sent for imprisonment to a place outside the l i m i t s of t h i s Order, 
the place shall be either a place i n the Presidency of Bombay, or a 
place i n some other part of His Majesty's dominions, the Government 
whereof consents that offenders may be sent t h i t h e r under t h i s A r t i c l e 
or a place i n which by Treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or other 
lawful means His Majesty has j u r i s d i c t i o n , provided that i f a person 
i s not a B r i t i s h subject he shall only be sent under t h i s A r t i c l e to 
a place i n His Majesty's dominions. 
19. (1) In cases of murder of culpable homicide, i f either 
the death or the criminal act which wholly or p a r t l y caused the death 
happended i n Bahrein, a Court acting under t h i s Order shall have the 
l i k e j u r i s d i c t i o n over any person to whom t h i s Order applies who i s 
charged either as a pri n c i p a l offender or as an abettor as i f both 
such criminal act and the death had happened i n Bahrein. 
(2) I n the case of any offence committed on the high seas 
or w i t h i n the Admiralty j u r i s d i c t i o n by any person who at the time 
of committing such offence was on board a B r i t i s h ship, or by any 
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B r i t i s h s u b j e c t on board a f o r e i g n s h i p to which he d i d not belong, 
the Court s h a l l , s u b j e c t to the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Order, have 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over such person as i f the offence had been committed 
w i t h i n i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
(3) I n c a s e s t r i e d under t h i s A r t i c l e no d i f f e r e n t 
sentence can be passed from the sentence which could be passed i n 
England i f the crime were t r i e d t h e r e . 
(4) The foregoing p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s A r t i c l e s h a l l be 
deemed to be a d a p t a t i o n s , f o r the purposes of t h i s Order and of the 
F o r e i g n J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t , 1890, of the f o l l o w i n g enactments, 
namelys-
The A d m i r a l t y Offences ( C o l o n i a l ) A c t , 1849; 
The Admiralty Offences ( C o l o n i a l ) A c t , 1860; 
The Merchant Shipping A c t , 1894, P a r t X I I I ; 
and those enactments s h a l l apply a c c o r d i n g l y , and be a d m i n i s t e r e d i n 
B a h r e i n . 
20. Where a person i s c o n v i c t e d of an o f f e n c e , the Court 
b e f o r e which he i s c o n v i c t e d may, i f i t t h i n k s f i t a t any time 
b e f o r e he i s d i s c h a r g e d , r e q u i r e him to g i v e s e c u r i t y to the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the Court f o r h i s f u t u r e good behaviour, and f o r t h a t 
purpose may, i f i t t h i n k s f i t , cause him to come or be brought before 
the Court. 
21. (1) Where i t i s shown by evidence on oath, to the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the D i s t r i c t Court, t h a t any B r i t i s h s u b j e c t has 
committed, or i s about to commit an o f f e n c e a g a i n s t t h i s Order, 
or i s otherwise conducting h i m s e l f so as to be dangerous to peace 
and good order, or i s endeavouring to e x c i t e enmity between the 
people of Bahrein and H i s Majesty, or i s i n t r i g u i n g w i t h i n the l i m i t s 
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of t h i s Order a g a i n s t H i s Majesty's power and a u t h o r i t y , 
the Court may, i f i t t h i n k s f i t , by order under i t s s e a l , 
p r o h i b i t t h a t person from being w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order, 
during any time t h e r e i n s p e c i f i e d , not exceeding two y e a r s . 
(2) The Court, by order i n w r i t i n g under i t s s e a l , 
may v a r y any order of p r o h i b i t i o n (not extending the d u r a t i o n 
t h e r e o f ) , and may revoke any order of p r o h i b i t i o n or removal. 
(3) The Court s h a l l f o r t h w i t h r e p o r t the order and 
the grounds thereof to the C h i e f Court, which s h a l l f o r t h w i t h r e p o r t 
to the Governor-General of I n d i a i n C o u n c i l every order made under 
t h i s A r t i c l e , and the grounds t h e r e o f , and the proceedings 
thereunder, 
22. (1) I f any B r i t i s h s u b j e c t f a i l s to g i v e s e c u r i t y f o r 
good behaviour of f o r keeping the peace when l a w f u l l y r e q u i r e d to 
do so, or f a i l s to comply w i t h an order of p r o h i b i t i o n made under 
t h i s Order, the C h i e f Court o r the D i s t r i c t Court may, i f i t t h i n k s 
f i t , order t h a t he be deported from any p l a c e w i t h i n i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n 
as p r e s c r i b e d by t h i s Order. 
(2) I f the order of d e p o r t a t i o n i s made by the D i s t r i c t 
C ourt, i t s h a l l f o r t h w i t h r e p o r t to the C h i e f Court the order and 
the grounds t h e r e o f . 
(3) Thereupon the person ordered to be deported s h a l l , 
u n l e s s the Ch i e f Court t h i n k s f i t otherwise to d i r e c t , be as soon 
as p r a c t i c a b l e , and i n the case of a person c o n v i c t e d e i t h e r a f t e r 
e x e c u t i o n of the sentence or w h i l e i t i s i n course of e x e c u t i o n , 
removed i n custody under warrant to the p l a c e named i n the warrant. 
(4) The p l a c e s h a l l be a p l a c e i n t h a t p a r t of His 
Majesty's dominions, or i n the B r i t i s h P r o t e c t o r a t e , to which the 
person belongs, or the Government of which consents to the r e c e p t i o n 
of persons deported under t h i s Order. 
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(5) The C o u r t s on making an order of deportation,, may s 
i f i t t h i n k s f i t , order the person to be deported to pay a l l 
or any p a r t of the expenses of h i s d e p o r t a t i o n , to be f i x e d by 
the Court i n the order. Subject t h e r e t o , the expenses of d e p o r t a t i o n s h a l l 
be defrayed as the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , w i t h the concurrence of the 
Treasury,, * or w i t h the previous or subsequent a s s e n t of the S e c r e t a r y 
of S t a t e , the Governor-General of I n d i a i n C o u n c i l , d i r e c t s . 
(6) The C h i e f Court s h a l l f o r t h w i t h r e p o r t to the 
Governor-General of I n d i a i n C o u n c i l every order of d e p o r t a t i o n 
made under t h i s Order, and the grounds t h e r e o f , and the proceedings 
thereunder. 
(7) I f a person deported under t h i s Order r e t u r n s to 
Bahrein without p e r m i s s i o n i n w r i t i n g of the C h i e f Court, or the 
Governor-General of I n d i a i n C o u n c i l , or the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e 
(which p e r m i s s i o n the C h i e f Court, or the Governor-General of I n d i a 
i n C o u n c i l , or the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e r e s p e c t i v e l y may g i v e ) , he 
s h a l l be punished w i t h imprisonment f o r a term which may extent to 
two months, or w i t h a f i n e which may extend to 1,000 rupees, or w i t h 
both. 
(8) He s h a l l a l s o be l i a b l e to be f o r t h w i t h a g a i n deported 
under the o r i g n a l or a new order, and a f r e s h w a r r a n t . 
23. An appeal s h a l l not l i e a g a i n s t an order of p r o h i b i t i o n , 
or removal, or d e p o r t a t i o n made under t h i s Order. 
24. (1) Where under t h i s Order a person i s to be sent or 
removed or deported from any p l a c e w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
Court as p r e s c r i b e d by t h i s Order he s h a l l , by warrant of the 
Court s e a l e d w i t h i t s s e a l , be de t a i n e d , i f n e c e s s a r y , i n custody, 
or i n p r i s o n , u n t i l a f i t opportunity f o r h i s removal or d e p o r t a t i o n 
o c c u r s , and then be put on board a v e s s e l belonging-to, or i n the 
s e r v i c e o f, His Majesty, of i f no such v e s s e l i s a v a i l a b l e , then on 
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board some other B r i t i s h or other f i t v e s s e l . 
(2) The warrant s h a l l be s u f f i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y to the 
person to whom i t i s d i r e c t e d or d e l i v e r e d f o r e x e c u t i o n , and 
to the Commanding O f f i c e r or master of the v e s s e l , to r e c e i v e 
and d e t a i n the person t h e r e i n named, i n the manner t h e r e i n 
p r e s c r i b e d , and to send or remove and c a r r y him to the p l a c e 
t h e r e i n named, according to the warrant. 
(3) I n ca s e of sending or removal f o r any purpose 
other than d e p o r t a t i o n , the warrant s h a l l be i s s u e d i n d u p l i c a t e , 
and the person executing i t s h a l l , a s soon as p r a c t i c a b l e 
a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l a t the p l a c e t h e r e i n named, d e l i v e r , according 
to the warrant, w i t h one of the d u p l i c a t e s of the warrant, to a 
c o n s t a b l e , or proper o f f i c e r of p o l i c e , or keeper of a p r i s o n , 
or other proper a u t h o r i t y or person t h e r e , the person named i n the 
warrant, to be produced on the order of the proper Court or a u t h o r i t y 
t h e r e , or to be otherwise d e a l t w i t h according to law. 
25. I f any person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s does any of 
the f o l l o w i n g t h i n g s , namelys-
( i ) W i l f u l l y by a c t or t h r e a t o b s t r u c t s any o f f i c e r of 
or person executing any proc e s s of the Court i n the performance of 
h i s duty; or 
( i i ) Within or c l o s e to the room or p l a c e where the Court 
i s s i t t i n g w i l f u l l y misbehaves i n a v i o l e n t , t h r e a t e n i n g , or 
d i s r e s p e c t f u l manner to the d i s t u r b a n c e of the Court, or to the 
i n t i m i d a t i o n of s u i t o r s or ot h e r s r e s o r t i n g t h e r e t o ; or 
( i i i ) W i l f u l l y i n s u l t s any member of the Court, or any a s s e s s o r , 
or any person a c t i n g a s a C l e r k or O f f i c e r of the Court during h i s 
s i t t i n g or attendance i n Court, or i n h i s going to or r e t u r n i n g from 
Court; or 
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( i v ) Does any a c t i n r e l a t i o n to the Court or a Judge 
t h e r e o f , or a matter pending t h e r e i n , which, i f done i n r e l a t i o n 
to a Superior Court i n England or i n I n d i a , would be punishable 
as a contempt of such Court, or as a l i b e l on such Court or the 
Judges t h e r e o f , or the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e t h e r e i n , such 
person s h a l l be l i a b l e to be apprehended by order of the Court 
w i t h or without warrant, and, on enquiry and c o n s i d e r a t i o n and 
a f t e r the h e a r i n g of any defence which such person may o f f e r , 
without f u r t h e r p r o c e s s or t r i a l , to be punished w i t h a f i n e not 
exceeding 100 rupees, or w i t h imprisonment not exceeding 
twenty-four hours. 
A Minute s h a l l be made and kept of every such c a s e of 
punishment, r e c o r d i n g the f a c t s of the o f f e n c e and the extent 
of the punishment. 
Provided t h a t , i f the Court t h i n k s f i t , i n s t e a d of 
proceeding under the preceding p r o v i s i o n s , i t may d i r e c t or 
cause the offender to be t r i e d i n a separate c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n 
or proceeding, i n which the offender s h a l l be l i a b l e to any 
punishment to which he would be l i a b l e i f the o f f e n c e were 
committed i n r e l a t i o n to the Court of a S e s s i o n s Judge i n I n d i a . 
Nothing h e r e i n s h a l l i n t e r f e r e w i t h the power of the Court 
to remove or exclude persons who i n t e r r u p t or o b s t r u c t the proceedings 
of the Court. 
26. I f any person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s smuggles or 
imports i n t o or exports from Bahrein any goods whereon any duty i s 
charged or payable to the Sheikh of B a h r e i n , w i t h i n t e n t to evade 
payment of the duty, he s h a l l be punished w i t h imprisonment f o r a 
term which may extend to two months, or w i t h f i n e which may extend 
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to 1,000 rupees, or a sum equal to t r e b l e the v a l u e of the goods 
(whichever s h a l l be the g r e a t e r ) , or w i t h both imprisonment and 
f i n e . 
27. I f any person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s smuggles 
or imports i n t o or exports from Bahrein any goods the importation 
or e x p o r t a t i o n whereof i s l a w f u l l y p r o h i b i t e d , he s h a l l be 
punished w i t h imprisonment f o r a term which may extend to one yea r , 
or w i t h f i n e which may extend to 2,000 rupees, or a sum equal to 
t r e b l e the v a l u e of the goods (whichever s h a l l be the g r e a t e r ) , 
or w i t h imprisonment and f i n e . 
28. Any a c t which i f done i n B r i t i s h I n d i a would be an 
offence a g a i n s t the law f o r the time being i n f o r c e i n B r i t i s h 
I n d i a r e l a t i n g to trade-marks, merchandise marks, c o p y r i g h t d e s i g n s , 
or i n v e n t i o n s , s h a l l , i f done i n Bahrei n , be an offenc e punishable 
w i t h imprisonment f o r a term which may extend to two months, or 
wi t h a f i n e which may extend to 1,000 rupees, or w i t h both. 
29. (1) I f any person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s -
( i ) P u b l i c l y d e r i d e s , mocks, or i n s u l t s any r e l i g i o n 
e s t a b l i s h e d or observed w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order; or 
( i i ) P u b l i c l y o f f e r s i n s u l t to any r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e , f e a s t , 
or ceremony e s t a b l i s h e d or kept i n any p l a c e w i t h i n those l i m i t s , or 
to any p l a c e of worship, tomb, or sanctuary belonging to any r e l i g i o n 
e s t a b l i s h e d or observed w i t h i n those l i m i t s , or belonging to the 
M i n i s t e r s or p r o f e s s o r s t h e r e o f ; or 
( i i i ) P u b l i c l y and w i l f u l l y commits any a c t tending to b r i n g 
any r e l i g i o n e s t a b l i s h e d or observed w i t h i n those l i m i t s , or i t s 
ceremonies, mode of worship, or observances, i n t o h a t r e d , r i d i c u l e , 
or contempt, and thereby to provoke a breach of the p u b l i c peace; 
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he s h a l l be g u i l t y of an o f f e n c e , and on c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e o f , l i a b l e 
to imprisonment which may extend to two y e a r s , w i t h or without 
a f i n e not exceeding 500 rupees, or to a f i n e alone not exceeding 
500 rupees. 
(2) The P o l i t i c a l Agent s h a l l take such p r e c a u t i o n a r y 
measures as seem to him proper and expedient f o r the prev e n t i o n 
of such o f f e n c e s . 
30. Any person being w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order 
may be proceeded a g a i n s t , t r i e d , and punished under t h i s Order 
for p i r a c y wherever committed. 
31. I f any person, s u b j e c t to t h i s Order, v i o l a t e s , or 
f a i l s to observe w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order, any s t i p u l a t i o n 
of any T r e a t y between H is Majesty, H i s p r e d e c e s s o r s , h e i r s , or s u c c e s s o r s , 
and the Sheikh of Ba h r e i n f o r the time being i n f o r c e , and 
a p p l i c a b l e to such person, i n r e s p e c t of the v i o l a t i o n whereof 
any p e n a l t y i s s t i p u l a t e d f o r i n the T r e a t y , he s h a l l be deemed 
g u i l t y of an o f f e n c e , and on c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e o f under t h i s Order 
s h a l l be l i a b l e to a pe n a l t y i n accordance w i t h the s t i p u l a t i o n s 
of the T r e a t y , or the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Order. 
32. The F o r e i g n J u r i s d i c t i o n N e u t r a l i t y Order i n C o u n c i l , 
1904, s h a l l apply to a l l persons and to a l l p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t to 
t h i s Order. 
33. Where a person e n t i t l e d to appeal to the C h i e f Court 
from any judgment or order passed i n the e x e r c i s e of c r i m i n a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h i s Order d e s i r e s so to appeal, he s h a l l 
p resent h i s p e t i t i o n of appeal to the Court which passed the 
judgment or order; and the p e t i t i o n s h a l l w i t h a l l p r a c t i c a b l e 
speed be t r a n s m i t t e d to the C h i e f Court w i t h c e r t i f i e d c o p i e s of 
- 471 -
the charge ( i f any) and proceedings of a l l documentary evidence 
admitted or tendered, of the d e p o s i t i o n s , of the notes of the 
o r a l testimony, and of the judgment or order, and any argument 
on the p e t i t i o n of appeal t h a t the a p p e l l a n t d e s i r e s to submit 
to the C h i e f Court. 
34. The Court a g a i n s t whose judgment or order the appeal 
i s p r e f e r r e d may postpone the e x e c u t i o n of the sentence pending 
the appeal, and s h a l l , i f n e c e s s a r y , commit the person c o n v i c t e d 
to p r i s o n f o r s a f e custody, or d e t a i n him i n p r i s o n f o r s a f e 
custody, or s h a l l admit him to b a i l , and may take s e c u r i t y , by 
recognisance, d e p o s i t of money, or otherwise, f o r h i s payment 
of any f i n e . 
PART IV - C i v i l 
35. (1) Subject to the other p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Order, 
the Code of C i v i l Procedure and the other I n d i a n enactments, 
r e l a t i n g to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of C i v i l j u s t i c e and to i n s o l v e n c y 
and bankruptcy, s h a l l have e f f e c t as i f Bahrein were a d i s t r i c t i n 
the P r e s i d e n c y of Bombay. The P o l i t i c a l Agent s h a l l be deemed 
to be the D i s t r i c t Judge, and h i s Court s h a l l be deemed to be the 
D i s t r i c t or P r i n c i p a l C i v i l Court of O r i g i n a l J u r i s d i c t i o n i n the 
D i s t r i c t ; the J u d i c i a l A s s i s t a n t to the P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t s h a l l 
be deemed to be an A d d i t i o n a l D i s t r i c t Judge, and h i s Court s h a l l 
be an A d d i t i o n a l D i s t r i c t Court of O r i g i n a l C i v i l J u r i s d i c t i o n ; 
the Court of the P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t s h a l l be deemed to be the h i g h e s t 
C i v i l Court of Appeal f o r the D i s t r i c t , and the Court a u t h o r i z e d to 
hear appeals from the d e c i s i o n s of the D i s t r i c t Court; and the 
powers, both of the Governor-General i n C o u n c i l and the L o c a l 
Government, under those enactments s h a l l be e x e r c i s a b l e by the 
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , or, w i t h h i s previous or subsequent a s s e n t , by the 
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Governor-General of I n d i a i n C o u n c i l , 
(2) Any j u r i s d i c t i o n e x e r c i s a b l e by the C h i e f Court 
under t h i s Order i n c i v i l matters may be e x e r c i s e d by the 
Judge of t h a t Court, e i t h e r w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order 
or elsewhere. 
36. When a s u i t between persons to whom t h i s Order 
a p p l i e s i s f i l e d i n the P o l i t i c a l Agency, the P o l i t i c a l Agent 
s h a l l enquire from the s e v e r a l p a r t i e s whether they d e s i r e t h a t 
proceedings s h a l l be i n s t i t u t e d i n accordance w i t h the Code 
of C i v i l Procedure and the I n d i a n enactments made a p p l i c a b l e to 
Bahrein, or i n accordance w i t h l o c a l usage, and s h a l l r e c o r d 
t h e i r r e p l i e s . 
37. When any of the s e v e r a l p a r t i e s d e s i r e t h a t the s u i t 
s h a l l be determined i n accordance w i t h the Code of C i v i l Procedure 
and other enactments made a p p l i c a b l e to Ba h r e i n , the D i s t r i c t 
Court s h a l l f o r t h w i t h proceed to decide the s u i t i n accordance 
w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of such enactments, a s f a r a s l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s 
permit. 
Nothing i n t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l prevent the D i s t r i c t Court 
from r e f e r r i n g -
(a) A q u e s t i o n of l o c a l custom to the M a j l i s - e l - U r f f o r 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n and r e p o r t ; 
(b) A d i s p u t e over accounts between p e a r l i n g masters and 
d i v e r s to the S a l i f a h Court f o r s c r u t i n y and adjustment 
nor s h a l l prevent the D i s t r i c t Court, the M a j l i s - e l - U r f , or the 
S a l i f a h Court from r e f e r r i n g any matter i n the prpgress of a s u i t 
which i n v o l v e s a p o i n t of Mahommedan Law to a K a z i f o r d e c i s i o n , or 
from sending any p a r t y or w i t n e s s , being a Mahommedan, to a K a z i 
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fo r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of an oath. 
38. (1) The F o r e i n g J u r i s d i c t i o n (Admiralty) Order 
i n C o u n c i l , 1910, s h a l l apply to Bahrein, and the C h i e f Court 
s h a l l have the j u r i s d i c t i o n c o n f e r r e d by A r t i c l e 4 of t h a t 
Order, and the D i s t r i c t Court s h a l l be deemed to be a P r o v i n c i a l 
Court, and the R e g i s t r y t h e r e o f a D i s t r i c t R e g i s t r y w i t h i n the 
meaning of the s a i d Order. 
(2) Admiralty a c t i o n s commenced i n the s a i d R e g i s t r y 
s h a l l be t r i e d i n the D i s t r i c t Court, u n l e s s the C h i e f Court 
i s a t the time s i t t i n g w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order, or u n l e s s 
a l l p a r t i e s agree t h a t the a c t i o n s h a l l be t r i e d i n the Ch i e f 
Court s i t t i n g elsewhere than w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order. 
(3) The d u t i e s of the R e g i s t r a r and of the M a r s h a l l 
e i t h e r of the Ch i e f Court or of the D i s t r i c t Court under the s a i d 
Order s h a l l be performed by such o f f i c e r s as the P o l i t i c a l 
R e s i d e n t s h a l l d i r e c t . 
39. (1) The D i s t r i c t Court s h a l l endeavour to obtain, as 
e a r l y as may be, n o t i c e of the deaths of a l l B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s or 
f o r e i g n e r s l e a v i n g property i n any p l a c e w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
the Court as p r e s c r i b e d by t h i s Order, and a l l such information 
as may serve to guide the Court w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e s e c u r i n g and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e i r property. 
(2) On r e c e i v i n g n o t i c e of the death of such a person, 
the Court s h a l l put up a n o t i c e thereof a t the Court-house, and 
s h a l l keep the same t h e r e u n t i l probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s granted, 
o r , where i t appears to the Court t h a t probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l 
not be a p p l i e d f o r , or cannot be granted, f o r such time as i t t h i n k s f i t . 
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(3) The Court s h a l l , where the circumst a n c e s of the 
ca s e appear so to r e q u i r e , as soon as may be, take p o s s e s s i o n 
of the property l e f t by the deceased i n any p l a c e w i t h i n the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Court as p r e s c r i b e d by t h i s Order, or put 
i t under i t s s e a l ( i n e i t h e r c a s e , i f the nature of the property 
or other c i r c u m s t a n c e s so r e q u i r e , making an i n v e n t o r y ) , and so 
keep i t u n t i l i t can be d e a l t w i t h according to law; p e r i s h a b l e 
a r t i c l e s being disposed of as the Court may co n s i d e r b e s t i n the 
i n t e r e s t s of the e s t a t e . 
(4) A l l expenses i n c u r r e d on b e h a l f of the Court i n 
so doing s h a l l be the f i r s t charge on the property of the deceased, 
and the Court s h a l l , by s a l e of p a r t of t h a t property, or otherwise, 
provide f o r the d i s c h a r g e of these expenses. 
(5) When a B r i t i s h s u b j e c t or f o r e i g n e r d i e s w i t h 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Court as p r e s c r i b e d by t h i s Order i n t e s t a t e , 
h i s property, or so much thereof as i s w i t h i n those l i m i t s , s h a l l , 
u n t i l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s granted, v e s t i n the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
40. I f a person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s be named executor 
i n a w i l l , and to the establishment of whose t i t l e as such i t i s 
neces s a r y to o b t a i n probate of t h a t w i l l , take p o s s e s s i o n af and 
a d m i n i s t e r s , or otherwise d e a l s w i t h , any p a r t of the property of 
the deceased, and does not o b t a i n probate w i t h i n one month a f t e r 
the death or a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n of any proceeding r e s p e c t i n g 
probate or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , he s h a l l be l i a b l e to pay double the 
amount of any f e e s chargeable on o b t a i n i n g probate, and he s h a l l 
a l s o be l i a b l e to a f i n e which may extend to 1,000 rupees. 
41. I f any person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s , other than the 
person named executor, or the a d m i n i s t r a t o r , or a person e n t i t l e d 
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to r e p r e s e n t the deceased without o b t a i n i n g probate or l e t t e r s 
of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t or an o f f i c e r of the Court, takes p o s s e s s i o n 
of an a d m i n i s t e r s , or otherwise d e a l s w i t h , any p a r t of the 
property of the deceased, he s h a l l , a s soon as p r a c t i c a b l e , n o t i f y 
the f a c t and the circumstances to the D i s t r i c t Court, and s h a l l 
f u r n i s h to the Court a l l such i n f o r m a t i o n as the Court r e q u i r e s 
and s h a l l conform to any d i r e c t i o n of the Court i n r e l a t i o n to 
the custody, d i s p o s a l , or t r a n s m i s s i o n of the property or the 
proceeds t h e r e o f , and, i n c a s e of any c o n t r a v e n t i o n of t h i s 
A r t i c l e , he s h a l l be punished w i t h f i n e , which may extend to 1,000 
rupees. 
42. (1) When the p e c u l i a r circumstances of the c a s e appear 
to the D i s t r i c t Court so to r e q u i r e , f o r reasons recorded i n 
i t s proceedings, the Court may, i f i t t h i n k s f i t , of i t s own 
motion or o t h e r w i s e , grant l e t t e r s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to an o f f i c e r 
of the Court. 
(2) The o f f i c e r so appointed s h a l l a c t under the d i r e c t i o n 
of the Court, and s h a l l be indemnified thereby. 
(3) He s h a l l p u b l i s h such n o t i c e s , i f any, as the Court 
t h i n k s f i t , i n Bahrein, the P e r s i a n Coast and I s l a n d s , Bombay, the 
United Kingdom, and elsewhere. 
(4) The Court s h a l l r e q u i r e and compel him to f i l e , 
i n the proper o f f i c e of the Court, h i s accounts of h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
a t i n t e r v a l s not exceeding t h r e e months, and s h a l l f o r t h w i t h examine 
them and r e p o r t thereon to the C h i e f Court. 
(5) The accounts s h a l l be a u d i t e d under the d i r e c t i o n 
of the D i s t r i c t Court. 
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(6) A l l expenses i n c u r r e d on b e h a l f of the Court 
i n e x e c u t i o n of t h i s A r t i c l e s h a l l be the f i r s t charge on 
the e s t a t e of the deceased as d e a l t w i t h i n accordance w i t h 
the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Order; and the Court s h a l l , by the s a l e 
of t h a t e s t a t e or ot h e r w i s e , provide f o r the di s c h a r g e of those 
expenses. 
43. I n ca s e s where p a r t i e s a r e Mahommedans the D i s t r i c t 
Court may r e f e r any qu e s t i o n , concerning probate of w i l l s or 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of property of deceased persons to whom t h i s 
Order a p p l i e d , to a K a z i f o r settlement under the general 
s u p e r v i s i o n of the Court. 
PART V. - Bahrein S u b j e c t s and T r i b u n a l s , 
(a) C r i m i n a l 
44. (1) When a Bahrein s u b j e c t d e s i r e s to i n s t i t u t e 
a complaint a g a i n s t a person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s , OE a 
person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s d e s i r e s to i n s t i t u t e a complaint 
a g a i n s t a Bahrein s u b j e c t , the P o l i t i c a l Agent s h a l l e n t e r t a i n 
the same, and may -
(a) With the concurrence of the Sheikh of Bahrei n , 
h i m s e l f hear and determine i t i n h i s D i s t r i c t Court, or 
(b) Send i t to the J o i n t Court, or 
(c ) I f the defendant i s a Mahommedan, r e f e r i t to a 
K a z i f o r d e c i s i o n , sending a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Agency to 
re c o r d b r i e f l y the proceedings. Such d e c i s i o n , when endorsed 
by the P o l i t i c a l Agent, s h a l l f o r a l l purposes be considered as i f 
i t were t h a t of the D i s t r i c t Court. 
(2) Nothing i n t h i s A r t i c l e s h a l l prevent the P o l i t i c a l 
R e s i d e n t from e x e r c i s i n g the r e v i s o r y powers possessed by him Under 
A r t i c l e 4 of the Convention w i t h B a h r e i n , dated the 31st May, 1861. 
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(b) C i v i l 
45. (1) When a Ba h r e i n s u b j e c t d e s i r e s to b r i n g a s u i t 
a g a i n s t a person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s , or a person to whom 
t h i s Order a p p l i e s d e s i r e s to b r i n g a s u i t a g a i n s t a Bahrein 
s u b j e c t , the P o l i t i c a l Agent s h a l l admit the complaint, and 
(a) With the concurrence of the Sheikh of Ba h r e i n , may 
hear and determine the s u i t i n h i s D i s t r i c t Court, or 
(b) May hear and determine i t i n a J o i n t Court, or 
(c) May r e f e r i t to the M a j l i s - e l = U r f f o r d e c i s i o n , or 
(d) I n c a s e s between p e a r l i n g - m a s t e r s and d i v e r s , may 
r e f e r i t to the S a l i f a h Court, or 
(e) With the consent of the s e v e r a l p a r t i e s , may r e f e r 
the c a s e to one or more A r b i t r a t o r s f o r s e t t l e m e n t . 
(2) The Judgment of the J o i n t Court or of the M a j l i s = e l - U r f 
s h a l l f o r a l l purposes be considered the same as i f i t were t h a t of 
the D i s t r i c t Court. 
(3) An appeal from the d e c i s i o n of the S a l i f a h Court 
s h a l l l i e to the P o l i t i c a l Agent a c t i n g i n conce r t w i t h the Sheikh 
of Bahrein, and i n a l l S a l i f a h c a s e s t h e i r j o i n t d e c i s i o n s h a l l be 
f i n a l . 
(4) The award of the A r b i t r a t o r under s u b - A r t i c l e 1 (e) 
s h a l l be f i n a l , and s h a l l not be open to appeal u n l e s s the same 
s h a l l w i t h i n a reasonable time have been ordered by the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent to be s e t a s i d e on the ground t h a t i t i s not f i n a l or i s 
d e f e c t i v e , or t h a t the A r b i t r a t o r has exceeded h i s a u t h o r i t y , or has 
been g u i l t y of misconduct i n the matter. 
(5) Nothing h e r e i n mentioned s h a l l prevent the D i s t r i c t 
C ourt, the J o i n t Court, the M a j l i s - e l - U r f , the S a l i f a h Court, or the 
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A r b i t r a t o r from r e f e r r i n g any matter i n the progress of a s u i t 
which i n v o l v e s a point of Mahommedan law to a K a z i f o r d e c i s i o n , 
or from sending any p a r t y or w i t n e s s , being a Mahommedan, to a 
K a z i f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of an oath. 
46. (1) Where a Bahrein s u b j e c t o b t a i n s , i n a Court 
e s t a b l i s h e d under t h i s Order, a decree or order a g a i n s t a defendant 
being a B r i t i s h s u b j e c t , or f o r e i g n e r , and i n another s u i t t h a t 
defendant i s p l a i n t i f f and the Bahrein s u b j e c t i s defendant, the 
Court may, i f i t t h i n k s f i t , on the a p p l i c a t i o n of the B r i t i s h 
s u b j e c t , or f o r e i g n e r , s t a y the enforcement of the decree or order 
pending t h a t other s u i t , and may s e t o f f any amount decreed or 
ordered to be pa i d by one p a r t y i n one s u i t a g a i n s t any amount 
decreed or ordered to be paid by the other p a r t y i n the other s u i t . 
(2) Where a p l a i n t i f f , being a Bahrein s u b j e c t , o b t a i n s 
a decree or order, i n a Court e s t a b l i s h e d under t h i s Order, a g a i n s t 
two or more defendants, being B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s , or f o r e i g n e r s , j o i n t l y , 
and i n another s u i t one of them i s a p l a i n t i f f and the Bahrein 
s u b j e c t i s defendant, the Court may, i f i t t h i n k s f i t , on the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s , or f o r e i g n e r s , s t a y the 
enforcement of the decree o r order pending t h a t other s u i t , and may s e t 
o f f any amount decreed or ordered to be paid by one p a r t y i n one s u i t 
a g a i n s t any amount decreed or ordered to be paid by the other p a r t y 
i n the other s u i t , without p r e j u d i c e to the r i g h t of the B r i t i s h 
s u b j e c t or f o r e i g n e r to o b t a i n c o n t r i b u t i o n from h i s co-defendants 
under the j o i n t l i a b i l i t y . 
(3) Where i n a s u i t a Bahrein s u b j e c t i s c o - p l a i n t i f f 
w i t h a B r i t i s h s u b j e c t or f o r e i g n e r who i s i n Bahrei n , i t s h a l l not 
be n e c e s s a r y f o r the Bahrein s u b j e c t to g i v e s e c u r i t y under t h i s 
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A r t i c l e as regards f e e s and c o s t s , u n l e s s the Court so d i r e c t s , 
but the c o - p l a i n t i f f B r i t i s h s u b j e c t , or f o r e i g n e r , s h a l l be 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l f e e s and c o s t s . 
47 - (1) Every agreement f o r r e f e r e n c e to a r b i t r a t i o n 
between a person to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s on the one hand, and 
a B a h r e i n s u b j e c t on the other hand, may, on the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
any p a r t y , be f i l e d f o r e x e c u t i o n i n the o f f i c e of the Court. 
(2) The Court s h a l l thereupon have a u t h o r i t y to enforce 
the agreement, and the award made thereunder, and to c o n t r o l and 
r e g u l a t e the proceedings b e f o r e and a f t e r - t h e award, i n such manner 
and on such terms a s the Court may t h i n k f i t , i n c o n c e r t w i t h the 
Sheikh or h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . 
( c ) General 
48 - (1) Where i t i s proved t h a t the attendance of a person 
to whom t h i s Order a p p l i e s , to g i v e evidence, or f o r any other purpose 
connected w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , i s r e q u i r e d before a 
Bahrein T r i b u n a l , a Court e s t a b l i s h e d under t h i s Order may, i f i t 
t h i n k s f i t , i n a c a s e and i n curcumstances i n which the Court would 
r e q u i r e the attendance of t h a t person before the Court, order t h a t 
he do attend as r e q u i r e d . 
(2) I f the person ordered to at t e n d , having r e a s o n a b l e 
n o t i c e of the time and p l a c e a t which he i s r e q u i r e d to a t t e n d , f a i l s 
to a t t e n d a c c o r d i n g l y and does not excuse h i s f a i l u r e to the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the Court, he s h a l l , independently of any other 
l i a b i l i t y , be l i a b l e to be punished w i t h imprisonment f o r a term 
which may extent to two months, or w i t h f i n e which may extent to 
1,000 rupees, or w i t h both. 
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49. When a person to whom th i s Order applies invokes 
or submits to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a Bahrein Tribunal, and engages 
i n w r i t i n g to abide by the decision of that Tribunal or to pay 
any fees or expenses ordered by that Tribunal to be paid by him s 
the Court may, on such evidence as i t thinks f i t to require, 
enforce payment of such fees and expenses i n the same manner 
as i f they were fees payable i n a proceeding i n the Court, and 
shall pay over and account for the same, when levied, to the 
proper Bahrein authority, as the Court may di r e c t . 
50o - (1) I f a person to whom t h i s Order applies w i l f u l l y 
gives false evidence i n a proceeding before a Bahrein Tribunal, 
or i n an a r b i t r a t i o n between a person to whom t h i s Order applies, 
on the one hand, and a Bahrein subject, on the other hand, he 
shall be g u i l t y of an offence, and s h a l l , on conviction, be l i a b l e 
to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
two months, or with f i n e which may extend to 1,000 rupees, or with 
both. 
(2) Nothing i n t h i s A r t i c l e shall exempt a person from 
l i a b i l i t y under any other B r i t i s h or B r i t i s h Indian law to any 
other or highE punishment or penalty: 
Provided that no person shall be punished twice f o r the same 
offence. 
PART VI - Registration 
51. A register of persons to whom t h i s Order applies shall 
be kept i n the P o l i t i c a l Agency. 
52. Every person to whom t h i s Order applies, being of the 
age of 21 years or upwards, or being married, or a widower, or a 
widow, though under that age, shall register himself at the P o l i t i c a l 
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Agency within:three months of the commencement of t h i s Order 9 i f 
resident w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order at that time, or, i f 
a r r i v i n g w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order, w i t h i n one month aft e r 
such a r r i v a l . 
Provided that a person who f a i l s to register himself w i t h i n 
the time l i m i t e d by t h i s A r t i c l e may be registered at any time i f 
he excuses his f a i l u r e to the sat i s f a c t i o n of the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
53. The r e g i s t r a t i o n of a man shall comprise the r e g i s t r a t i o n 
of his wife, or wives, i f l i v i n g with him; and the r e g i s t r a t i o n of 
the head of a family shall comprise the r e g i s t r a t i o n of a l l females 
and minors, being his re l a t i v e s i n whatever degree, l i v i n g under the 
same roof with him at the time of his r e g i s t r a t i o n . 
54o Registration under t h i s Order sh a l l be renewed annually 
i n the month of January. 
55. Every person who has not previously been registered 
applying to be registered under t h i s Order s h a l l , unless excused by 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent, attend personally for that purpose at the 
P o l i t i c a l Agency, but no person applying for the renewal of his 
re g i s t r a t i o n need attend personally unless directed by the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent so to do. 
56. Every person registering himself under t h i s Order may 
obtain, i f he so desire, a c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n i n such form 
as may be prescribed by the P o l i t i c a l Resident. 
57. I f any person to whom t h i s Order applies neglects to 
register himself under i t s provisions he shall not be e n t i t l e d to 
the protection, assistance, or good of f i c e s of the P o l i t i c a l Agent, 
and shall be l i a b l e to a f i n e not exceeding 25 rupees f o r each 
instance of such f a i l u r e , but he s h a l l , although not registered, be 
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subject to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Courts established by t h i s Order. 
58. A person applying to be registered under t h i s Order must 
produce such evidence as the P o l i t i c a l Agent may think necessary that 
he i s e n t i t l e d to be registered. 
59. Registration under t h i s Order shall be no evidence of 
na t i o n a l i t y , and a statement to that effect shall be inserted on the 
face of every c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n issued under t h i s Order. 
PART V I I - Miscellaneous Provisions 
60. Subject to the control of the Secretary of State the 
P o l i t i c a l Resident may, from time to time, with the previous sanction 
of the Governor-General of India i n Council, make Rules of Procedure 
and other Rules, consistent with t h i s Order, for the better execution 
of the provisions herein contained i n respect of any matter a r i s i n g 
i n the course of any c i v i l or criminal case, including ineolvency 
and bankruptcy proceedings. 
61 - (1) Subject to the control of the Secretary of State 
acting with the concurrence of the Treasury, the P o l i t i c a l Resident 
may, from time to time, with the previous sanction of the Governor-
General of India i n Council, make rules imposing fees leviable i n 
respect of any proceedings i n , or processes issued out of, any Court 
established under t h i s Order. 
(2) But a Court before which any matter i s pending may, 
i n any case, i f i t thinks f i t , on account of the poverty of a party, 
or for any other reason, dispense i n whole or i n part w i t h the 
payment of any fees chargeable i n respect of such matter. 
62 - (1) A l l fees, charges, expenses, costs, f i n e s , damages, 
and other money payable under t h i s Order, or under any law made 
applicable by thi s Order, may be enforced under order of the Court 
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by seizure and sale of goods, and, i n default of s u f f i c i e n t goods, 
by imprisonment as a c i v i l prisoner for a term not exceeding one 
month, but such imprisonment shall not operate as a s a t i s f a c t i o n 
or extinguishment of the l i a b i l i t y . 
(2) Any b i l l of sale or mortgage, or transfer of property, 
made with the view of avoiding such seizure or sale, shall not be 
effectual to defeat the provisions of t h i s Order. 
(3) A l l fees, penalties, f i n e s , and f o r f e i t u r e s levied 
under t h i s Order upon a B r i t i s h subject, and fees, other than actual 
Court fees, that may be levied under the provisions of t h i s Order, on 
a person to whom t h i s Order applies, s h a l l be paid to the public 
account, and s h a l l be applied i n such manner as the Secretary of 
State, with the consent of the Treasury, or, with the previous or 
subsequent assent of the Secretary of State, as the Governor-General 
of India i n Council, may d i r e c t . 
63. Whenever an Acting P o l i t i c a l Agent or Acting Judicial Assistant 
has commenced the hearing of any cause or matter, c i v i l or criminal, 
he may, unless the P o l i t i c a l Resident otherwise d i r e c t s , continue 
and complete the hearing and determination thereof, notwithstanding 
that his authority to act as P o l i t i c a l Agent or Judicial Assistant, 
has otherwise ceased by reason of the expiration of the time for which 
he was appointed to act, or by reason of the happening of any event 
by which his authority i s determined. 
64 - (1) I f an o f f i c e r of the Court, employed to execute 
a decree or order, loses, by neglect or omission, the opportunity 
of executing i t , then, on complaint of the person aggrieved and 
proof of the fact alleged, the Court may, i f i t thinks f i t , order 
the o f f i c e r to pay the damages sustained by the person complaining, 
or part thereof. 
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(2) The order may be enforced as an order d i r e c t i n g 
payment of money. 
65 - (1) I f a clerk or o f f i c e r of the Court, acting under 
pretence of the process or authority of the Court, i s charged with 
extortion, or with not paying over money duly levied, or with other 
misconduct, the Court may, i f i t thinks f i t , inquire into the 
charge i n a summary way, and may for that purpose summon and enforce 
the attendance of a l l necessary persons as i n a s u i t , and may make 
such order f o r the repayment of any money extorted, or for the 
payment over of any money levied, and for the payment of such 
damages and costs as the Court thinks f i t . 
(2) The Court may also, i f i t thinks f i t , on the same 
inquiry, impose on the clerk or o f f i c e r such f i n e , not exceeding 
50 rupees for each offence, as the Court thinks f i t . 
(3) A clerk or o f f i c e r punished under t h i s A r t i c l e shall 
not, without the leave of the Court, be l i a b l e to a c i v i l s u i t i n 
respect of the same matter; and any such s u i t , i f already or 
afterwards begun, may be stayed by the Court i n such manner and on 
such terms as the Court thinks f i t . 
(4) Nothing i n t h i s A r t i c l e shall be deemed to prevent 
any person from being prosecuted under any other B r i t i s h or B r i t i s h 
Indian law f o r any act or omission punishable under t h i s A r t i c l e , 
or from being l i a b l e under that other law to any other or higher 
punishment or penalty than that provided by t h i s A r t i c l e : 
Provided that no person sh a l l be punished twice f o r the same 
offence. 
66. The P o l i t i c a l Resident or the P o l i t i c a l Agent may exercise 
any power conferred on any Justices of the Peace w i t h i n His Majesty's 
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dominions by any Act of Parliaments f o r the time being i n force, 
regulating merchant sea-men or the mercantile marine. 
67. Where under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, anything 
i s authorized to be done by, t o , or before a Consular o f f i c e r , 
such thing may be done i n any place i n Bahrein by, t o , or before 
the P o l i t i c a l Resident, or the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
68. The P o l i t i c a l Resident and the P o l i t i c a l Agent shall 
each be e n t i t l e d i n Bahrein to act as a Notary Public. 
69. The Court shall have j u r i s d i c t i o n from time to time to 
make an order requiring a person to whom t h i s Order applies to contribute 
i n such manner as the Court d i r e c t s , to the support of his wife, or 
to the support of his or her c h i l d , whether legitimate or not, 
being, i n the opinion of the Court, under the age of 16 years. Any 
such order may be made i n a summary way, as i f the neglect to provide 
for the support of such wife or c h i l d were an offence, and any f a i l u r e 
to comply with any such order shall be deemed to be an offence, and 
shall be punishable with a f i n e not exceeding 10 rupees for any one 
default, and the Court may dir e c t any penalty imposed for such offence 
to be applied for the support of such wife or c h i l d i n such manner as 
the Court thinks f i t . 
70. The P o l i t i c a l Resident shall have power to make Regulations 
(to be called King's Regulations) for the following purposes (that i s 
to say)s-
(a) For the peace, order, and good government of persons to 
whom t h i s Order applies i n r e l a t i o n to matters not provided for by 
t h i s Order. 
(b) For securing the observance of any Treaty for the time 
being i n force, r e l a t i n g to any place w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h i s Order, 
or of any native or local law or custom, whether r e l a t i n g to trade, 
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commerce, revenue, or any other matter. 
(c) For applying, amending, modifying, or repealing 
with respect to Bahrein any Acts or enactments which apply, or 
are made applicable or have been brought into operation i n Bahrein 
by or under any of the provisions of A r t i c l e 11 of th i s Order. 
(d) For regulating or preventing the importation or 
exportation i n B r i t i s h ships or by any person to whom t h i s Order 
applies of arms or munitions of war, or any parts or ingredients 
thereof, and for giving effect to any Treaty r e l a t i n g to the 
importation or exportation of the same. 
(e) For requiring Returns to be made of the nature, quantity, 
and value of a r t i c l e s exported from or imported into Bahrein, by or 
on account of any person to whom t h i s Order applies or i n any 
B r i t i s h ship, and for prescribing the times andmanner at or i n which, 
and the persons by whom, such Returns are to be made. 
( f ) For the governance, v i s i t a t i o n , care, and superintendence 
of prisons. 
71 - (1) Any Regulations made under the preceding A r t i c l e 
may provide for f o r f e i t u r e of any goods, receptacles, or things 
i n r e l a t i o n to which, or to the contents of which, any breach i s 
committed of such Regulations, or of any Treaty or any native or 
local law or custom, the observance of which i s provided for by 
such Regulations. 
(2) Any person to whom t h i s Order applies committing a 
breach of any such Regulations s h a l l , i n addition to any f o r f e i t u r e 
prescribed thereby, be l i a b l e , on conviction, to imprisonment f o r 
a period not exceeding three months, or to a f i n e , or to both. 
- 487 -
(3) Any f i n e imposed fo r a breach of Regulation s h a l l 
not exceed 1,500 rupees, provided that i n the case of any breach 
of any native or local law r e l a t i n g to customs law, or under which 
the importation or exportation of any goods i s prohibited or 
r e s t r i c t e d , the f i n e may extend to a sum equivalent to treble the 
value of the goods i n r e l a t i o n to which the breach i s committed. 
72 - (1) King's Regulations s h a l l not take effe c t u n t i l 
they are allowed by a Secretary of State, or, w i t h his previous 
or subsequent assent, by the Governor-General of India i n Council; 
provided that i n case of urgency declared i n any such Regulations, 
the same shall take effect before such allowance, and shall continue 
to have effect unless and u n t i l they are disallowed by the Secretary 
of State, or, with his previous or subsequent assent, by the 
Governor-General of India i n Council, and u n t i l n o t i f i c a t i o n of 
such disallowance is received and published by the P o l i t i c a l Resident, 
and such disallowance shall be without prejudice to anything done or 
suffered under such Regulations i n the meantime. 
(2) A l l King's Regulations shall be published by the 
P o l i t i c a l Resident i n such manner and at such places as he may think 
proper. 
(3) I n t h i s Order "breach of the Regulations" includes 
the breach of any native or local law or custom, the observance 
of which i s required by any King's Regulations. 
73. J u d i c i a l notice shall be taken of t h i s Order and of 
the commencement thereof, and of the appointment of the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident, P o l i t i c a l Agent, and J u d i c i a l Assistant, and of the 
constitution and l i m i t s of the Courts and d i s t r i c t s , and of the 
seals and signatures, and of any Rules and Regulations made or i n 
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force under t h i s Order, and no proof shall be required of any of 
such matters. 
74. Nothing i n t h i s Order sh a l l deprive the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident, or an o f f i c e r subordinate to him, of the r i g h t to 
observe, and to enforce the observance of, or s h a l l deprive 
any person of the benefit of any reasonable custom existing i n 
Bahrein, unless t h i s Order contains some express and specific 
provision incompatible with the observance thereof. 
75. Nothing i n t h i s Order shall -
( i ) Affect any power of j u r i s d i c t i o n conferred by, or 
referred to i n , the Act of the Governor-General of India i n 
Council, e n t i t l e d the Foreign J u r i s d i c t i o n and Extradition Act, 
1879 (Act XXI of 1879), or i n the Indian (Foreign Ju r i s d i c t i o n ) 
Order i n Council, 1902; or 
( i i ) Affect any j u r i s d i c t i o n for the time being exercisable 
by the P o l i t i c a l Resident under any Imperial Act other than the 
Foreign J u r i s d i c t i o n Act, 1890; or 
( i i i ) Prevent the P o l i t i c a l Agent from doing anything which 
His Majesty's Consuls i n the dominions of any State i n amity with 
His Majesty are for the time being, by law, usage, or sufferance, 
e n t i t l e d or enabled to do. 
76. I f a question arises whether any place i s or i s not i n 
Bahrein for the purposes of t h i s Order, i t shall be referred to the 
P o l i t i c a l Resident, and a c e r t i f i c a t e under his hand and seal shall be 
conclusive on the question, and s h a l l be taken j u d i c i a l notice of 
by any Court established under th i s Order. 
77. Not l a t e r than the 31st day of March i n each year, or 
such other day as the Secretary of State, or, with his previous or 
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subsequent assent 9 as the Governor-General of India i n Council, 
directs from time to time, the P o l i t i c a l Resident shall send 
to the Governor-General of India i n Council, for transmission 
to the Secretary of State, a Report on the operation of t h i s 
Order up to the 31st day of December i n the previous year, 
or such other date as the Secretary of State, or, with his 
previous or subsequent assent, as the Governor-General of India 
i n Council , directs from time to time, showing for the l a s t 
twelve months the number and nature of the proceedings, criminal 
and c i v i l , taken under t h i s Order, and the result thereof, and 
the number and amount of fees received, and such other information, 
and being i n such form as the Secretary of State, or, with his 
previous or subsequent assent, as the Governor-General of India 
i n Council from time to time dir e c t s . 
78. - (1) A printed copy of t h i s Order, and of a l l Rules 
of Procedure and other Rules f o r the time being i n force under 
t h i s Order, shall be kept open to inspection free of charge i n the 
o f f i c e of the P o l i t i c a l Agent and of each Court established under 
t h i s Order. 
(2) Printed copies thereof shall be sold w i t h i n the 
islands of Bahrein at such reasonable price as the P o l i t i c a l Agent 
from time to time directs. 
79. - (1) This Order shall be published i n the "Gazette of 
India" w i t h i n such time af t e r the passing thereof as the Secretary 
of State may prescribe, and shall come into force on such day ( i n 
t h i s Order referred to as the commencement of t h i s Order), w i t h i n 
six months a f t e r that publication, as the Governor-General of India 
i n Council may, by n o t i f i c a t i o n i n the said "Gazette," appoint i n 
t h i s behalf. 
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(2) But any appointment under t h i s Order may be 
made at any time after i t s passing, and no proof s h a l l , i n any 
proceedings, be required of any of the matters prescribed by t h i s 
A r t i c l e . 
And the Most Honourable the Marquess of Crewe, K.G., and 
the Right Honourable Sir Edward Grey Baronet, K.G., two of His 
Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, are to give the 
necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain. 
Aimeric FitzRoy. 
SCHEDULE 
Indian Acts Applied. 
Acts XXXV and XXXVI of 1858 re l a t i n g respectively to 
lunatics and lunatic asylums. 
The Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)i 
The Whipping Act, 1864 (Act VI of 1864). 
The Indian Succession Act (Act X of 1865). 
The Indian Divorce Act (Act IV of 1869), 
except so much as relates to divorce and n u l l i t y of marriage. 
The Bombay C i v i l Courts Act, 1869, (Act XIV of 1869), except 
sections 6, 15, 23, 32, 33, 34, 38 to 43 (both i n c l u s i v e ) , the la s t 
clause of section 19, and the la s t two clauses of section 22. 
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act I of 1872). 
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Act IX of 1872). 
The Indian Oaths Act, 1873 (Act X of 1873). 
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The Indian Majority Act (Act IX of 1875). 
The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (Act XI of 1890). 
The Indian Pilgrim Ships Act (Act XIV of 1895). 
The Code of Criminal Procedure. (Act V of 1898), except 
Chapter XXXIII. 
So much of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), 
as relates to offences against the Post Office. 
The Code of C i v i l Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). 
The Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Act IX of 1908), so far 
as i t applies to appeals and applications. 
And the enactments r e l a t i n g to insolvency and bankruptcy 
for the time being i n force i n the Presidency of Bombay beyond the 
l i m i t s of the ordinary o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of the High Court of 
Judicature at Bombay. 
A P P E N D I X I I 
Note on the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Bahrein as existing at the end 
of 1919, wi t h suggestions and proposals f o r improving the s i t u a t i o n 
by Major H.K.V, Dickson. 
1. I arrived i n Bahrein on November 6th, 1919, and since 
my a r r i v a l I have taken pains to t r y and get at the bottom of the 
curious atmosphere of h o s t i l i t y which seems to exist everywhere i n 
Bahrein"for the foreigner and more expecially towards the Agency. 
To accomplish my purpose I have spent much time interviewing 
persons, great and small, and have taken special care to get at 
the confidence of people by frequent v i s i t s and dinner parties at 
the houses of residents of a l l shades of opinion, both neutral, 
Sunni and Shiah. I have also been largely helped i n my investigations 
by r i d i n g around among the many hamlets of the Island and chatting over 
a cup of coffee with the local headman surrounded by his v i l l a g e r s i n 
the local guest chamber. The general conclusions that I have 
arrived at are enumerated below. 
2. In my opinion -
(a) The p o l i t i c a l atmosphere of Bahrein while not i n any 
way dangerous i s wholly unsatisfactory. 
(b) There i s a strong a n t i - B r i t i s h sentiment which i s long 
standing and deepseated. 
(c) B r i t i s h prestige rests on e n t i r e l y false standards, 
namely on fear and not on respect. 
I consider our task therefore both extremely d i f f i c u l t , yet imperative. 
3. I t would be quite useless were I to make the bold 
statements above, had not strong proofs to substantiate them and 
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suggested remedies i n d i f f e r e n t directions to r e c t i f y them. The 
character and methods of Shaikh 'Isa bin ' A l i a l Khalifah, 
K.C.S.I.t C.S.I., the Ruler of Bahrein, are so well known as 
hardly to bear r e p e t i t i o n , yet I must perforce give a rough 
sketch of the man so as to convey the true atmosphere prevailing. 
Shaikh 'Isa i s a timid r u l e r , at the same time I believe he i s 
a very l o y a l friend to ourselves and means extremely well by us. 
Friendly l e t t e r that he writes to myself either personal or for 
transmission to His Majesty's Government give him almost c h i l d i s h 
pleasure, and he has been heard on several occasions to t e l l 
others of them and boast about the said friendliness. I n opposition 
to t h i s he i s continually attempting to assert his supposed r i g h t s 
i n an i l l a d v i s e d way and to cause small embarrassments by puerile 
methods and easily discernable intentions. 
The explanation of such contrary virtues and vices i s easy 
of explanation. His own personal feelings are undoubtedly of 
the f r i e n d l i e s t nature to ourselves, those of his advisers by no 
means unanimous i n t h i s respect. Their reasons f o r t h e i r h o s t i l e 
a t t i t u d e may be divided into two degrees 
"A" An honest one, that we may ourselves appreciate; 
"B" A dishonest one; 
both c a l l for special consideration and d i f f e r e n t methods of 
handling. 
"A" The honest opposition i s based p a r t l y on fear, p a r t l y 
on pride, p a r t l y on suspicion, inherent i n Arab minds, and p a r t l y 
on ignorance appalling i n i t s completeness. 
( i ) Fear of a great power who has them so completely i n 
i t s control makes them anxious to grasp and hold on to what actual 
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freedom and l i b e r t y of action remains to them, with the constant 
dread that t h e i r freedom may be s t i l l further c u r t a i l e d . 
( i i ) Pride, which i s equally part of the Arab character, 
encourages them to acts that w i l l gain them renown, however small, 
i n the eyes of t h e i r compatriots, and makes them equally averse 
to surrender an action once committed, or an a t t i t u d e once 
assumed. Pride of comparison bears a real part i n t h e i r l i n e 
of thought, that i s to say, t h e i r own power compared to that 
exercised by other Arab r u l e r s , and the fear of loss of prestige 
i n any curtailment of t h e i r powers i n the eyes of other r u l e r s . 
( i i i ) Suspicion, which, as I said above, i s an inherent 
vice or v i r t u e , depending on the standpoint of regard i n the 
co n s t i t u t i o n of Arab minds, and which always exists i n the minds 
of a more or less p r i m i t i v e people, i t s degree depending on the 
extent of t h e i r backwardness, as a w i l d animal depends on 
suspicion, whilst a domesticated depends on i t s confidence, for 
i t s comfort and well being. 
( i v ) Ignorance of anything outside t h e i r own environment i s 
so astonishing as to merit a special paragraph to i t s e l f , and I 
w i l l t reat t h i s question further on i n t h i s note. But i t i s a 
real and distressing factor with which we have to deal. A l l the 
above are what we might c a l l honest drawbacks, which we may 
appreciate, sympathize with and gradually remove by personal 
intercourse, sympathy, example and t a c t . The p i t y of i t i s that 
these characteristics are taken advantage of by those ill-disposed 
towards and I a t t r i b u t e eighty per cent, of our d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
our relationship with the r u l e r , and the present low standard of 
prestige, as due to them. 
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B - Dishonest opposition. 
This we may take for granted comes i n no inconsiderable 
extent from those i n opposition to Shaikh Isa himself; mainly 
from his cousins A l i Ibrahim Rashid the sons of Mahomed a l 
Khalifah who was formerly deposed by us, and to a certain 
extent from the heir presumptive. Quite apart from the natural 
h o s t i l i t y of the former family to ourselves for ousting t h e i r 
clan (hamoula) from the succession and t h e i r natural r i g h t s , i t 
may be easily understood how they would be only too ready to 
advise Shaikh 'Isa to take a l i n e of action that w i l l bring him 
i n opposition to ourselves. For they aim at nothing less than 
the deposition of the Shaikh himself, and clumsy diplomats as they 
are, they hope and never cease from attempting to accomplish t h i s 
by t r y i n g to make us lose patience with the present r u l e r , through 
his apparent obstinacy and maladministration, both of which they 
encourage and excite. They may therefore be said to be playing a 
two-handed game, on incited by t h e i r own hopes and ambitions and 
the other fostered by t h e i r real h o s t i l i t y to ourselves, for 
supposed wrongs committed and natural d i s l i k e of the white foreigner, 
the more so as he has behind him the mighty strength of a great 
nation. 
Thus then may we sum up the character of Shaikh 'Isa bin 
' A l i a l Khalifah w i t h i t s resultant effects on his dealings with 
ourselves s 
"A very old and weak man, imbued with sincere feelings of 
friendship and regard f o r His Majesty's Government, swayed and 
confused i n his weakness by v i r i l e and astute minds and delicate 
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i n t r i g u e r s , dictated for the most part by e v i l intentions to 
himself 9 to us and to both - helped i n t h i s by the characteristics 
of Arab mentality mentioned above." 
4 . We must now turn our at t e n t i o n from the "Entourage" 
of the Ruler to the "Mass", and i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n are causes 
of h o s t i l i t y and lack of prestige no less interesting and no 
less delicate. For here we have the "pawns" i n the game and 
the material f o r the edi f i c e of h o s t i l i t y . 
We w i l l divide them into two classes i -
A - The Government o f f i c i a l s ; 
B - The notables of the Islands. 
A - Like a l l Government o f f i c i a l s of an or i e n t a l State, 
we may expect to fi n d abuse of authority and extortion, but unlike 
most o r i e n t a l States i n such close relationship to a European 
Power, we may be j u s t l y grieved to f i n d that these exceed a l l bonds 
of propriety and sense of j u s t i c e , so much so as to c a l l f o r t h 
the odium of the Arabs themselves. The Amirs or Governors of 
the towns of Muharraq and Manama are o f f i c i a l s e n t i r e l y unsuited 
for c o n t r o l , and the power they wield i s oppressive and immoral. 
The Amir of Manama encourages and receives an income from 
prostitutes and gamblers, impresses boat and donkey transport i n 
a shameless manner and generally extorts money from householders, 
shopkeepers and the people as a whole. 
The Amirs of Muharraq i s l i t t l e b e tter, and would be 
equally as bad, were he not more or less under the supervision 
of the Shaikh who resides there for the greater part of the year. 
The Amirs being men of t h i s stamp, i t i s not surprising 
that the "Fidawis" (police) and o f f i c i a l s under them follow t h e i r lead. 
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This being so, i t i s obvious that any measure of reform 
i s at once opposed by these gentlemen s and intrigues set on 
foot to prevent them being carried out. 
B - The Notables of the Island. - Of these 25 per cent, 
are f r i e n d l y to a greater or less degree s while 75 per cent, are 
d e f i n i t e l y h o s t i l e . 
I w i l l attempt to describe the more important of them 
further on i n t h i s note, but for the present I w i l l confine myself 
to anticipating the causes of our unpopularity i n a general way 
before coming to d e t a i l s . 
These causes we may study under three headingss-
( i ) War, ( i i ) Normal, ( i i i ) I ndividual. 
( i ) War. 
(a) Economical. - The necessary r e s t r i c t i o n s due to the war 
have h i t the Island hard as i n most other places. The 
p r o h i b i t i o n of the export of s i l v e r and r e s t r i c t i o n s as 
to the export of r i c e from India during 1919 especially 
have caused acute hardship and discontent, but except 
where these have been taken advantage of by ill-disposed 
persons they should be speedily corrected or erradicated 
by the return of normal conditions, when present 
, p r o h i b i t i o n prices w i l l f a l l and normal trade be resumed. 
Our e f f o r t s then must be directed to the removal as soon 
as possible of trade r e s t r i c t i o n s made necessary by the 
war. 
(b) Propaganda. - This has l e f t i t s scars, and i s s t i l l 
existent. The present uncertainty of future status, active 
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pro-Turk feeling and Khilafat propaganda from India, 
are exercising men's minds and providing material 
for h o s t i l e endeavour. This can be erradicated or 
p a r t l y reduced by measures proposed (See paragraph v ) . 
( i i ) Normal. 
Fanatical h o s t i l i t y , due to u l t r a - r e l i g i o u s feelings 
among the Arabs; t h i s i s to be expected i n a place 
l i k e Bahrein, which has always taken i t s cue from 
Najd, but i t can be reduced by intercourse and 
closer touch. (The "Akhwan" movement of the mainland 
has undoubtedly increased t h i s feeling of h o s t i l i t y . ) 
Persians, due i n the f i r s t place to a rather unfriendly 
and fana t i c a l Shiah Persian community, but also due to 
recent p o l i t i c a l events i n Persia, and the natural 
leaning of the Persian towards i n t r i g u e . 
Ignorance - I t i s d i f f i c u l t to credit the hopeless 
ignorance that exists i n Bahrein, even among the best 
families. Those who have travelled and seen something 
of the world are a class apart. But the Shaikhs 
(r u l i n g house) and people generally are the most 
ignorant people I have ever met. No story, however, 
impossible i s too extravagant for t h e i r c r e d u l i t y . 
Isolated to a deplorable extent, they are callous and 
i n d i f f e r e n t to outside matters of any kind. I refer 
not to the humble and poor, but to the r i c h and i n f l u e n t i a l . 
Very few can w r i t e . Geographical knowledge i s appalling, 
p o l i t i c s of most amazing conception, they cannot 
understand the simplest measure of administration or 
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reform, incapable of clear statement and sound 
reasoning, i n t e l l e c t u a l l y d u l l and nat u r a l l y stupid. 
I t i s for t h i s reason that I specially advocate at 
homes, weekly durbars, evening v i s i t s and a 
newspaper to help broaden t h e i r minds and help t h e i r 
judgment. 
( i i i ) I n d i v i d u a l . 
I attach a black and white l i s t of important Bahrein individuals 
with a short description against each. The l i s t i s by no means complete, 
but i s interesting as an index to the various causes and effects i t i s 
necessary to study. I also attach a l i s t of important individuals who 
do not pay v i s i t s to the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
WHITE LIST 
1. Salman bin Matar A wealthy pearl merchant, very 
f r i e n d l y . 
2. Yusuf bin Ahmed Kanoo, M.B.E. I n f l u e n t i a l merchantj has incurred 
hatred of Shaikh 'Isa and his a n t i -
English advisers for his friendliness 
to us. Undoubtedly would get into 
serious trouble i f B r i t i s h ever 
withdrew from Bahrain. 
Pearl dealer. 
General merchant, member of the Majlis 
a l U r f i . 
General merchant, very f r i e n d l y to us. 
Bin Saud's agent i n Bahrain. One of 
the best type of Nejdis, a fervent 
supporter of the Imam, an "Akhwan" i n 
his tenets. Very f r i e n d l y to the 
B r i t i s h . 
Brother to (6) and equally f r i e n d l y , 
spends six months each year i n Bombay 
making purchases f o r Bin Saud and people 
of Nejd generally. 
3. Abdullah bin Mahmud 
4. Haji Ahmad bin Yatim 
5. Salman Megoo 
6. Abdul Aziz a l Qusaibi 
7. Abd-el Rahman a l Qusaibi 
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8. Mahomed A l i a l Zaiyani 
9. Sayed Mahomed Jemal a l L a i l 
10. Mahomed bim Hamad a l Qazi 
11. Sulaiman bin Hamad a l Bassam 
12. Seyed Ahmed bin Seyed Alawwi 
13. Shaikh Abdul L a t i f a l Dosari 
General merchant, regularly v i s i t s 
India. 
Head man of the Yemen community; 
anti-Turk and a n t i - r u l e r of Bahrein; 
would l i k e to see B r i t i s h i n 
absolute control here. 
A well read Nejdi merchant from 
Anaizeh. 
Nejdi merchant of well-known Bassam 
family established Basra, Mecca, 
Baghdad, Damascus, etc. 
Bahrein pearl merchant and broker. 
The leading Shiah inhabitant. Very 
B r i t i s h , often goes to India. Afraid 
of showing his l i k i n g for us, for 
fear of persecution from the Ruler 
of Bahrein. Has secretly applied to 
become a B r i t i s h subject, was once 
imprisoned and fined Rs.5,000 by 
Shaikh 'Isa; became bankrupt owing 
f a i l u r e i n pearls now gradually 
looking up again. A man w i t h 
greatest influence among Bahama 
vi l l a g e r s of the Island, 
Of Buddaiya, cousin of Shaikh Abdulla 
a l , Dosari. Pro-British probably on 
account of Shaikh Abdulla, being chief 
friend and adviser of Sheikh Abdulla 
bi n Isa a l Khalifa, C.I.E., Shaikh 
'Isa's youngest son. A frequent 
v i s i t o r to Agency and good provider of 
local news. 
Persians 
14. Khan Sahib Muhammad Sharif 
Kutbaddin 
15. Muhammas Farook A k i l 
16. Yousuf L u t f a l i Khunji 
A wealthy general merchant, head man 
of the Persian community, pr o - B r i t i s h 
and f r i e n d l y to the Agency. 
A wealthy and i n f l u e n t i a l general 
merchant with f i r a s i n Bombay, Lingah, 
Debai, Henjam. 
English educated general merchant. 
Pro-British, keeps up English s t y l e , 
subscribes London Times, Graphic and 
the Near East. He i s very f r i e n d l y 
w ith the Agency. He i s gone to Bombay 
where he intends establishing a good 
business and w i l l stay there f i v e 
months i n a year during winter. 
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17. Abdul Nabi Bushiri 
A l i Kazim Bushiri 
Wealthy partners i n general business. 
Once suspected of smuggling tea, but 
now f r i e n d l y towards the Agency. 
Follow Khan Sahib Muhammad Sharif's 
advice. They hold no p o l i t i c a l views. 
18. Abul Kassan D i t t o d i t t o d i t t o 
BLACK LIST 
Arabs. 
1. Haji Yusuf bin Abdul Rahman 
Fakhru. 
2. Haji Jassim Jodar 
3. Shaikh Rashid bin Muhammad Al 
Khalifah. 
4. Shaikh A l i bin Muhammad Al 
Khalifah. 
5. Shaikh Ibrahim bin Muhammad Al 
Khalifah 
Formerly noted arm smuggler from 
Muscat and Bahrein. Suspected strongly 
of being chief smuggler of contraband 
goods into Persia now. Too clever 
to be caught out: anti-English c h i e f l y 
because of his crooked trade dealings. 
Vi o l e n t l y pro-Turk r e s u l t i n g i n extreme 
h o s t i l i t y to everything B r i t i s h , 
openly boasts his p o l i t i c a l view. 
F i r s t cousins of Shaikh Isa. 
Intriguers - father deposed by His 
Majesty's Government who appointed 
Shaikh Isa as Shaikh of Bahrein instead. 
Hostile and revengeful i n consequence. 
6. Fahad bin Abdul Rahman, Amir of 
Muharaq. 
7. A l i bin Husain Ghomri, Amir of 
Manamah. 
8. A l i bin Musa 
Always arresting B r i t i s h subjects 
apparently from sheer desire to cause 
trouble between Shaikh Isa and His 
Majesty's Government. A dangerous man. 
A man of loose character and crooked 
dealings. Has great influence with 
Shaikh Hamid bin Isa. Vi o l e n t l y 
pro-Turk, 
Partner to (1) above and as equally 
a notorious arms smuggler. Well-
known at Muscat. 
9. Shaikh Abdullah bin Hasan Dosari See No. 13 White L i s t . Easily led 
by others. Stupid rather than 
dangerous. 
10. Haji Abdul Rahman Al Zayani Pearl merchant. Partner to Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Isa Al Khalifah i n 
business. Knows Bombay w e l l . Pro-Turk 
but moderate i n his views. 
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11o Ahmad bin Salman Ghigu Pro-Turk, former member of M a j l i s -
ul-Urfi„ 
12. Shaikh Jassim bin Mehza 
13. Shaikh Ahmad bin Mehza 
14. A l i b i n Abdullah 
15. Jassim Chirawi 
Chief Sunni Qazi i n Manama, Has 
very high reputation l o c a l l y f o r 
charity and good works, pretends 
to l i k e English. A mischief maker 
of worst-type. 
Brother of (12) . Narrowly escaped 
deportation 1905-06. Dangerous 
i n t r i g u e r . Confidential adviser 
to Shaikh Isa on land question. 
Financial Agent of Shaikh Isa. 
Ill-disposed jealous of English 
interference. Reputed hand i n glove 
with Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa Al 
Khalifah, C.I.E., i n swindling 
Shaikh Isa out of half the receipt 
from the Customs. Hated by a l l 
f o r his miserly methods. Dangerous. 
Shaikh Isa's Private Secretary. 
Great friend of Shaikh's son, Abdullah. 
The cleverest rogue i n Bahrein. 
Outwardly extremely p o l i t e and polished, 
but always endavouring undermine 
B r i t i s h influence with Shaikh. Close 
friend of Shaikh Isa's wife (the Queen). 
A man to be watched very closely. 
Engaged i n deadly feud with Yosuf 
Kanoo, M.B.E., whom he i s t r y i n g 
to r u i n . Adopts humble a t t i t u d e and 
pretends always he has no influence 
with Shaikh Isa. 
16. Ahmad bin Mansur Il l - n a t u r e d bigot. 
Persian 
1. Haji Abdul Nabi Kazeruni Formerly used to style himself Persian 
Consul, Bahrein. Used to take money 
and issue passports t i l l stopped by 
Agency. Vi o l e n t l y anit-English. 
Undoubtedly engaged i n smuggling 
contraband to Persia. 
2. Abdul Nabi Germani 
3. Abdullah Germani 
Lately Head Clerk to the German f i r m 
of R. Wonckhaus and Company, pro-German 
and so pro-Turk. 
Agent at Muharaq fo r the lat e German 
f i r m of R. Wonckhaus and Company. 
Poor and mischievous. 
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4. Mullah Shaikh Abdul Rahim Petty merchant. Was warned for 
giving out false war news. Pro-Turk. 
Indian 
1. Mr. Muhammad Roshan Akhtar Punjabi Musalman, formerly employed 
as vernacular clerk i n the Agency. 
A well educated Indian. Holds strong 
p o l i t i c a l views, has v i s i t e d Egypt 
and travelled generally. Openly 
talks about recent Punjab r i o t s . 
Reads Indian papers to Arab public, 
who gather to hear anti-English 
news i n his house. Being clever 
w i t h easy and assumed manner, his 
influence i s d i s t i n c t l y not for good. 
A 6taunch member of the k h i l a f a t 
movement. Secretary to Mr. Yosuf 
Kanoo, M.B.E., who i s a f r a i d of 
him, but dare not get r i d of him l e s t 
he j o i n hands with Jassim Chirawis 
party. A dangerous i n d i v i d u a l . 
L i s t of Notables who do not c a l l on the P o l i t i c a l Agent, Bahrain. 
1. Shaikh Abdul L a t i f bin Sa'ad, Imam of the great mosque, Manamah. 
2. Shaikh A l i (brother) pro-Turk. I n f l u e n t i a l Aalim, smaller Imam of a 
mosque. 
3. Shaikh Hussian Musharraf, pro-Turk. 
4. Mubarak a l Fadhil. 
5. His son Khamis. 
6. Shaikh Ahmad bin Mahza. Was going to be deported 1904-05. 
7. Shaikh Khalid bin A l i a l Khalifah, brother of Shaikh f I s a . Lives 
i n Rafa'a Old. 
8. Shaikh Hamud b i n Sabah a l Khalifah. Lives i n Rafa'a, well read 
pro-Turk. 
9. Shaikh Rashid bin Muhammad a l Khalifah, cousin of Shaikh Isa. 
10. Shaikh Hamad bin Muhammad a l Khalifah. On bad terms with Shaikh. 
11. A l i bin Abdullah, Shaikh 'Isa's f i n a n c i a l agent, i n f l u e n t i a l (came 
once), ill-disposed. 
12. Shaikh Abdul Wahhab bin H a j j i Zaiyani, pro-Turk (came once). 
13. Shaikh 'Isa bin Rashid, bigoted Aalim, Imam of Jummah, Muharraq. 
14. Shaikh Ahmad bin Muhammad Qazi of a l Hidd. 
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5. Action proposed to improve on the s i t u a t i o n , (a). To 
meet and defeat these various d i f f i c u l t i e s , an energetic and open 
handed policy i s immediately imperative. For i n my opinion with so 
much cheap sentimentality at large i n the world to-day, sue to 
catch phrases used f o r p o l i t i c a l purposes both during the world war 
and throughout the period of the Armistice, men's minds, especially 
those of or i e n t a l s , are apt to fasten on unrealities rather than on 
the facts of the outcome of the world conflagration. These ephemeral 
ideas are greedily fastened on to by the astute Arab mind and 
especially by those unfriendly to us, and i f B r i t i s h prestige i s not 
to suffer, I submit a change of manner i n dealing with these 
people i s essential. And the primary duty of a P o l i t i c a l Officer i n 
these serious times i s to break away from the f e t t e r s of the past 
and enter a wider and freer sphere of p o l i t i c a l thought l e s t B r i t i s h 
domination or control appear weak-kneed and sentimental. Added to 
th i s the general upset due to the war, the doubts and uncertainties, 
propaganda and dislocation of trade with i t s necessary hardship 
necessitates infusing energy and wideness of v i s i o n into our work i n 
order to lead minds unbalanced by recent events into same channels. 
(b) A closer touch with individuals, who have the least influence 
i n educating public opinion, with the closest possible study of t h e i r 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y and especially^ i f h o s t i l e s t h e i r reasons for h o s t i l i t y . 
The P o l i t i c a l Officer must be the doctor of his charge and know 
accurately the mediciee required for each of his patients. I t i s 
impossible for the senior p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s to have leisure to do 
th i s except i n the case of men of re a l importance, but so well should 
they be sured by their junior lieutenants that the exact tune and 
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mentality of any particular place can be clearl y and accurately 
sounded. I must be pardoned i f I appear to generalize, I am 
wr i t i n g a note on Bahrein and the mainland under i t , ( i n a ju n i o r 
sense) and I purposely w r i t e at length so that one's superior 
o f f i c e r s may themselves f e e l the atmosphere as I fe e l i t , and as 
I am about to ask f o r support, to give my f u l l e s t reasoning. I 
have started, therefore, a l i s t of every important and f a i r l y 
important personage i n the place. I intend to meet them frequently 
to study them i n d i v i d u a l l y . A short v i s i t of a few hours may 
easily change an enemy into a f r i e n d . I need not emphasise t h i s 
aspect of p o l i t i c a l dealing that gained an Empire a hundred years 
ago, but has greatly f a l l e n into disuse to our disadvantage, mainly 
through pressure of o f f i c e work. To the above end I have set 
apart four days i n each week for c a l l i n g purposes. The hours selected 
are from 5.30 p.m. to 7 p.m. between sunset prayer and the Arab's 
dinner hour. 
(c) Entertainment and open handedness i s an essential, and 
I intend to hold at homes to the gentry of the place, where rumours 
may be corrected, and minds enlarged by social intercourse. The 
P o l i t i c a l Officer must be the schoolmaster of public opinion and 
thought. Our opponents i n the past have robbed us of many things 
by these means, i n future we must deny t h i s to them. The King's 
birthday, New Year's day, etc., etc., must be celebrated i n good 
style and made an occasion of entertainment on a suitable scale. 
(d) The public. The small shopkeeper, the man earning a small 
l i v e l i h o o d , must be equally studied and considered, especially our 
own subjects and protected persons, he must f e e l his position not 
only i n law suits and public matters, but also i n his private l i f e , 
- 506 -
and small hurts and pleasures, so that his citizenship becomes 
something to him. I have, therefore, i n s t i t u t e d a weekly (Monday) 
Darbar or Majlis at which a l l , or any of the above, are free to 
come and w i l l be served with l i g h t refreshment to take away shyness 
and reserve. They w i l l be encouraged to speak t h e i r minds, and i f 
immediate action can be taken, i t w i l l be taken before them. Through 
t h i s channel I hope f i r s t l y to gain confidence and information, and 
secondly to set an example to the Ruler and his people. 
(e) Education. - The P o l i t i c a l Officer cannot hope to educate 
i n i t s l i t e r a l sense, yet education on sound lines i s essential i f the 
present ignorance i s to be r e c t i f i e d . I hope to carry through my 
predecessor's proposal to have a school f o r B r i t i s h subjects and 
protected persons. But i t must be under the supervision of the 
P o l i t i c a l Officer. 
( f ) Healh. - The p o l i t i c a l importance of t h i s subject cannot 
be overestimated, or i t s means for progress denied. Much prejudice 
w i l l have to be ridden down, the Ruler i n particular w i l l have to be 
gradually weaned to the idea that a clean t i d y c i t y i s i n every way 
preferable to a d i r t y one. This duty I have taken upon myself and 
hope to be able to report results before long. 
(g) Reward, for services rendered either to ourselves or to the 
community, should receive frequent recognition and I can not emphasize 
too strongly the enormous influence these have on the Arab mind. While 
not cheapening the higher decorations and d i s t i n c t i o n s , we may be a 
generous d i s t r i b u t i o n of the less impesing ones gain many friends and 
encourage honest endeavour. Often have I heard the Arab cry that he 
has served f a i t h f u l l y 10 or 20 years, but has received nothing, while 
his less deserving but i n t r i g u i n g brother has been rewarded i n some 
incomprehensible manner. 
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(h) Presents have t h e i r great value and are f u l l y 
appreciated by Arabs, and are a sine qua non among themselves. I 
do not deny that we'"have and do give presents, but a judicious 
increase i n t h i s respect w i l l help us greatly. Foreign firms wese 
very generous i n t h i s respect, with excellent results to themselves, 
and we as a Government should be no less generous. 
( i ) Letters of appreciation or thanks are treasured and 
have t h e i r weight, and occasional l e t t e r s from the Senior P o l i t i c a l 
Officer go a very long way to cementing a friendship. An instance 
of t h i s I saw only l a s t week when i n public Darbar Sheikh Abdul L a t i f 
a l Dosari of Budaiyeh pulled out a black edged l e t t e r w r i t t e n him 
by Sir Percy Cox, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., on the occasion of the l a t e 
King Edward's death. He paraded t h i s l e t t e r with a great show and 
obviously placed a very high value on i t . He insisted on reading 
i t over twice to his audience. 
( j ) Intelligence. - Even i n time of peace i s of the 
utmost importance both as a means of f o r e s t a l l i n g troubles and 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and guaging the trend of events. The information thus 
gained might be centralized i n Baghdad and would y i e l d important 
r e s u l t s . I propose i n future supplying the C i v i l Commissioner, 
Baghdad, and to the Deputy P o l i t i c a l Resident, Bushire, with a short 
weekly report that w i l l , I hope, give information that gradually 
may be of use, under the headings M i l i t a r y trade, l o c a l i t i e s , 
individuals, public opinion. 
For secret service work I require Rs 2,000 per annum. As my 
allotment here i s fixed and I have no funds to meet such a charge, I 
t r u s t C i v i l Commissioner, Baghdad, w i l l grant t h i s sum from funds at 
his disposal f o r 1920, 
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Summary of matters to be taken i n hand for improving 
general tone. 
(a) E l e c t r i c l i g h t Capital promised. Baghdad asked to 
supply but l a t e r f a i l e d . Enquiries 
being made India for estimates. 
(b) School ......................... Subscriptions promised. Teachers 
asked for from Baghdad, general 
arrangements well forward. 
(c) Water supply This w i l l have to await u n t i l India 
or Baghdad can supply pipes. I t i s 
most urgent measure. 
(d) Pearl Button Plant ............. Enquiries being made 
(e) Bank . . . . o . o . . o . . . . . . . . . Greatly desired by local merchants 
awaiting sanction by Government of 
India to allow export of s i l v e r . 
Eastern Bank w i l l i n g open branch. 
( f ) Darbar .........................Arranged weekly on Mondays. 
(g) V i s i t to gentry ................ Started - Car wanted. 
(h) Information .................... Funds being asked for from C i v i l 
Commissioner. 
( i ) Honours and Rewards ...........vFor consideration of C i v i l Commissioner. 
( j ) Letters of thanks ..............For consideration of C i v i l Commissioner. 
(k) Newspaper . . . . . . . A l l ready to st a r t on conclusion of 
peace. 
Note. - Reference (g). Shaikh Isa has imported a car and also Shaikh 
Abdullah, his son, roads are being improved i n consequence, 
and with a car at one's disposal one w i l l now be able to go 
over the whole island. 
A P P E N D I X I I I 
a) Speech made by the Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel S o G . Knox, 
C.S.I., C.I.E., P o l i t i c a l Resident i n the Persian Gulf, 
at the Majlis convened i n Bahrain on the 26th May 1923. 
Gentlemen: 
You have j u s t heard read to you the l e t t e r i n which Shaikh 
Hamad announces to you that he has, i n obedience to the orders of 
the B r i t i s h Government, taken over the administration of these 
islands as his father's f u l l y empowered Agent. Some of you present 
here to-day may remember what was the state of these Islands when 
f i f t y - f i v e years ago Shaikh 'Isa was summoned by His Majesty's 
Government to take his seat as Shaikh. These Islands were then 
exposed to the f u l l b last of internecine s t r i f e , rapine and disorder. 
His father, Shaikh A l i , had been k i l l e d i n the f i g h t i n g that had 
taken place a few months before. For f i f t y - f i v e years his ru l e 
has been blessed with peace and, on the whole, good orders. He 
has been a steady loyal f r i e n d of the B r i t i s h Government and the 
Islands have undoubtedly progressed i n wealth, population, commerce 
and agriculture. The Islands of Bahrain are ever watched by 
covetious eyes on both sides of the Persian Gulf and the f i f t y - f i v e 
years of Shaikh 'Isa's r u l e have been no mean achievement. I 
am sure I may speak confidently on behalf of t h i s assembly of 
Bahrain Notables when I say that we a l l thank him for what he has 
done for these Islands % he leaves no enemy or i l l - w i s h e r behind him 
and we a l l wish him s t i l l many happy years of well-earned retirement 
a f t e r the labour and fatigue of so many years of arduous r u l e . 
Recent deplorable events, on which I have no wish to dwell 
on t h i s occasion, have merely emphasized and accentuated an insistent 
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cry f o r reform of the administration on modern lines and there 
i s j a f t e r a l l , nothing surprising i n the fact that a man who 
has reached the ri p e age of seventy-five years, Shaikh 'Isa's 
easy tolerant r u l e - some may perhaps c a l l i t misrule : I 
personally prefer to c a l l i t lack of ru l e - has led to the 
growth of a number of petty tyrannies and independencies which 
were fast c r y s t a l l i s i n g i n t o vested interests and seriously 
weakening the Administration. Rights were being l o s t which i t 
would be hard to recover and the B r i t i s h Government, looking to 
the general good, have i n t h e i r wisdom decided that i t i s time 
that new blood was introduced and the Administration strengthened. Shaikh 
' Isa i s s t i l l t i t u l a r Shaikh of these Islands and Shaikh Hamad i s only 
his Agent, although the f u l l y empowered Agent for his father, and 
he has assumed a very d i f f i c u l t and thankless task. 
Gentlemen, you know Shaikh Hamad far better than I , a 
foreigner, can know him. You know he i s a modest, unassuming man, 
but I should l i k e to t e l l you that throughout the negotiations that 
have preceded hhis decision, Shaikh Hamad has v a l i a n t l y fought for 
his father's retention and i t was no greed for power that led 
him to assume the Administration. I t i s rather a regard for his 
father's good name, for the benefit of the Al-Khalifa and for the 
welfare of the Sunni community that had induced him, despite some 
diffiden c e , to take upon his shoulders the weight and burden of 
the Administration. He r e l i e s greatly on the promise of unstinted and 
loy a l assistance from his brother Shaikh Abdullah, and I am here, 
as the mouthpiece of my Government, to promise the help of that 
Government to Shaikh Hamad i n a l l paths of lawful endeavour both 
against external aggression and i n t e r n a l sedition. 
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I t i s quite possible that many of you present here to-day, 
especially Sunnis, may view with regret the disappearance of a 
Sunni r u l e r who has ruled over you for so many years. I t i s a 
very natural feeling and I venture to express the very earnest 
hope, almost the b e l i e f , that our proceedings to-day w i l l 
eventually tend to the u p l i f t and special progress of the Sunni 
Community. Ever since some twenty years ago Shaikh 'Isa i n 
his wisdom handed over the P o l i t i c a l Agent, Bahrain, the 
administration over and di r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for foreigners, 
there have been p r a c t i c a l l y two Governments working side by side 
i n Bahrain. One has been open and above-board and has resulted 
i n an enormous i n f l u x of foreigners to these Islands and I believe 
that I shall not be accused of exaggeration i f I say that the 
proportion of foreigners has during the l a s t twenty years progressed 
as 20 : 1 and t h e i r wealth as 100 s i . I r e a l l y believe I am 
understating facts. On the other hand, the other Government has 
beenj, so to speak, behind a purdah and the Sunmi community and i t s 
r u l e r have been apt to stand aloof and d i s t i n c t from other 
communities and, although there has no doubt been some progress, 
they have lagged behind the foreigner. I t i s my earnest hope, which 
I am confident i s f u l l y shared by Shaikhs Hamad and Abdullah and 
by the P o l i t i c a l Agent, that the measures of reform we i n i t i a t e 
to-day w i l l bring the Sunni community into l i n e with other 
communities. They w i l l p u l l t h e i r weight i n the boat and have, 
as i s t h e i r b i r t h r i g h t , a preponderating voice i n the administration 
of these Islands so fihat, i n spite of some natural regrets, we can 
look forward with some confidence to a bri g h t and happy future for 
the Sunni community. 
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I must now give my f i r s t warnings which i s to those who 
co l l e c t the main revenues of these Islands - the Customs revenues -
that a f t e r deduction of necessary working expenses, they must pay 
a l l such revenues to Shaikh Hamad and to Shaikh Hamad alone. 
No drafts except those signed by him on the Customs should be 
honoured. Infringements of t h i s r u l e w i l l e n t a i l dismissal and 
the personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the g u i l t y party. 
My second warning i s to the Qazis. We shall preserve the 
Shara Law and the Shara Courts to the f u l l e s t possible extent 
and we have no wish to f e t t e r l i t i g a n t s or those who seek 
a r b i t r a t i o n , from free recourse to Shara but any Qazi who permits 
the interference or advocacy of i n f l u e n t i a l persons or their 
submitting cases to Shara w i l l be dismissed from his appointment, 
be he Sunni or Shiah. The only persons who have the power to commit 
cases to Share are Shaikh Hamad and the P o l i t i c a l Agent, Bahrain, 
or t h e i r regularly appointed deputies. $azis are expected to 
be v i g i l a n t against these abuses and to defeat these attempts by 
suspending cases and reporting to Shaikh Hamad or the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent, Bahrain, as may seem most convenient or expedient i n the 
particular case. I repeat that the ;free intercourse o= l i t i g a n t s 
themselves d i r e c t to Shara i s a r i g h t which God f o r b i d ! I or 
anyone else should in t e r f e r e with. 
Attempts by unauthorized persons to usurp executive or j u d i c i a l 
authority w i l l be resented and punished, p a r t i c u l a r l y attempts 
by persons who constitute themselves leaders of any community 
as has been done i n the past. 
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Gentlemen of the A l - K h a l i f a s 
I am a f r a i d t h a t l o o k i n g t o the past i t i s my d u t y 
t o warn you t h a t you must not expect t h a t because you have 
taken t he t r o u b l e t o be born you have t h e r e f o r e a r i g h t 
t o l i v e on the r e s t of the community, whether by allowances 
from t h e revenues o f these I s l a n d s or by p r e y i n g on t h e 
poor and h e l p l e s s . "He who w i l l not work, n e i t h e r s h a l l he 
ea t " i s a good motto and you had b e t t e r a pply i t t o your 
own case. Those of you who l e n d your e n e r g i e s t o a s s i s t i n g 
Shaikh Hamad i n h i s t h a n k l e s s t a s k of r a i s i n g t h e Government 
of these I s l a n d s t o the plane of modern c i v i l i z a t i o n w i l l 
be l i b e r a l l y rewarded and g i v e n o p p o r t u n i t i e s of e x e r c i s i n g 
such t a l e n t s as God has g i v e n you. Those who s i t s t i l l 
and do n o t h i n g must be c o n t e n t w i t h a bare p i t t a n c e f o r 
s u b s i s t e n c e . Those who do m i s c h i e f w i l l be cut o f f 
a b s o l u t e l y and punished a c c o r d i n g l y . I n any case, i t i s 
Shaikh Hamad t o whom a l l c l a s s e s must now l o o k f o r reward 
and punishment and the B r i t i s h Government, here by my mouth, 
promises him fulU support i n a l l l a w f u l e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y . 
I endeavour t o t u r n your thoughts t o e d u c a t i o n and t h e means 
of e a r n i n g an honest l i v i n g f o r you are too numerous f o r a l l 
t o f i n d p l a c e s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and I f e a r , owing 
t o n e g l e c t , many are not competent. 
Gentlemen of the Sunni p e r s u a s i o n and e s p e c i a l l y 
the Dawasir t r i b e s m e n ; 
I t i s f o r you t o understand t h a t we mean to e s t a b l i s h 
th e r u l e of these I s l a n d s under a Shaikh of the A l - K h a l i f a 
and t h a t t h e Shaikh's r i g h t s a r e g o i n g t o be e n f o r c e d 
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e q u a l l y over a l l t o the best of Shaikh Hamad's a b i l i t y 
and i n such a t t e m p t s he w i l l have our f u l l s u p p o r t . 
You have f r e q u e n t l y met such t h r e a t s i n the past by a 
counter t h r e a t t o le a v e these I s l a n d s i n a body and go 
over to Bin Saud or o t h e r s . I f t h a t i s your i n t e n t i o n , 
i n God's name, go; but i f you r e s i g n as a p r o t e s t , do 
not be s u r p r i s e d i f your lands and houses are c o n f i s c a t e d 
t o t h e S t a t e and g i v e n t o o t h e r s , and I can assure you 
t h a t t h e r e w i l l be no l a c k of a p p l i c a n t s . These I s l a n d s 
are not date gardens i n d e s e r t A r a b i a where t h e p r o p r i e t o r s 
roam t h e d e s e r t t h e whole year round o n l y r e t u r n i n g t o 
eat the f r u i t of t h e i r gardens a t the ti m e of h a r v e s t . I 
do not mean i t t o be understood t h a t t he mere d e p a r t u r e 
of a p r o p r i e t o r on business to Bombay or p i l g r i m a g e t o 
the Haj or o t h e r l a w f u l occasions w i l l be the s i g n a l f o r 
the Shaikh to c o n f i s c a t e the p r o p e r t y l e f t b e h i n d , b u t I 
do mean t h a t those who behave c o n t u m a c i o u s l y may f i n d 
themselves d e a l t w i t h s t r i n g e n t l y . We have no use f o r 
absentee l a n d l o r d s or persons owning a double a l l e g i a n c e . 
I f e a r t h a t i n t h e East t h i s merely means p l a y i n g o f f 
one r u l e r a g a i n s t another and c o n s i s t e n t l y b e t r a y i n g b o t h . 
I f you r e s i d e i n the I s l a n d s of B a h r a i n , you must, w h i l e 
owning p r o p e r t y t h e r e , conform t o the r u l e of the c o u n t r y 
and pay t h e customary dues, nor can we t o l e r a t e an 
imperium i n i m p e r i o . 
Gentlemen of the Shiah p e r s u a s i o n and e s p e c i a l l y 
those i n d i g e n o u s t o these I s l a n d s ! 
- 515 -
I wi s h you p a r t i c u l a r l y t o weigh t he f o l l o w i n g 
remarks. Much of the a g i t a t i o n of r e c e n t years has 
been f i c t i t i o u s . I am f a r from s a y i n g t h a t you have 
had no cause f o r c o m p l a i n t but what I mean t o say i s t h a t 
I cannot s u b s c r i b e t o t h e o p i n i o n t h a t r e c e n t m i s r u l e i s 
e i t h e r more t y r a n n i c a l or more f l a g r a n t t h a n i t has 
o f t e n been i n the p a s t . The s t a t e of these I s l a n d s s t h e 
signs of a d d i t i o n a l w e a l t h t h a t meet the eye everywhere 
around g i v e t he l i e t o the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t m i s r u l e has 
been p e r s i s t e n t and i s i n c r e a s i n g . We have a d m i t t e d some 
abuses and announced our i n t e n t i o n of f i g h t i n g them. But 
I want you t o remember t h a t t h i s i s a Sunni c o u n t r y and 
surrounded on t h i s shore of the Gulf by p o w e r f u l Sunni 
communities who watch our proceedings w i t h v i g i l a n t 
i n t e r e s t and no small degree o f s u s p i c i o n . You must not 
expect e q u a l i t y a t a bound and Sunni p r i v i l e g e s cannot be 
swept away a t one, i f a t a l l . 
As Shaikh Hamad has t o l d you, we s h a l l endeavour to 
see t h a t you know t o what e x t e n t you are b e i n g t a x e d , t h a t 
taxes are l e v i e d e q u a l l y and not a r b i t r a r i l y , t h a t you 
remain i n q u i e t enjoyment of the f r u i t s of your l a b o u r and 
t h a t you are not exposed t o o u t r a g e of any k i n d as you have 
I f e a r , sometimes been i n t h e p a s t , and I l o o k t o you f o r 
l o y a l s u p p o r t of Shaikh Hamad who promises t o p r o t e c t you 
a g a i n s t o p p r e s s i o n and e x a c t i o n . You have found r e c e n t l y 
t h a t you have a v o i c e , and f o r e i g n a d v i s e r s have t a u g h t 
you how t o use i t . Be c a r e f u l t h a t you do n o t , by c l a m o u r i n g 
u n j u s t l y , d e s t r o y t he b e n e f i t s you may r e a s o n a b l y expect 
from t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n of the p r e s e n t regime. 
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To you, gentlemen, who, t o use a l e g a l t a g , 
are f o r e i g n e r s w i t h i n t h e meaning of the Ba h r a i n Order 
i n C o u n c i l , I have l i t t l e t o say. The j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
f o r e i g n e r s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be e x e r c i s e d i n the f u t u r e , 
as i t has been i n the p a s t , by the P o l i t i c a l Agent. I 
b e l i e v e i t has been t o your b e n e f i t and t h a t you are 
rea s o n a b l y c o n t e n t w i t h i t . One t h i n g no one w i l l deny, 
t h a t s i n c e Shaikh ' I s a , i n h i s wisdom, e n t r u s t e d f o r e i g n 
cases t o the P o l i t i c a l Agent, t h e number of f o r e i g n e r s , 
t h e i r w e a l t h , importance and wei g h t i n the community has 
in c r e a s e d i n a manner t h a t i s l i t t l e s h o r t of amazing. 
I t does not seem as i f people would f l o c k here t o the 
e x t e n t t h e y do, i f they were d i s s a t i s f i e d under t he 
c o n d i t i o n s under which t h e y l i v e . Shaikh Hamad, however, 
e x p r e s s l y a u t h o r i s e s me t o say t h a t he w i l l welcome 
comments and c r i t i c i s m and t h a t he w i l l l end a s y m p a t h e t i c 
ear t o a l l t h a t may tend t o i n c r e a s e t he w e a l t h , c o m f o r t 
and g e n e r a l w e l l - b e i n g of the town of Manameh i n which 
f o r e i g n e r s preponderate t o such an e x t e n t t h a t i t may 
almost be s a i d t o have been made by them. 
Gentlemen, I have kept you an unreasonable t i m e 
and y e t no speech i n Ba h r a i n would be complete w i t h o u t 
a word on the s u b j e c t t h a t must be uppermost i n the minds 
of those who l i v e i n B a h r a i n - the p e a r l t r a d e . I t i s 
the source of the w e a l t h of these I s l a n d s . I t f u r n i s h e s 
the reason why f o r e i g n e r s f l o c k here i n such numbers and 
b u i l d f i n e houses and on i t are founded t h e p r o s p e r i t y , 
c l e a n l i n e s s and w e l l - b e i n g of Manameh. And y e t , I know, 
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the P o l i t i c a l Agent knows, Shaikh Hamad knows, the Qa z i , 
Shaikh Jasim b i n Mehza, and you a l l know, and above a l l , 
the d i v e r s know t h a t i t i s the plague spot of these I s l a n d s 
We a l l know t h a t l a b o u r i s i n a p o s i t i o n l i t t l e s h o r t of 
l i f e l o n g s l a v e r y and t h a t t r i c k e r y , f r a u d and o p p r e s s i o n 
are rampant i n the Trade; and what are any of us d o i n g t o 
remove these e v i l s ? I t i s almost i m p o s s i b l e t o get 
r e s p e c t a b l e people to serve i n the S a l i f a C o u r t , Nakhodas 
s t e a d i l y r e f u s e t o produce t h e i r a ccounts; i f t h e y d i d , 
d i v e r s , who are dumb d r i v e n c a t t l e , would not understand 
them; and y e t , who cares or g i v e s r e a l t h o u g h t t o a l l 
t h i s s u f f e r i n g ? You can r e g i s t e r d i v e r s , you can even 
r e f o r m the S a l i f a C o u r t , you can i m p r i s o n Nakhodas, 
compel them t o f u r n i s h a c c o u n t s , and y e t , even i n t h a t 
way you w i l l not go f a r . You must b e g i n a t t h e bottom 
w i t h t h e l o w e s t c l a s s - the d i v e r s - encourage them by 
f i n d i n g them work i n t h e s l a c k season, i n h a b i t s of t h r i f t 
which w i l l render them independent of Salaf and i t s 
o p p r e s s i v e usury i n s t e a d of encouraging them, as the 
Nakhodas do, i n extravagance and dependence. I must leav e 
those among you who wish them w e l l t o f i n d out t h e way. 
Shaikh Hamad and t h e P o l i t i c a l Agent can do l i t t l e b u t 
p r a c t i c a l , c a u t i o u s p h i l a n t h r o p i s t s can do a g r e a t d e a l . 
(N.B. - The speech now passed i n t o A r a b i c . ) 
And now, Shaikh Hamad, I ask you t o bear w i t h me 
w h i l e I g i v e you some a d v i c e f o r the f u t u r e . I have 
a l r e a d y spoken t o you on t h e s u b j e c t and f o r one word I 
say t o you now I speak s i x t o my o t h e r h e a r e r s . 
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My f i r s t p i e c e of a d v i c e i s "Fear two s f i r s t God 
and t h e n f e a r " . I had almost r e v e r s e d t h e o r d e r , f o r 
A l l a h i s the m e r c i f u l , t h e compassionate, t h e m i l d and 
th e generous, w h i l e f e a r i s the hated enemy. 
My second p i e c e of a d v i c e i s , "Avoid two t h i n g s ; 
hate and l o v e " . They ar e the "wasamain" (camel-marks) 
of t h e weak man and however harmless a weak man may be 
as a merchant or a c o o l y , he i s u s e l e s s as a r u l e r . 
My t h i r d p i e c e of a d v i c e i s i n r e g a r d t o rewards 
and punishments, the two p r i n c i p a l f u n c t i o n s of a r u l e r . 
I n r e g a r d t o b o t h of t h e s e , f o l l o w the r u l e s of the B r i t i s h 
Man-of-War and l e t t w e n t y - f o u r hours elapse between the 
ac t and i t s recompense, whether t h a t recompense be good 
or e v i l . Examine y o u r s e l f i f your h e a r t i s c o l d and 
i f you f i n d i t not so, w a i t another f o u r and t w e n t y h o u r s . 
Then recompense. 
And now 0 Hamad I I w i l l t e l l you a s t o r y t h a t I 
heard here of what to o k p l a c e t h e o t h e r day when t h e r e 
was an assembly much l i k e the p r e s e n t one, t o c e l e b r a t e 
a School P r i z e g i v i n g . Most of the s c h o l a r s r e c e i v e d 
rewards but one, who p r o b a b l y d i d n o t deserve one, began 
to whimper and the headmaster, f e a r i n g t h a t he would s p o i l 
t h e tamasha, l e d him up t o you and e x p l a i n e d t h a t by some 
mi s t a k e t h i s boy had been f o r g o t t e n . Whereupon, 0 Hamad! 
you p u l l e d out a g o l d watch from your pocket and p r e s e n t e d 
i t t o t h i s whimpering l i t t l e boy and another member of the 
A l - K h a l i f a , not t o be outdone i n g e n e r o s i t y , gave him £5 
and I have no doubt t h a t the assembly went out s a y i n g what 
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n o b l e - h e a r t e d open-handed gentlemen you were. I t sounds 
l i k e a s t o r y from t he A r a b i a n N i g h t s or the spacious days 
of Haroun a l Rashid. 
Now I t e l l you 0 Hamad! t h a t your conduct on t h i s 
o c c a s i o n was a b s o l u t e l y r o t t e n . I t was bad f o r the boy 
h i m s e l f , i t was bad f o r the o t h e r boys and i f you go on 
on such p r i n c i p l e s , you w i l l n o t , 0 Hamad, l a s t s i x months. 
T h i r t y years have I worked w i t h Hakims g r e a t and s m a l l and 
ye t never have I known or met the Hakim who was not i n 
need of money f o r p u b l i c needs. The P o l i t i c a l Agent i s 
hard put t o i t f o r want of money, I am cramped f o r l a c k 
of f u n d s , P e r s i a and I r a q and France are on the verge of 
ba n k r u p t c y and Germany has f a l l e n over the p r e c i p i c e . The 
Government of I n d i a i s r e d u c i n g i t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t s and 
d i s m i s s i n g i t s s e r v a n t s and the Government of London i s 
do i n g l i k e w i s e and who are you, 0 Hamad, t h a t you should 
be b e t t e r than they? You have r i c h and ample revenues b u t 
I s h a l l be g r e a t l y s u r p r i s e d t o l e a r n t h a t t h e y amount 
to as much as Re. 1 per month per head of the p o p u l a t i o n 
of these I s l a n d s s and y e t , a l l these men, women and c h i l d r e n 
l o o k t o you, 0 Hamad, f o r t h e i r moral u p l i f t , s a n i t a t i o n 
and p r o g r e s s . And how much u p l i f t , s a n i t a t i o n and prog r e s s 
are you.going t o e f f e c t f o r Re. 1 per head per month and 
how much w i l l be l e f t over f o r g i v i n g g o l d watches, and 
f i v e - p o u n d notes t o l i t t l e whimpering boys f o r a term's work 
o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , f o r motor cars or motor boats f o r t h e 
members of the A l - K h a l i f a ? I n a l l p r i v a t e e x p e n d i t u r e , 0 Hamad, 
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you must be a miser and i t i s o n l y when you e n t e r t a i n 
p r o j e c t s t h a t w i l l b r i n g money out of money and p r o j e c t s 
f o r t he g e n e r a l advancement of your people t h a t you must 
spend money w i t h b o t h hands. 
I f you w i l l f o l l o w these f o u r p r e c e p t s and people 
curse you, as people w i l l curse a Hakim, go on your way 
w i t h o u t f l i n c h i n g . I f they p r a i s e you t o your f a c e , 
examine y o u r s e l f and ask i n your h e a r t "Where, 0 Hamad, 
hast thou e r r e d ? " And i n c o n c l u s i o n , my f r i e n d (and here 
I took him by the hand), b l e s s i n g s and p r o s p e r i t y on 
your r u l e . 
Note. - The speech was w e l l r e c e i v e d and Shaikh 
Hamad, though he might have r e s e n t e d some of t h i s p u b l i c 
p l a i n - s p e a k i n g , appeared g e n u i n e l y d e l i g h t e d w i t h i t . 
Even Yusuf b i n Ahmed Kanoo, our c a u s t i c c r i t i c , was 
moved t o enthusiasm and s a i d t h a t Hamad should have k i s s e d 
my hands and head f o r t h e A r a b i c a d v i c e . Read i n c o l d 
b l o o d and i n an E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n i t sounds s i l l y i n 
the extreme but one must r e c o l l e c t t h e p r i m i t i v e f o l k t o 
whom i t was addressed. 
b) T r a n s l a t i o n of Speech made by Shaikh Hamad b i n ' I s a 
A l - K h a l i f a a t t h e M a j l i s convened i n B a h r a i n on t h e 
26th May 19 23. 
Gentlemen, - I n obedience to the o r d e r s of the High 
Government, to-day I assume on my s h o u l d e r s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of t h e Government of t h i s c o u n t r y w i t h the o b j e c t of 
p r e s e r v i n g the honour of my dear f a t h e r and to serve the 
f a m i l y of A l - K h a l i f a and the p u b l i c . I w i l l do my utmost 
f o r t h e w e l f a r e of the s u b j e c t s of His E x c e l l e n c y my 
r e s p e c t e d f a t h e r and, as you a r e p e r f e c t l y aware, His 
E x c e l l e n c y my f a t h e r has always been s o l i c i t o u s t o p r e s e r v e 
S.G. KNOX. 
- 521 -
peace, order and p r o s p e r i t y i n h i s c o u n t r y and I s h a l l 
endeavour t o f o l l o w i n h i s f o o t s t e p s . Moreover, 
gentlemen, I know, as a l s o you a l l know, t h a t , of r e c e n t 
y e a r s , t h e r e has been a g r e a t p r o g r e s s i n c i v i l i z a t i o n and 
p r o s p e r i t y i n a l l towns i n t h i s w o r l d and why should our 
dear n a t i v e c o u n t r y not f o l l o w t h e i r example? I say 
t h a t my c h i e f duty i s c h e e r f u l l y t o a t t e m p t to promote 
the p r o s p e r i t y of my dear n a t i v e c o u n t r y , the spread 
of e d u c a t i o n and p u b l i c s a n i t a t i o n , to encourage commerce 
and a g r i c u l t u r e . I thank A l m i g h t y God f o r my good f o r t u n e 
i n t h a t my b r o t h e r , Shaikh A b d u l l a h , on whom I f u l l y r e l y , 
has promised me h i s a s s i s t a n c e i n C o u n c i l and t o co-operate 
i n s e t t l i n g Government a f f a i r s . From the l o v e I bear t o 
my dear c o u n t r y I d e s i r e t h a t a l l i n my town a t t e n d t o t h e i r 
own b u s i n e s s , t h a t the merchant busy h i m s e l f i n h i s 
m e r c a n t i l e a f f a i r s and o t h e r s f o l l o w each t h e work by 
which he earns h i s l i v e l i h o o d and the peasant concern 
h i n s e l f w i t h h i s c u l t i v a t i o n . 
I say c o n f i d e n t l y t h a t i f I f i n d persons i n t r i g u i n g 
a g a i n s t the n a t i o n s or i n d u l g i n g i n any mischievous a c t i o n s 
or d i s t u r b a n c e , I w i l l t a k e the necessary a c t i o n f o r h i s 
c h a s t i s e m e n t . Gentlemen, I i n f o r m you t h a t i n f u t u r e I 
w i l l n o t s u f f e r t h e i n t e r m e d i a t i o n of anyone on b e h a l f 
of any c u l p r i t t o p r e v e n t h i s b e i n g punished as he deserves, 
so i t i s u s e l e s s f o r anyone to t r o u b l e h i m s e l f i n such 
m a t t e r s . A l s o I s e i z e t h i s o c c a s i o n t o a c q u a i n t you t h a t 
I i n t e n d t o safeguard the income and r i g h t s of my Government. 
A f t e r the d e d u c t i o n a o f the s a l a r i e s of those who a s s i s t 
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Government and are e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e s a l a r y and a f t e r 
the d e d u c t i o n of o t h e r necessary e x p e n d i t u r e by Government 
s e r v a n t s on Government account, t h i s i s my f i r s t d u t y . 
The balance of the income and taxes w i l l be k e p t w i t h me 
and earmaked f o r the improvement, p r o m o t i o n and e x t e n s i o n 
of the commerce of my c o u n t r y and f o r such ends as may 
l e a d to the improvement of the c o n d i t i o n of my c o u n t r y and 
Government. I n these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I am r e s p o n s i b l e b e f o r e 
the p u b l i c not t o waste p u b l i c f u n d s . I s h a l l c a r e f u l l y 
c o n s i d e r and make the necessary arrangement r e g a r d i n g 
t a x a t i o n , so t h a t i t may f a l l e q u a l l y on a l l and t h a t the 
amount of the t a x should b openly known, so t h a t no 
o f f i c a l can r e c o v e r more than the f i x e d amount. 
T h i s what had t o be s a i d and i n c o n c l u s i o n I s i n c e r e l y 
thank t h e High Government f o r t h e i r v a l u a b l e a s s i s t a n c e 
t o us i n the past and I hope t h a t they w i l l a s s i s t us 
and our Government i n f u t u r e i n p u b l i c progress and the 
e x t e n s i o n of our s u b j e c t s ' t r a d e and t h a t f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s 
w i l l be m a i n t a i n e d between us. I a l s o thank the Hon'ble 
C o l o n e l Knox, C.S.I., C.I.E., the P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t i n 
the P e r s i a n G u l f , f o r the a s s i s t a n c e a f f o r d e d by him t o 
us and i n c o n c l u s i o n , gentlemen, accept by g r a t i t u d e and 
r e s p e c t . 
(Note. - O r i g i n a l not reproduced) 
A P P E N D I X IV 
L e t t e r from C o l o n e l S.G. Knox t o Shaikh, S i r , I s a B i n . 
A l i A ' l K h a l i f , K.C.I.E. 
From 
Co l o n e l S.G. Knox, C.S.I. C.I.E., 
The Resident a t t h e P e r s i a n G u l f . 
To 
His Highness, Shaikh, S i r , I s a , B i n . A l i A ' l K h a l i f , K . C . I . E 
Your l e t t e r i s r e c e i v e d and what you have mentioned 
t h e r e i n i s un d e r s t o o d . 
I do not remember i t app e a r i n g from t he papers t h a t 
are w i t h t h e B r i t i s h Government t<!> have c o n s u l t e d t h e people 
when the B r i t i s h Government made you King o f B a h r e i n . 
Besides times and a f f a i r s change on a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
So I do not see the l e a s t n e c e s s i t y f o r c o n s u l t i n g people 
as l o n g as t h e B r i t i s h Government, i n view of the p u b l i c 
good, c o n s i d e r s t h a t owing t o your o l d age you are i n c a p a b l e 
and u n f i t f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Government m a t t e r s . So 
i n accordance w i t h the d i r e c t i o n s of the B r i t i s h Government 
r e c e i v e d by me, I i n f o r m you t h a t now and h e n c e f o r t h you 
have no r i g h t t o meddle w i t h t h e a f f a i r s of the Bahrain 
Government which i s t r a n s f e r r e d t o your son Shaikh Hamad 
as your r e g e n t . I a l s o r e q u i r e you t o do the n e e d f u l so 
t h a t t h e ord e r of the B r i t i s h Government may take e f f e c t w i t h 
r e s p e c t t o the above. 
24th May 1923 ( 8 t h Shaval 1341. A.H.) 
(Sd.) S.G. Knox, 
C o l o n e l , S.G. Knox, 
The Head of t h e G u l f . 
A P P E N D I X V 
P e t i t i o n from Shaikh I s a to C olonel T r e v o r e , P o l i t i c a l 
R e s ident i n the G u l f . 
To , 
His E x c e l l e n c y C o l o n l e l T r e v o r e , 
The D i p l o m a t i c Agent, 
& 
The Consul General f o r the P e r s i a n G u l f a t B u s h i r e 
f o r the B r i t i s h Government. 
From 
Shaik I s a B i n A l i , the Chief of B a h r e i n and h i s Nobles, 
Scholars and the C h i e f s of the (Tribefe 
Your E x c e l l e n c y , 
I n your absence have o c c u r r e d g r e a t i n c i d e n t s and 
i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r s which d i s t u r b e d our t h o u g h t s and r u f f l e d 
our senses. Our t r e a t y w i t h the B r i t i s h Government was 
f o r j u s t i c e e q u i t y r e s p e c t f o r the Arab t r i b e s and a s s i s t a n c e . 
But w i t h much r e g r e t we have to s t a t e t h a t we have experienced 
from the p r e s e n t D i p l o m a t i c Agent (Major Daly) t r e a t m e n t 
i n t e r f e r e n c e and h i s tendency towards d i s t u r b a n c e s and 
encroachments which have c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e B r i t i s h P o l i c y 
and have t r a n s g r e s s e d i t precedents towards t h e Arab people. 
T h i s made us i n v i t e your a t t e n t i o n hoping your 
E x c e l l e n c y would r i g h t t he wrong a f t e r i n q u i r i n g i n t o what 
has taken p l a c e a t B a h r e i n of d i s t u r b a n c e s and m i s c h i e f 
though d u r i n g a c e n t u r y t h a t passed b e f o r e t h i s occurrence 
no m i s c h i e f was heard of and no b l o o d was shed a t B a h r e i n . 
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T h i s w i l l h e l p you to understand as t o who has been 
th e cause f o r a l l t h i s . And we are sure o f your 
g e n t l e m a n l i n e s s and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d n e s s . 
Your E x c e l l e n c y ; -
Since the a c c e s s i o n of s h a i k h I s a t o t h e t h r o n e 
of h i s c o u n t r y he has abided by the f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s 
between him and the B r i t i s h Government and the many 
years t h a t have passed would prove t h a t he has p r e f e r r e d 
t o be f r i e n d l y w i t h B r i t a i n t o any o t h e r f e e l i n g and 
f u l l y c o n f i d e n t t h a t on her p a r t she too would answer by 
t i g h t e n i n g t h e t i e s of s i n c e r i t y and c o n f i d e n c e t e n d i n g 
t o mutual good and w i t h an i n t e n t i o n o f a s s i s t i n g the Arab 
t r i b e s i n t h e i r p r o g r e s s . We f e l t g r a t e f u l t o her f o r 
her a b i d i n g by the u n d e r s t a n d i n g made between us b o t h . 
But s i n c e Major Daly i s a p p o i n t e d f o r us the a c t i v i t y 
has proved t o be e n t i r e l y r e t r o g r a d i n g and h i s a c t i o n s 
show t h a t he i s a l t o g e t h e r i g n o r a n t of the B r i t i s h P o l i c y 
towards t he Arabs. We bore p a t i e n t l y h i s going a s t r a y 
beyond the l a w f u l b a r r i e r s and p r e f e r r e d not t r o u b l i n g you 
w i t h t h e m a t t e r and hoped t h a t he h i m s e l f would see h i s 
way t o what i s r i g h t . But i t was i n v a i n f o r he c o n t i n u e d 
p e r s i s t e n t l y h i s p o l i c y i n j u r i o u s and caluminous f o r B r i t a i n , 
and l a s t l y f i v e months ago he and C o l . Knox who harbours 
o l d m a l i c e towards B a h r e i n and i t s Government i n a s p i r i t 
f a r f r om v e r a c i t y and u p r o o t s t h e p i l l a r s of our c o n f i d e n c e 
and t h a t of the people i n His Ma j e s t y ' s government i f we 
d i d not know t h a t she won't a l l o w them b o t h t o c o n t i n u e t h i s 
i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
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Thus we c o u l d no l o n g e r c o n n i v e a t t h i n g s and 
p a c i f y t h e s p i r i t of the t r i b e s and promised them t h a t 
we would i n f o r m you the d e t a i l s of what has passed which 
we s t a t e as f o l l o w s : -
The a c t i o n s p e r p e t r a t e d by Major Daly a r e ; - F o r m a t i o n 
of P o l i c e of s t r a n g e r s and handing over of the o f f i c e s of the 
M u n i c i p a l i t y t o an a l i e n i n an A r a b i a n c o u n t r y . We rose 
and p r o t e s t e d and sent p e t i t i o n s a f t e r p e t i t i o n s t o Shaikh 
I s a which p e t i t i o n s (Major D a l y ) he pre s e n t e d t o him and 
we r e c e i v e d no r e p l y t o our p r o t e s t . I n the month of 
Ramzan t h e r e o c c u r r e d a s m a l l q u a r r e l between an a l i e n 
and an N a j d i . The P o l i c e O f f i c e r and the M u n i c i p a l O f f i c e r 
were i n f l u e n c e d w i t h t h e i r communal p r e j u d i c e and ordered 
t h e a l i e n s t o f i r e . The d u t y of p o l i c e i s t o set a p a r t 
t h e q u a r r e l l i n g p a r t i e s and t o set up an i n q u i r y . But 
t h e communal p r e j u d i c e p r e v a i l e d and t h e p o l i c e i n s t e a d 
of doing t h e i r d u t y undertook t r a n s f o r m i n g a s m a l l q u a r r e l 
i n t o a bloody r e v o l t and t h i s proved what we had expected 
and had t o l d Shaikh I s a t o o . Three days a f t e r t h i s C o l . 
Knox a r r i v e d i n the B r i t i s h Man-of-war and we expected good 
from him and r e v e r s i o n from t h e i n j u r i o u s diplomacy. But 
he s i m p l y amazed us by h i s demanding from Shaikh a b d i c a t i o n 
of h i s t h r o n e . That was a s t r a n g e m a t t e r . I s t h i s t h e 
r e s u l t of t h e f r i e n d l i n e s s of B r i t a i n ? So we d i d not 
agree as w e l l as our Shaikh I s a won't. Then we assembled and 
r e s o l v e d but the C o l o n e l and the Major i g n o r e d our e x i s t e n c e 
a l t o g e t h e r and began t o t h r e a t e n us w i t h punishment and 
t h e man-of-war s t a r t e d t h r o w i n g on our c o u n t r y search l i g h t 
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a t n i g h t w a r n i n g us of danger should we not agree t o t h i s 
d i s g r a c e of o u r s , and w i t h i n two days got over Shaikh Hamad 
by f r i g h t e n i n g and t h r e a t e n i n g him t h a t he should a d m i n i s t e r 
the Government i n s t e a d of h i s f a t h e r and w r o t e t o Shaikh I s a 
h i s d e p o s i t i o n . Then the Major went t o t h e Customs House, 
took p o s s e s s i o n of i t s revenue and d e p o s i t e d them i n an 
a l i e n Bank and t h e n he encroached upon the N a t i v e Courts 
of Law, d i d away w i t h them and s t a r t e d o n l y one Court where 
should be s u b m i t t e d a l l c o m p l a i n t s and p e t i t i o n s i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of t h e i r b e i n g l o n g causes of c r i m i n a l or summary s u i t s and 
put h i m s e l f w i t h Shaikh Hamad i n t h i s Court t h e r e b y d i d away 
w i t h the N a t i v e Government. He d i d a l l t h i s w i t h o u t even 
t a k i n g us i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n as i f we were not from t h i s 
c o u n t r y . W i l l Great B r i t a i n approve of her agent t r e a d i n g 
upon the honour of p e a c e f u l t r i b e s which never stood but 
by the s i d e of the Great B r i t a i n i n a f r i e n d l y temper of 
mind p a r t i c u l a r l y a t a time when she i s t r y i n g t o b e g i n 
a s s i s t i n g Arab t r i b e s : -
Your E x c e l l e n c y : -
One of t h e happenings t h a t a g i t a t e d and h u r t the 
f e e l i n g s and which took p l a c e a t B a h r e i n i s the s e i z u r e 
of our c o m p a t r i o t Ahmed b i n A b d u l l a A l d o s a r i i n an annoying 
manner by sending the man-of-war t o c a p t u r e him a t t h e 
D i v i n g p l a c e . When he came t o know of the s h i p ' s advent 
he p r e s e n t e d h i m s e l f when a t once he was i m p r i s o n e d w i t h o u t 
any t r i a l and was f i n e d Rs.15,000 (Rupees f i f t e e n thousand) 
and was ordered t o w r i t e a d m i t t i n g h i s crime which he 
d e c l i n e d t o do and remained i n t h e g a o l a l o n g t i m e under 
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t h r e a t s t o h i m s e l f and t o h i s t r i b e i f he won't pay up 
t h e f i n e and a d m i t i n w r i t i n g h i s c r i m e , t h e man-of-war 
w o u l d bombard and d e s t r o y t h e i r v i l l a g e s . Then he 
p e t i t i o n e d s o l i c i t i n g t o know h i s c r i m e o r t o be t r i e d 
by a l e g a l t r i b u n a l a l l o w e d t o e v e r y a c c u s e d . He was g i v e n 
no r e p l y . A f t e r t h e y made o u t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n n o t t o 
a d m i t h i s c r i m e t h e y e x a c t e d t h e f i n e Rs.15,000 and s e t 
hi m a t l i b e r t y . No d o u b t t h i s i s a s o r t o f i n t e r f e r e n c e t h e 
l i k e o f w h i c h wont be f o u n d i n t h e modern h i s t o r y and n e v e r 
has been h e a r d a t h i n g l i k e t h a t i n o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
t h e B r i t i s h Government n o r i n t h e r e l a t i o n s o f any o t h e r 
p e o p l e t h a n o u r s e l v e s w i t h o t h e r D i p l o m a t i c A g e n t s . 
Your E x c e l l e n c y s -
We have s t a t e d a l l t h i s f e e l i n g f u l l y . We have f u l l 
c o n f i d e n c e i n you t h a t t h e r i g h t w i l l be g i v e n t o t h e 
r i g h t f u l and t h a t o u r c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e j u s t i c e and e q u i t y 
o f G r e a t B r i t a i n w i l l be r e n e w e d . S h o u l d we and o u r S h a i k h 
I s a be d i s a p p o i n t e d and what t h e a n t e B r i t i s h say o f t h e 
above m e n t i o n e d h a p p e n i n g s h a v i n g t a k e n p l a c e by t h e o r d e r 
o f t h e I m p e r i a l Government and u n d e r h e r k n o w l e d g e t h e n we 
i n t i m a t e t h a t we wont be a b l e t o s u p p r e s s t h e f e e l i n g s o f 
t h e t r i b e s some o f w h i c h have d e t e r m i n e d t o e m i g r a t e and 
a g i t a t i o n i s a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t i n some o f them. 
We sue f o r j u s t i c e and e q u i t y o r m e r c y . Have mercy 
on us i n o u r own c o u n t r y and l e a v e f o r us o u r h o n o u r i n o u r 
own h e a r t h and home. 1 6 t h R a b i u l A v a l 1342 A.H. 
We beg t o r e m a i n , 
Your E x c e l l e n c y ' s 
R e s p e c t f u l l y . 
Sd. SHAIK ISA BIN A L L 
R u l i n g C h i e f o f B a h r e i n . 
A P P E N D I X VI 
Memorandum w r i t t e n on t h e P o l i t i c a l C o n t r o l i n t h e P e r s i a n G u l f 
A r r a n g e m e n t s p r i o r t o 1921 
The f i r s t a s s o c i a t i o n o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s 
Government w i t h t h e P e r s i a n G u l f i s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
by t h e E a s t I n d i a Company, i n 1616, o f t h e F a c t o r y a t 
J a s h k ; and f r o m t h a t d a t e u n t i l a v e r y r e c e n t p e r i o d 
t h e l o c a l i n t e r e s t s o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government a r e 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h o s e o f , o r i n t h e hands o f , t h e 
Company and i t s a g e n t s . The d a t e f r o m w h i c h t h o s e 
a g e n t s can p r o p e r l y be spoken o f as e x e r c i s i n g p o l i t i c a l 
c o n t r o l i s d i f f i c u l t t o f i x p r e c i s e l y ; b u t i t i s n o t 
u n r e a s o n a b l e t o s e l e c t , i n an u n b r o k e n o c c u p a t i o n o f 
s t a t i o n s i n t h e G u l f f r o m 1616 o n w a r d s , t h e y e a r 1763, 
when B r i t i s h h e a d q u a r t e r s w e re moved f r o m Bunder Abbas 
t o B a s r a and t h e B u s h i r e R e s i d e n c y was e s t a b l i s h e d . 
D u r i n g t h e c e n t u r y and a h a l f b e t w e e n t h a t d a t e and 1 9 2 1 , 
p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n t h e P e r s i a n G u l f was e x e r c i s e d 
( w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r v a l s e n d i n g i n 1873 d u r i n g w h i c h 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e s t e d w i t h t h e Government o f Bombay) 
by t h e Government o f I n d i a on b e h a l f o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s 
Government; and f r o m 1824 onwards t h a t c o n t r o l was 
c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e hands o f an o f f i c e r i n I n d i a n 
Government s e r v i c e known as t h e P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t i n 
t h e P e r s i a n G u l f , who s i n c e 1878 h e l d i n a d d i t i o n H i s 
M a j e s t y ' s C o m m i s s i o n as C o n s u l - G e n e r a l f o r t h e p r o v i n c e s 
o f F a r s , K h u z i s t a n and L a r i s t a n , and t h e d i s t r i c t o f L i n g a h , 
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and f o r t h e c o a s t s and i s l a n d s o f t h e P e r s i a n G u l f 
b e i n g w i t h i n t h e d o m i n i o n s o f P e r s i a . T h i s o f f i c i a l qua P o l i t i c a 
R e s i d e n t was u n d e r t h e I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t , b u t qua C o n s u l -
G e n e r a l u n d e r t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e . The c o s t o f h i s 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t was d i v i d e d b e t w e e n t h e B r i t i s h and 
I n d i a n E x c h e q u e r s , and h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s were a t B u s h i r e . 
H i s j u d i c i a l powers and e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n 
as C o n s u l - G e n e r a l were and a r e e x e r c i s e d by v i r t u e o f 
t h e P e r s i a n C o a s t and I s l a n d s O r d e r i n C o u n c i l , f i r s t 
a p p r o v e d by Her M a j e s t y i n C o u n c i l i n 1889, and s i n c e 
t h a t d a t e s u b s t a n t i a l l y m o d i f i e d f r o m t i m e t o t i m e . 
2. S u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e R e s i d e n t i n h i s p o l i t i c a l 
c a p a c i t y , f o r w h i c h he was, p r i o r t o t h e War, s o l e l y 
r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e Government o f I n d i a , were t h e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e I n d i a n Government ( o f f i c e r s o f 
t h e I n d i a n P o l i t i c a l D e p a r t m e n t ) i n M u s c a t , * t h e T r u c i a l 
S t a t e s , B a h r e i n * * and K o w e i t , * * and t h r o u g h t h e s e 
o f f i c e r s he e x e r c i s e d an u n d e f i n e d b u t c o n s i d e r a b l e 
i n f l u e n c e upon t h e p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s o f t h e S t a t e s i n 
q u e s t i o n . On t h e C o n s u l a r s i d e , t h e R e s i d e n t , i n h i s 
c a p a c i t y as Consul-General„ had c o n t r o l o f c e r t a i n i n l a n d 
C o n s u l a t e s i n S o u t h P e r s i a . 
* ( A l s o h o l d i n g H.M. C o m m i s s i o n as C o n s u l t a n t M u s c a t , 
and e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n , s u b j e c t t o t h e P o l . Res., 
u n d e r t h e Muscat O r d e r i n C o u n c i l o f 1915.) 
** ( E x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n , s u b j e c t t o t h e P o l . Res., 
u n d e r t h e B a h r e i n and K o w e i t O r d e r s i n C o u n c i l ) . 
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A r r a n g e m e n t s s i n c e t h e R e p o r t o f t h e M a s t e r t o n - S m i t h 
C o m m i t t e e , 1 9 2 1 . 
3. The q u e s t i o n o f r e d i s t r i b u t i o n as b e t w e e n 
H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government and t h e Government o f I n d i a 
o f p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h e P e r s i a n G u l f a p p e a r s t o 
have been t e n t a t i v e l y u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e ; y e a r s 
b e f o r e t h e War, b u t , p a r t l y , no d o u b t , b ecause o f t h e 
d e s i r a b i l i t y o f r e a c h i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
w i t h T u r k e y on t h e l i m i t s o f B r i t i s h and T u r k i s h i n t e r e s t s 
i n t h e G u l f , no d e c i s i o n had been r e a c h e d i n 1914. The 
p r e - w a r s y s t e m , t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f w h i c h was t h e s u b j e c t 
o f c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c u s s i o n f r o m t i m e t o t i m e d u r i n g t h e 
War, c o n t i n u e d i n f o r c e u n t i l 1 9 2 1 . I n t h a t y e a r t h e 
M a s t e r t o n - S m i t h C o m m i t t e e , t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f w h i c h were 
a c c e p t e d g e n e r a l l y , s u b j e c t t o t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e 
Government o f I n d i a , by H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , 
recommended t h a t h e n c e f o r t h t h e c o n t r o l o f p o l i c y as 
a f f e c t i n g t h e A r a b i a n l i t t o r a l o f t h e P e r s i a n G u l f s h o u l d 
be t r a n s f e r r e d t o H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government and e x e r c i s e d 
t h r o u g h t h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e ; 
t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n s on t h a t l i t t o r a l o f t h e Government o f 
I n d i a s h o u l d be c o n f i n e d t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and l o c a l 
m a t t e r s , t h e p r i o r c o n c u r r e n c e o f t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e 
b e i n g o b t a i n e d by them t o any m easures o f p o l i t i c a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e , and t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s 
Government w i t h I b n Saud (as S u l t a n o f N e j d ) s h o u l d be 
c o n d u c t e d e x c l u s i v e l y by t h e new M i d d l e E a s t e r n D e p a r t m e n t . 
The c h a a n e l o f c o n t r o l i n a l l c a s e s was t o be t h e P o l i t i c a l 
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R e s i d e n t i n t h e P e r s i a n G u l f and H i s M a j e s t y ' s 
C o n s u l - G e n e r a 1 B u s h i r e s who was, as h i t h e r t o , t o 
be f o u n d f r o m t h e s e r v i c e o f t h e Government o f I n d i a . 
The p o s i t i o n o f t h e R e s i d e n t v i s - a - v i s t h e Government o f 
I n d a on t h e P e r s i a n l i t t o r a l o f t h e G u l f ( i n w h i c h a r e a 
he h a d , o f course,, a t a l l t i m e s w o r k e d i n v e r y c l o s e 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h H i s M a j e s t y ' s M i n i s t e r a t T e h r a n ) and i n 
M u s c a t , r e m a i n e d unaffecte4» 
4. W h i l e t h e f o r m a l c o n c u r r e n c e o f t h e Government 
o f I n d i a i n t h r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h e M a s t e r t o n - S m i t h * 
C o m m i t t e e has n o t been g i v e n o w i n g t o t h e n e c e s s i t y o f 
d i s p o s i n g o f t h e c o n n e c t e d q u e s t i o n o f Aden, t h e y have 
a g r e e d t o w o r k p r o v i s i o n a l l y on t h e l i n e s w h i c h t h e 
C o m m i t t e e recommended, and i t may be s a i d t h a t , b r o a d l y 
s p e a k i n g , t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s a p p r o v e d by t h e M a s t e r t o n - S m i t h 
C o m m i t t e e , so f a r as d i v i s i o n o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was c o n c e r n e d , 
have been i n o p e r a t i o n s i n c e 1 9 2 1 . Some d i s c u s s i o n t o o k 
p l a c e i n 1922-3 on t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s 
w i t h I b n Saud s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e t h r o u g h t h e P o l i t i c a l 
A g e n t , B a h r e i n , r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h t h e P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t 
a t B u s h i r e . The a r r a n g e m e n t f i n a l l y r e a c h e d b e t w e e n t h e 
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e and I n d i a O f f i c e was t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s 
f r o m H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government as r e g a r d s , and w i t h , I b n 
Saud and N e j d when s e n t t h r o u g h t h e P e r s i a n G u l f s h o u l d 
* P a r a . 3 o f C O . Desp. 13 t o P o l . Res., A p r i l 15, 1924, 
p.1836/24 . 
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pass t h r o u g h t h e P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t e x c e p t i n ca s e s 
of a w h o l l y e x c e p t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r and o f v e r y g r e a t 
u r g e n c y ; t h a t t h e same s h o u l d h o l d good i n t h e case 
o f K o w e i t ( t h e i n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and a f f a i r s o f 
w h i c h were t o r e m a i n a m a t t e r f o r t h e Government o f 
I n d i a ) ; t h a t i n t h e case o f B a h r e i n , t h e I n d i a O f f i c e 
s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o be t h e n o r m a l c h a n n e l f o r t h e 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s 
Government on m a t t e r s o f p o l i c y ; t h a t o r d e r s on a 
q u e s t i o n i n v o l v i n g b o t h r e l a t i o n s w i t h I b n Saud and 
l o c a l a c t i o n o r i n t e r e s t s i n B a h r e i n , s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d 
i n c o n s u l t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e I n d i a O f f i c e and C o l o n i a l O f f i c e 
and s h o u l d i s s u e ( p r o b a b l y ) t h r o u g h t h e I n d i a O f f i c e 
t o t h e R e s i d e n t , b u t t h a t i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f a w h o l l y 
e x c e p t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e m i g h t c o m m u n i c a t e 
d i r e c t w i t h t h e o f f i c e r s s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e R e s i d e n t 
who were i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h I b n Saud and t h e S h e i k h 
o f K o w e i t ; and on a m i n o r p o i n t , t h a t q u e s t i o n s a f f e c t i n g 
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e o i l r e s o u r c e s o f t h e Arab l i t t o r a l 
s h o u l d f o r c o n v e n i e n c e be d e a l t w i t h e x c l u s i v e l y by t h e 
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . The p o s i t i o n as r e g a r d s t h e T r u c i a l 
S h e i k h s and t h e I s l a n d s i n t h e G u l f u n d e r t h e s u z e r a i n t y o f 
t h o s e S h e i k h s has n o t been p r e c i s e l y d e f i n e d , b u t , b r o a d l y 
s p e a k i n g , i t w o u l d sees t o be s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n t h e case 
o f B a h r e i n , and i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e r e c e n t i n c i d e n t 
a t Tamb t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government were 
c o m m u n i c a t e d t o t h e P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t t h r o u g h t h e I n d i a 
O f f i c e and t h e Government o f I n d i a . 
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5. The g e n e r a l e f f e c t o f t h e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s 
i s t h a t t h e P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t i s d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e 
t o , and c o r r e s p o n d s d i r e c t l y w i t h , H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government 
(as r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e ) on q u e s t i o n s 
a f f e c t i n g I b n Saud, e x c e p t when he i s i n t h e H e j a z , and 
t h e p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t s o f t h e A r a b l i t t o r a l o f t h e G u l f : 
t h a t he i s d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e i n h i s c a p a c i t y as 
C o n s u l - G e n e r a l , B u s h i r e , t o t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e ; and a c t s 
as a l i a i s o n b e t w e e n t h e M i n i s t e r a t T e h r a n and a f f a i r s 
i n t h e G u l f w h i c h a r e o f i n t e r e s t t o H i s M a j e s t y ' s 
Government as a f f e c t i n g t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h P e r s i a ; 
t h a t he i s d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e Government o f I n d i a 
f o r t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f t h e v a r i o u s S t a t e s on t h e A r a b 
l i t t o r a l , f o r B a h r e i n , t h e T r u c i a l Sheikhdoms, and M u s c a t , 
and f o r k e e p i n g them i n t o u c h b o t h w i t h a f f a i r s g e n e r a l l y 
i n S o u t h P e r s i a and t h e G u l f , and w i t h d e v e l o p m e n t s v i s - a - v i s 
P e r s i a i n t h a t a r e a , w h i c h , f r o m t h e l a r g e I n d i a n i n t e r e s t s 
r e p r e s e n t e d i n i t and i t s s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e , i s o f t h e 
f i r s t i m p o r t a n c e f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e Government o f 
I n d i a . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o - o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n i n t i m e s 
o f s t r e s s i n t h e G u l f i n e v i t a b l y and n a t u r a l l y f a l l s on t h e 
P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t , who i s a l o n e s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e l y i n 
pe r m a n e n t t o u c h w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l , s t r a t e g i c and c o m m e r c i a l 
i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d a d e q u a t e l y t o d i s c h a r g e t h i s f u n c t i o n , 
and on whom a c c o r d i n g l y t h e i m m e d i a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y must 
f a l l , i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e A i r O f f i c e r Commanding, 
I r a q , t h e S e n i o r N a v a l O f f i c e r , P e r s i a n G u l f , o r t h e 
Government o f I n d i a as t h e case may b e , f o r a d e c i s i o n as t o 
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t h e p o i n t s a t w h i c h t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f n a v a l , m i l i t a r y 
o r a i r u n i t s s h o u l d be a s k e d f r o m t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n a v a l 
or a i r a u t h o r i t y , o r f r o m t h e Government o f I n d i a . 
P e r s i a and t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f a " P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t " 
(as d i s t i n c t f r o m C o n s u l - G e n e r a l ) a t B u s h i r e . 
6. A m i n o r b u t c o n n e c t e d q u e s t i o n may c o n v e n i e n t l y 
be d e a l t w i t h i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n . S i n c e 1878, as w i l l be 
seen f r o m p a r a 1 a b o v e , t h e B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t 
B u s h i r e has d i s c h a r g e d C o n s u l a r f u n c t i o n s , and has b o r n e , 
i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e t i t l e " P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t , " w h i c h d a t e s 
f r o m as e a r l y as 1824, t h e t i t l e " C o n s u l - G e n e r a l " . Qua 
P o l i t i c a l R e s i d e n t on t h e P e r s i a n l i t t o r a l o f t h e G u l f , 
h i s f u n c t i o n s a p p e a r now t o be a l m o s t n e g l i g i b l e , b u t he 
s t i l l p e r f o r m s i m p o r t a n t d u t i e s i n t h a t c a p a c i t y i n 
r e s p e c t o f t h e A r a b l i t t o r a l f r o m h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s a t 
B u s h i r e or S h i r a z . I n t h e l a s t f ew months P e r s i a has 
shown i n d i c a t i o n s o f a d i s p o s i t i o n t o r e c o g n i s e and 
r e f e r t o t h e B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e as C o n s u l - G e n e r a l 
o n l y , w h i l e t h e p r e s e n c e o f a f l a g s t a f f i n t h e g r o u n d s 
o f t h e R e s i d e n c y a t B u s h i r e a p p e a r s r e c e n t l y t o have 
r o u s e d t h e s u s p i c i o n s o f t h e P e r s i a n M i n i s t e r o f F i n a n c e . 
I t i s , p e r h a p s , i m p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e t i t l e o f t h e 
B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , o r t h e f a c t t h a t f u n c t i o n s i n 
r e s p e c t o f t h e A r a b s h o r e a r e d i s c h a r g e d by h i m f r o m a 
h e a d q u a r t e r s i n P e r s i a n t e r r i t o r y , w i l l be r a i s e d by 
P e r s i a i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e f o r t h c o m i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
b u t , i n v i e w o f h e r p r e s e n t a t t i t u d e , i t may be p l a c e d 
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on r e c o r d t h a t t h e t i t l e , and t h e a p p o i n t m e n t , o f 
R e s i d e n t were s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c o g n i s e d by P e r s i a 
t h i r t y - s e v e n y e a r s b e f o r e t h e c r e a t i o n o f a C o n s u l a t e -
G e n e r a l a t B u s h i r e i n A r t i c l e 2 o f t h e C o m m e r c i a l 
T r e a t y w i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n o f 1841 (" as f o r a 
s e r i e s o f y e a r s a R e s i d e n t o f t h e B r i t i s h Government 
has r e s i d e d a t B u s h i r e , t h e P e r s i a n Government g r a n t s 
p e r m i s s i o n t h a t t h e s a i d R e s i d e n t s h a l l r e s i d e t h e r e 
as h e r e t o f o r e , and i n l i k e manner two ( P e r s i a n ) C o m m e r c i a l 
A g e n t s s h a l l r e s i d e i n . .... London and ..... Bombay"), 
and t h a t t h e r e i s no r e c o r d o v e r the' p e r i o d s i n c e 1841 o f 
P e r s i a n o b j e c t i o n t o t h e e x i s t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t . 
INDIA OFFICE 
5 t h O c t o b e r , 1928. 
J o G o L * 
A P P E N D I X V I I 
The R e s o l u t i o n o f t h e B a h r a i n N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s 1923 
° o o J ^ U J L <ub U l i i l i a I J U - ^ 
c i j^ f lJJ^y lS (JLcj ^ ^ ^ U V l ^ J j l r u ^ L f r A ^ JJJ*3Q\ — 
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J S ' o * o o * - ^ JUKI 1^ 1 dSl iw j 4Ui 
A P P E N D I X V I I I 
Law r e g a r d i n g 'OtoMg&ship o f immovable p r o p e r t y i n 
B a h r e i n by f o r e i g n e r s 1937 
J^^o oJj&JB j^AJfl «s)}teJ J > U L o ^ . j ^ l o ^ 
to VB 
aJj^B j ^ L a ^ J B poS^B V a j U f l u ^ aJLvAS y ^ B J 8 
<Jr^ • oJ^asJB^JB «s)3LV B e l ! ? ^ ^ ^ 4^ 0ttS A ^ l k ^ J B 
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jLfiJ 
A P P E N D I X IX 
T e x t o f L e a f l e t d i s t r i b u t e d i n B a h r e i n d u r i n g 1938 
P o l i t i c a l U p h e a v a l 
< a ^ J { °IU^ ^ 1 fd^Dj^j} 1 g l l ^ ^ aJ11=-IU--J1 
° c ^ ^ J S j j l j u i w V i ^ J L ^ JL^ j ^^sJ l 
s 
£ t &J?Ajsi±> l & g j j l j jjX* p>jJ*X'jZ> ^ \j<u,j&\j ddXcysJS 
v ' ^ S S J c w ^ s - ^ p£=Jl J-Jtt^ L-=- U J I C L - < ^ L i l « . V t j5}=a 
d d U ^ J i 4=j iJUJ! 4L cUJi U i . 1 
- 542 -
l^JjSs V j&^iap I & L v^s J o5 l a t~*L£}\ U=.l 
^ S l t ^ t ^ l ^ J ! ^ % J _ ^ J » L i ^ 1 ^ $ J L J <us^^JI^ 
P=^ > JLAE? j l 4 c ^ » ^ « J ^ » ^ V^j.l <UJ1 t j o & U L « L i ^ S j j o = ° 0 ^ p»js£ <^ 
°(^L43I t ^ y L i J l S d l ^ j y U J I SwiJrj ^ L y j I^ AJU 
i T o Y U w Jlj-i T 6 <J> J > U ' 
A P P E N D I X X 
One o f t h e H.E.C. L e a f l e t s 
0 ° ) p ^ J , 
e j } U l <>S& (J> e^<&}\ L^-^ jV 1 ^ j & l ^ l o * / * * ^ ^ * 5 ^ % 
° ^ J S J ^ ^ J j J ^ f U ^ J i S-JuaisH d J , , ^ J ! 0 t 3UJ 
u^L^j L^=.aS^ ^ i i t s ^ p b w ^ ^ ^ i y J J &s&jk}\ o x& 
J * J > ^ > u J > U 1 ^ J j M b UUdt ^ J U s l t 4^-^Jto^-!-u^t 
!Ju§> S S J j ^ t S U J t j S ^ ^ c ^ s s y w ^ t ^Jt I JUJ t ^Ju&sJt S i j - s - J L ^&il^ t 
»iUr^CL . t^L*Jt ^ ^ L - j j J ^ b J t t - l ^ ^ t j ^ ^ ^ X a J t j J L ^ J t ^ o j^yJ 
° U . 2 u . j L J | S i > e L J l l > B
 6tji.S ^ J U i o j ! t j j ^^ l j ^ V l o ^ ' b JUVt 
\ o e tjfSXW^j \ ° ( j i t j J l t jLa 
1 . ^ 1 ^ . V I I Jus JjUj J ^ J - ^1201 u j j 0 ! f g ^ H c ^ A A J l J S J J 
La^ajf Layslkt 0=3 V t^lf Lj ° l i ^ V t 
d JU§) J}'AA^5 y^ Jt S^jL-salt S i pa i JJ g U ^ V t ^S* bZu£jj) UJ.^ i%w> ^ £ ^ ^ - s . i U 
• j t j j t 
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